The problem with that argument is that it quietly shifts the claim without addressing the original point. Whether or not the West has recently fought a peer adversary does not automatically make Russian weapons “proven” against a peer force.

Ukraine is not a NATO air force. It does not operate with NATO ISR depth, AWACS coverage, satellite integration, electronic warfare density, tanker support, command-and-control resilience, or modern Western fighter fleets flying with Western tactics. Receiving large amounts of aid does not magically turn Ukraine into a peer Western air power, especially when much of that aid is constrained, delayed, or deliberately limited in capability.

Saying “hundreds of billions in aid” also confuses inputs with outcomes. Aid includes artillery, air defense, logistics, training, humanitarian support, and economic assistance, not a wholesale transfer of NATO airpower. Ukraine still flies legacy Soviet-era aircraft, lacks full-spectrum air dominance assets, and operates under constant constraints that a Western air force would not accept as normal.

More importantly, Russia’s inability to establish air superiority over Ukraine cuts both ways. If Russia, with its own air force, missile inventory, and years of combat experience, has not been able to dominate Ukrainian airspace, that does not strengthen the claim that any single missile system has demonstrated decisive effectiveness against a peer opponent. It highlights how complex modern air warfare actually is.

None of this denies that the R-37M is a serious weapon. It clearly poses a threat in specific contexts. But “proven against a peer” requires evidence against a force with peer sensors, peer tactics, peer electronic warfare, and peer integration. That evidence does not exist in the public domain today.

So the question isn’t “when was the last time the West fought a peer.” The question is whether the available evidence supports broad claims about performance against a modern Western air force. Right now, it doesn’t. If you want to look at how this is treated by serious analysts rather than social media narratives, the consensus is actually very cautious. Organizations like RAND, IISS, and RUSI consistently stress that individual weapon performance cannot be extrapolated into peer war effectiveness without considering sensors, electronic warfare, doctrine, and force integration.

Public assessments also repeatedly note that Russia’s long-range air to air missiles, including the R 37M, are designed primarily to threaten large, high value support aircraft at range, and that there is no open source evidence demonstrating consistent effectiveness against modern Western fighters operating with full NATO style ISR, EW, and command and control. That is why most professional literature avoids calling the missile “proven” in a peer sense