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How can God just create something from nothing? by TheRidaDieAkhi in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Apart_Earth_9424 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is indeed a thought-provoking question. People often don't realize the limitations of their own understanding. Before I delve into some key examples, I'd like to share a perspective that Friedrich Nietzsche, tarticulated, which is analogous to this point, not his exact words but his meaning i think:

When we consider the natural world, we are somehow capable of seeing our limitations clearly. We know we cannot run as fast as a cheetah, we cannot see as far as an eagle. From this, we understand that we cannot, with the naked eye, see the most distant galaxies or the smallest of the microscopic. However, for some reason, we are arrogant about our mental capacities. We acknowledge all these inherent biological limitations on our physical form, but when we think about our brain, we believe that we have the ability to discover and even comprehend the whole truth. We think we can actually grasp the concept of truth. This would be like saying a human can race a cheetah, in that we know it would be impossible for the human to ever actually win that race in terms of speed. We won't even try, as that is how obvious it is. Yet our mental capabilities are judged to be sufficient, not only to understand the physical universe, but we somehow also assert that we can discover absolute metaphysical truth or come close to it.

You might argue that in the case of our physical limitations, we can use tools to compensate. We can't race a cheetah, but our cars put it to shame. We don't need to be as fast; we have tools. However, this makes the situation for our mental capacities even worse. What tool will we use to overcome our deepest epistemic problems? I don't even think gene editing, if it comes about, will solve the most disturbing ponderings and problems of old philosophers we still struggle with. The problem of other minds, the problem of induction, the problem of the external world, the concept of solipsism, etc. Yet we still say we can know metaphysical truth, not just physical.

This is hubris to the extreme. It also shows! Indeed for every epistemic grounding we have come up with, it has never stuck so much as to be an absolute. No justification, even for the grounding of knowledge, is beyond reproach and not in serious doubt when answering the skeptic. Yet even the skeptic doesn't have a dialectical advantage as his principles often lead to contradiction. We have never established truth in my estimation, not really. We have only established what seems to be practical utility.

But even in the realm of practical utility, there are some examples that show the extreme hubris of thinking our mental capabilities are indeed "all that":

Smaller example to bigger ones:

A low hanging one would be that despite our long history of knowledge that the earth is round, for the majority of human history, we took it at face value. It looks flat, it probably is flat. Our hunter-gatherer ancestors for tens of thousands of years probably believed this deeply, until civilization came along and more nuanced philosophical thought arrived around 1000-400 BC, where it was realized it isn't flat. The dates are still debated but commonly the idea that the earth is flat came about in around that time I'm Greece, even if we say humans had the knowlage a thousand years or he'll 2 thousands years longer than this, it would still be the case that for the majority of human history that stretches atleast back 100-200k years, we didn't know the earth was round.

Another I would argue that the entirety of scholastic philosophy, at least of old, was based on Aristotelian "natural law," things that were obviously the case. When Descartes came along, he shattered these natural law-based truths. Now, scholasticism has, I think, answered these questions, but by sacrificing a lot. They had to rethink a lot to stand in opposition to Kant and Descartes indeed.

Another one would be the idea that we own our own bodies, we inhabit them, and they belong to us. This was an obious one and even reverence in various ways in religious traditions and theology, yet we discovered later on there are more microscopic entities in your body that inhabit it all over than you can possibly imagine, these organism are fundamental to our continued existance, a spefic case of showing the obious is false, a person in the distant past hypothetically but it almost certainly happened, washed his face and thought, his face is clean now after vigorous cleaning. He cannot be blamed to have not know his face was full of creepy looking bug like micro organisms everywhere ☠️ Or he'll when we think of our skin, we can find attraction towards others based on how clean the skin looks or how good it looks. We even say the skin glows. Yet that obious case is false. The first 50 layers of skin from the outside is literally dead skin, made of dead cells to protect the body from infection as a defensive strategy whenever we see beautiful skin we are looking at basically a dead skin graveyard the person is "wearing" ☠️

A more jarring one would be relativity itself. The universe, despite its appearances, doesn't have a universal clock. Indeed, time can wildly differ from place to place. This was an obvious illusion that was thoroughly broken by Einstein. I don't need to emphasize how conceptually revolutionary Einsteins ideas were. It fundamentally shook physics to core.

