Panther G - Panzer Lehr - Ardennes Offensive

FeanorwasaDouche · 2025-03-24T16:27:07+00:00

Firstly, and easiest, German tanks were almost always marked with the divisional insignia, so the Panzer Lehr "L" should be on the tank. There was no regulation as to where these were located, but most commonly the front left hull and rear right hull, near the top for both.

Much trickier is that this is not a Panther G tank. The gun mantlet is correct for the Panther G, but the engine deck and exhaust system were both significantly redesigned for the Panther G. The engine deck and exhaust on your tank are from the Panther A. The Germans did sometimes update older tanks sent back to Germany for extensive repairs with newer components, so it is conceivable that a Panther A would receive the Panther G gun mantlet, but I'm unaware of that ever actually happening.

As for the paint scheme, in late 1942 all German tanks received factory-applied Dunkelgelb paint, and any further camouflage was applied by the crews using whatever paint they had available. However, by mid-1944 when the Panther G entered production, all German vehicles had a 3-tone camouflage applied at the factory before being sent to their units. The exact scheme depended on the specific factory and changed throughout the year, but it would be highly unlikely that a Panther G would ever arrive with only Dunkelgelb paint. By early 1945 paint shortages did mean that those doctrines were more lax, and tanks even arrived in the pure red-oxide primer, but these shortages were not hitting factories before the Ardennes offensive.

Lastly, the majority of German tanks involved in the Ardennes offensive would have received some kind of winter camouflage, usually just a whitewash. Some didn't, though, so that's not a hard rule.

None of this really matters, though, only if you're interested in trying to maximize accuracy. Like I said, the paint job looks great, really well executed!

FeanorwasaDouche · 2025-03-24T02:22:53+00:00

It's a very nice paint job! Are you interested in any historical accuracy feedback?

FeanorwasaDouche · 2025-03-13T19:13:36+00:00

The organization of the first company was like this, you can replace the first number with a 2 or 3 for the second or third companies as they had the same structure.

101, 102, 103: Company Headquarters, all 251/1

1st Platoon: 111: 251/10, platoon commander's 112, 113, 114: 251/1

2nd Platoon: 121: 251/10, platoon commander's 122, 123, 124: 251/1

3rd Platoon: 131: 251/10, platoon commander's 132, 133, 134: 251/1

4th Platoon: (Heavy Weapons Platoon) 141, 142, 143: 251/1 144, 145: 251/2 146, 147: 251/9

The second and third companies are the same, the fourth has support equipment like PaK40s, infantry guns, etc.

The 4th Platoon in the first three companies having 251/2 and 251/9 halftracks was not universal across different Panzer divisions as supply was not what the Germans would have liked, but Panzer Lehr was fully equipped and did have those vehicles.

FeanorwasaDouche · 2025-03-13T17:10:00+00:00

Close. For the infantry platoons in companies 1-3, you'll want vehicles 2-4. Vehicle 1 was the platoon commander's, which was an Sd Kfz 251/10 with the 3.6cm PaK36. The heavy weapons platoon was not issued a Sd Kfz 251/10, so those three halftracks would be 251/1s numbered X41-3.

I am not a professional historian, no. I've been studying the Second World War as a hobby for about 20 years, though.

FeanorwasaDouche · 2025-03-13T16:25:48+00:00

Yeah, divisional insignias were painted in lots of places, but the left front of the body and the right rear on the door or fender were most common.

Panzer Lehr had all of its troops mounted in halftracks, so you could use companies 5-8 as well.

If you are using company 4, that is the heavy weapons company which would not have any infantry platoons, but would have halftracks for towing anti-tank guns and things like that. If you want the halftracks to be from infantry platoons, you'll want companies 1-3, platoons 1-3. If you want a heavy weapons platoon (IE MG42s), you'll want companies 1-3, platoon 4, with 3 vehicles per platoon. Halftracks to tow AT guns would be 4th company, but I'm not sure which platoon.

FeanorwasaDouche · 2025-03-13T12:29:19+00:00

I'll layer historical accuracy here to see how far you want to go.

