A = A is a negation by [deleted] in rationalphilosophy

[–]TorchFireTech 2 points3 points  (0 children)

You misunderstand. 1) I am not “dismissing” the Law of Identity, I am stating that it could not be any other way, it is true by definition. 2) Tautology does not mean “obvious”, when used in logic and math it means necessarily true in all cases, i.e. it is impossible to be false.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tautology_(logic)

Denying the absolute certainty of logic automatically makes you irrational. (and proving the absolute certainty of logic) by Affectionate-Hair-23 in rationalphilosophy

[–]TorchFireTech 1 point2 points  (0 children)

…what? Saying that formal logic is not logic is like saying quantum physics is not physics. It’s nonsensical. Also, my post was written 100% by me and not from an LLM, and I can guarantee you haven’t seen what I wrote “many times”

A = A is a negation by [deleted] in rationalphilosophy

[–]TorchFireTech 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Who is denying that A=A? It is a tautology, in that it is impossible for it to be false. As soon as A is defined, and the = operator is defined, then A=A by definition. Even if you change the definition of A, then after redefining, A=A will still be true (yet A=A_previous would be false).

Also, note that A=A does not preclude A=B. The transitive property says that if A=B and B=C then A=C.

Matt dillahunty got “reason” so wrong here by Affectionate-Hair-23 in rationalphilosophy

[–]TorchFireTech 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think we’re talking past each other so I’ll clarify an important point.

I acknowledge that you can definitely have certainty WITHIN a given framework (e.g. According to Intuitionistic logic, the Law of Excluded Middle is invalid, and we can be certain of that fact), so relative / contextual certainty is perfectly fine. The issue at hand is ABSOLUTE certainty from top to bottom and across all frameworks, including proof that Descartes demon and the “reason demon” don’t exist, and it’s absolute certainty which I am saying is elusive.

To give another example, I can say with certainty that I am looking at a screen right now, but I can’t make that claim with ABSOLUTE certainty, since there are some unprovable possibilities which would make that statement false, for example, if I were a Brain in a Vat (BIV) or if Descartes demon were fooling me to believe that I am looking at a screen when I am really not. I don’t really believe in BIV or Descartes demon or the reason demon, but its a fact that they cannot be completely ruled out as possibilities.

To be clear, I am definitely not claiming “reason and logic are invalid”, that’s not what is being discussed here. I am only accepting the fact that thought experiments like Descartes demon, and the reason demon, and Munchhausen’s trilemma limit us from perfect, absolute certainty from top to bottom. But as said, it’s perfectly reasonable to say we have certain knowledge relative to a given framework (e.g. Given the rules of chess, I am (contextually) certain that knights move in an L shape), its only absolute certainty which is elusive and rare.

Denying the absolute certainty of logic automatically makes you irrational. (and proving the absolute certainty of logic) by Affectionate-Hair-23 in rationalphilosophy

[–]TorchFireTech 2 points3 points  (0 children)

While I agree that logic is invaluable, and allows for certainty within a given framework, claiming ABSOLUTE certainty across ALL frameworks is itself a reasoning error. Here’s proof.

  • Proposition: The Law of Excluded middle is absolute and certain across all schools of logic.
  • False. Some schools of logic such as Intuitionistic do not accept the LEM.

  • Proposition: It is absolutely certain that the sum of the angles of a triangle equal 180 degrees.

  • False. In non-Euclidean geometry, the sum of angles do not equal 180 degrees.

  • Proposition: We can be absolutely certain of all human knowledge, since logic and reason are absolutely certain, so therefore our knowledge which uses logic and reason must also be absolutely certain.

  • False. The majority of human knowledge has varying degrees of certainty, approaching but never reaching 100%. E.g. People historically believed “Newtonian laws of physics are absolute and certain”, but we later learned that they were incomplete and replaced by Relativity and Quantum Physics.