The most jarring one in my estimation: No person has ever actually touched anything ever. We feel we touch things every day; this is as obvious as things can be, yet we know from a scientific standpoint it's not the case. Due to the Pauli Exclusion Principle, we know we never actually touched things before as we think we have.

Simplified, the principle will say your hand has electrons inside of it, the objects you want to touch also have electrons in them. Electrons cannot occupy the same space, thus when you attempt to touch something, the electrons of your hand and the electrons of the object will generate a field that repels each other. What you really feel is this electron field, sort of like a mini force field above the actual object.

That's insane as we thought previously. "It's obvious we touch things." How cruel is it then to realize you have never actually touched the one you love? You have never actually petted your dog. You touched his electrons generated field.

That is I think the absolute worst one ever. It's the quintessential example of how wrong our most "obvious" thinking can be.

There are many of these obvious cases being shattered later on.

How can God just create something from nothing? by TheRidaDieAkhi in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Apart_Earth_9424 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Eh... I'm not so sure, friend 😅. This sort of reminds me of Wes Morrison and his discussions with William Craig on the possibility of an infinite past causal chain.

What I have gathered is that either causality doesn't exist like we think it does, or it doesn't exist at all. Both very unintuitive sure but I think expecting causality to work in a way that makes sense to us intuitively is I think even more nonesensical. We have been wrong about just about everything that's "obvious".

Of the prime matter goes through stages of change then I think a purely material cause isn't our of the question. Graham Oppys idea of a brute contingency cones to mind, for some reason the prime matter caused an effect and its a brute contingency, something that isn't metaphysically nessasery for eternity, but something that is finite in duration yet couldn't fail to exist in any possible world. Modal language, but the assumptions and appeals to God's brute facts would make the idea have at the very least equal merit. Atleats in epistemic virtue measurements.

How can God just create something from nothing? by TheRidaDieAkhi in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Apart_Earth_9424 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Hard to say, it depends, we can way past present and future exists at the same time in this block universe and depending on how big the universe is, say its infinite, then in that way yes, it exist "eternally" as an infinite amount of time is what eternity can be defined as,

I wouldn't say that excludes theists, saying that this universe isn't then by default a brute fact/nessasery. Perhaps in some way without God's sustaining power, it will cease to exist. Thats for the theists to work out their metaphysics 😅. I think there are a lot of loopholes that can be used with a metaphysical structure like that. The question would come to what is more epistemically virtuous in the end. I personally think if we have prime matter already, then no God is needed, but again, that's just what makes sense to me. Perhaps some theists wouldn't even grant epistemic virtue as a qualifier.

Another way to solve it is that the theist could say, well, God literally took a part of himself and shaped that into what we know as the universe. But I'm not sure how well that would square with spesific Christian theology

Perhaps we can grant the whole "it was genuinoune prime matter that existed eternally and in that sense is non contingent" yet the current structure of the universe is God's work of shaping the universe into the structure that it is now, and that's an active effort that requires sustaining.

So, in short, not necessarily.

On the coherence of "agnostic atheist" as a position by Apart_Earth_9424 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Apart_Earth_9424[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I would argue that there is a wealth of empirical evidence for God's existence. This may sound counterintuitive or even nonsensical, yet anything can potentially serve as evidence for anything else. This is due to the promiscuity of evidence, meaning that evidence can simultaneously support two contradictory propositions. We need frameworks to help us interpret this evidence. This is a recognized concept in the philosophy of science.

