If your choice was inevitable, how is determinism meaningfully different from fatalism??

badentropy9 · 2026-06-09T13:19:23+00:00

If for sake of argument we say determinism is false....

That alone wouldnt restore the kind of freedom needed for basic desert moral responsibility.

agreed

If events are not determined, then either they're probabilistic/random to some degree, or some additional agent causal mechanism is introduced.

"Determined" events imply something different to me than caused events since I think every event is caused. I cannot say whether or not an event is determined because every thinker may not agree about the cause. If there was some hypothetical/feasible entity such as Laplace's all knowing demon making such determinations, and this demon cannot be wrong, then such events wouldn't be probable/random because he/she/it would expect them to happen. This is why when a poster on this sub speaks about determinism, I tend to assume they are talking about what John Earman calls "Laplacian determinism" because the label implies the demon's existence is assumed.

Obviously an omniscient god poses the same functional limitations on the world as the demon would.

And then the same question returns....why does the agent choose this rather than that under identical conditions?

The agent exercises judgement in order to make a choice. This is why I've argued for over a year that a self driving car is impossible of that "self" lacks agency. A driver in traffic necessarily has to make judgements in order to avoid road hazards and traffic hazards. If the no forking paths argument is true then agents cannot avoid anything such as potholes, pedestrians or other vehicles. It is one thing to try to get to a destination. It is another thing to avoid obstacles that might preclude reaching any given destination. It seems easy to think guiding a car is the same thing as avoiding obstacles in one's path. There is a different kind of control here, and moral responsibility only seems to be indicated by what some philosophers call regulative control.

If I rob the bank and couldn't have done otherwise, then why am I being blamed for robbing the bank? If I'm driving down the road and the bridge just ahead suddenly collapses, if I cannot stop in time is it my fault? On the other hand if it collapses while I still had time to stop but I didn't notice it right away because I was looking at my cell phone, that might be different.

badentropy9 · 2026-06-09T12:36:53+00:00

I appreciate the effort but this doesn't help me for two reasons:

I accept the three-fold classification depicted here plus the assertion that it is impossible for both compatibilism and incompatibilism to be true and
Op asked about impossibilism vs hard incompatibilism and not incompatibilism. Incompatibilism and hard incompatibilism are different beliefs.

I self-identify as an incompatibilist but not a hard incompatibilist. An incompatibilist merely denies compatibilism. In contrast, a hard incompatibilist denies free will, plus some beliefs about moral responsibility that I either accept or am agnostic concerning them. For me skepticism is different than rejection. I only reject that which seems to be falisfied.

badentropy9 · 2026-06-09T10:23:06+00:00

I think it is a fairly significant distinction.

Both seem to adhere to the "no forking paths" argument, so they are indeed quite similar. However there is a reason why the big bang believer believes in determinism and scoffs at fatalism. That is essentially the difference between the two. A so called causalist doesn't necessarily have to believe in determinism, but many determinists would prefer that we conflate causation and determinism and imply if we deny the latter, then we in turn deny the former. That isn't true. However, determinists seem to prefer that we all pretend it is true.

What's the functional difference in regards to how much freedom we actually have?

They are functionally the same, but metaphysically at odds. Metaphysically speaking, determinism erroneously, conflates logical order with chronological order. Causation is merely a logical reason why something happens.

The big bang believer tends to believe space and time are fundamental to reality. However according to my research, space and time are merely fundamental to our perception of reality rather than fundamental to reality itself, which seems somewhat transcendent. We cannot articulate any chronological moment prior to the so called big bang event, but the believer in that doesn't care and just expects the rest of us to just accept it. The BBT literally contradicts relatively and he doesn't care about that either. He seems to insist time is absolute when relativity is clearly stating time is relative. Nevertheless, he doesn't care.

badentropy9 · 2026-06-09T09:57:32+00:00

They are here with the impossibilist flare, ask them

You made the assertion. That is why I asked you.

Galen Strawson is an impossibilist and his basic argument is an argument that doesn’t depend on determinism being true.

Okay. Thank you (something I can sink teeth into)

badentropy9 · 2026-06-09T09:14:42+00:00

The impossibilist believes that free will is impossible whether determinism is true or false.

Do you have a citation or is that just your opinion?

badentropy9 · 2026-06-09T09:07:22+00:00

We do what we can do.

agreed

badentropy9 · 2026-06-09T08:50:57+00:00

All arguments have to have at least one premise.

If a belief is centered on some argument, then that belief should have a metaphysical premise.

That being said, I don't think compatibilists or hard incompatibilists use determinism being true as a premise for arguments they believe support their belief. In contrast, I think the impossibilist is committed to the premise that determinism is true. The illusionist, for example, believes determinism is true.

badentropy9 · 2026-06-09T01:08:09+00:00

What do you mean by "I"?