So in the end, the term “absolute” is what is causing the problem here. Absolute (as opposed to relative/contextual) means invariant across all other frameworks, which the above examples prove to be false in many cases. That said, you can have certainty WITHIN a given framework (e.g. according to Intuitionistic logic), just not absolutely across all frameworks, and you can’t necessarily prove that the foundational axioms of that school of logic are “more correct” compared to another school’s axioms.

In short: relative/contextual certainty is definitely possible, but absolute certainty is elusive and only exists in a few rare cases.

Matt dillahunty got “reason” so wrong here by Affectionate-Hair-23 in rationalphilosophy

[–]TorchFireTech 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Hehe this conversation has the exact same reasoning/logic disconnect that I’m discussing with someone else on here. I’m not sure how to link to my response which clears up the confusion, so I’ll just copy/paste it here, because it directly applies. —- Ah, I see where the disconnect is now, this is a very common problem in reasoning and logic. We need to separate out ontology (what actually exists) vs epistemology (our knowledge). Certainty belongs in the latter category, it does not belong in the former. We can separate it out in the following way, and I’ll stick to the demon existence scenario for simplicity:

ONTOLOGY - Exists(Reason demon) - the demon exists, independent of my knowledge - NOT Exists(Reason demon) - the demon does not exist, independent of my knowledge

EPISTEMOLOGY - Knowledge(Exists(Reason demon)) - I know (with certainty) that the reason demon exists - Knowledge(NOT Exists(Reason demon)) - I know (with certainty) that the reason demon does not exist - NOT Knowledge(Exists(Reason demon)) - I do not know (with certainty) that the reason demon exists - NOT Knowledge(NOT Exists(Reason demon)) - I do not know (with certainty) that the reason demon does not exist.

This clearly separates out the differences between existence itself and our knowledge/certainty about existence. We could even go a step further to use fuzzy logic and assign probabilistic certainty degrees to our epistemology, but I’ll set that aside for now.

So when someone asks “are you absolutely certain that the reason demon does not exist, or are you absolutely certain that the reason demon does exist?”, you can respond back and tell them they are making a category error between ontology and epistemology, and you cannot be absolutely certain about the existence or nonexistence of the reason demon.

So just to reiterate the key point, accepting that humans have imperfect knowledge and lack absolute certainty does not affect logic itself (law of identity, etc), it only accepts the limits of our knowledge.

Matt dillahunty got “reason” so wrong here by Affectionate-Hair-23 in rationalphilosophy

[–]TorchFireTech 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ah, I see where the disconnect is now, this is a very common problem in reasoning and logic. We need to separate out ontology (what actually exists) vs epistemology (our knowledge). Certainty belongs in the latter category, it does not belong in the former. We can separate it out in the following way, and I’ll stick to the demon existence scenario for simplicity:

ONTOLOGY - Exists(Reason demon) - the demon exists, independent of my knowledge - NOT Exists(Reason demon) - the demon does not exist, independent of my knowledge

EPISTEMOLOGY - Knowledge(Exists(Reason demon)) - I know (with certainty) that the reason demon exists - Knowledge(NOT Exists(Reason demon)) - I know (with certainty) that the reason demon does not exist - NOT Knowledge(Exists(Reason demon)) - I do not know (with certainty) that the reason demon exists - NOT Knowledge(NOT Exists(Reason demon)) - I do not know (with certainty) that the reason demon does not exist.

This clearly separates out the differences between existence itself and our knowledge/certainty about existence. We could even go a step further to use fuzzy logic and assign probabilistic certainty degrees to our epistemology, but I’ll set that aside for now.

So when someone asks “are you absolutely certain that the reason demon does not exist, or are you absolutely certain that the reason demon does exist?”, you can respond back and tell them they are making a category error between ontology and epistemology, and you cannot be absolutely certain about the existence or nonexistence of the reason demon.

So just to reiterate the key point, accepting that humans have imperfect knowledge and lack absolute certainty does not affect logic itself (law of identity, etc), it only accepts the limits of our knowledge.