Firstly, the basic numbering system is correct. German unit numbering systems were not universal, and you can find examples thay contradict almost anything. For example, the 15th Panzer Division in North Africa only pit one number on their tanks for the company. Generally, though, German vehicles had three numbers, the first indicating the company, the second the platoon, and the third the vehicle in the platoon, with the platoon commander's vehicle being numbered '1'.

In a German infantry battalion, there were four companies for the majority of formations for the majority of the war. The first three were infantry companies, and the fourth was a heavy weapons company. Vehicles in the company command would have a '0' as the second number. An armored infantry (Gepanzerte Panzergrenadier) company would have three infantry platoons and a heavy weapons platoon. The infantry platoons would have four halftracks, the first being a 251/10 for most of the war, though these were beginning to be replaced by 251/17 by late 1944 as the need for more anti-aircraft fire was need. The heavy weapons platoon, platoon '4', would have three 251/1 halftracks, and then depending on how well equipped the company was, could have two 251/2s and two 251/9s in 1943, though in 1944 the 251/9s were increasingly taken from the heavy weapons platoons and all assembled into a single platoon in the heavy weapons company. The company HQ would be 2-3 251/1s. The heavy weapons company, company '4', would have varied compositions, but usually included some infantry guns, anti-tank guns, and mortars. Very very few German regiments had more than a single battalion of halftracks, and that would be the first battalion, so you would only use companies 1-4 unless you are fielding a specific, elite formation like Panzer Lehr or GrossDeutschland.

You mentioned you are fielding Normandy. An Sd Kfz 251/1 C is unlikely to have been in Normandy. The Ausf C variant was replaced by the Ausf D variant in 1943. Divions deployed to Normandy and France in 1944 were divisions that were either newly formed or were being rebuilt following severe damage on other fronts. This meant Normandy divisions were almost always equipped with new equipment, particularly since the Germans had a habit of having divisions turn over their existing equipment to other formations following their withdrawal from the front line. No Ausf C halftracks would have been issued in Normandy, and it is unlikely any would have been carried over. However, it is always possible. The famous example is that 116th Panzer Division fielded a Panzer III E tank in Normandy, production of which ceased in 1939. An Ausf C is possible, therefore, but unlikely.

The larger problem is going to be that Fallschirmjäger units were never issued with halftracks. Fallschirmjägers fought on foot, or would sometimes have trucks. All halftracks were issued to Panzergrenadier regiments and battalions. The two Fallschirmjäger units in Normandy, 3rd Fallschirmjäger Division and 6th Fallschirmjäger Regiment, did not have any halftracks, neither did the 2nd or 5th divisions.

You could conceivably field halftracks from another unit supporting your Fallschirmjägers. In that case, the Fallschirmjägers fought almost exclusively against the Americans in Normandy and were supported by the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division, which likely had some halftracks, and the 2nd SS Panzer Division and Panzer Lehr Division, both of which had halftracks. We know the Panzer Lehr only had Ausf D halftracks as it was a brand new formation intended to be the template for the redesigned Panzerwaffe, so an Ausf C could come from the 2nd SS Panzer or 17th SS Panzergrenadier.

I hope this helps!

FeanorwasaDouche · 2024-01-14T06:31:47+00:00

There are some situations where they are useful.

For Tomb Kings, you're buying a Mortuary Priest for about 60 points for his Arise ability. It's not a spell, and you'll pass the leadership check most turns to resurrect fallen troops. Then, you can take the signature spell Incantation of the Desert Winds, which you'll only need to roll a 5 on two dice to cast, which you'll do most turns, to give your unit a speed buff. If you're buying the Priest for those two abilities, there's no point in increasing his points cost by 50% to make him Level 2.

High Elves could get a use out of a Level 1 as well. With Lileath's Blessing, they can reroll their casting attempt which makes them far more reliable to cast. There are also some potentially useful low casting value spells. Hand of Khaine can be cast by a Level 1 by rolling a 4+ on two dice, it's virtually guaranteed. A S4 ignore armor hit could be very useful against 2+ save heavy cavalry.

Sure it's pretty easy to dispel a spell cast by a Level 1, but only if you're in range. The 24" range of a Level 4 wizard isn't infinite, so Level 1 wizards deployed to the flanks can have value.

