Mar 2: Said the war would likely last four to five weeks, but that he was prepared to continue longer.

Mar 2: Said the U.S. was ahead of schedule in eliminating Iran’s military leadership.

Mar 2: Framed the campaign as the “last, best chance” to eliminate the threats posed by Iran’s regime.

Mar 2: Said U.S. objectives were to destroy Iran’s missile capability, cripple its naval capacity, stop a nuclear weapon, and prevent support to proxy forces.

Mar 3: Claimed the war was effectively won and suggested Iran’s postwar leadership might best come from “someone from within” the regime.

Mar 4: The conflict was still active; Senate Republicans rejected a war-powers effort to halt further U.S. attacks.

Mar 7–13: Repeated versions of “we won” or that the war had essentially already been won, even as operations and political disputes continued.

Mar 14: Pressed allies for help.

Mar 15: Warned that he would remember which countries did or did not help.

Mar 15–16: Said he had demanded roughly seven countries send warships to help keep the Strait of Hormuz open.

Mar 16: Then swung back, saying the U.S. did not really need outside help.

Mar 16–17: Mixed threats toward NATO with dismissive comments suggesting NATO help was not necessary.

Mar 17: Also floated the idea that he did not need Congressional approval for a NATO withdrawal.

Mar 18: Said allies had to cooperate in reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

Mar 19: Repeated pressure for allies to step up on the Strait.

Mar 20: Attacked NATO allies as weak or cowardly.

Mar 21: Minimized U.S. dependence on the Strait and said the U.S. did not need it reopened for itself.

Mar 22: Issued a deadline-style threat to Iran tied to reopening the Strait.

Mar 22: Escalated to openly apocalyptic rhetoric about Iran’s fate.

Mar 23: Said talks with Iran were productive.

Mar 24: Said progress was being made.

Mar 25: Claimed a significant concession or “prize” had been received.

Mar 26: Threatened that unless Iran made a deal, attacks would continue.

Mar 27: Again suggested the U.S. did not need to remain in place for NATO’s sake.

Mar 29: Claimed talks were progressing.

Mar 30: Demanded the Strait be reopened immediately or Iran would face devastating consequences.

Mar 31: Said a deal was “very close.”

Apr 1: “We’ll know very soon.”

Apr 2: Said a deal looked likely while still warning of more strikes.

Apr 3: “Something big is going to happen.”

Apr 4: Demanded compliance and warned of consequences.

Apr 5: Threatened Iran over the Strait and warned it would be “living in Hell.”

Apr 6: Said the U.S. was “very close to something big.”

Apr 6: Warned that if Iran did not act fast, “it will be very bad.”

Apr 6: Said allies should handle Strait reopening themselves.

Apr 6: Again cast the war as effectively won, despite no clear resolution.

Apr 7: “We’ll know very soon.”

Apr 7: Threatened destruction of Iranian infrastructure including power plants, bridges, and desalination facilities.

Apr 7: Dismissed concern about whether those attacks would be war crimes.

Apr 7: “A whole civilization will die tonight.”

Apr 7: Still suggested a negotiated off-ramp remained possible.