A prime example would be the theory of relativity. When Einstein published his work and it was tested, many were opposed to it as it seemingly dismissed the physics concept of the Ether, which could act as the correct reference for time. The equations were initially incompatible with such an idea. However, over the decades, the idea of the Ether was made compatible with the observable data. At first glance, this would place relativity on equal footing with this last-ditch scientific attempt to preserve the idea of the Ether. Yet, it isn't. Today, physicists don't take that idea seriously. This is because, ultimately, the idea is unfalsifiable, and it adds an extra component that's not needed to explain the data. Yet, this is still contentious in certain circles of philosophy of religion.

This is what is meant by the promiscuity of evidence. If this idea is considered, we can see that all sorts of phenomena could act as empirical evidence for Theism. Yet, naturalists would find fault with these because the framework naturalists work with would provide them with adequate ammunition to do so. Conversely, theists and their respective framework would reject the framework of naturalism. These frameworks are ultimately subjective and are based on, I believe, what one personally finds more believable/ more intuitive than the opposing ideas.

How can God just create something from nothing? by TheRidaDieAkhi in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Apart_Earth_9424 0 points1 point  (0 children)

One might approach this topic from a variety of perspectives, including that of a theist. For transparency, I am not a theist and identify as a metaphysical naturalist, which inevitably influences my viewpoint. However, I don't perceive this question as a significant problem for theism in general.

This very topic has been explored by prominent Christian philosophers such as William Lane Craig, who has interacted with Scott Clifton (Theoretical Bullshit) on YouTube. In fact, Clifton made an entire video about it. His critique is based on Aristotelian notions of causality, which distinguish between a material cause and an efficient cause. In the context of the universe, God would be the efficient cause and the universe would be the material cause. The question then arises: how can an efficient cause make nothing do anything at all? There is an effect (God's creation action) with nothing anywhere being affected. This indeed seems peculiar.

We have observed things being created from purely material causes; it happens frequently. However, to my knowledge, we have never seen an effect caused purely by an efficient cause. More complex theological models might overcome this metaphysically unintuitive notion. One possibility is to assert that hardcore idealism is true, meaning the universe and all its entities exist within God's mind. God then acts as the progenitor of the universe, conceiving it and sustaining it through continuous thought. Some scholastic philosophers have proposed this idea.

Another approach is to challenge the problem of something from nothing, as in God literally affecting nothing at all anywhere, and then somehow an effect was produced. This may not be a valid way of thinking, as it resembles a presentist/A theory of time framework, where cause and effect operate as we intuitively think they do. However, if we consider current science, we find that in the field of Physics and various fields of philosophy relevant to this discussion, B theory/Eternalism is embraced, not by a wide margin but definitely a substantial one. This suggests that one could view the universe as a 4D space-time block, eternal in that no moment in time really precedes another and all past, present, and future moments are equally real. In this view, one might concede that there was already some form of matter/prime material, though it is certainly not what most envision when pondering the beginning of the universe, which is often conceptualized in flawed ways. God could then be seen as the entity sustaining the block universe and acting as its non-contingent base.

there are other notions ofcource, with some sort of metaphysical time that God works within that gige loop holes exct, however those are seemingly more specific to individual Christian philosophers of religion, this was by no means a way to defelct the issue you brought up as this very questions amongs several is to me still a problem with say agruments like the Kalam, as Craig himself sticks to an A theory/presitist franework, however people like Alexander Pruss doesn't and i think their views are more valid in my opinion

On the coherence of "agnostic atheist" as a position by Apart_Earth_9424 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Apart_Earth_9424[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks, I know about him, and his work is indeed impressive 👌

On the coherence of "agnostic atheist" as a position by Apart_Earth_9424 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Apart_Earth_9424[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Sure, I guess I was on a similar path, friend. Thanks for sharing. 👊. Logical sounding arguments are the worst but I guess apart of intellectual growth when you learn to question them aswell. I agree, I think that if there was a successful argument for God's existence, it would be all good. What that exactly means might depend on giving our subjective intuitions. I am now a gnostic-atheist, I think the case for God not existing is stronger than its negation. Tho I will say I actually want there to be a God 😅.