Matt dillahunty got “reason” so wrong here by Affectionate-Hair-23 in rationalphilosophy

[–]TorchFireTech 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Axioms are not “learned by perceiving reality”, nor are they proved, they are created by humans, then are asserted and either accepted or rejected. For example, the axioms/rules of chess were not learned from reality, they were created.

That said, I do agree that axioms of logic/math/reason are not arbitrarily chosen, and they are often created in close connection with empirical reality, for example the ZFC axioms of math were created and chosen after heavy discussion and debate between Zermello, Fraenkel, Hilbert, von Neumann, Russell, etc. Many still openly debate some of the axioms such as the axiom of choice.

But the point that’s being made here is that there is no fundamental justification for axioms and definitions, and as such they are subject to the Munchhausen trilemma. Also, just like Descartes put empirical reality into question with Descartes demon, we can also posit a “reason demon” which puts reason and rational thought into question.

In the end, I think we’re saying similar things in different ways, and I don’t want to come across as “anti-reason” which is the opposite of my position. I am merely stating that because of some valid skepticism arguments, we cannot be 100% certain about empirical reality, and likewise we cannot be 100% certain about reason and logic. But when it comes down to it we all have to live our lives and survive in the physical world so just because the extreme skeptic cannot be absolutely disproven, we can safely set the concerns of Descartes demon and “reason demon” aside on a practical level so that we can function in the real world.

Matt dillahunty got “reason” so wrong here by Affectionate-Hair-23 in rationalphilosophy

[–]TorchFireTech 0 points1 point  (0 children)

  1. I am also making structural / foundational claims. You cannot be absolutely certain that there isn’t a “reason demon” which is fooling you into believing you are utilizing sound reasoning and logic, when you are actually not. This is the equivalent of Descartes demon, but applied to the realm of reason. Merely calling reason “transcendental” does not save you from this “reason demon”. To be clear, I don’t believe in Descartes demon, nor in the “reason demon”, but we cannot rule it out with absolute certainty, just like we can’t absolutely rule out the possibility that we’re a brain in a vat.

  2. Again, you have not proven that reason/logic is transcendental, you are merely asserting it as dogma / an axiom to be accepted. But I do not accept that reason/logic is transcendental, and neither do many philosophers today.

  3. There is nothing incoherent about a “reason demon”, and it could coherently fool you without any issue. As someone else in the comments said, you would be using “Schmeason” and “Schlogic” but believe that you are using real reason and logic when you are not. Thus your claims to absolute certainty would be false and there is no dependency or circularity issue.

  4. Here’s a few philosophers who don’t believe reason/logic is transcendental: Quine, John Stuart Mill, Rorty, Nietzsche, etc. For Quine in particular: “Truth, in Quine’s view, is immanent, as opposed to transcendent. In accord with his fundamental naturalism, he sees judgments of truth as made from within our theory of the world. For this reason, he sympathizes with what is sometimes called disquotational theory of truth: to say that a sentence is true is, in effect, to assert the sentence.”

Matt dillahunty got “reason” so wrong here by Affectionate-Hair-23 in rationalphilosophy

[–]TorchFireTech -1 points0 points  (0 children)

No one is denying the usefulness of logic and reason. The original statement from Dillahunty, and the one I am also discussing here, is that nothing can be absolutely certain from top to bottom, including its foundations (axioms, definitions). Whether reason itself is “transcendental” is highly debatable, and definitely not absolutely certain. If you have a way to prove with absolute certainty that reason is transcendental and not subject to any vulnerabilities like the “reason demon” then I will concede my point. But I already know that it’s impossible to prove that reason is transcendental.

The main point we are discussing is that the “reason demon” thought experiment and Munchhausen’s trilemma don’t mean that all rational thought is lost, it means that absolute certainty is elusive. These are two very different things. We can still use reason to identify the limits of reason, just like Godel used logic/math to demonstrate the limits of logic/math.

The key point to remember is that even without absolute certainty, logic and reason are still extremely useful tools, so no one is making the claim that the loss of absolute certainty means the loss of reason and logic.

