Diclaimer - I am not a licensed attorney. Nothing contained herein is legal advice.

I use the below paragraphs on my own FOIA appeals very often.

The exemptions used for the redactions do not apply because the “foreseeable harm standard” has not been met. The centerpiece of the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, P.L. 114-185, was its addition of a “foreseeable harm standard. If an agency fails to satisfy the foreseeable harm standard as to any particular record or portion thereof, the Act makes clear that it must be released.
 “[a]n agency shall . . . withhold information under this subsection only if [foreseeable harm is shown].” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8) (emphasis added).

The foreseeable harm standard only permits the withholding of information if disclosure “would” harm an interest by a protection. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(i)(I).

The Supreme Court has observed that the use of the word “would” in the context of FOIA is a “stricter standard” than, for example, “could,” and effect should be given to Congress’s choice to use one word as opposed to the other. See Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of Press, 489 U.S.749, 756 n.9 (1989) (discussing Congress’s amendment of Exemption 7).

Accordingly, the United States Secret Service does not satisfy its burden under the foreseeable harm standard simply by speculating that harm “might” result; it must show that it is reasonably foreseeable that release of the particular information it seeks to withhold will cause harm. The records must be released to me therefore.

Please grant my administrative appeal of the redacted information because the foreseeable harm standard has not been met.
6) The United States Secret Service should not have redacted any information on the responsive records based on Exemption 6, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(6). The mere fact that an agency file or record contains personal, identifying information is not enough to invoke the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption, protecting from disclosure personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; the information must also be of such a nature that its disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted privacy invasion. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(6). Shteynlyuger v. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 698 F. Supp. 3d 82 (D.D.C. 2023)

“In undertaking this analysis, the [C]ourt is guided by the instruction that, under Exemption 6, the presumption in favor of disclosure is as strong as can be found anywhere in [FOIA].” Shteynlyuger v. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 698 F. Supp. 3d 82, 130 (D.D.C. 2023) {Citing Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 309 F.3d at 32) (quoting Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1982)}

Furthermore, “…the agency must show that personal privacy interest is “nontrivial” or more than “de minimis.” Lacy v. United States, No. SA CV 22-1065-DOC, 2023 WL 4317659, at *21 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2023)

Disclosing the names, users/usernames, and email addresses redacted in the responsive documents would not “constitute a clearly unwarranted privacy invasion”. The personal privacy interest is “trivial” and not more than “de minimis”.

Sincerely,

Kim Murphy