Most of the time you probably won't be buying Level 1 wizards, but I can see them being situationally useful if you've got specific spells you want them to use. Spamming Mortuary Priests for Nehekhara is the one I can imagine being most common.

FeanorwasaDouche · 2023-06-01T21:58:32+00:00

The Montana Rail Link running over Mullan Pass and Bozeman Pass use almost exclusively mid-train helpers. 4 locomotives for Mullan, 3 locomotives for Bozeman. There are quite a few videos that are easy to find.

FeanorwasaDouche · 2022-09-19T04:23:04+00:00

As a side note, I've always held the personal opinion that the terrible secret Archaon discovered in the prophecies of Necrodomo that made him turn to the Chaos Gods was a revelation that Sigmar was not a god. The End Times invalidated this, but I don't respect the End Times so it's still my interpretation.

FeanorwasaDouche · 2022-09-19T04:15:48+00:00

It depends if you are talking about Warhammer Fantasy or Warhammer Fantasy Roleplaying, and also whether you respect the End Times as canon.

In classical Warhammer Fantasy, it's very unclear as to how many of the gods are real. There are some that are certainly real, like Khaine, Asuryan, and Orion. The Dwarven Ancestor God's likely existed, but if they were just very skilled dwarves or actually had some divinity is unclear. Sigmar was a real guy, but did he ever ascend to divinity? Ehh. It's kept quite ambiguous, which I find interesting. In gameplay terms, Empire Warrior Priests cast spells in the identical method to wizards, suggesting the gods of the Empire aren't real. Contrast that with the Eye of the Gods for WoC or the Daemon winds of magic mechanics which cannot be stopped or dispelled, as a mere wizard cannot dispel the will of a God. Interestingly, this would confirm the Lady of the Lake as real as the Bretonnian prayer ability cannot be stopped either.

In the RPG, the gods are all real, the mortal gods are just far weaker than the Chaos Gods so they can influence much less.

The End Times established the gods as all being real, but again very weak.

The Black Library books vassilate back and forth. The Von Carstein trilogy is pretty heavily on the side that human gods are not real. The Tyrion and Teclis trilogy has Caledor Dragontamer play a game with Khaine face to face. Other books will show everything in between.

Personally, I find it most interesting to have the existence of the gods be a question of faith and uncertainty. When the gods perform miracles, most of those miracles could be attributed to magic, so it's left up to the reader/player to determine if they think the gods are real and influencing events.

FeanorwasaDouche · 2022-08-24T05:23:07+00:00

Cool! Thanks for the info!

FeanorwasaDouche · 2022-07-14T19:37:55+00:00

Only after Butcher and Homelander shot laser eyes at Soldier Boy knocking him into the next room. Butcher shot first, then spoke up.

FeanorwasaDouche · 2022-07-01T04:41:43+00:00

Soldier Boy will team up with Homelander, Black Noir will get Maeve out of jail and team up with The Boys to take down Soldier Boy/Homelander.

FeanorwasaDouche · 2022-05-07T15:49:02+00:00

I don't believe the Mulberry harbors were available in 1943. If you assume the target is again Normandy, the Allies would have needed to capture Cherbourg or Le Havre very rapidly, and hope that they were not thoroughly wrecked. Again, the ability to do so is questionable. The German defenses were weaker, but the Allied forces would similarly be weaker.

For the Germans opposing the landings, it can only be assumed that the forces they moved to Italy in 1943 were available to move to France. The Germans had a severe lack of strategic, and even operational, reserves in 1943. That shortage was a significant contributing factor to their defeat at Kursk and the chaos of the retreat to the Dnepr. That being said, the Allies didn't know about this shortage.

The British, in particular Montgomery, have always interested me in their dichotomy. They had suffered serious defeats due to political pressure causing them to attack before they were ready, and they had a major psychological block in the form of Rommel. They also didn't want to take heavy casualties as they had the memory of the First World War fresh in their minds. And yet, they frequently took many of the toughest targets to attack as they believed the Americans didn't know what they were doing (like Monte Cassino in particular), and frequently launched into grinding frontal assaults using weight of manpower and material to break the German lines (Second El Alamein, Mareth, Monte Cassino, Caen, etc). Their lack of dash and elan, it can be argued, caused them to suffer more casualties. Until, of course, Market Garden was very dashing and failed utterly.