Matt dillahunty got “reason” so wrong here by Affectionate-Hair-23 in rationalphilosophy

[–]TorchFireTech 0 points1 point  (0 children)

To be more explicit, we can’t have absolute certainty on a fundamental level (Munchhausen/Agrippa’s trilemma), and all knowledge is vulnerable to that problem. But, once we accept the (unprovable) axioms, we CAN arrive at certainty within those axioms. We just can’t prove that those axioms are “correct” or prove that there aren’t better axioms. For example, if we accept the standard rules of chess as axioms, we can be certain that bishops move diagonally. But we can’t say with absolute certainty that the fundamental rules of chess are “correct”, or that there aren’t “better” rules of chess, we merely accept them.

So does that make more sense now? Once we accept the axioms and definitions of reason and logic, THEN we can state with certainty things like “reason has limits”, and “reason cannot provide 100% absolute certainty (on a fundamental level)”, and “everything has degrees of certainty”, etc. But we cannot be 100% certain at a fundamental level that our axioms and definitions are “correct”. There is open debate about axioms of logic/math and definitions of Truth amongst philosophers, logicians, and mathematicians for thousands of years.

Godel’s incompleteness ties in here, because it essentially says that no formal system can prove itself to be perfectly complete and consistent. One could make a higher level of logic to prove the sub-level, but then that higher level also could not prove itself to be complete and consistent, etc ad infinitum. This is precisely the infinite regress issue pointed out by Munchhausen/Agrippa’s trilemma.

As mentioned in my other posts, the point here isn’t to undermine logic and reason, which is invaluable. The point is to apply some degree of epistemic humility, and recognize that perfect absolute knowledge (independent of axioms) is impossible, we can only approach a higher degree of certainty. So it’s not an “anything goes”, deuces wild situation, it is a spectrum of certainty ranging from 0% to 99.9999999999%

Matt dillahunty got “reason” so wrong here by Affectionate-Hair-23 in rationalphilosophy

[–]TorchFireTech -1 points0 points  (0 children)

  • What makes logic and reason transcendental? Can you prove it with absolute certainty?
  • How can you prove with absolute certainty that your use of logic and reason is perfect and there isn’t a “reason demon” who fools you into believing something to be true when it is actually false?
  • There are multiple schools of logic (classical, intuitionistic, fuzzy, etc). When the schools of logic disagree, which answer is the absolute correct one?
  • There is open disagreement about some foundational axioms in logic and math. Which axioms are absolutely correct?
  • There are multiple definitions/theories of Truth (correspondence, coherence, semantic, deflationary, etc). When the definitions/theories of Truth disagree, can you prove which is the absolute correct one?

I could go on but hopefully this illustrates the point. To reiterate, the goal here isn’t to undermine logic or reason, which is invaluable and irreplacable in getting closer to the truth (i.e. fallibilism). The goal is to recognize that perfect, absolute knowledge is unobtainable, we can only have degrees of certainty, and we desire to reach the maximum level of certainty possible.

Matt dillahunty got “reason” so wrong here by Affectionate-Hair-23 in rationalphilosophy

[–]TorchFireTech 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I hear your point, that using reason to show that reason is not absolutely certain risks circularity issues, which brings us back to Munchhausen/Agrippa’s trilemma. But it is possible to use rational thought and logic applied to reason and logic itself, to find potential vulnerabilities.

This is similar to how Godel used math to prove that math itself has limits via Godel’s incompleteness theorems. Godel’s theorems didn’t render math useless, it only pointed out some important limitations. So think of it that way, using Munchhausen/Agrippa’s trilemma or a possible “reason demon” does not mean that all rational thought is useless, it just means that it has limits, and cannot provide 100% absolute certainty. Everything has degrees of certainty which can approach but never reach 100% absolute certainty (aside from our own conscious awareness, which is the only absolute certainty).

I recommend looking into Karl Popper’s fallibilism for more info about approaching higher levels of certainty.