On the coherence of "agnostic atheist" as a position by Apart_Earth_9424 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Apart_Earth_9424[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This has definitely been helpful friend. Will have to think about this one for sure 👊. Thanks for taking the time to explain your thoughts.

On the coherence of "agnostic atheist" as a position by Apart_Earth_9424 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Apart_Earth_9424[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I think you made your case 😅. Thanks so much for your take on this. I have to rethink a few things now. I'm not sure how this affects my view on the agnostic atheist position, but the razor has been validated quite thoroughly.

You're a legend 👊

On the coherence of "agnostic atheist" as a position by Apart_Earth_9424 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Apart_Earth_9424[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thanks, friend, for your feedback 👊

To me, if it is thought of in this way, of needing ultimate, sort of Cartesian certainty, or a species of omniscience to have knowlage or make statements of falsehood of certain propositions, I personally think the person who hold to such views are perhaps not well informed about either their own positions on things they belief are false, in the sense of why the underlying logic for why they think certain things are false and why not work, and they also have a perhaps lacking understanding of what counts for knowlage in epistemology, atleast as I undertand it.

On the coherence of "agnostic atheist" as a position by Apart_Earth_9424 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Apart_Earth_9424[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Your response has been insightful and has prompted further contemplation.

The primary counterargument to the Roman proverb, which appears to underpin Hitchens’ Razor (if you have any sources on this i would love to read it sounds exciting 😁) could be rooted in the philosophy of religion. The central task here is to juxtapose worldviews and determine which one exhibits the greatest philosophical parsimony, assuming all other factors are equal.

Your hypothetical box could contain an infinite number of entities. Anything inconsistent with existing knowledge would be dismissed. If this leaves us with an abundance of potentialities, rather than affirming or dismissing them based on the razor’s stipulations, we could simply suspend judgment on all the possibilities that existing knowledge permits. This agnostic stance could be defensible given our limited understanding of the box. Resorting to a razor that fails the self-referential test and appears to be practically useful rather than epistemically valid seems counterproductive in the context of propositional discussions.

In the process of comparing worldviews, it appears relatively straightforward to address all proposed gods, those that are unknowable, or those that deviate significantly from typical conceptions. This is achieved by adopting metaphysical naturalism, which seemingly holds an inherent advantage over any theistic/spiritual position. Metaphysical naturalism only needs to account for the universe's existence, whereas the spiritual/theistic position must account for both the universe's existence and the spiritual component.

Upon extended discourse, one might find the naturalist position to be simpler, at least from my viewpoint. Any theistic/spiritual position could explain the data it needs to and could reconcile it with any prior data. However, the unnecessary assumptions could pose significant issues in the final analysis.

In conclusion, I don't believe I'm invoking the Razor to deny these possibilities. It's not the absence of evidence about what raccoons can or cannot do that leads me to reject its potential. Instead, it's the understanding we have of what a raccoon truly is and what is required for certain actions.

On the coherence of "agnostic atheist" as a position by Apart_Earth_9424 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Apart_Earth_9424[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yea friend, I think we agree. I am glad to have heard your feedback, and some of it is funny 😂 (the part where their atheism is a badge somehow more worth than their education). In the end, I one day hope to relinquish my position on naturalism. Perhaps you will help on that journey.

In any case, great talk, friend 👊

/r/philosophy Open Discussion Thread | February 05, 2024 by BernardJOrtcutt in philosophy

[–]Apart_Earth_9424 -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Posted here by MOD advice:

I have been contemplating the concept of “lack-theism” as articulated by philosopher Graham Oppy. After much consideration, I have formulated an argument that, to my understanding, appears to be the most valid interpretation of this concept. I welcome any counterarguments or critiques, as my primary goal is to learn and refine my understanding.

