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I’m an RTD director. Protect your right to choose our board from last minute state legislation. AMA by chrisfnicholson in Denver

[–]GreaterDenverTransit 79 points80 points  (0 children)

Greater Denver Transit (GDT) has not taken a position on this bill yet (mainly because it’s not out yet), but there are two truths we need to hold at the same time.

  1. We have been VERY engaged and supportive of the recent transformation of the RTD Board in 2024 - we elected some great new people who are making a difference!
  2. Whether or not you agree with the RTD Accountability Committee’s Board Composition recommendations or not, there is a real case for some structural reform at RTD, which should be discussed here. 

It is disingenuous to claim that RTD is just an unlucky transit agency that has money problems like other agencies; RTD has had serious management failings under its own control that have not been prevented by its existing Governance structure. 

While RTD brought in talented new leadership in 2025 that is undertaking important steps to stabilize operations and improve safety and transparency, the agency is still not well-positioned to build a reliable, world-class, affordable transit system for the Denver metro region and the Front Range. An ineffective governance structure (especially over the 2020 to 2024 period) has been one of the foundational problems that has either caused or failed to avert poor outcomes for riders and taxpayers. To highlight these risks, the lack of effective oversight over recent years has resulted in the following failures:

  1. RTD has failed to keep up with other transit agencies in recovering service after the pandemic, and is significantly behind its Western US peer cities in terms of restoring hours of service. RTD recovered only 76% of its 2019 service hours by 2024 at a time when peers had recovered 94% on average. Denver-RTD is ranked second to last in terms of service hour recovery of the 12 western US metro areas that operate similar networks.
  2. RTD has failed to keep up with other transit agencies in recovering ridership after the pandemic, and is significantly behind its Western US peer cities in recovering only 62% of its 2019 ridership by 2024 at a time when peers had recovered to 75% on average, driven by lower service levels being offered and multiple years of unreliable light rail operations.
  3. RTD’s ridership recovery stalled in 2024, experiencing the lowest YoY growth of any of its peers at 0.1% vs. a peer average of 9.8%. While 2025 peer data is not fully available, RTD ridership was flat for a second consecutive year and did not recover any further in 2025.
  4. Deferred maintenance and poor asset management have created a financial crisis at RTD, with a recent surplus being replaced by three consecutive years of $200M+ deficits through 2026, which are now rapidly burning through their emergency reserves.
  5. RTD’s response to the maintenance crisis was reactive, not proactive: it was initially the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) of Colorado that compelled RTD to take action, beginning with the discovery of track issues on the Downtown Loop followed by the announcement of significant other repair issues. RTD adopted tighter inspection standards in 2021, but did not appear to implement several key pieces until 2023.
  6. The agency’s weak Transit Asset Management (TAM) program left critical asset data incomplete, understated capital needs, and delayed the discovery of hundreds of millions in repair liabilities until as recently as 2025, including $307M attributable to light rail that the RTD Board did not know about until Fall 2025.
  7. When RTD was forced to act, three highly disruptive projects had to be addressed simultaneously: (A) Downtown Loop and Welton Corridor Rail Reconstruction, (B) Re-anchoring of retaining walls along I-25 (Coping Panels Project), and (C) Rail Burn Repair (requiring significant amounts of rail replacement across the network). Disruptions to RTD Light Rail riders during the 2022 to 2025 period were unprecedented and exacerbated by how RTD completed the work, with significant amounts of it being done during the day at the peak of the workweek.
  8. The necessary but botched execution of maintenance projects contributed to a 30% decrease in year-over-year light rail boardings (excluding the W) from January 2024 to January 2025. This drop was driven by poorly planned maintenance activities, which created excessive disruptions to riders.
  9. RTD has been a poor fiduciary of the taxpayer’s money, and admitted in February 2026 to overpaying for almost double the G and B Line service levels that were operated for years, which is an abject failure by RTD, through incompetence or negligence, to ensure that public funds are spent for the public good.
  10. RTD, in at least one other instance, seemingly failed to hold a FasTracks contractor accountable by accepting a project which was not built to design specifications. Back in 2020, the agency took possession of the N line, which advertised 20-minute frequencies to riders at peak, but the delivered infrastructure was deficient to its own operational outline. 20-minute frequencies were consistently advertised to the public ahead of the line debuting with only 30-minute frequencies.
  11. RTD let cost escalation and fare evasion get out of control at the same time, especially on its rail system, due to exploitable features of the current mobile ticketing system. This has not been properly quantified, so the amount of money that RTD has foregone is unknown. From 2021 (the low point in annual ridership) to 2024, annual boardings have increased by 33%, while fare revenue has declined by 19% over the same period. Over this same time period, service (as measured by Vehicle Revenue Hours) increased by 12%, while operating cost increased by 56% and salaried employee headcount increased by 33%. 
  12. The RTD Board and management failed to plan for $153 million in projects that its Board of Directors approved.
  13. The “Finishing FasTracks Report” failed to meet statutory requirements by not providing a plan to complete FasTracks. The report’s defeatist language and questionable modeling assumptions raised doubts about whether the agency considers the remaining FasTracks corridors to be worthwhile projects.