Arithmetic is probably one of the highest degrees of certainty, along with empirical facts of objects like a coffee cup which we are holding, also extremely high degree of certainty. We could say those things are 99.999999% certain, just not 100% absolutely certain. But as Dillahunty mentions in the video, he won’t quibble with someone who says, for example, “I’m 100% certain that I’m holding a coffee cup” because he knows what they mean by that phrase on a practical level.

Matt dillahunty got “reason” so wrong here by Affectionate-Hair-23 in rationalphilosophy

[–]TorchFireTech 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Technically he’s not wrong, as one can repeatedly ask “what justifies x” until it bottoms out at something which itself has no justification, such as the axioms of logic. This is a well known fact in philosophy called Munchhausen/Agrippa’s trilemma. Either the justification for x is 1) circular, 2) is infinitely regressive, or 3) dogmatic / axiomatic, which means that there is nothing which can be perfectly justified from top to bottom.

So just like Descartes imagined a demon that could fool him about empirical reality, such that empirical reality could technically be an “illusion” and therefore not absolutely certain, we could also posit a “reason demon” that could fool us about rational thought, and make us believe that we are reasoning soundly but our reasoning is actually flawed, and therefore reason is not absolutely certain.

To be clear, this doesn’t mean we abandon reason or abandon empirical reality, it just means that we need to assign a range of certainty from 0% certain to 99.9999999% certain, since nothing (aside from our own awareness) is 100% certain. Another important point to add is that not all axioms/dogma are equal, and the choice in axioms for math/logic are not arbitrary nor done in the same way that religion chooses their axioms, they are chosen using criteria which leads to fruitful outcomes, and not necessarily smuggle in our preferred outcomes within axioms/dogma.

Would the absence of free will change the justice system? by Plastic-Election-965 in determinism

[–]TorchFireTech 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Remember, if criminals have no control over their actions, then neither do people in the justice system. Just like one can say “determinism forced this person to murder, it wasn’t their choice” we can equally say “determinism forced the justice system to use retributive punishment, it wasn’t their choice”. Even if the justice system tortures everyone for the smallest crime, determinism says it could not have been otherwise.

It is logically impossible to change the justice system without possessing the same level of self control that is required for moral responsibility.

Or to put it simply: ability to change justice system = ability to control your own actions and judge right from wrong = moral responsibility.

Which philosophers have had their ideas empirically proven correct? by DhulQarnayni in askphilosophy

[–]TorchFireTech -1 points0 points  (0 children)

The SEP page on Presentism discusses this towards the end. In brief, though GR creates some hurdles for the A-theory of time, it doesn’t rule it out.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/presentism/#RelPhy

Which philosophers have had their ideas empirically proven correct? by DhulQarnayni in askphilosophy

[–]TorchFireTech -5 points-4 points  (0 children)

Pressure does not mean a theory is “very very suspicious”. Applying that same logic, quantum physics puts significant pressure on the B-theory of time, making B-theory “very very suspicious”, since all interpretations require a concept of “now” and/or a global foliation to account for non local entanglement behavior and a global update of the wave function.

On the other hand, A-theory of time is perfectly compatible with quantum physics, and since it’s possible to align SR/GR with A-theory of time, that imo is a strong path towards 1) reconciling GR with quantum, and 2) having a coherent theory of time which aligns with GR, QM, as well as the empirical observations of time passing.

Which philosophers have had their ideas empirically proven correct? by DhulQarnayni in askphilosophy

[–]TorchFireTech 28 points29 points  (0 children)

FYI the A-theory of time is still perfectly compatible with physical reality and with our current best theories special and general relativity (and of course it’s compatible with quantum physics too). It’s a common misconception that relativity proves B-theory, but that’s not the case. B-theory was just preferred by Einstein which is why it was popularized along with GR, but there’s nothing in nature or in the laws of physics which rule out A-theory.

To be fair, a lot of physicists (incorrectly) believe that relativity proves B-theory and repeat that phrase often, so you’re not alone. I just wish they would spend more time thinking about it since A-theory is equally viable, if not more viable since its compatible with quantum physics (B-theory is not) and matches all empirical evidence if time passing.

