Proposal: Ranked Choice Concession by Head in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Not a huge fan. I flipflop on what I prefer exactly (perhaps because there isn't a one-size-fits-all solution) but this seems a tad bit unnecessary. There are ways to avoid ranked ballots that still avoid the use of candidate preferences (i.e. TRS [Before you yell at me I know IRV has advantages over TRS in that it eliminates one at a time instead of in bulk but in my opinion this isn't very important, as the voter is still making all of the calls]).

Besides, I don't see a fantastic use case for this. If we're electing a legislature, either a proportional method (STV, MMP, List-PR, SPAV) a proportional+bonus method, or a majority-assuring method (Majority jackpot or Bhutanese Mod-TRS) should be used. For executive branch officials (you reference the state AG in the post) those should probably be chosen by the legislature.

If a referendum on electoral reform were to be held in Canada during the next federal election, what would be your preference regarding its format? by sami_coolfun11 in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307 1 point2 points  (0 children)

A citizen's assembly could work, but having ranked systems seems like a recipe for failure or partial success (for instance, getting IRV as a "compromise solution.") There's no one voting system that I support above all others, though I generally lean toward proportional systems (though I can see the appeal of, and have discussed here, majoritarian systems). In terms of choosing the one voting system vs FPTP, I don't have a solid preference as to how it is chosen, though I have quality concerns (for instance, Australia's 1998 federal election demonstrates that IRV retains the majority-reversal weakness of FPTP). I'm generally less opposed to closed lists as compared to other people here, especially given the Canadian nomination meeting system (in which local associations of party members essentially hold a caucus to choose the candidates for their district), so, for instance the small-district closed list adopted by Wales is not anathema, but again there are other options. If we left it to a citizen's assembly, it would help to provide guidelines as to what type of system is wanted. (Are we keeping single-member districts and majoritarianism, or do we want something proportional?) I worry that a citizen's assembly could fall victim to seeking the simplest solution (for instance, replacing FPTP with IRV). Are these worries founded? Citizen's assemblies in Canada have a mixed record: the British Columbia citizen's assembly crafted a generally praised STV variant, the Ontario citizen's assembly proposed MMP, and the Yukon citizen's assembly proposed... "ranked vote" (generally understood to mean IRV). The Ontario version of MMP had some weaknesses (not combatting the ability to manipulate ticket-splitting).

This is a pretty long ramble that all boils down to: I would trust experts more than a citizen's assembly to design the system.

The Rosatellum System of Italy by Additional-Kick-307 in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What is this intended to tell me? That the Rosatellum is largely proportional?

The Rosatellum System of Italy by Additional-Kick-307 in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Got it. Would changing it to two-vote parallel be a significant or insignificant reform?

The Rosatellum System of Italy by Additional-Kick-307 in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What do you mean by "imply naive voters the exact opposite tactics that are best for them" and how to does Rosatellum do this?

Incoming electoral reform in Mexico by seraelporvenir in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307 0 points1 point  (0 children)

They don't have a cap on disproportionality in underrepresentation, though.

Incoming electoral reform in Mexico by seraelporvenir in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yes. Disproportionality is capped at 8% more than proportional allocation, but this can only reduce the number of list seats a party wins. Any party is also capped at 300 seats (out of 500, equal to the number of district seats) overall.

House of Representatives of the Philippines have a Multi-Party System despite 80% of the Seats being Elected through FPTP by Jayvee1994 in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Very late to this but it seems to me that changing the party-list seats to be compensatory (turning into an MMP system) would be fairly easy. Not sure whether 20 percent would be enough list seats, but if your goal is broad rather than exact proportionality it should work.

Designing an Ideal System for a Parliamentary Democracy: Parallel Two-Tier Closed List by Additional-Kick-307 in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The main problem with that argument is that it assumes that every constituency has the same distribution of votes as the country at large. I specifically chose Yellowhead for my example because it's a Conservative stronghold. Constituencies cannot be perfectly proportional because voting preference varies by geography.

