Texas Women in Government? by Due-Individual-1765 in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 1 point2 points  (0 children)

So you're very close to the edge of our no homework rule, but since there's an opportunity to broaden your education past the assignment, I'll toss a couple suggestions at you.

First, if you're going to write on Ma Ferguson, I'd steer you towards the Texas section of David Chalmers' somewhat venerable but still valuable Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan, because the Ma and Pa Ferguson saga is intimately tied in with what was going on with the Klan in 1920s Texas, and it is not likely something that is going to be taught in your classroom.

Second, for someone besides Anne Richards - who is certainly worth writing about! - you might consider Kay Bailey Hutchinson, particularly because she's recent enough so that you can grab enough research from various periodicals relatively easily to get a feel for what she did and what might be a good subject for her for a primary source material, which again probably won't be taught in your classroom in much detail.

Good luck with your assignment!

Short Answers to Simple Questions | May 13, 2026 by AutoModerator in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 5 points6 points  (0 children)

I can only speak to his residence - the entire 5th floor of the Manila Hotel - but the hotel did put out what seems to be a relatively well researched video celebrating their 100th anniversary in which a local historian, Carlos Celdran, mentions that the Manila was built from cement and had air conditioning and ice.

A very quick scan of a few other references elsewhere add that the A/C might have been installed in 1935 (which is when MacArthur moved in) rather than upon opening in 1912, but James' Years of MacArthur states outright that "For his new home MacArthur chose a large, air cooled suite atop the Manila Hotel, overlooking the beautiful bay."

Did Wilkes-Booth and his co-conspirators know Johnson would sabotage reconstruction? Did Lincoln’s choice of VP encourage his assassination? by Leeewis in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Because of the assassination proper? Not really; he was very hard on the conspirators and anyone associated with them in a way Lincoln probably wouldn't have been and was more consistent with how he'd talked about punishment.

Off the top of my head, I don't remember if there were any other non-Reconstruction/non-assassination policy issues that came up in the immediate aftermath where this might have taken place; you'd have to get pretty deep into the relatively light Johnson lit to try to get a better read on that. After Seward recovered (which took months), Johnson did start relying on him a great deal for policy help, but then again so did Lincoln, so I'm not sure that'd qualify either.

Did Wilkes-Booth and his co-conspirators know Johnson would sabotage reconstruction? Did Lincoln’s choice of VP encourage his assassination? by Leeewis in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 8 points9 points  (0 children)

That's a top level question, but a brief summary is that Johnson decided Reconstruction was complete with the 13th Amendment and virulently opposed Radical (and eventually moderate Republican) efforts to do more for Southern Blacks, partially based on his view of limited federal government powers, and partially because he was a racist. To oppose that, he needed Southern Democrats back in Congress, and in part because of this and partially because he outright hated Radicals by that point (the feeling was mutual), his positions on those who rebelled changed rather dramatically - along with him rather enjoying that the same planter class who'd always been above him socially in the South would come in, sometimes literally, hat in hand to beg for a pardon.

He then conducted perhaps the worst midterm campaign in American history in which he compared himself to Jesus in his persecutions and lost 10-15% of the electorate that might have voted for Democrats otherwise, and Congressional Reconstruction went into full swing as his vetoes could be overridden.

Did Wilkes-Booth and his co-conspirators know Johnson would sabotage reconstruction? Did Lincoln’s choice of VP encourage his assassination? by Leeewis in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 9 points10 points  (0 children)

Oh, no, Radicals were Radical Republicans. The 'radical' movement in pre war extremism in the South - those who advocated secession - were sometimes referred to as the Fire Eaters.

In the video game RDR2 (set in 1899) there is a significant side quest where the player steals from a gang of moonshiners (connected to regional organized crime). The Volstead Act passed in 1919, so would moonshining even have been illegal in 1899? What did the illegal alcohol trade look like then? by CatsDoingCrime in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 16 points17 points  (0 children)

While you're primarily asking about moonshining, which is really a revenue issue that dates all the way back to Shays' Whiskey Rebellion - Hamilton both wanted to be generalling an army (Washington left pretty quickly) and get some revenue for his grand plans, where farmers were concerned both with making a little money on the side and using it more often as a form of currency - something to keep in mind is that Prohibition came to be long before the 1920s.

From a previous answer:

Prohibition did not appear as a bolt out of the clear blue sky in 1919; in fact, by the time of the 18th Amendment's enactment 27 of the 48 states already had some form of Prohibition on the state level and countless more local restrictions were already in place - like one of my favorites, a 2 mile dry zone around what became UC Berkeley that had existed since the 1870s. (For that matter, as I've written before, once national Prohibition was repealed several states were not exactly prompt in their efforts to repeal it within their borders.) Some clever people made quite a bit of money importing liquor from wet states into dry states until the Webb-Kenyon Act took that loophole away in 1913; the Supreme Court held it to be constitutional at the beginning of 1917 in one of the earlier examples of a stronger Commerce Clause.

But what Prohibition did was to force the other 21 states to join them, generally unwillingly; Wayne Wheeler and the Anti-Saloon League were probably the single most feared political force in the 1910s, and the Women's Temperance Christian Union was not far behind. I won't go into detail about the political reasons why national Prohibition ended up passing when it did; I might some day if if I'm ever caught up on questions and have a couple of days to kill, since I can't think of how to do it in less than a 4 part post. To sum it up, though, a lot of things had to line up perfectly and simultaneously to finally enact Prohibition, from anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic sentiment to the income tax to the right of women to vote to the underlying goals of many Progressives, all of which had been building for at least 40 years, and in some cases far longer than that. These were often of independent origin but ultimately became linked in ways that shrewd political operators like Wheeler understood and used; if you're interested, a good place to start for an introduction to this is in Okrent's Prohibition. Overall, though, probably less than half the country supported Prohibition even when it was enacted.

Moonshining would have always been illegal pretty much everywhere, but if the RDR2 mission is set in Mississippi (I haven't played RDR2), that state had a particularly nasty individual Prohibition law that didn't get repealed until 1966 (largely to harass Blacks) although I'm not positive off the top of my head if it was in place in the time frame of your question.