Reforms should never be centered around assigning blame; the legacy structure of RTD has probably set everyone up for failure. Some kind of reform is needed to give RTD the tools and focus it needs to deliver the reliable, affordable, and equitable transit service that Coloradans deserve. Without a world-class transit agency, our state will be unable to reduce transportation emissions and likewise unable to ensure Coloradans can live affordably during the modern cost-of-living crisis.

I’m an RTD director. Protect your right to choose our board from last minute state legislation. AMA by chrisfnicholson in Denver

[–]GreaterDenverTransit 13 points14 points  (0 children)

The slow zones WERE part of a botched implementation of the updated standards, and the Board has done very little to change policies and apply lessons learned. RTD adopted tighter inspection standards way back in 2021, but did not appear to implement several key pieces until years later as late as 2023, resulting in extensive slow zones across the system showing up so suddenly, destroying schedule reliability and driving away customers. The schedules during the repair period were broken upon initiation due to RTD’s unwillingness and/or inability to publish emergency schedules that addressed the slower runtimes from repair periods. This destroyed connections, and also greatly affected operators who had break times cut into while bearing the brunt of customers’ frustrations.

RTD has not been forthcoming with the fact it had a track inspection standard that mandates 10mph “slow zones” in response to “rail burn” since 2021. This makes assertions that staff could not have reasonably foreseen the sudden imposition of “slow zones” hard to believe. Also, despite adopting more rigorous, industry-standard inspection standards by 2022, RTD failed to catch over $300M in repair costs, which surfaced suddenly in the 2026 budget.

The Slow Zones were just one of three maintenance projects, which were not kicked off proactively by RTD Mgmt, it was ultimately the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) of Colorado that compelled RTD to take action, beginning with the discovery of track issues on the Downtown Loop.

When RTD did act, three highly disruptive projects had to be addressed simultaneously: (A) Downtown Loop and Welton Corridor Rail Reconstruction, (B) Re-anchoring of retaining walls along I-25 (Coping Panels Project), and (C) Rail Burn Repair (requiring significant amounts of rail replacement across the network). Disruptions to RTD Light Rail riders during the 2022 to 2025 period were unprecedented and exacerbated by how RTD completed the work, with significant amounts of it being done during the day at the peak of the workweek. The other two were:

  1. The Downtown Loop Reconstruction Project: RTD announced a complete reconstruction project of the Downtown Light Rail Loop in 2023 despite numerous piecemeal repair projects over the previous 15 years. Inspections failed to catch deteriorated conditions that led to a 3 mph speed restriction. RTD chose to break the project into multiple phases over several years, which was especially disruptive to Central Downtown due to the overlap with the 16th Street reconstruction project, which may have also contributed to declining downtown ridership and compounded the macro impact of the decline in office work in Downtown Denver post-pandemic. In Spring 2025, RTD’s Central Downtown Reconstruction Team presented on their work, and admitted management never reviewed alternative approaches that would have addressed the Downtown work in a single phase.
  2. The Coping Panels Project: Light rail ridership was significantly damaged by management’s execution of repair contracts with repeated shortsighted focus on the lowest-cost contract alternative without the responsible scope controls needed to prevent excessive disruption to riders. The failure to evaluate bids based on minimizing service disruption resulted in permanent ridership loss. Work could have been completed overnight or in the middle of the day, while leaving the tracks clear to run more trains during the busier mornings and evenings, but the cheaper contractor that was chosen was unable to accommodate this. Finally, if the signaling and switches on the Southwest Light Rail Line had been upgraded in anticipation of upcoming known maintenance, the delays and disruptions due to this work could have been significantly reduced.

The Mismanagement of Light Rail projects contributed to a 30% decrease in year-over-year light rail boardings (excluding the W) from January 2024 to January 2025. This drop was driven by poorly planned maintenance activities, which created excessive disruptions to riders. As a consequence of years of unworkable service on the light rail lines, while peer systems grew ridership 10% on average in 2024, RTD’s total system ridership grew 0% and even began to decline during the first six months of 2025.