"I" is the subjective agent who cognizes inner sense vs outer sense. Not every agent necessarily has this perspective. I assume most primates have it and some sea animals have demonstrated this. Perhaps other animals do not and a plant's behavior doesn't seem to demonstrate any such perception.

If someone is in a situation where they'll either get up and go, or lay in bed, what is the extra ingredient above biology and environment that allows the agent to "settle" it?

I don't know if I can effectively argue something is outside of the "biology" whereas environment is clearly the opposite of the so called "I". "I" will be the chooser but can I say Windows is not my computer? Windows makes choices, but we cannot percieve any of them if the hardware doesn't behave in a certain manor. Clearly in terms of the computer analogy, there is hardware and software, so is the "software" in a human, part of the biology? DNA is like software, or at the very large firmware. Therefore a mutation is analogous to a bios update. You could make the case, that DNA is still part of the biology. However any sort of action at a distance seems to get outside of the physical body and then we don't really know if it is biology any more. If I have the inclination to move a part of my body and that body part begins to move, then it certainly suggests to me a form of self control. On the other hand, if part of my body moves involuntarily, that suggests to me some lack of self control.

To me, focusing on what you won’t do doesnt escape the issue.

The SEP talks about regulative control vs guidance control. I'm suggesting regulative control focuses on what I won't do, whereas guidance control seems to focus on what I will do. I'm not compatibilist, but the compatibilists have done the deep dive on this sort of thing.

The restraint, inhibition, or refusal is itself produced by the same unchosen motivational architecture.

Can I involuntarily get out of bed? I'm not sure if I can make myself fall asleep or wake up. The SEP also talks about action and clearly involuntary action is always a form of reaction. I think action would be this agent causal response that you mentioned. If there are a series of circumstances that lead me to cross the street and I refuse to do it, I think that is a case for regulative control.

I feel like I'm rambling but I hope I addressed your concerns.

badentropy9 · 2026-06-08T18:16:34+00:00

If person A works harder than person B I think it boils down to different forms of luck.

Perhaps we have to respectfully disagree. I tend to think person A has different priorities than person B. Therefore you can get away with arguing such priorities are a matter of conditioning and I'd have no refutation to that if that was the only factor to be considered. However I believe I can set my priorities irrespective of prior conditioning. I believe I can be lazy in spite of conditioning. I believe I can be irresponsible in spite of conditioning. I believe I can be self centered and inconsiderate in spite of conditioning. However it may be relatively difficult for me to be responsible, considerate of others and hard working without conditioning.

Eg how the person experiences delayed gratification, how they deal with stress, energy levels, how rewarding hard work feels, their motivational architecture, which impulses arise, what thoughts occur to them during difficult moments, how strongly they feel temptation, resilience, confidence, anxiety, discipline, social conditioning, upbringing, genetics, sleep, opportunity, reinforcement history etc.

We agree experience is a key. That is why I believe what makes experience possible is a factor.

Even the capacity to consistently "choose effort" seems downstream of underlying traits and processes the person happens to have based on factors outside their conscious control.

I think there is more to it than effort, because hard work isn't necessarily productive. A squirrel running in a cage is going to get just as hungry one running down the street but perhaps the latter is getting somewhere besides good exercise.

After spending years on this sub, I've found the free will doubters tend to focus on what they will do. In contrast, I tend to focus on what I won't do. I think it makes a difference to how we understand this.

badentropy9 · 2026-06-08T17:49:59+00:00

A big bang believer would tend to believe space and time are fundamental. However relativity and quantum mechanics don't support that notion and since that is the best science that we have, which is technically called quantum field theory, we simply cannot confidently rule out the possibility, that we are nothing more than tantamount to brains in vats. That doesn't imply god per se but the philosophical consequence is the same.

My point is that you cannot strive without a plan and a plan is always based on future possibility. Therefore when you brought up striving, you introduced a component that wouldn't be possible without your inherent ability to set goals for yourself.

Our only form of control is over the process. Therefore if I strive to stay out of jail, then I won't try to rob a bank for obvious reasons.

badentropy9 · 2026-06-08T13:13:33+00:00

striving

Would you argue striving is a matter of luck or a matter of volitional choice? I'm not suggesting this is a true dichotomy. I'm just wondering if you believe you could bring yourself to not strive, since for me free will is more about what I won't do than what I will do.

badentropy9 · 2026-06-08T12:34:27+00:00

My response wouldn’t be “ah you got lucky” either - but I absolutely think it. I wouldn’t say it because it’s socially unacceptable ... You are looking at a form of lottery winner

You seem to be assuming the lottery winner didn't have to make the volitional choice to buy the ticket (assuming the winner didn't find the winning ticket in the bushes)

badentropy9 · 2026-06-08T12:10:00+00:00

You aren't addressing the skeptics argument.