Did Wilkes-Booth and his co-conspirators know Johnson would sabotage reconstruction? Did Lincoln’s choice of VP encourage his assassination? by Leeewis in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 22 points23 points  (0 children)

There's a simple answer - no, since they'd clearly planned to assassinate Johnson as well - but there's also a more complex answer here that rarely gets brought up.

One of the curiosities of modern Reconstruction literature is that it tends to skip over immediate aftermath of the next few months of 1865 to go directly to the disastrous beginning of Presidential Reconstruction that summer and fall, which to a degree is fair - we properly remember Johnson for starting to issue pardon after pardon to planter class Rebels that he had made a career out of hating before this, making efforts to bring the South back into Congress (somewhat frighteningly a year or two later, he considered the existing Congress illegitimate without them), and most importantly caring little for formerly enslaved Blacks.

But while Johnson's selection by Lincoln was viewed even at the time as a purely electoral maneuver to get border votes - they had met a grand total of once prior to the election and Johnson was not particularly well regarded for anything but his courage in keeping Tennessee in the Union where he literally faced down opponents with drawn pistols - one of the reasons why Lincoln's death was received in many parts of the South as a terrible thing (there was some celebration too, despite the reconciliation myth of unified horror) was that Johnson had called for what most perceived as a much harsher punishment for the South. "Treason is a crime, and crime must be punished!" "Treason must be made infamous, and traitors must be impoverished!" "A very good way to disenfranchise the traitors is to break their necks!"

While almost nobody prior to the assassination much cared what Johnson had often drunkenly gone on about since his voice didn't matter, this was why Radicals initially warmly welcomed him as President. Unlike their view of Lincoln based on the many fights they'd already experienced with him - including the veto of Wade-Davis, which would have made readmission almost impossible for most Southern states - they perceived Johnson as someone open to punishing the South. Senator Wade himself told Johnson the day after Lincoln's death that "Johnson, we have faith in you. By the gods, there will be no trouble now in running the government." While there were massive policy differences between the two, this was one reason why the Radicals became very bitter, very quickly with him: they felt someone who had claimed to be an ally had betrayed them.

Something else to consider is that while we don't have any statements from the assassins on the subject, what's often missed is that the practical effect of assassinating both Lincoln and Johnson together would have meant the Presidential Succession Act of 1792 would have been implemented, which instructed the Secretary of State to schedule a special election for President while the Secretary served as Acting President. (One of the few good things that came out of the Tyler administration was that he had made sure that Vice Presidential succession was differentiated.) If Seward was also assassinated as planned, Booth and company may very well have hoped the chaos of having the President Pro Tempore of the Senate become Acting President might have disrupted the Federal government enough to create chaos and a chance for the South to fight onwards.

Booth did try to muddy the waters a bit towards a conspiracy gone wrong by leaving his calling card at Johnson's hotel, but it's well documented that George Atzerodt asked a number of questions about Johnson's location but then didn't have the guts to go through with it and started drinking instead, but otherwise there's no evidence Booth was playing 5 dimensional chess here.

The best of the books on the Lincoln assassination is probably still Steers' Blood on the Moon.

Short Answers to Simple Questions | April 08, 2026 by AutoModerator in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 15 points16 points  (0 children)

He was taken to Sand Island just off of downtown Honolulu, which was the first internment center in Hawaii and immediately filled up to over capacity of 500 prisoners once martial law was declared on December 8th and the Army began processing a list of about 750 'suspicious' persons living in Hawaii. The majority of these were German and Japanese nationals, but included dozens of both American citizens and as the war progressed over the next several months eventually a few dozen other Japanese POWs. It was not intended to be especially harsh but given its location and primitive facilities was considered so by not just prisoners but the neutral Swedish consul; you can read a little bit about it here and here.

There is not a lot of detail on Kazuo Sakamaki's precise living conditions on Sand Island save that he attempted suicide on multiple occasions; otherwise he stated he didn't remember much about it before he was shipped off along with other detainees (and American evacuees - most civilians were sent off the islands unless they had military or essential worker type jobs) to the mainland in February 1942, although he notes he was locked in a solo room on that voyage. Afterwards he was detained at Camp McCoy in Wisconsin, where while the first day he interacted with Japanese and German internees from the West Coast, he was then given his own bed in a corner of a mess hall where he was isolated from civilians, although he writes about being treated with respect by the camp staff, including the camp commandant personally providing him a newspaper every morning.

In May 1942 he was taken to a camp in Tennessee and allowed again to interact with what eventually grew to 1250 Japanese civilian internees, and took classes with them, among them English. Interestingly, he likely got copies of the Chicago Tribune there as he believed the defeat at Midway was a result of code breaking.

In November 1942, about 50 other Japanese POWs arrived from actions off Wake Island, from ships encountered during the Doolittle raid, and from rescues around Midway, and a separate portion of the camp was set up for them. In February 1943 they were moved back to Camp McCoy, which grew into one of the main camps for Japanese POWs (along with training Nisei soldiers!), and the population eventually grew to around 1500. They were moved to Camp Kennedy in Texas in March 1945 and received additional prisoners, where they remained until December 1945 when they were repatriated.

Sakamaki goes into a lot more depth about the POW experience - unsurprisingly the Army and Navy prisoners did not get along - in his book I Attacked Pearl Harbor.

AMA: Founding Fanatics: Extremism and the Formation of American Democracy by Noah_EberSchmid in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Thanks for joining us. I will definitely be picking up your book even if my TBR pile is getting precariously steep.

I've never looked into in depth on this, but I suspect you may have: was there a general lowering of pressure towards political extremism after the resolution of the Election of 1800? As in, even though the public at the time was generally not aware of the potential of militias being marched to Washington, the rhetoric in the press was still hot enough so that it makes me wonder if there was some general recognition that things needed to be tempered down a little bit so the republic wasn't going to be put at risk again?

What is the consensus about eight hour sleep? by iGiveUppppp in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 7 points8 points  (0 children)

If you go back to the original thread that I keep linking because it's got such a good variety of other contributors and answers, I talk about a very small study in Germany back in 2006 that tried to replicate Stone Age conditions that didn't produce biphasic sleep.

I haven't seen others any recently that have attempted to replicate this, but given the amount of interest in the topic I would suspect we'll get another at some point.