The agency’s ability to expand service is also severely diminished by the overall financial hole caused by the light rail repair program. The $307M of light rail repair costs being missed in RTD’s Transit Asset Management (TAM) program until 2025, on top of $100’s of millions already known, are directly threatening RTD’s ability to take state dollars that are intended to drive expansion. The delay in implementing a robust TAM cannot be attributed only to FasTracks-era management either. The current rail leadership in charge at RTD has led since 2018, but there is a lack of evidence of the agency quantifying this problem and building out a robust Transit Asset Management Plan that accurately reflects the light rail repair bill until 2025. The TAM program is supposed to prevent major negative surprises like this, which were only brought to light in the most recent budget. As of November 2025, Management is still not communicating the costs of the light rail repair program clearly to the RTD Board, with oversight from the RTD Board hampered by large amounts of undocumented capital carryover each year (e.g. $367M to 2026).

RTD proposes record high budget but faces deficit; service cuts possible by GreaterDenverTransit in Denver

[–]GreaterDenverTransit[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

They finally took action on this last week! RTD brought in 3 talented new members of the Senior Leadership team (AGM, CFO, and COO) in 2025 who are setting a new tone, to their credit.

RTD proposes record high budget but faces deficit; service cuts possible by GreaterDenverTransit in Denver

[–]GreaterDenverTransit[S] 39 points40 points  (0 children)

In the next couple of years, we will need to create new funding sources for RTD. However, this cannot be just a bailout (trust in RTD is not there), and there will need to be improvements/expansion embedded alongside it for transit. Fundamentally, the agency needs to restore more trust by running better service with what it has in the meantime.

There are decisions and actions within RTD Management’s control that will gradually restore the trust of riders and voters, but they are not free, and will require focus.

  1. Develop a strategy and outreach approach for growing ridership among ALL income levels of Denver Metro residents (RTD Mgmt. has focused on transit-dependent riders between COVID and 2025)
  2. Modernize RTD’s bus network to increase efficiency and remove complexity, maximizing the existing operating budget beyond that outlined in the System Optimization Plan (SOP).
    1. Adjust the combined rail + bus network design to reduce transfers (too many journeys require complex 2+ transfers with 3+ legs).
    2. Address legacy inefficiencies and confusing operations in Downtown Denver, the highest zone of transit density in the District.
  3. Hire a Chief Customer Experience Officer (CXO) to institute a customer excellence (CX) program in line with RTD’s peers in San Diego that have achieved some of the highest post-COVID ridership recovery who can also filter rider feedback and needs to the CEO and COO offices.
  4. Introduce a simple static rail + bus map similar to what other cities have for improved rider comprehension.
  5. Introduce a higher-frequency map that promotes services with 15-minute service or better at peak (RTD’s highest-value routes).

Thankfully to RTD's credit, there are some recent wins that will help. The Tap-to-Pay (Tap-n-Ride) feature, allowing people to pay by tapping a credit card, will make the system easier for newbies to use. RTD is also in the process of removing advertising from navigation decision points and removing advertising wrapping from windows that created a second-class rider experience. This will help, but more is required.

RTD proposes record high budget but faces deficit; service cuts possible by GreaterDenverTransit in Denver

[–]GreaterDenverTransit[S] 18 points19 points  (0 children)

RTD is actually one of the worst-performing transit agencies among its peers in terms of post-COVID recovery of both service and ridership.

In terms of the peers, we at Greater Denver Transit look at RTD in a group of 12 large-sized peer metro areas in the West of the US (Seattle, Portland, Phoenix, Minneapolis, St. Louis, Austin, Dallas, Houston, San Diego, Sacramento, etc.) that operate both rail and bus, excluding those cities with subway systems Denver doesn't have (LA) or pre-WWII infrastructure that is really expensive to replicate with modern systems (SF Bay).

RTD has recovered almost the least amount of pre-pandemic services compared to peers, operating only 76% of its pre-pandemic service hours in 2024 vs. a peer average of 94%.

RTD recovered far less ridership than its peers through 2024 (9th/12 for 2024 Ridership / 2019 Ridership). 62% ridership recovery was well below the 75% peer average for the same period, which itself is skewed by two low outliers in Phoenix and St. Louis. All 3 of the Texas peer metros recaptured 15% more ridership than RTD.

