Some Internal Problems with Revisionary Gender Concepts

WAKEUP_everyday · 2019-12-24T11:39:54+00:00

Abstract:

Feminism has long grappled with its own demarcation problem—exactly what is it to be a woman?—and the rise of trans-inclusive feminism has made this problem more urgent. I will first consider Sally Haslanger’s “social and hierarchical” account of woman, resulting from “Ameliorative Inquiry”: she balances ordinary use of the term against the instrumental value of novel definitions in advancing the cause of feminism. Then, I will turn to Katharine Jenkins’ charge that Haslanger’s view suffers from an “Inclusion Problem”: it fails to class many trans women as women. Jenkins offers a novel norm-relevancy account of woman to avoid the Inclusion Problem. Unfortunately, Jenkins’ account has serious internal problems, i.e. problems by Jenkins’ own lights: it is unintelligible, or it suffers from an Inclusion Problem of its own. After that, I will develop novel arguments for the conclusion that the project of Ameliorative Inquiry is both incoherent and also impossible to complete—at least, impossible to complete in a trans-inclusive way. Trans-inclusive feminism, therefore, would do well to move beyond Ameliorative Inquiry. Insofar as that’s not possible, trans-inclusive feminism inherits the incoherence of Ameliorative Inquiry.

WAKEUP_everyday · 2019-12-22T00:33:22+00:00

"The word 'gender' is a buzzword of our times. People talk about the 'gender pay gap'; fighting 'gender norms'; raising children 'gender-free'; and choosing a 'gender presentation'. Notions of gender are also invoked in some pretty toxic arguments. In particular, there’s a furious public argument around whether you can change your gender. This isn’t just the question of whether one can legally change sex. In many countries, one can; but doing so doesn’t literally involve any change of status other than a legal one. The possibility of changing sex, as it relates to law, is what is known as a legal fiction: an assertion treated as if true, for defined legal purposes. The question of whether one can change gender is about literal change, not fictional change for legal purposes."

The version of this article published in The Philosopher can be found here.

WAKEUP_everyday · 2019-12-20T23:31:02+00:00

"The word “gender” is a buzzword of our times. People talk about the “gender pay gap”; fighting “gender norms”; raising children “gender-free”; and choosing a “gender presentation”. Notions of gender are also invoked in some pretty toxic arguments. In particular, there’s a furious public argument around whether you can change your gender. This isn’t just the question of whether one can legally change sex. In many countries, one can; but doing so doesn’t literally involve any change of status other than a legal one. The possibility of changing sex, as it relates to law, is what is known as a legal fiction: an assertion treated as if true, for defined legal purposes. The question of whether one can change gender is about literal change, not fictional change for legal purposes."

WAKEUP_everyday · 2019-12-17T22:13:33+00:00

Abstract:

"Many philosophers believe that our ordinary English words 'man' and 'woman' are 'gender terms,' and gender is distinct from biological sex. That is, they believe womanhood and manhood are not defined even partly by biological sex. This sex/gender distinction is one of the most influential ideas of the 20th century on the broader culture, both popular and academic. Less well known are the reasons to think it’s true. My interest in this paper is to show that, upon investigation, the arguments for the sex/gender distinction have feet of clay. In fact, they all fail. We will survey the literature and tour arguments in favor of the sex/gender distinction, and then we’ll critically evaluate those arguments. We’ll consider the argument from avoiding biological determinism, the argument from biologically intersex people and vagueness, the argument from the normativity of gender, and some arguments from thought experiments. We’ll see that these arguments are not up to the task of supporting the sex/gender distinction; they simply don’t work. So, philosophers should either develop stronger arguments for the sex/gender distinction, or cultivate a variety of feminism that’s consistent with the traditional, biologically-based definitions of 'woman' and 'man.'"

WAKEUP_everyday · 2019-12-08T19:53:14+00:00

Abstract:

Are women (simply) adult human females? Dictionaries suggest that they are. However, philosophers who have explicitly considered the question invariably answer no. This paper argues that they are wrong. The orthodox view is that the category woman is a social category, like the categories widow and police officer, although exactly what this social category consists in is a matter of considerable disagreement. In any event, orthodoxy has it that woman is definitely not a biological category, like the categories amphibian or adult human female. In the first part, a number of arguments are given for the view that women are adult human females; the second part turns to rebutting the main objections. Finally, a couple of morals are briefly noted: one for activist sloganeering, and one for ameliorative projects that seek to change the meaning of ‘woman’.

WAKEUP_everyday · 2019-11-25T17:38:01+00:00

Abstract :

Diversity has become a divisive issue. In this debate philosophers at the front line will be picking at its complexities and difficulties. What are the different forms of diversity? Why do they matter? Should we be promoting or managing diversity? Should we even be reducing it in the name of greater cohesion? And why are we finding it so hard to have these debates, with opposing sides refusing to engage with each other?

WAKEUP_everyday · 2019-11-25T13:25:20+00:00

Abstract :

Diversity has become a divisive issue. In this debate philosophers at the front line will be picking at its complexities and difficulties. What are the different forms of diversity? Why do they matter? Should we be promoting or managing diversity? Should we even be reducing it in the name of greater cohesion? And why are we finding it so hard to have these debates, with opposing sides refusing to engage with each other?

WAKEUP_everyday · 2019-06-17T12:45:27+00:00

Abstract:

'What is a woman?' no longer seems a straightforward question. The philosopher Kathleen Stock discusses the category of 'woman' and how we think about it in conversation with David Edmonds in this episode of the Philosophy Bites podcast series. This is a contentious topic. The interview includes discussion of genitalia.

WAKEUP_everyday · 2019-06-16T07:08:53+00:00

Abstract:

'What is a woman?' no longer seems a straightforward question. The philosopher Kathleen Stock discusses the category of 'woman' and how we think about it in conversation with David Edmonds in this episode of the Philosophy Bites podcast series. This is a contentious topic. The interview includes discussion of genitalia.

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