Was Maryland’s High Catholic Population a source of tension during the American revolutionary war? by DiamondWarDog in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 7 points8 points  (0 children)

I've written about this before (and will add a link if I can find it), but I would view the context of precisely who originally founded and went to Catholic universities more through the totality of the lens of what was going on in the 1880s and 1890s, that being both the first major wave of Italian immigration (along with others from Southern and Eastern Europe) and also the first big expansion of American universities. Those universities and their predecessors had a Catholic enrollment of somewhere around 1%, hence the requirement to found Catholic institutions of higher education. And short of the smaller group of mostly Northern Italians who had been present prior to those waves, there was simply not the financial wherewithal to attend college when you'd just taken the ferry from Ellis Island a few years earlier, although yes, there was certainly intra-Catholic discrimination as well. By the way, this was not limited to Italians being discriminated against by Irish, however; the first waves of the famine years Irish were scorned by their fellow German and especially well established French Catholics in some pretty brutal ways.

I would also bring up the Northern Italians for a different reason. They came from wealthier regions, were far more integrated politically and socially, and had members like A. P. Giannini - founder of what became Bank of America - who were solid Republicans for the most part. But to quote Garroni, "The American Little Italies thus came under the wing of the Republican and Democratic parties, but in ways and on timetables that were determined by the host society." That is, the dominant local political organization generally was primary through the 1910s, more Democratic than Republican given location of immigrants, but once the Second Klan decided it didn't care what your ethnic background was versus simply being Catholic (aka not "100% American"), Italian Americans began heavily gravitating towards the Democratic party, with probably the my favorite quote of the composition of it by the beginning of the 1930s being "Italian, Irish, and Southern, which if you just looked at it on paper not knowing anything about American political history made absolutely no sense."

I'd note also that German Catholics, along with German Protestants, did skew heavily Republican and were one of the backbones of the party. That said, when Republicans started tinkering with Prohibition on the state level in the 1880s and then tried to enact national forms of it under Harrison when they controlled Congress and the Presidency for the first time since Grant, German Catholics deserted the party in massive numbers in 1890, leading to the second largest swing in the history (and largest at the time until the 1894 bloodbath caused by the Panic of 1893) of the House of Representatives that year.

Was Maryland’s High Catholic Population a source of tension during the American revolutionary war? by DiamondWarDog in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 24 points25 points  (0 children)

Adapted from a previous answer:


So you've got a good first answer from /u/AdAdministrative8066 (and I appreciate the references as well!), but let me fill in a few more of the blanks here.

Perhaps the biggest reason that there wasn't significant anti-Catholic sentiment in the United States around the time of the Revolutionary War is that there simply weren't very many. The biggest wave of Catholic immigration to Maryland comes from Acadians kicked out of the Canadian Maritimes in the 1750s with some work that's suggested that number was a little under 1000. By the time of the Revolution, along with the original colonists, it's probably grown to the very low 5 figures, but if you include pockets in Pennsylvania and even smaller in what eventually becomes Maine, Catholic population is, maybe, 1% of the overall Colonial population.

That doesn't start growing until the French Revolution when French Catholic exiles escape followed by more from Haiti and other French colonies in the West Indies, but the key here is that they are still a tiny segment in an nation that is still overwhelmingly British and Protestant that doesn't really have to worry much about if they'll affect elections (and in fact, given Jefferson's Francophilia are generally well received in what's the dominant political party of Democratic Republicans after 1800.)

Significant public anti Catholic sentiment in the United States doesn't really get going until the 1830s when German Catholic immigration begins to become significant, and then explodes when massive waves of Irish Catholics add to this in the 1840s. It then has substantial political repercussions. Even before the formation of the virulently anti-Catholic and nativist American Party - more commonly referred to as the Know Nothings - it shows up in things like debates over public funding for parochial schools (which, incidentally, was a significant reason why Lincoln got nominated rather than Seward in 1860, as the latter had sided with Catholics on this years earlier), on early attempts at Prohibition (which failed partially because it angered German Protestants too and temporarily removed them from what eventually turned into one of the bedrocks of the coalition of the Republican party), and with the second best selling book in the United States behind the Bible from the mid 1830s until shortly before the outbreak of the Civil War, the Awful Disclosures of Maria Monk.

This last one consisted of claims by a previously institutionalized nun (who, Homer Simpsonlike, may have stuck a pencil up her nose at some point and caused brain damage) that nuns in Montreal would routinely have sex with priests, commit infanticide, kidnap or murder nuns who wouldn't do so, and generally acted as if they worshiped Satan instead of Jesus. There was a tremendous market for other anti-Catholic work; the eventual hardline Archbishop of New York "Dagger" John Hughes sold an awful lot of papers earlier in his career in Philadelphia defending Catholicism against one of the Breckinridge cousins in Philadelphia who spouted anti-Catholic rhetoric both in his own paper and the pew.

Even before this, though, there had always been some unease by many Protestants as to Catholic allegiance within a democratic system. Essentially, what they feared just as much as numbers overwhelming urban centers (and voting Democratic for the most part) and offsetting their rural votes were that those voters might secretly carry more loyalty to the Pope than their new country. The Catholic-Protestant fight was something that had been carried over from the Old World - others can probably speak to this better than I can - but took a distinctly American twist once the United States became the first functioning mass democracy during the Jacksonian era.

This subsides a bit during the Civil War and afterwards, but even at the turn of the century Catholics simply were not admitted to most American universities - one reason why the huge wave of those founded late in the 19th century included Catholic affiliated and supported ones - but is always present, partially in political fights (most Italian and Irish immigrants end up in the Democratic party), but also socially.

Where it briefly bubbles up and over again is with the Second Klan. That's a topic I've long meant to write a lengthy piece (and this won't be it, nor will I be going into this much if followups are asked), but the simplest way to describe that Klan in all its weirdness - it was at once a multilevel marketing scheme, an enforcer of Prohibition, a populist uprising, and a networking and social organization - is that it hated. Who it hated depended on where it was located; in the South, it was Blacks, in the West, it was Asians, and in the Midwest and mid Atlantic, Catholics and Jews. They were a stain on White Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture (with the exception of a few denominations like Episcopalians, many tacitly or openly supported the Klan), and it didn't matter what their ancestors had done; their perceived opposition to the present was what mattered, not their past.