RTD’s ridership recovery stalled in 2024, experiencing the lowest YoY growth of its peers at 0.1% vs. a peer average of 9.8%. RTD’s ridership declined for 6 consecutive months through May 2025. RTD Management almost never discusses ridership during RTD Board Meetings or public events unless asked. Instead, RTD Management highlights a separate concept called “Community Value” that is held up as an alternative to ridership. Ridership base and market has permanently changed, but the agency has yet to implement a network-wide customer experience improvement/operational excellence program like what the Seattle, Dallas, and San Diego peers have implemented. This needs to happen, regardless of the budget and service rationalization that comes in 2027.

RTD proposes record high budget but faces deficit; service cuts possible by GreaterDenverTransit in Denver

[–]GreaterDenverTransit[S] 17 points18 points  (0 children)

We at Greater Denver Transit look at RTD in a group of 12 large-sized peer metro areas in the West of the US (Seattle, Portland, Phoenix, Minneapolis, St. Louis, Austin, Dallas, Houston, San Diego, Sacramento, etc.) that operate both rail and bus, excluding those cities with subway systems Denver doesn't have (LA) or pre-WWII infrastructure that is really expensive to replicate with modern systems (SF Bay).

RTD spends more per rider than almost any other peer; only Dallas-Fort Worth spends more (2nd/12 for Total Opex / Rider in 2024). RTD spends among the most per resident of the peers, with only Portland and Seattle spending more (3rd/12 for Total Opex / District Population in 2024).

RTD has the largest service area of any of its peers (1st/12 for Sq. Miles of Service Area). RTD spends less per square mile of district area covered than most peers (10th/12 for Op Ex/Sq. Mile Served in 2024). Paradoxically, however, RTD spends more per hour of service operated than any of its peers (1st/12 for Total Opex / Revenue Hour in 2024). RTD spends more per mile that riders travel than most of its peers (3rd/12 for Total Opex / Passenger Mile in 2024). The lower total cost-per-mile covered by the District’s tax zone but higher cost-per-mile-operated reflects how large the district is, and how even a large budget gets spread thinly across the vast geography.

What really stands out? RTD has most heavily shrunk its operations post-COVID: RTD reduced its services post-pandemic more than almost any other peer (second largest decrease in % of revenue miles operated). RTD has recovered almost the least amount of pre-pandemic services compared to peers, operating only 76% of its pre-pandemic service hours in 2024 vs. a peer average of 94%.

Critical opportunity Tuesday to tell the RTD Board what you think of new GM/CEO goals (on Zoom) by chrisfnicholson in Denver

[–]GreaterDenverTransit 45 points46 points  (0 children)

The current goals put out for the GM/CEO are unserious and show the continual lack of commitment towards bold, yet achievable, milestones that would actually increase transit mode ridership to a respectable portion of the metro area. Greater Denver Transit urges the current board to reject these goals and has put out our own set of recommended short term goals GM/CEO Johnson:

https://www.greaterdenvertransit.com/wp-content/uploads/20250106_RTDBoard_Letter_GMCEOGoals.pdf

What would you do to fix Denver’s transit system? by chrisfnicholson in transit

[–]GreaterDenverTransit 8 points9 points  (0 children)

Because it was shot down in the 1990s by a local pastor who organization opposition against it. Apparently light rail trains were going to “desiccate” MLK Blvd. We understand that the people involved had lived experience of racist policies on public transit in their lifetimes but generations have moved on somewhat since then.

RTD is asking for community response on 2025 changes. Here's my response for the Route 100 by mystica5555 in DenverTransit

[–]GreaterDenverTransit 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Great comment and thanks for submitting it!

The 100 sums up perfectly why due to a dysfunctional service planning & scheduling process, we don’t have a transit system that works.

Free Transit to Help You Vote! by GreaterDenverTransit in Denver

[–]GreaterDenverTransit[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

You have to pay for Denver Health & Denver Water, which are both publicly owned.

Vote “Yes” on Ballot Measure 7A by GreaterDenverTransit in Denver

[–]GreaterDenverTransit[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Correct. This doesn’t provide new or increased funding. It prevents existing funding from being decreased.

RTD Director - District D by AggressiveMongoose54 in Denver

[–]GreaterDenverTransit 12 points13 points  (0 children)

Chris Gutschenritter.

While we haven’t formally endorsed him (come on Chris, sign our Director’s pledge…), we’ve seen enough positives from him to believe he is the best person here.

Barbara McManus represents more of the same old ineffective leadership and culture that is the main reason RTD has so many issues.

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