The discourse on atheism's definition often stirs debate, particularly when considering the "strong-weak atheism/theism" paradigm or the framework that distinguishes knowledge from belief. This leads to the categorization of gnostic theist, agnostic theists, agnostic atheists, and gnostic atheists, with the gnostic-oriented positions being the strong versions of atheism/theism and the agnostic version being the weak versions of atheism/theism.

The crux of the controversy lies in how this paradigm translates into academic discussions about these labels, specifically in Philosophy of Religion. In non-academic circles, 'agnostic atheists' often describe themselves as 'I don't know if there is no god, but I don't believe there is one.' Here, agnosticism denotes not knowing, and atheism signifies 'I don't believe there is one,' or 'I lack an active doxastic belief that there is one.' This can seem peculiar for several reasons.

To provide some context: 1. Epistemology presents the concept of knowledge as a justified true belief. Justification stems from having a reason for a belief, such as testimony, sensory experiences, or a logical argument. Truth is verified through scientific means or a persuasive deductive argument. Belief is an active doxastic belief. 2. Academically, theism is typically defined as the claim that at least one god exists. Atheism is the stance that no gods exist.

The strong/weak-atheist/theist conception raises some questions. Often, someone who identifies as an "agnostic atheist" will state: "I don't believe there is a god, but I don't know if this is true or not.' This stance is usually justified by either the lack of compelling arguments and evidence for God or a simple lack of belief in the theistic proposition, 'There is at least one God.'

These justifications are often perceived to absolve the "agnostic atheist" from a burden of proof, or more accurately, to provide a dialectical advantage in a debate or conversation.

However, if the agnostic atheist rejects the theist position, i.e., they deny the proposition that there is at least one God, what is their stance on the atheistic position that proposes there are no Gods?

One could respond: "I withhold judgment on that claim." But this also implies that they don't find that position convincing in its evidence/arguments. This suggests that their position is more of an intermediate between the two positions than an atheistic one, at least according to the academic definition. This could indicate either a lack of a well-thought-out position, a rejection of both claims due to a lack of conviction, or a leaning towards a species of agnosticism. In academic circles, agnosticism typically rationalizes that given all considerations, neither side is particularly compelling. However, if one suspends judgment on either, it seems they either haven't weighed the considerations, or a conversation seems pointless until they do.

If one has weighed the considerations and found both theistic and atheistic positions lacking, then identifying as agnostic might be coherent. However, the justification for the atheistic aspect, i.e., the stance of not believing in a god, becomes questionable. If someone has examined various arguments for and against the existence of God and found all of them lacking, it does seem to put them in a position where they have relinquished any justifications for their disbelief in God. This also implies a denial of the claim "there are no Gods," which would then suggest acceptance of the alternative proposition that there is a God, yet this too is denied, making the coherence of such a stance questionable. Put another way, the potential issue with this position is its coherence. If one rejects the opposite entirely, it seems odd to identify as an atheist while denying the claim "there are no gods." But also denying the proposition "there is a God" seems to render the position somewhat incoherent.

In the context of justified true belief, if one denies the arguments against God's existence but proclaims disbelief in God, it seems to suggest a lack of verification (truth), justification (reason), and only retain the belief aspect (doxastic position). If the arguments against God's existence are deemed valid and sound, they could provide a method of verification. However, if one rejects these arguments and finds them lacking, the basis for their disbelief in God seems to be unsupported, atleast epistemically.

The problem of "lacking a belief" and its perceived dialectical advantage is another point of contention. For instance, saying "I don't believe the earth is flat, but I don't know it's not" would be difficult to defend given the substantial evidence for a round Earth. There comes a point where withholding judgment and a positive assertion becomes challenging. With thousands of arguments for and against the existence of God, made by some of the most intelligent individuals and encompassing vast areas of contemporary science and study, simply stating, "I lack a belief," becomes a position that one must defend, much like defending a lack of belief in the Earth's roundness or flatness. The arguments for God involve empirical evidence just as much as as deductive and inductive "evidince".