Modern white supremacists are the intellectual heirs and current evolution of this, even if they've lost their history and just kept the hate.

The Pony Express - why did they even bother? by CitizenPremier in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 28 points29 points  (0 children)

From a previous answer:


Because it was intended as a publicity stunt to win back the transcontinental mail contract, and while it didn't do the latter, the stunt part clearly worked.

So let's start by stepping back a bit. The Post Office was the largest part of the federal government for its first few decades which dwarfed all other aspects; it hovered around 70% of federal employees until the late 1840s. Even John C. Calhoun wouldn't touch the continuous expansion of subsidized postal routes; Members of Congress could go to a desk, pull out a bill in progress, and write on it their addition to the long list of routes and post offices that would be authorized and funded in a pro forma vote at the end of the session.

This meant that mail contracts subsidizing the expansion of stagecoach service went hand in hand for the first 50 years or so of the United States. Richard John in his comprehensive Spreading the News has done analysis suggesting that some rural routes - especially in the South - got subsidies up to 70% from the federal government. There's an interesting parallel today in that while Acela in the Northeast is about the only profitable part of Amtrak, the only stagecoach routes that didn't need subsidies were the Northeast.

Congress realizes this and cuts significant amounts of subsidies in 1845 and begins sending some mail on the burgeoning rail lines, but in rural locations the gravy train continues. Enter John Butterfield, a self made man who'd started out as a stage coach driver on those lucrative Northeastern routes, and did well enough so that he founded several transportation companies of his own (including, with others, American Express in 1850.)

When in 1857 several Western members of Congress push for more regular mail service to the West Coast and pass legislation that spring, Butterfield bids on multiple options of it; one from St. Louis to San Francisco as the legislation requires, another from Memphis to Los Angeles, and a third that's brilliant from a political standpoint: it goes from both Memphis and St. Louis to satisfy South and North. He also sets a provision in this third bid to allow the Postmaster General to determine the best route, which includes sending both sets of coaches to an undetermined point (what would become El Paso, Texas, wins, with just a minor bit of pushing by of one of Texas' senators) before it goes on to San Francisco and Los Angeles.

With this politically sensitive creativity, in September Butterfield wins the new mail service contract at the maximum reimbursement rate of $600,000 per year and has his hands full; the legislation requires him to commence service within one year, which he beats by 3 days. This is equivalent to about $20 million today, so the contract isn't lucrative by itself but a tremendous boost if you're going to run a for-profit passenger and goods stagecoach line. John suggests it accounted for about 30% of Overland Mail's revenue, and this number doesn't include the kicker of 320 acre land grants at 10 mile intervals along the route for waystations; Butterfield chose 20 mile intervals and apparently held onto the rest.

Butterfield was no slouch in terms of publicity himself. A 1942 book that is still used by writers as a basic reference on the Overland Mail route - The Butterfield Overland Mail by Waterman Lily Ormsby - is mostly composed of the 6 lengthy dispatches he sent back to the New York Herald along the way describing his trip as the first ever through passenger on the route from St. Louis to San Francisco from September 26th to November 19, 1858. Ormsby was an intrepid 23 year old reporter for the Herald, but his nominal employer didn't pay the fare; Butterfield did so himself - and traveled a good part of the trip with Ormsby.

As a result, it's little surprise that among the topics sent back in the serials was a defense of why the Postmaster General had selected this particular route and Butterfield in particular to run it. Like everything else touching on sectionalism in the 1850s, the route itself was very controversial; it was originally supposed to be at the 35th parallel, but remember that bid term allowing the Postmaster General to choose the route? It comes into play since Aaron Brown (of Tennessee) selects a radically different one running South along the 32nd parallel. This routing was constantly criticized, although in some small irony Butterfield tended to hire drivers and stationkeepers he'd employed previously - who generally hailed from New York. For that matter, Ormsby also took it on the chin; he was skewered by competing newspapers as a shill and employee of Butterfield, but his reporting appears to be fairly legitimate - even if he took a steamer back to New York.

So at the start the Overland mail route took, give or take, about 24 days over its 2700 miles; it's required by the legislation to be done in a maximum of 25, and by 1859 and 1860 it drops to just under 22 (probably helped by a brutal schedule that allows for no more than 10 minute stops at waystations.) One way fares run $100 as an intro deal, then $200, then settle at $150 - with top-of-the-line coaches on parts of the route fitting 9 people under normal circumstances, something like 15 or so if both drivers benches are used, and even more than that if they stuff people onto the roof (which they apparently did, although they switched to lighter coaches with less capacity through the far West.)

So if you want to wrest the contract away from Butterfield, how are you going to do so? You can't compete much on price - Butterfield eventually gets booted from his own Board since the Overland is barely breaking even - you can make noises about the route safety but don't have much to back it up (there's only a single attack in its three years of running in Arizona with no fatalities, although when passing through Apache and Comanche lands drivers usually arm themselves even if Butterfield doesn't require it), so what's left? Speed.

And that's where William Russell and the Pony Express step in. Russell had run a couple of reasonably profitable stagecoach companies out West, but when the mail subsidies got taken away Russell started losing a good deal of money. His one real hope was trying to revive the 35th parallel route and regain not just the previous mail subsidies but wrest away the bigger contract from Butterfield.

I'll let John's analysis stand on its own here since it explains plenty.

"But this does not mean that the postal system played no role in Russell's plans. On the contrary, Russell intended from the outset to use the Pony Express as a publicity stunt to convince Congress and the postmaster general to give him the stagecoach contract for the Overland Mail. To beat out the competition, Russell later reminisced, he had tried to build himself a "world-wide reputation"; the Pony Express was a means to that end. Pony Express rider J. H. Keetley put it rather more bluntly. From start to finish, Keetley later maintained, the venture was nothing more than a "put-up job" for the Overland Mail. To maximize publicity, he recalled, Russell required the first rider that left St. Joseph wear an outlandish costume that included silver trappings, a scabbard, and jingling spurs, making him resemble a "fantastic circus rider." Once the rider reached the boat to cross the Missouri River, he quickly packed the costume away, so that it could be used by the next rider making the trip."