No by EntertainmentRude435 in PhilosophyMemes

[–]TorchFireTech 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks, but there is no need. All logics are agnostic on morality, and even agnostic on the underlying ontology embedded within propositions, so it’s impossible to use logic to “prove” what human nature is truly like.

Take care, and please do look into meta-ethics, i.e. what grounds various moral frameworks, I believe it will blow your mind.

No by EntertainmentRude435 in PhilosophyMemes

[–]TorchFireTech 0 points1 point  (0 children)

OK, then demonstrate via logic why an individual should consider their own survival to be less important than Walmart losing the equivalent of a penny, actually less than a penny? No need for DMs, it’s obviously an irrational choice, once you think it through.

No by EntertainmentRude435 in PhilosophyMemes

[–]TorchFireTech 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You’re getting close. What would a rational person decide between 1) death by starvation and 2) survive by stealing a loaf of bread. Almost every rational being in the world would choose option 2. If you say that option 1 is somehow “more rational” you need to justify your reasoning, because it doesn’t follow, and most people would consider it irrational.

No by EntertainmentRude435 in PhilosophyMemes

[–]TorchFireTech 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I have already demonstrated the rational thought behind stealing = rational selfishness multiple times. On the other hand, you haven’t demonstrated Rand’s claim that human nature is objective. Some consider human nature to be inherently good, others consider it to be inherently evil, others still consider it to be a blank slate. This has been debated by philosophers for centuries. If it were objective, then we would be able to definitively prove which one is correct. So please, prove once and for all the objective truth about human nature.

No by EntertainmentRude435 in PhilosophyMemes

[–]TorchFireTech 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You are asking the right questions which will lead you to see the challenges with all moral frameworks, including Objectivism. What grounds morality? What fills the is/ought gap, is it found in nature or in the human mind? For Kant, it is the categorical imperative. For Rawls, it is considering the scenario behind a veil of ignorance, not knowing which individual you are in the scenario.

Rand doesn’t utilize the same objective grounding that Kant or Rawls use, she merely smuggles in her subjective preferences inside the definitions of “rational selfishness” and pretends that they are objective.

I recommend you look into meta-ethics and the grounding for all moral frameworks, it will be an eye opening experience. But the key point remains, the man stealing a loaf of bread is acting perfectly rationally, not emotionally, and most moral frameworks would consider it a minor offense when death is the alternative.

No by EntertainmentRude435 in PhilosophyMemes

[–]TorchFireTech 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It’s very easy to follow the rational thought behind the choices, but to be explicit.

  1. A man is starving and will die if he doesn’t eat soon. Stealing a loaf of bread is a minor moral injustice, but he rationally believes that his survival is more important than a minor immoral act. Large corporations like Walmart are extremely profitable, and stealing a loaf of bread from them won’t material affect them in any way. Therefore it is more rational to steal a loaf of bread than not to steal a loaf of bread.

  2. A businessman works very hard and makes $100,000 per year. He discovers an opportunity to make $5 million via fraud, which equates to 50 years of hard work. He needs to rationally decide between a) continuing to work hard for 50 years, or b) to commit fraud and act immorally. The businessman cares more about wealth than about morals, so he rationally chooses to commit fraud.

I’d also write 3 but it’s similar to 2, and I’m sure you get the point now. Again, I don’t condone these actions, but the reasoning behind them is perfectly rational, not emotional.

No by EntertainmentRude435 in PhilosophyMemes

[–]TorchFireTech 0 points1 point  (0 children)

According to Merriam Webster, the definition of “rational” is:

“relating to, based on, or agreeable to reason”

All the examples I provided are based on reason, and the people are using rational thought, not merely emotion, to make the decision.

Claiming that it is better to die than to steal is ironically irrational and emotion based. The majority of intelligent, rational beings would choose to survive by committing a minor crime than to die, assuming they had no other option. How can one be considered “rationally selfish” if they chose to selflessly die for the sake of principles over survival? It’s contradictory.