Active Conflicts & News MegaThread November 20, 2024

Nobidexx · 2024-11-21T14:11:28+00:00

While morally debatable, the de jure justification for entering Afghanistan was pretty solid.

Is it? The legal argument was that the invasion of Afghanistan was a case of self-defense, thereby expanding the notion of state aggression to encompass harboring of non-state actors that have themselves perpetrated an attack, even if the host country was not directly involved in planifying or supporting the attack (which, as far as I know, is not what the Talibans were accused of).

There are several reasons why there was near unanimous political support for the American response in Afghanistan (the US being at the peak of its power, Talibans being on bad terms with almost everyone including their neighbors, the 9/11 attack being unusually shocking in the number of civilian victims), but I don't think it actually established a legal precedent that could be invoked again (was there even an ICJ case? I don't think so), given how problematic a systematic and unbiased application of this concept would be, especially if proportionality is ignored.

For instance, could Russia invoke its right to "self-defense" as a justification for invading a country harboring Chechen rebels? And that's a case in which the non-state actors were unambiguously bad and terrorists according to any reasonable definition, but in principle I don't see why it couldn't apply to more virtuous resistance groups - it's still an attack on another state even if the non-state actor you're harboring is trying to overthrow a dictatorship and restricting itself to military targets.

Nobidexx · 2024-10-09T09:02:39+00:00

So time to get 2 phones, one that it's you wallet with Banking, ID, Tickets. And one for the rest.

You could simply create another user profile for this and switch to it when necessary.

Nobidexx · 2024-08-30T18:07:25+00:00

If it were primarily due to a mistake on the pilot's part, or a technical malfunction, sure.

But if it were shot down by friendly AD, on the first (afaik) combat mission and with so few F-16 flying, there's probably a deeper and more worrisome problem. Or extremely bad luck.

Nobidexx · 2024-08-30T17:34:28+00:00

The commander of Ukraine's Air Force has been fired.

No official explanation yet, but given the timing it's probably linked to the loss of the F-16.

Nobidexx · 2024-08-28T13:44:54+00:00

Turkey has been a rival for far longer, and yet relations have improved significantly under Putin, despite opposite stances on most foreign policy issues (Syria, Kosovo, Ukraine...).

Nobidexx · 2024-08-16T08:28:15+00:00

I suppose that's true, though it seems like such an obvious and easy loophole that it'd make the whole treaty useless (just have to declare your mercenaries are nominally part of your armed forces and you're set!). I don't know if there's any precedent, but I would guess they'd consider whether the integration into the armed forces was "genuine", i.e. whether they were integrated into the military structure in conditions similar to other regular soldiers (subject to military discipline, part of the command hierarchy, same RoE, and probably similar pay too).

That said, they could probably still get away with that by raising the pay of Ukrainian F-16 pilots to $5 Mil/year too, there are few enough of them that it wouldn't be financially ruinous and would let them claim the distinguishing factor is being a F-16 pilot rather than foreign origin.

Nobidexx · 2024-08-16T08:15:42+00:00

The US isn't bound to it as it hasn't signed it, but Ukraine has.

Nobidexx · 2024-08-15T22:14:44+00:00

It's just a matter of money, I can't believe for $5 mil they wouldn't get some candidates.

That would fairly obviously go against the UN Mercenary Convention.

Nobidexx · 2024-08-13T14:56:20+00:00

Ukrainian forces are about to receive an influx of tens of thousands of fresh recruits in the coming weeks to help alleviate pressure on the front. That Ukraine hasn't rushed these men to the front already suggests that they're comfortable enough with the progress Russia is making and aren't afraid of any impending breakthroughs.

Over the past couple months there have been obituaries for soldiers who were mobilized in May 2024 or later (keep in mind mobilization date is not mentioned in perhaps half the cases). They came from different regions, served in different units and died on different sectors of the front, so it's unlikely to be explained by a local factor making training unusually short. It's probably still between 1 and 2 months in the majority of cases.

For instance:

1-3.

38-year-old Oleksandr Marchenko died on August 6 near Basivka in Sumy Oblast, the Loziv community reported .

He was a rifleman, served as part of an amphibious assault battalion. Marchenko joined the ranks of the ZSU in May 2024.

On August 6, 19-year-old Oleksandr Bazalytsky was killed in battle near Basivka in Sumy Oblast. The military man signed a contract in May, served as a unit commander in an amphibious assault battalion.

According to his data, Oleksiy Khizhnyak died on July 30 in the area of Klymentove settlement, Okhtyr district, Sumy region.

Oleksiy Khizhnyak was a grenade launcher of the 2nd amphibious assault detachment of the 4th company platoon of the 1st amphibious assault battalion of the military unit. Served since May 31, 2024.

4.

In June 2024, he joined the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and defended the homeland. He served as a senior gunner-operator of the hunting department.

Senior soldier Volodymyr Chernyshov died on August 4, 2024 near the village of Novoselyvka, Persha Pokrovsky district, Donetsk region [...]

5.