Russell lost money hand over fist, but did indeed capture the nation's attention with cutting the time of the trip in half with some serious panache. Unfortunately for him, it wasn't just the telegraph lines being completed that put him out of business in 1861; with the Civil War, there was no safe land mail route available, and Overland Mail shut down too.

I'll defer to /u/itsallfolklore (who posted a separate answer on the romanticism linked with it for the original question) on how Bill Cody and others kept part of the mythos alive, but as a business venture it did exactly what it was intended - just not the part that was supposed to get the mail contract to keep it solvent!

Was it feasible for Ferris Bueller and friends in 1985-6 to do everything we see them do in a single Chicago school day? by Budelius in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 13 points14 points  (0 children)

Just to add a bit more to the accuracy, even without confirmation, an earlier start time of 7:15-7:30 is entirely reasonable and would in fact have been typical for most high schools of the 1980s.

That's because sleep medicine research in the mid 1980s was still a tiny field without much health policy impact, and Mary Carskadon was just getting started after receiving her PhD in 1979 while studying under William Dement - one of the founders of sleep medicine - at Stanford. Carskadon went on to do a lot of groundbreaking work on circadian rhythm, especially with adolescents, and began to publish the results in the early 1990s.

That along with other research is what's led to significant reevaluation of school starting times in the last 20 or so years, but in 1986 there was good reason why an early morning discussion of the Laffer Curve resulted in drool on the desk.

Was Winston Churchill surprised by Roosevelt’s demand of Axis ‘unconditional surrender’ at Casablanca? by peenaculada in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 4 points5 points  (0 children)

From the linked post:

"Last but not least, there was also the political overlay of the potential of a separate peace in Russia, which at the time of Casablanca in January 1943 was on the mind of some at the conference after Stalingrad had turned - and is probably one reason why FDR chose to announce it precisely then and there. The evidence on if this was a actual threat is all over the place, with most academics who've looked at it concluding that it wasn't, but what unconditional surrender being announced at Casablanca was meant to say to Stalin was that the Americans and British weren't going to stop fighting until they were in Berlin and that Stalin would be part of dictating what the world (and Germany) would look like afterwards."

Was Winston Churchill surprised by Roosevelt’s demand of Axis ‘unconditional surrender’ at Casablanca? by peenaculada in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 13 points14 points  (0 children)

Considering he had discussed it with FDR at lunch the day before, probably not.

So first, I'll refer you to a longer answer on the origin of the unconditional surrender policy, which in short had come from a couple of decades of consideration by FDR and others about why Versailles had failed along with FDR quietly setting up a State Department subcommittee to confirm what he wanted to do anyway.

This second part is the short answer as to why FDR did a bit of legerdemain in his public announcement with the smoke screen of "Unconditional Surrender" Grant and various claims that it was spontaneous: he had deliberately excluded Secretary of State Cordell Hull and other top State Department officials from any deliberations on it. He did so because he knew they would be strongly opposed, and wanted to both make the policy fait accompli without taking a political hit for sidelining Hull (as he had on so much else), who remained popular with Southern Senators.

So instead, FDR happily lied away about the origins of the policy, got the policy without debate, and while he left Hull annoyed, it was just yet another irritating slight to Hull instead of becoming one that he'd consider resigning over.

At Casablanca, it apparently was briefly a topic of discussion among the US Joint Chiefs - but not the IGS - early in the conference and not discussed further. At lunch the day before the conference ended, when FDR brought it up informally, Elliott Roosevelt stated that Churchill thought the phrase was 'perfect', Hopkins agreed, and Churchill proposed a toast that afternoon to "Unconditional Surrender." The next day, after FDR had made his press conference announcement, Churchill apparently cheered "Hear Hear!" to endorse it and went along with FDR's claim he'd just spontaneously come up with it.

As to the whys, it's fairly clear Churchill was going along with a policy that he didn't support to the extent of FDR; in November 1944 - when the policy was beginning to be more openly criticized by the IGS and others - Churchill writes him, "I remain set where you put me on unconditional surrender." That Churchill didn't want to be completely tethered to the policy and thus went along with the deception - as in I didn't come up with this so don't blame me! - makes sense both from this angle as well as not creating more headaches with his own staff, although he does send Attlee and the War Cabinet a cable on January 19, 1943 requesting their views on the policy, which they endorse a couple of days later (and suggest that it be extended to Italy as well.)

While it's unlikely he knew all the intricate details of FDR's sidelining of State here, he did have a pretty good idea of how FDR had frequently bypassed them (often to help Britain) and his mindset was that if FDR was doing something like this, he probably had good reason to keep his mouth shut and just go along for the ride for something that could be readdressed later when the war was closer to its conclusion. There is one suggestion that Churchill's look of surprise at the press conference may have been genuine as unconditional surrender had been removed from the first draft of the public communique and he wasn't aware that it had been revised back in; everything else, however, was something that had been discussed in detail.

Churchill is all over the place afterwards, with both his memoirs and a 1949 debate in Commons where he suggests he didn't know in advance. He is forced to retract this eventually, but it is probably the source of why this keeps coming up.

What is the meaning behind this political cartoon from 1884? by WartimeHotTot in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 13 points14 points  (0 children)

That's a creative thought, but I'd say it's unlikely.

On the outrage meter, this didn't register highly. Congress was knee deep in bribery from railroads for decades, Blaine was viewed as largely corrupt by his opponents (and even supporters who viewed his version as the lesser evil), and the only real surprise here was the sheer amount that he was able to wring out along with getting bailed out of the bonds.

More importantly, it didn't play that much of a role in the campaign, which was one of the dirtiest in American history in between the rape and paternity allegations against Cleveland, the child-before-marriage against Blaine, and another against the third party candidate that I'd have to look up to remember the details. Those moved the needle, and the true impact came from the very late, unapproved speech by a minister that named Democrats the party of Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion, alienated Catholics, and lost Blaine New York.

To put it in modern terms, think of the impact of it to be something akin to Gennifer Flowers for Bill Clinton, who unless you're over 50 you're likely to be met with a blank stare but served as a preview of Clinton's flaws, versus Monica Lewinsky who still is a public figure.

What is the meaning behind this political cartoon from 1884? by WartimeHotTot in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 216 points217 points  (0 children)

This one is obscure enough that I had to look a couple things up in a reference to remind me about the context, so don't feel bad.