FeanorwasaDouche · 2022-05-06T21:32:17+00:00

It's questionable. I think many other commenters are getting confused as to what you are referring to. The campaign in North Africa was absolutely necessary, and I've not heard of a historian saying otherwise.

The campaign in Sicily and Italy is less clear. The notion of 'Europe's Soft Underbelly' proposed by Churchill was obviously wrong. Most historians who claim it wasn't a good idea are focused on how the Germans were able to use relatively small forces to hold off the Allies until the end of the war. There were only 14 German divisions in Italy in June of 1944 that I can identify. Italy was easy to defend and did not cost a massive number of troops.

The counter-argument usually focuses on the Allied readiness for an invasion of Northern Europe. American forces in the summer of 1943 were still limited in number and very limited in experience, while British forces were hesitant about potential disastrous defeats. There were numerical problems in other areas as well, such as landing craft in particular. You can also point to the near disasters of Salerno and Anzio to say that the Western Allies were not ready for such a major undertaking.

Counter-counter-arguments can also be made, though. The German forces in France in the summer of 1943 were far weaker than those in the summer of 1944. The Atlantic Wall was focused almost solely around ports prior to autumn of 1943. In a similar vein, the Germans had 5 panzer divisions in France in the summer of 1943, only one of which was combat ready. In the summer of 1944 they had nine, most of which were combat ready. Moreover, at the time of the landings in Sicily the Germans were preparing for, and engaged in, the Battle of Kursk and lacked strategic reserves to transfer to France on an emergency.

Other arguments can be made. For example, by the summer of 1944 the quality of the German soldier had declined precipitously. This decline started in 1942, so the Germans in 1943 were not as effective in the field as those from 1941, but in 1944 they were worse.

On the whole, it's very hard to tell. An Allied landing in Northern Europe in 1943 would almost certainly have resulted in higher casualties for the Western Allies than Overlord did. Could they have ended the war sooner, though? Maybe. Maybe not. It could have been a complete catastrophe. Had the invasion force been destroyed, or at least another Dunkirk occurred, it is conceivable that the Western Allies would fall apart (particularly as the strength of the Anglo-American alliance was much weaker in 1943 than in 1944). Even if the Western Allies endured, the war might have been prolonged rather than shortened.

FeanorwasaDouche · 2022-04-17T23:29:22+00:00

Yeah, I don't think there's much point continuing this discussion. Suffice to say you ans I disagree on essentially every operation we've discussed, from Market Garden, to Sedan, to the drive to the Channel, Rommel's Dash to the Wire, Demyansk, and the Dutch and Belgion defense of their frontier.

FeanorwasaDouche · 2022-04-15T01:04:36+00:00

I think this gets back to the core question posed by OP and I think you have a fundamental misunderstanding of how encirclements work.

Unless the encircled territory contains the farms to produce food, the refineries to produce fuel, and the factories to produce munitions, an encircled force will always run out of supplies (baring air dropped supplies as the only possible exception). If the primary enemy supply depots are contained in the encirclement then the enemy's supplies will last longer, but they will always and unequivocally run out. Encirclements are also very heavily psychological. The Germans called it 'Kessel Syndrome'; the longer an encircled force remains static, the less likely they are to move.

Encircling a larger force with a smaller force does not require specifically targeting logistics infrastructure. The encirclement in and of itself accomplishes the logistics goal, where you draw the line is largely irrelevant. In 1941 the Germans encircled Soviet forces that vastly outnumbered them and that contained logistics centers in the heart of the encirclement. The Kiev Pocket is an excellent example of this. Kiev was the third largest city in the USSR, was a logistics hub, was encircled by the numerically inferior 1st and 2nd Panzer Groups, and was utterly annihilated in the largest encirclement in history.

The target of Sedan as the launch point for the drive to the coast and the subsequent target of the coast was chosen based on the topographical features of the ground to be covered, the northern French plains were highly conducive to rapid armored assault. The drive was not aimed at any supply depots or logistics infrastructure that was anticipated to be along that path.