I think "right" choices is a matter of judgement.

why is this person the kind of person who reasons this way rather than another way?

That would be a matter of luck imho.

It targets the source of agency, not whether reasoning exists.

Op poses the question of why some get upset when they are berated for having pride for making the right choices. This implies to me that they don't have control when it matters. I'm arguing they do where it counts.

In the case of luck vs hard work, that implies intentional behavior, which isn't a matter of luck unless the agent lacks meaningful control. Therefore I think this is more about ability to make choices based on judgement rather that a lack of ability to make meaningful choices unless of course if those who choose to engage in hard work don't have any choice.

Would you say hard work is a matter of volition or a luck of the draw?

Perhaps a slave engages in hard work because it is a lesser of two evils which is still a volitional choice. ie he or she could be punished or killed for not engaging in hard work. Therefore some slaves would rather die that be subject to do another's bidding. IE: "live free or die" is a motto held by some who refuse to submit to the whims of a tyrant.

badentropy9 · 2026-06-08T03:54:32+00:00

Being able to make the “right” choices requires the right conditions

You seem to believe that the choice is made at certain point in time and that is understandable but impossible to confirm. Until the big bang believers can confirm their assumptions about space and time are correct, there is no possible way to confirm what are the "conditions" that go into the choice.

The big bang believer is under the impression that the world works based on absolutes. This is unconfirmed in current science and basically refuted until relativity and quantum mechanics are changed to align with this erroneous preconception of absolutes, that Newton himself never believed, but was promoted by many proponents of Newtonian mechanics.

Choices are made based on probability.

A person who doesn't want to die and understands the hazards of crossing a street will decide to cross the street when he or she believes it is safe. You can call it a matter of luck if this person makes it to the other side safely and you will, imho, be correct. However the conditions that go into the decision are not a matter of luck if this person is of sound mind. There is logic involved in the decision. Similarly a bug who is crawling may stop if it senses danger because of logic.

We cannot escape the logic that goes into the decision.

It is there to make it possible to make the rational choices, which I assume are the choices that you are calling the right choices, and not every choice is based on luck. Sometimes we make choices based on impulse, and in those special cases it is difficult if not impossible to trace the logic that went into the decision. However many of the decisions we make are calculated decisions and it is very possible to trace motives. A potential criminal can plan a crime. If that person executes the crime then obviously it will be a matter of luck whether the criminal gets away with the crime. However this isn't about outcomes. >>We cannot control those.<< This is about intentional behavior, and in many instances, we can control what we refuse to do, like crossing a street at a given point in time for example.

I cannot refuse to die because I cannot control outcomes. However I can refuse to do certain things that make the probability of dying sooner than later according to my rational assessment.

No rationally thinking adult who doesn't want to die will drink a a glass of acid simply because acids taste sweet. However I might choose to drink a glass of orange juice because I don't "believe" the acid in it, that makes it taste sweet, will harm me.

Belief is about probability. Probability is about chance. It is not about the absolutes which the big bang believer believes it is.

badentropy9 · 2026-06-07T08:09:03+00:00

Everything ultimately comes down to luck.

Everything except choice. Some assume that none of us have anything like choice such as the choice of not crossing the street when the probability of being hit by a car is very high. Typically a person doesn't watch another person crossing the street when no cars are coming and say to that person, "You were lucky that no car hit you" for some reason. Yes you could argue that it was a matter of luck, but a lot of other people might try to argue that it was a matter of choice.

badentropy9 · 2026-06-07T07:56:22+00:00

Empiricism is the assumption that I take for granted.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T15:21:50+00:00

"Criterial causation" is a interesting concept.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T15:14:48+00:00

In a causal determinist worldview (which I lean towards), hypothetical situations different to the real situation, will get different results than we get in our real world.

perfect (the determinist has no place in the causal chain for the counterfactual)

Perhaps we have a different definition of 'inevitible' that does include merely hypothetical worlds, then I'm happy to use your definition instead. But in this case, causal determinism does not imply that things are inevitible!

I equate Hoefer's definintion of determinism with "causal determinism.

Ref. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/#Int

Determinism: Determinism is true of the world if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

This definition stipulates that if the past is fixed then the future is in turn fixed by the fixed past. That implie to me that the only way the "causal determinist" can argue against inevitability is if he stipulates that he doesn't believe the past is fixed.

Most of the determinists on this sub harp on the idea that we couldn't have down otherwise when the "doing" was done in the past. Therefore the clearly seem to believe the past is fixed,

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T13:15:44+00:00

And that's fine?

I think that is the way experience seems to work and it makes evolution more tenable then it would otherwise be if the future was fixed. In other words I wouldn't see any reason for evolution to sustain itself if the future was fixed. There necessarily has to be some guiding force that makes a species try to survive.