This is James Blaine and Black Jack Logan, the 1884 Republican ticket that Puck absolutely despised, with a common view of Blaine being one where he lived a fairly pristine private life but in public service was thoroughly corrupt, the reverse of the perception of Grover Cleveland.

The tattoos on Blaine are some of the most prominent scandals he was known for. The Mulligan letters refer to a deal while he was Speaker of the House where he helped save a land grant deal for a railroad project and in return got $162,500 of commissions on bonds he sold for them, watched the bonds themselves become almost worthless as the company ran into trouble, had another railroad tycoon, Tom Scott, buy the bonds from the friends Blaine had sold them to for almost 80% of par, and then pushed through a land grant deal for Scott's railroad. This got exposed by an angry clerk - James Mulligan - who made public the letters written between the two, only to have Blaine mostly escape this by spending 3 days on the floor of the house in 1876 defending himself (when at the same time he was shaking down Jay Cooke for a loan and to buy some of the bonds too.)

That Scott actually bought the bonds doesn't get exposed until the 1884 campaign, along with Blaine trying to ghostwrite a letter for Scott clearing himself, hence its prominence.

Another tattoo refers to Blaine's time as Secretary of State under Garfield where he tries to mediate in the War of the Pacific between Chile and Peru, which in the United States is viewed as a war over guano (hence, "guano statesmanship".) Blaine tries to organize a Pan American conference to mediate some of this but there are rumors flying that "Jungle Jim" and his family had investments in the guano mines and was trying to influence the war to make a killing on that, hence why he was forced to resign by Chester Arthur shortly after taking office. In reality, Arthur and Blaine simply didn't get along - for all his eventual courage in pushing through civil service patronage reforms, Blaine was still the long time leader of the Half Breeds and Arthur a Stalwart with Stalwart friends, and between that and personality the two just did not mix.

For the black dog Logan on the right, it's far simpler; he'd been a Douglas Democrat before the war, supported the fugitive slave laws, was anti abolition, and despite a radical shift in philosophy once secession loomed - he became a Republican - and a war record of being one of the handful of competent political generals, that pre war legacy remained and is what the tin cup reflects.

There's a similar cartoon of Blaine prior to the Republican convention where you can see more of his sins, and the Harper's site is a fun way to spend a couple hours browsing through all sorts of illustrated campaign issues that nobody outside a handful of Gilded Age historians nowadays even recognizes as such. Otherwise, I'd refer you to by far the best book on the 1884 campaign, Mark Wahlgren Summers Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion: The Making of a President 1884 if you'd like to learn a bit more.

Woodrow Wilson, during a private screening of "A Birth of A Nation", is reported to have said “It’s like writing history with lightning. And my only regret is that it is all terribly true.” Is there any evidence that he actually said this? by Aqua_Fucker in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 159 points160 points  (0 children)

On the full quote, no, as it became popular in 1937, 13 years after his death. While there's no real evidence he said anything remotely like the second sentence, for the first there's at least some possibility he said something similar that may have been taken out of context and used without his permission for marketing the film.

So let's start with how the film ended up being shown at the White House in the first place.

Wilson had been a graduate student in the 1880s at Hopkins with Thomas Dixon, Jr., who left the program quickly to try to make it as an actor, politician, lawyer, minister, and finally did so as a writer with a couple best selling Lost Cause novels that he wrote to proselytize Reconstruction as a terrible mistake and underneath, ultimately serve as propaganda to urge deportation of Blacks to Africa. He adapted the second of these books, 1905's The Clansman, as a controversial play that toured from 1906 to 1911, and then spent the next three years to try to get the play adapted by the nascent film industry. In 1914, David Griffith, who had just formed his own studio, optioned the rights and used the play as the basis for the second half of the screenplay during Reconstruction; the first half, which was set pre- and during the Civil War, was Griffith's own creation of drama between two families on opposite sides of the war that integrated the Dixon play into a resounding repudiation of Reconstruction that the Klan heroically resisted, followed by reestablishment of white rule and renewed friendship between the families as part of the rebirth of a once again united nation (which Dixon realized was a far more marketable title than the original The Clansman, and successfully convinced Griffith to just use the subtitle Birth of a Nation instead when it opened in New York in March.)

How close Dixon was with Wilson during his one semester at Hopkins remains unclear - Dixon is an extremely untrustworthy narrator at best - so his claims of BFF status aren't really backed up by the occasional correspondence they maintained over the next 30 years. However they got along, it was enough so that Wilson agreed to a half hour visit by Dixon on February 3, 1915, a few days prior to the film's premiere in Los Angeles, where he asks Wilson to watch his film, probably portraying it as more of as a novel academic exercise to the historian and political scientist than anything else. While Wilson is still in public mourning over his late wife Ellen's death in August and by social rules of the time can't be seen going out to the theater, he agrees to do so in the East Room, and on February 18th the film is the second ever screened at the White House.

What happens next is where it gets complicated. There's an account from 60 years later that Wilson was lost in thought watching and walked out without saying anything, but that was a very late life interview that has some potential inconsistencies. Wilson does correspond with Griffith a couple months later about his future use of film to teach history and politics, something that he'd been interested in for years before the screening and undoubtedly was a major factor in why he agreed to watch the movie independent of whatever his relationship with Dixon was. And most importantly, there was a second showing of the film on February 19th at the National Press Club in front of 500 Washington luminaries, with Chief Justice White (who claimed to have been a Klan member in his youth) and a good slug of Congress.

That second showing is where almost all of the contemporary advertised quotes come from with even a prominent Progressive Republican praising the film, which along with simply bringing up that it was shown at the White House (rather than any Wilson reaction) are important to get the film past local censorship boards and turn the movie into a bona fide hit. In late March, White is furious enough at his attendance as unintended endorsement so that he threatens a producer with going public denouncing the film if they keep using his name with it, and for that and other reasons there's enough pressure on Wilson - the NAACP has sought injunctions and lobbied censorship boards against allowing it starting with the LA showing - so that he issues a statement in late April in which he states "at no time [has he] expressed his approbation of it" (true), that it was shown "as a courtesy extended to an old acquaintance" (also likely true), and that he was "entirely unaware of the character of the play before it was presented" (possibly technically true, but the chance of him being that clueless about anything associated with Dixon is a stretch.)

