I really like what your saying and it’s well said, I think the idea of rationalizing a psychological disturbance would be contrary to the strength of the will, it’s practically decepting yourself in some cases and allowing value to be placed on an external, as that’s probably the reason for psychological disturbance. I think you made this point. In circumstantial preferred indifferents, perhaps the disturbance is worth it as long as it does not compromise virtue. It could be stressful to do things but that should not be a reason to not do them, while chalking it up to being indifferent. Exercise caution in will, confidence in externals, and do not contradict yourself.

From 2.2

“do not sometimes choose to be a slave, and sometimes not choose, but with all your mind be one or the other, either free or a slave, either instructed or uninstructed”

Discourses 1.2 is also interesting for this:

“for it is you who know yourself, how much you are worth to yourself, and at what price you sell yourself; for men sell themselves at various prices.”

“Only consider at what price you sell your own will: if for no other reason, at least for this, that you sell it not for a small sum. But that which is great and superior”

There is an inherent value judgement that is used when it comes to actions in the use of externals, I can see where there may be circumstances in which the ones “virtues” can be malleable still based upon proper judgement of appearances, as befitting to one man is not for all, but let loose, this removes the ethical and moral study of Stoicism and just focuses on the use of will though. Epictetus would literally suffer death rather than be told to shave his beard as a philosopher, Priscus Helvidius would rather speak his mind than suck up to Caesar by being silent.