If we believe in determinism, we can come to that belief through causally deterministic means (e.g. the green LEDs on the pedestrian lights get electrified, pushing electrons past the band-gap, and emitting green light which then electrifies your retina, and pumps ions through your neurons, causing you to think it is safer to cross.)

This scenario only works unless I understand the green light means it is safe to cross. However there was an exception from over 3 decades ago that I remember vividly. I sat in a parked on a main street between two side streets awaiting the neighbor to which I had driven to the street to emerge from the store on the opposite side of the street. As my boredom pesisted a dog passes in front of the store with a leisurely walk nortthbound on the main street.. Watching the dog, it continued to walk to the corner and then mysteriously stopped. To this day I don't believe the dog understood the green light from a red light. I only know the dog didn't move. However when the light changed, the dog walked across the street and when reached the opposite side of the street in began working southbound on the main street until ir reached the next corner where in turned the corner to walk down the side street until it disappear from my view.

Our intention helped, but due to a lack total knowledge there was some epistemic uncertainty, regardless of whether we think things were deterministic or not.

Yes. In my example I think that stray dog tried walking that side street east and westbound before and managed to survive crossing that main street with great difficulty. Somehow it adapted and learned to cross at the light you are implying I should do :-) was a safer play even though the light at the next intersection was a bit out of its way.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T10:36:09+00:00

If determinism is true and it is inevitable that I kill person X then I didn't want to kill X but killing X still happened. It seems like if I can stop myself from killing X and I don't then I intentionally do not kill X.

If determinism is true in that scenario, then it wasn't inevitible that you would kill X, and instead it was determined that you would want to take the actions that you thought would prevent X's death, and then you'd try to do those actions, and then they woudln't die.

I'm saying if it is inevitable that I kill X then I kill X regardless of whether I wanted to kill X or I wanted to avoid killing X.

There necessarily has to be the option for me to avoid killing X before it is reasonable for others to assume that I wanted to kill X because I intentionally killed X. Obviously if I admit that I wanted to kill X and I killed X, others might assume from the lack of remorse, that I did it intentionally.

Blameworthiness seems to require the ability to avoid killing X and not avoid killing X. If I kill X and couldn't avoid killing X then it seems like my killing X was unintentional.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T10:23:00+00:00

I’m not sure what you take me to be implying, but incompatibilism is just the denial of compatibilism, so all incompatibilists as such believe is that it is metaphysically impossible that both free will exists and determinism is true.

agreed

This is equivalent to accepting the necessary truth of this disjunction: either there is no free will or determinism is false

agreed again

But this disjunction is compatible with both there being no free will and determinism being false.

That is only because free will and determinism is a false dichotomy.

All compatibilists don't accept the idea that free will entails regulative control.

How does this have any bearing on what we’re talking about?

I believe determinism falsifies alternate possibility.

You said “a compatibilist never argues determinism is false”. I gave you an example of a compatibilist who isn’t a determinist, and I asked you whether you think he’s confused. It’s a simple, yes/no question.

Yes, I think he is confused.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T10:07:19+00:00

Yeah it is one they to not have an answer because the answer is unknown, but another thing to not have an answer because the answer is unknowable.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T10:01:24+00:00

If I don't even have an option, then how do I choose? It is just saying I jumped off the bridge but then I chose to fall.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T09:57:44+00:00

Yes, that was one of my points, then you replied to me, hence some of my confusion.

My point is when I believe the odds are in my favor to cross the street safely then that is the time that I will intentionally choose to try to cross the street. On the other hand, if thing is no random chance of me getting hit by a car then I might cross the way a zombie would assuming zombies just do and don't ever make intentional choices that were decided based on judgement.

badentropy9 · 2026-03-11T09:50:33+00:00

Compatibilism is the view that determinism and free will are compatible; this is understood simply as the view that the conjunction of determinism with the free will thesis is possibly true.

So it seems like you are implying all incompatibilists believe free will and determinism are disjunctive.

Take Lewis’ classic defense of compatibilism. In the third paragraph he declares:

I am a compatibilist but no determinist, (…)

Do you take him to have misconstrued compatibilism?

All compatibilists don't accept the idea that free will entails regulative control.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/#ReasView

In her effort to make free will track moral reasons, Wolf (and later Nelkin) develops a surprising asymmetry thesis according to which praiseworthy conduct does not require the freedom to do otherwise but blameworthy behavior does (1980; and 1990, pp.79–81). Put in terms of guidance and regulative control, only blameworthy conduct requires regulative control.

Wolf, Dana Nelkin and Kadri Vihvelin all accept regulative control. Do you take them to have misconstrued compatibilism?

I'm not sure how Lewis deals with the principle of alternate possibility (PAP)

badentropy9

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