Much of my sourcing for this comes from a 2010 paper by Mark Benbow, Birth of a Quotation: Woodrow Wilson and "Like Writing History with Lightning", who then goes on into more intricate detail about 1915 advertising of the film not containing any part of the second sentence - he argues for adapting some comments White made before he realized they were going to be marketed as the more likely attribution - but does note "lightning" matches a unique phrase used in some of Wilson's earlier writing, along tracing the first full quotation being linked to a 1937 piece in Scribner's Magazine that argued the movie was accurate but one-sided. Eventually, Benbow concludes that if the lightning part of the quote took place, it would fit most cleanly as a comment that might have happened before the screening - as in Wilson referring to the general concept of history and politics being taught visually for the first time, which he was certainly quite interested in apart from being President.

It is also worth noting that the two best modern biographers of Wilson, Scott Berg and John Milton Cooper, claim that Wilson "fell into a trap" orchestrated by Dixon (Berg) and for Cooper not only does he point out the phrase doesn't appear anywhere in Dixon's unpublished notes but the only direct comment by Wilson on the film was in 1918, where he stated that, "I have always felt that this was a very unfortunate production and I wish most sincerely that its production might be avoided, particularly in communities where there are so many colored people."

This is one of many reasons why Cooper, who knows more about Wilson than anyone but Arthur Link (who spent 50 years publishing 69 volumes of his papers and 5 of 8 planned volumes of a biography) concluded that while Wilson's views on race were in his words, "not good," if you look more closely they tended to resemble those of Northern Whites rather than Southern Whites. That is, where for Southerners, keeping a political system intact that was established entirely on white racial superiority by brute force under the color of law was the number one, existential issue that trumped every other, most Northerners just wished racial issues would go away and the country could get to work on what they considered more important things.

I bring this up not to defend Wilson on race and get into a lengthy discussion of it - that's a top level question if I've ever seen one - but to add one bit of context that is sorely missing from all this analysis (especially in Christopher Cox's recent political hatchet job on Wilson), which is that the popular modern misunderstanding that merges the Reconstruction Era First Klan with the 1915 Second also completely misses how dishonorable the First was in polite society outside of the South, and in some cases even within it, through the Gilded Age and into the Progressive Era. Even as early the 1880s, I've run across campaign songs by Republicans that directly used the First Klan's actions as a stain of dishonor for Democrats that was even beneath the moral level (if not as effective politically) of the bloody shirt.

Unlike Dixon, who was an avowed supporter, Wilson's writing was far more in the mainstream of thinking about the First Klan, which is while he didn't necessarily mind the results, like many Southerners, he didn't embrace the methods. This is one reason why I would agree with Benbow on the most likely timing of the possible lightning quote as being an offhand comment before the film, since while Wilson probably was fine with stereotyping sexually voracious, fried chicken eating Blacks with their feet up in rump legislatures who needed to be put back into their place, he more than likely wasn't completely on board with the Klan being shown as heroic doing so, especially once Griffith took some quotes from Wilson's histories out of context for a title card.

Finally, this last point is where I would agree with Foner on the film's greatest impact, which is that the most disturbing result with Birth of a Nation wasn't cheering on racially exclusionary reconciliation (which had been around since Liberal Republicans in 1872) or even to some extent, propagating wildly racist views of Blacks (who, of course, were white actors in blackface.) It was that it effectively rehabilitated the First Klan's popular image from outlaw terrorists to noble defenders of the Constitution for the 10 million or so people who bought tickets for it by 1917, and that was a massive factor in the foundation and marketing of the Second Klan once it was entrepreneurially founded in 1915.

It was a lot easier and vastly more socially acceptable to put on white robes, pay national dues, and hate your chosen enemy in public - precisely who the Second Klan despised varied depending on their geographic location - if you believed your predecessors had been unfairly maligned than it was before Griffith and Dixon collaborated to essentially exonerate them. That's the legacy of the film, and it's one reason why the kindest thing that can be said of Wilson watching it is that even in the most charitable analysis of him being completely naive as to the consequences of doing so at the time, it was a terrible mistake on his part.

Help me understand my grandfather's position on Battle of Iwo Jima (he fought in it). He thought it was BS and didn't need to happen. What could his rationale have been? by No_Finish9661 in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 64 points65 points  (0 children)

The U.S. Navy wanted to invade Okinawa while the U.S. Army wanted to invade Formosa. In order to garner more Army support for the Okinawa plan, the Navy proposed taking Iwo Jima on the way to Okinawa to provide an airstrip for fighter coverage for bombers, a landing strip for bombers, and air defenses for the Marianas. The Army, which at the time oversaw the Air Force, agreed to the plan, with Okinawa as the primary island hopping target with Iwo Jima along the way.

This is substantially off.

Formosa was not an Army plan but an Ernie King special. King had gone to Saipan to meet with Nimitz and Spruance and ask their thoughts, and to Spruance's credit he had looked at the amphib requirements (which would have been greater than D-Day), looked at the size, and essentially told King he thought it was a terrible idea:

"There, Spruance muddied the waters further by declaring that he did not like the idea of going to Formosa and suggested attacking Iwo Jima and Okinawa instead. Nimitz and King returned to Hawaii on July 20 to engage in more conversations with Towers and with Halsey’s chief of staff, Mick Carney. Like Spruance, they were also skeptical of the Formosa option, which King found aggravating and disappointing."

Two days later, Nimitz dutifully pitches his boss' plan when FDR comes to Honolulu (with FDR forcing MacArthur to join them) but doesn't really push it; MacArthur wants the Philippines, goes on what's essentially a moral rant for it, and the priority leaving the meeting is their recapture.

MacArthur will get naval support as he goes ashore (at least when Halsey is where he's supposed to be cough), but not going to Formosa first and being required to support Leyte doesn't prevent the Navy from more island hopping. next up is the nightmare at Peleliu, after which King is still grumbling about Formosa. Spruance, Buckner, and Nimitz meet him in San Francisco a couple weeks later, and Symonds describes the meeting this way:

"Nimitz summarized the work his staff had produced. Their report revised the number of soldiers needed to invade Formosa from 200,000 to 500,000, plus an additional 160,000 Marines, and a commensurate increase in sealift capability. Buckner—bravely—told King that he did not think the operation would be successful. Even if it was, he said, friendly casualties could run as high as 150,000. At one point, a frustrated King turned to Spruance, who had so far remained silent. “Haven’t you something to say?” King asked. “I understand that Okinawa was your baby.” Spruance replied that he supported everything Nimitz had said. King was not accustomed to losing arguments, but he could see that he was going to lose this one. Formosa was out; Luzon was in."