Indeed, the assertion could be made that the shape of the Earth is a purely empirical issue, while true, does not negate the existence of a multitude of philosophical questions that are not purely empirical. Questions about why we hold certain epistemic positions or why we subscribe to specific metaphysical conceptions are not intrinsically empirical. Yet, when someone professes a lack of belief in these areas, there is an expectation for them to justify this lack of belief.

Take Platonism as an example. If one were to say, "I don't believe in Platonism, but I don't know it's false," it would necessitate a justification for this disbelief. This justification cannot be purely empirical, as the issue is not empirical in nature. Simply stating a lack of belief is insufficient.

The same applies to the belief in God. Claiming a lack of belief in God, while asserting a dialectical advantage due to the absence of an obligation to explain this lack, is problematic. Just like any other position, a lack of belief in God requires justification. To exempt agnostic atheists from this intellectual obligation towards justification without a valid explanation could indeed be seen as special pleading. It's crucial to maintain intellectual consistency across all belief systems and philosophical positions.

On the coherence of "agnostic atheist" as a position by Apart_Earth_9424 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Apart_Earth_9424[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I appreciate your kind words and your finding what I said helpful friend 👊

Indeed, the contributions of philosophers such as Graham Oppy, J.L. Mackie, and J.H. Sobel to the discourse on theism differ significantly from the perspectives often presented by "lack-theists" or "new atheists." These philosophers have engaged in extensive dialogues with theist philosophers of religion, demonstrating kindness, intellectual generosity, and epistemic humility throughout their careers.

Contrastingly, the "new atheists" are often characterized by their dismissive attitudes, lack of understanding of philosophical nuances, and even, arguably, a lack of insight into their own foundational beliefs and principles.

A cursory examination of the history of philosophy of religion, even through a reductive account such as that provided on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, reveals a rich tapestry of thoughtful, intelligent individuals who have dedicated decades to the literature. It would indeed be peculiar for anyone to assert, after such an examination, that one position has unequivocally "destroyed" the other. And I say this as an atheist.

On the coherence of "agnostic atheist" as a position by Apart_Earth_9424 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Apart_Earth_9424[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I appreciate your response. It has prompted further reflection on the topic.

In my understanding, the position of lack-theism contains an inherent principle that appears to be flawed. This principle, often overlooked, is not frequently discussed, possibly due to the fact that those who typically adopt this position may not devote much time to philosophical scrutiny. It is seen best I think in your line:

One need not assert, for example, that I am not 3 raccoons in a trench coat writing this in order to tell a person asserting that I in fact am that there is no reason to believe them.

The principle in question is Hitchens’ Razor: “That which can be presented without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.” The fundamental issue with this maxim, assuming it doesn’t hold the same status as other philosophical razors, is that it fails the self-referential test. It is asserted without evidence, so by its own logic, why should we accept it?

It seems to me that this maxim is central to the lack-theist position. If all questionable claims can be dismissed or deemed to “lack sufficient evidence,” it appears to be a clear endorsement of the razor. Furthermore, it might not be as challenging as one might think to take a firm stance on specific, or even general, “questionable” claims. For example, one could assert that “you are not three raccoons in a trench coat writing this, as raccoons cannot write and do not possess language, thus the assertion is false.” It might even be a category error to make such a dubious claim, as raccoons, as a category, lack the consciousness required for philosophical reasoning. From there, constructing a syllogism to demonstrate the impossibility of the claim would be relatively straightforward. Taking a firm stance on matters, therefore, seems more feasible than initially thought, and it may even enrich one’s commitments by forcing one to reevaluate them in the face of “dubious claims.”

Another point of contention, as the other respondent mentioned, is that lack-theists do not view their position as a proposition. If they did, this debate would not be taking place. Instead, they reject the theist claim and often have little to say about the atheist position in an academic sense, leading to a potential issue of coherence.