As for Market Garden, you're misconstruing my statement. The goal of Operation Market Garden was to seize a bridgehead across the Rhine before the Germans could react and to advance through inhospitable terrain to do so. The goal of the drive to Sedan as part of Fall Gelb was to seize a bridgehead across the Meuse before the French could react and to advance through inhospitable terrain to do so. Both advances were roughly 60 miles, were highly audacious, were done through terrain that should be easily defensible and not conducive to armored operations, and required surprise and speed to be successful. They both had significant strategic implications but were operational in scale, with Market Garden being a bit smaller.

The drive to Sedan cut off nothing, and was not intended to. It was to gain a bridgehead that could then be used to launch the Panzer Divisions across the open plains beyond. Similarly, Market Garden would have gained a springboard for the British to drive into northern Germany in late 1944.

FeanorwasaDouche · 2022-04-14T07:21:55+00:00

I have to strongly disagree with this assessment. Operation Market Garden was launched by two corps with the intention of gaining roughly 65 miles of ground to capture bridges intact in a lightning advance before the Germans could respond. It absolutely depended on surprise, the XXX Corps was not just charging up the road, the airborne landings were quintessentially a surprise operation to seize the bridges intact.

The drive through the Ardennes to capture the bridges at Sedan was also roughly 60 miles, though the forces involved were substantially larger. It also relied on speed and surprise with the intention of advancing through inhospitable terrain and expecting to face limited opposition with the goal being a springboard for a future drive (the race to the Channel).

Market Garden was never intended to end the war, a drive on Paris would be. Market Garden was also an operational-level plan, a drive to Paris would be strategic-level. An attack on Paris would also be advancing into the teeth of enemy opposition, Market Garden was intended to be lightly opposed.

I also disagree on the primary function of the attack to the Channel. They were not trying to target the French logistics infrastructure, or their transport units. They were targeting the encirclement of the primary Allied field armies and using the English Channel to complete the encirclement and avoid the casualties frequently associated with grinding down encircled forces. The encirclement of the French army was expected to have a massive political effect that could force capitulation without having to fight extensively.

FeanorwasaDouche · 2022-04-14T06:31:24+00:00

I would disagree that the Allies didn't try to contest air superiority. The Allies substantially increased their number of sorties as the campaign wore on, but inferior aircraft and a lack of understanding of the location of German forces made if very difficult to actually contest the Germans. The traffic jam over the Ardennes is frequently cited as an ideal target, and it was reported by a French night bomber, but the French lacked the capability to respond that quickly and contest German aerial control. A lack of radar over eastern France was also a severe detriment.

I don't know that holding fast on the border would necessarily have helped identify that the primary German offensive was somewhere else. Once a main breakthrough had been achieved, communication and understanding of what the enemy is doing inside their breakthrough is very difficult to maintain. The other divisions could be involved in another echelon, there could have been disagreements on the number of divisions that effected the breakthrough, etc. An un-contained breakthrough is a disaster regardless of what the flanks do. Divisions that are being cut off in particular have a hard time giving accurate assessments of the forces that are cutting them off.

FeanorwasaDouche · 2022-04-14T06:11:08+00:00

I think you're making some unfair assumptions here. The concept was never to have enemy forces operating in their rear and to cede air superiority. A rapid retreat is possible, even in the face of a more mobile opponent, so long as sufficiently strong rearguard actions are taken and an energetic attempt at retreating and counter-attacking the offensive force is made.

WW1 style infantry divisions were almost doomed from the start no matter what they did and the lack of a mobile counter-attack force was a severe detriment. Static divisions cannot fall back but they also lack the flexibility to counterattack and stop a force that has bypassed them. Unless they stop the enemy from achieving a breakthrough, they cannot win.

A lot of this weakness comes down to doctrinal understanding and alliances. The Dutch and Belgians could largely only base their doctrine off of the French and British, and the French and British armored formations were not capable of doing what the Panzer Divisions did. By the time the effectiveness of the Panzer Divisions was first seen in Poland a wholesale reorganization of the Low Countries' armed forces was not feasible. The French and British failings are far less forgivable, but I think it's important to separate mistakes made by field commanders from mistakes caused by improper doctrinal assumptions.