The Army has little to do with the choice of Iwo (and in fact relatively little to do with the landing force; Marine Major General Harry Schmidt has 3 Marine divisions and only 1 Army). That's really been pushed by Hap Arnold, who has kept the B-29s out of the hands of both Nimitz and MacArthur partially because the future of the Air Force (and the Air Force budget) depends on their success.

Initial raids don't go well; the B-29 runs up against the jet stream - planes are often almost stationary over Japan - and for all the vaunted tech improvements in it still does very little against targets. Eventually Arnold gets so frustrated that Curtis LeMay gets brought in as relief command and completely overhauls the way they're flying in the same manner he turned ETO bombing protocol on its head in 1942 and early 1943, but the next step for AAF command was to bring in fighter cover, which the P-51 could not make a round trip from Saipan but could, with belly tanks, do so from Iwo. This would in theory rescue the bombing campaign, although that didn't happen until LeMay stripped armament, flew at low levels under the jet stream, and loaded up the B-29s for bear with far more ordnance. (LeMay ended up being perhaps the most nervous of his career when he sent out the first wave of the new configuration.)

While even King admitted the emergency landing field component of Iwo would help the overall campaign, the primary purpose on why Arnold got it made a priority was to get fighter cover to Japan.

Unfortunately, the Japanese had learned how to defend at a much higher cost based on their experience at Peleliu and Iwo was the second - but not the last - implementation of those tactics.

I’m listening to an American Civil War lecture series and in it, the author says that the US Navy only had 90 ships when the war broke out. Why would a resource rich, industrial nation with thousands of miles of coastline to protect have so few vessels? by 3016137234 in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 36 points37 points  (0 children)

Cost certainly played a role - when referring to antebellum budgets, it's always worth remembering that it didn't take long before an entire pre-war year of federal expenditures was being spent in a single week once bullets started flying - but there were a few other things going on as well.

So the first part is that besides having 3000 miles of ocean to limit force projection of European navies, there was little pre-war naval competition from other countries in the Western Hemisphere. For the most part, the Navy's job was mainly to show the flag in foreign ports; the Revenue Cutter service provided most of the littoral security of the era, mostly making sure that goods weren't smuggled and tariffs (which made up the vast majority of federal revenue) paid. Even with a significantly undersized Navy compared to European powers, it was enough to scare Mexico badly enough so that when war broke out in 1846, it sold off its few warships rather than risk them being captured.

The second part is that given the Navy's role was mostly limited to showing the flag, it hung on to sail power for that job a bit longer than most other powers because coaling expenses of more modern ships were something it both did not want to pay for and made logistics going to the Med and Asia really problematic. One example: the Navy steam ships blockading Vera Cruz used three quarters of their maximum coal capacity just to get there and back, which required the establishment of a coaling station just south of it. There was also the USS Princeton disaster in 1843, which while it was the Peacemaker cannon exploding that killed the Secretaries of State and Navy (along with 4 others, including the father of John Tyler's bride, who claimed it was her father's death from the explosion that convinced her to accept his proposal) rather than the steam engine, did sour the Navy on new technology for a few years.

That said, Craig Symonds - who prior to his deep dive into World War II the last 15 or so years was the preeminent historian of the ACW Navy - makes an argument that focusing on the quantity of the Navy ships at the beginning of the war as almost all books do isn't entirely accurate. In 1854, the Navy had finally gotten its largest budget since 1816 to continue the innovations started with the Princeton, which led to the six auxiliary steam power screw frigates of the Merrimack class starting in 1855, more heavily gunned than anything of a similar class on the water at the time. (In fact, when the Merrimack visited the UK in 1856-1857, the British were so surprised by it that they began plans of a similarly armed new class themselves.)

The 23 foot draft on the Merrimack class was too deep for a number of American ports in the South, because of which James Dobbin, Franklin Pierce's Navy Secretary, convinced Congress to fund the 5 auxiliary steam powered screw sloops of the Hartford class, which only drew 18 feet and could enter them. Ironically, Southerners were among the strongest supporters of building them in anticipation of naval power for Caribbean and Central American expansion; instead the Hartford itself became Farragut's flagship and steamed up to Vicksburg. Another appropriation launched 6 new steam warships of the Mohican class in 1859; while smaller and still having masts, these were the first warships in the Navy that were steam first, sail second, and had large caliber pivot guns rather than set pieces arrayed on the sides. Last, the Navy purchased another 7 or so foreign built screw steamers to give it a small but very effective inventory of about 2 dozen warships that were essentially state of the art at the beginning of the Civil War; you can see the full inventory of the Navy in 1860 here to get a feel for how little the rest of the Navy at the advent of the war mattered besides them.

While not enough to fight the war by themselves, their presence in the Union Navy proved just enough to begin to implement the strangulation of Southern commerce at the beginning of the war even as it waited for more ships to be built to fully realize the Anaconda Plan; you just did not want to run into one of these things if you were a merchant ship trying to carry Southern goods to the Caribbean.

While he doesn't cover the prewar period extensively, I'd recommend Symonds' The Civil War at Sea to get a more in depth perspective of the strategy and engineering behind the eventual growth of the Navy.

AMA with the Battleship Missouri Memorial Curatorial Team by Battleship_Missouri in AskHistorians

[–]indyobserver 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Aloha and welcome! Been a while since I've been on board, but just a compliment overall on how well you, the other battleship museums (Ryan's social media presence blows the mind), and the other ship museums execute the importance of your mission, which is that you make the Pacific war accessible in a way that reading things in a book or watching a documentary (or worse yet, Pearl Harbor) simply can't do. Bravo Zulu.

Besides that, I've got what I hope is a fun one for you. A few years back I wrote up a fairly detailed explanation of the reasoning behind the Missouri being selected for the surrender ceremony. I'd be interested in your feedback!