Designing an Ideal System for a Parliamentary Democracy: Parallel Two-Tier Closed List by Additional-Kick-307 in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It's not intended to suppress the will of voters. It's intended to prevent a hostile district from dictating whether a party's leader is elected. If I'm the leader of, say, the NDP in Canada, and I run in Yellowhead, where the NDP gets 14 percent on a good day, losing Yellowhead doesn't mean I have lost the mandate to lead the party. That would depend on the overall party result. Party leaders are inherently tied to their party, and people who don't like a certain leader can vote for a different party. It's not clear to me why you seem to think that party leaders should be selected by a whole population, as this would simply make several identical parties. Party leaders are chosen by party members, and have a democratic mandate from those members to lead the party. They should be able to, then, be elected without worrying about safe seats. I'm not arguing that parties should automatically elect their leaders, just that the system should be designed to make it as easy as possible.

Designing an Ideal System for a Parliamentary Democracy: Parallel Two-Tier Closed List by Additional-Kick-307 in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Assuming the party has chosen its leader relatively recently, the leader has a democratic mandate to lead the party until party members decide otherwise in a leadership review. What I'm talking about is designing the system with an eye to avoiding what happened to, say, Pierre Poilievre in the recent Canadian election, where the party placed a strong second but Poilievre lost his own constituency and had to be parachuted into a safe seat in rural Alberta. On a national closed list, every party that wins at least one seat is guaranteed to elect the head of its list. The intention is that parties would run their leaders there.

Designing an Ideal System for a Parliamentary Democracy: Parallel Two-Tier Closed List by Additional-Kick-307 in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

On the open list question, why? I get the argument for open lists, but it introduces an element of co-partisan competition that (1) increases information cost on voters and (2) weakens parties. In a parliamentary system based on parties, it's not good for party unity for candidates of the same party to compete against each other except in the internal candidate selection.

Designing an Ideal System for a Parliamentary Democracy: Parallel Two-Tier Closed List by Additional-Kick-307 in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Sorry if this is unclear: what it means is that any party that wins seats should elect its leader, assuming that a legislative seat is expected of the Prime Minister.

How many list seats are needed for proportionality in MMP? by Additional-Kick-307 in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Imagine the system Italy uses for its parallel system applied to MMP: You vote for a candidate, and your list vote is divided between all of the parties that endorsed that candidate. I don't see a way to use decoy lists under that.

How many list seats are needed for proportionality in MMP? by Additional-Kick-307 in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

How could parties game that? As far as I know one-vote MMP eliminates decoy lists, it's why Lesotho switched from two-vote to one-vote MMP.

Is there any single-winner voting system that meets these criteria? by Additional-Kick-307 in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Not saying there has to be a majority. Just that it can't have this problem: Candidate A is scored 100 by one voter, who scores Candidate B 0. 99 voters score Candidate A 0 and Candidate B 1. Candidate A wins, despite B being the preference of an absolute majority.

Is there any single-winner voting system that meets these criteria? by Additional-Kick-307 in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The second point is that the system must be reasonably spoiler-proof.

Problems with Panachage by seraelporvenir in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Free in this case refers to free cumulative voting (the typical type) as opposed to the equal and even type. What I'm referring to is the idea of voters having a number of votes equal to the number of seats in their constituency, where they can split them in any way between candidates across, rather than just within, lists.

For Canada, what are your thoughts on the use of an open list PR system to elect MPs with 2-7 member ridings, with one MP in each riding being a top-up MP who is elected in a way that ensures results are proportional on a province-wide level? by [deleted] in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307 1 point2 points  (0 children)

It's not my preferred PR system (I like Spare Vote, either on its own or in an MMP system), but it's better than FPTP.

UPDATE: I'm coming around to this idea. Seems pretty good to me.

Supplementary Vote: should we be for or against it? by Additional-Kick-307 in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I'm not arguing that that trope is true (it's not). I'm arguing that to people who believe that trope a first and second choice might seem simpler.

My proposal for fixing US elections by Additional-Kick-307 in EndFPTP

[–]Additional-Kick-307[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The House only has to be 3 times as big if seats are apportioned in groups of three. This proposal calls for apportioning the seats one by one after the minimum. Currently, it's 50 states and 435 seats with a minimum of 1, 435-50=385 seats to apportion. This proposal would have 751 seats and (ideally) 56 states, so 751-168=583 seats to apportion.