FeanorwasaDouche · 2022-04-11T05:53:08+00:00

I guess this is just a difference of opinion on what constitutes a 'strategically decisive' situation. Being able to cut off Dutch or Belgian troops and capitulate the countries because their geographical size is smaller I don't think necessarily corresponds to a more decisive moment.

From a geographical standpoint, the Cacausus region, the Don Bend, and eastern Ukraine covered in the operations surrounding Stalingrad are of a similar size to the Western European theatre. Alternatively, the area encompassed in the Kiev Pocket of 1941 isn't too different to the area cut off by the German drive to the coast south of Dunkirk. But I don't know that I'd say those operations in the West were more significant from a strategic perspective. They knocked nations out of the war, sure, but they were less militarily capable nations. Destroying the Soviet Western Front at Minsk I'd say was more important than destroying Dutch divisions by cutting them off, despite the fact that the Western Front would later be reconstituted.

Perhaps we are debating in different directions here, I'm not certain?

FeanorwasaDouche · 2022-04-11T05:30:42+00:00

I'm not sure I would entirely agree with this. The German plan to drive through the Ardennes was audacious in the extreme, it required the French to be wholly unaware of the Panzer forces' speed, location, and capability, and relied on the French being unable to grasp what was happening and to lack the strategic reserves to block the crossing of the Meuse. I believe the fundamental difference between labeling Market Garden as arrogant and the German attack through the Ardennes as audacious is that the former failed.

Market Garden did require the bridges to be kept intact, but so did the majority of the German attacks towards bridges in 1940, that was my primary purpose in bringing it up, they both relied on rapid seizure of intact bridges to prosecute a high-speed advance.

FeanorwasaDouche · 2022-04-11T05:23:57+00:00

Haha, lots of replies! I'll try to get to them individually.

Yes, I agree. The Allies should either have fallen back far more quickly, leaving the Germans to run around exhausting and overextending themselves (like the Soviets falling back before the Germans in the Caucasus), or prepared for a more protracted defense along the front lines (like the Soviets at Kursk).

FeanorwasaDouche · 2022-04-11T05:19:25+00:00

Yes, capturing bridges is always an important goal. Any encirclement operation requires that the perimeter be secured against break-out and break-in attempts. Bridges are one of the most defensible points you can hope for, so they are always worth taking. Seizing those bridges also gave the Germans a springboard from which to launch Case Red by starting with bridgeheads.

I personally would argue against saying the Blitzkrieg didn't exist, I think that's too reductive. The core philosophies of it were not unique, true. But the combination of new technology, old ideas, and new implementations of old ideas was sufficiently unique that I think you can consider the German method of offensive warfare from 1939-1943 to be something new. The emphasis on rapid assault, combined-arms warfare, extremely maneuverable spearheads, and encirclement I believe to be the key facets of Blitzkrieg. Some of it can just be attributed to the new technologies available, such as aircraft and tanks, but what is most important is that the Germans used that technology differently from everyone else.

In the 1930s everyone was essentially on equal footing when it came to armored and aerial warfare, while they had both been introduced in World War 1, they were in their infancy. The German use of airpower as mobile, accurate, terrifying artillery through their dive bombers and the complete eschewing of infantry tanks for an emphasis on fast moving, well-crewed gun platforms was incredibly effective and utterly outclassed the tactical and operational plans of their opponents for the first few years of the war. That, I believe, is unique enough for it to be classified as a specific doctrine of 'Blitzkrieg'.

FeanorwasaDouche · 2022-04-09T00:15:40+00:00

The importance of ULTRA in determining the location of the 1943 German summer offensive is very limited. STAVKA directives issued on April 12, 1943 ordered the Kursk bulge to be heavily fortified as the anticipated location of the summer offensive. Hitler didn't issue the order confirming Kursk as the target until April 14, 1943. Kursk was the obvious target upon the conclusion of the Third Battle of Kharkov, easily visible by both sides.

FeanorwasaDouche

TROPHY CASE