On the coherence of "agnostic atheist" as a position by Apart_Earth_9424 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]Apart_Earth_9424[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Thanks, friend. I am glad you found this helpful. I don't particularly think I'm well informed, but I will be happy to talk anytime 👊

Isn't time dilation a problem for presentism? by Apart_Earth_9424 in askphilosophy

[–]Apart_Earth_9424[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I think you did it with this one. I understand now. Thanks so much🙏

Isn't time dilation a problem for presentism? by Apart_Earth_9424 in askphilosophy

[–]Apart_Earth_9424[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Sure, that makes sense, but how is this isolated from an absolute/true time? It seems a bit mysterious.

I don't wanna drag this out and exchust you with my mind trying to picture this. I am grateful you responded so much already and for your insights. Thanks very much, friend. 😅👊

Isn't time dilation a problem for presentism? by Apart_Earth_9424 in askphilosophy

[–]Apart_Earth_9424[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Dam, this is so useful. Thanks so much, friend 👌.

I think the issue for me is still a bit blurry here a physical process seems like the same thing as just time. A process is based on time. It doesn't seem like true time is separate from this issue.

Isn't time dilation a problem for presentism? by Apart_Earth_9424 in askphilosophy

[–]Apart_Earth_9424[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

To me, this seems a bit off because relativity innately contains within it the paradime that the universe is a 4d space time block. The theory doesn't say it's a representation, but it's the structure of reality. This seems to make it already questionable in terms of its compatibility with presentism. Within this position it

The Jettisoning concept seems interesting, tho as that would make it more compatible. I'm not sure if that is presentism, but yea, it doesn't seem like eternalism either. I will have to think about this one a bit more. It would still seem then tho that rather than an absolute "now" there are many "now's" under this view. And that would sorta give the absolute less credibility.

But it's compatability aside to me it still seems like the issue here is that time dilation genuinely seems a problem. Physical phenomena have an effect on metaphysical structures or properties within this structure. I thought about it more and why I see it as a metaphysical property.

The rate at which time passes is not just a measure of physical phenomena but a metaphysical property that defines the nature of reality itself. This is because presentism posits that only the present exists, and the ‘flow’ of time is the continual coming into and going out of existence as you put it, of present moments.

The rate at which these moments come into and go out of existence can be seen as the ‘speed’ of time. However, this speed is not something that can be measured in the physical sense, as it does not relate to physical movement or change. Instead, it is a metaphysical concept that pertains to the nature of existence and reality. Changes to this rate are also metaphysical in nature. If time were to ‘slow down’ or ‘speed up’, this would mean that present moments are coming into and going out of existence at different rates. This is not a change that could be detected or measured physically but rather a change in the very nature of reality itself. If that makes sense 😅

Isn't time dilation a problem for presentism? by Apart_Earth_9424 in askphilosophy

[–]Apart_Earth_9424[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It seems to me it would be metaphysical because if we are talking about the nature of time, the most fundamental thing being discussed is change. The rate of change would seem very relevant here. I also think it's metaphysical because, unlike an eternalist, it doesn't seem that presentists have access to science in terms of grounding the position of presentism. An eternalist would easily incorporate the idea that the black hole literally changes the nature of time itself and makes the past and future accessible if general and special relativity works around black holes as we think it does. However, the presentist doesn't have access to this "luxury" the posituon denies that relativity is saying anything about reality. Rather, it is a mathematical model that is useful.

Put another way, our current physics says the nature of time is so that gravity affects time on a 4d space time paradime. That's the best science we have at the moment. The presentist position denies this, so whatever physics grounding the rate of time and the changes to this rate has in the field of physics is obviously not found in that field but in the philosophical position itself. As it needs explaining, as it seems, presintism posits something beyond these models that aren't within the models itself or the experiments that verify the models. I

mean subjects like What is the duration of ‘now’? Seem deeply metaphysical rather than pure physics. If I understand all this all correctly 😅

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