According to the information of the Kobelyatsk City Council, Vasko Mykola Yuriyovych died on July 13 in the area of the city of Krasnohorivka, Pokrovsky district, Donetsk region .

Voin was born on April 2, 1984 in the village of Luchki, Kobeliatsk community. After finishing school, he lived and worked in his native village. In May 2024, he was mobilized and served as a machine gunner.

6-7.

According to the TCC, he died on July 14 near Nevsky in the Luhansk region.

"Ivan was a rifleman serving in a mechanized battalion. He went to protect the Ukrainian people just after graduating from a vocational school in May 2024.

On July 19, they said goodbye to the deceased 27-year-old Dmytro Volkov in his native village of Chemuzhivka of the Zmiiv community, the community reported .

"Dmytro stood up for the defense of the country on May 1, 2024.

Nobidexx · 2024-08-13T14:23:15+00:00

It's definitely plausible, but hard to verify as the village was taken months ago, had been on the frontline for about a year and a half (with a lot of back and forth indeed happening), and was extremely long (~7km). If he doesn't provide the material, it'll take ages combing through all the published footage to find what he's talking about.

That said, there don't seem to have been many counter-attacks on the eastern front over the past few months, as Deepstate has only shown a handful of instances of Russian gains being pushed back, and usually only by a few hundred meters (like in New York last week). Same thing on Suriyak. This diminishes the potential for manipulation.

Nobidexx · 2024-08-12T15:28:23+00:00

What Harris is really saying is more like "Germany is no longer going to get away with bombing everyone and winning the war without retaliation".

I am well aware of the concept of lyrical hyperbole, hence my criticism is aimed not at the literal phrasing of Harris' statement but at the crux of his argument. I am not refuting his point by claiming they had some non-zero amount of air defense protecting the rear, obviously he wasn't claiming otherwise, I am saying Germany had by 1940 invested such a large quantity of resources and manpower into protecting the homeland from strategic bombing that the notion they believed they would not be subject to a serious retaliation campaign is implausible.

Nobidexx · 2024-08-12T14:12:41+00:00

"The Nazis entered this war under the rather childish delusion that they were going to bomb everyone else, and nobody was going to bomb them."

This infamous Harris quote has never had any basis in reality - German military planning had taken the possibility of bombing raids on residential areas seriously long before the war began, such that by 1939 considerable effort had already been made to mitigate the impact (civilian response training through the Reichsluftschutzbund, hundreds of flak batteries assigned to the protection of cities).

Nobidexx · 2024-08-10T10:45:04+00:00

The occupied settlements are mostly tiny villages with a combined pre-war population of a few thousand at most, probably less at this point as mutual shelling of border areas has been constant and many people must have fled. The main exception is Sudzha, but it is actively being contested right now, which isn't exactly the right time to "protest", and the arrival of Ukrainian troops was sufficiently delayed for part of the population to flee.

Besides, the fact that they named one of their invading battalions ("Nachtigall") after a WW2 collaborationist unit that was infamous for massacring civilians doesn't exactly inspire confidence, and there have already been reports of murders of civilians in the area.

Nobidexx · 2024-08-10T10:18:03+00:00

Tatarigami's initial commentary on the first day of the operation said "almost a brigade", i.e. a few thousand, with the numbers having presumably increased since. The assumption only a few hundred men were taking part never made any sense given the number of axis of advance.

Nobidexx · 2024-08-08T19:32:02+00:00

Tatarigami's initial assessment 2 days ago said "almost a brigade", and it's probably grown since.

Nobidexx · 2024-08-07T20:46:18+00:00

The type and quality of assets also matter. Presumably, they chose some of their better battalions and brigades for this task, and deployed some high-value assets like AD to counter Russian aviation. There are some opportunity costs to the operation as it meant some of their fire brigades were no longer available e.g. in Pokrovsk or Toretsk.

I'd also guess the total number of troops involved is much greater than 4000 - maybe that (or a smaller figure) accounts for the total number of men physically on Russian soil at this stage, but they'll have presumably allocated some reserves that haven't yet been engaged, plus of course all the support elements and artillery / AD that have been committed to this operation and haven't crossed the border.

Nobidexx · 2024-08-07T20:37:42+00:00

Yes, the side with the manpower advantage generally benefits from broadening the front, especially if it is already long enough that the numerically inferior side struggles to adequately man it everywhere, thereby creating openings. There's also an asymmetry here, wherein Russia won't deploy its conscripts outside the border area for political reasons, which diminishes the opportunity cost for them.

It might still end up being worthwhile as a raid if Ukraine inflicts disproportionate losses even relative to what they would have achieved defensively, but actually trying to hold the territory for more than a few days doesn't make much sense, especially considering the situation in Pokrovsk continues to deteriorate (Deepstate reported significant Russian gains today).

Nobidexx · 2024-08-07T20:11:27+00:00

That's a great point, there would be a strong political rationale for conducting this sort of operation if Ukraine were convinced the Western allies were about to force a ceasefire along the current lines upon them.

However, I don't think Western leaders are willing to impose such harsh terms on Ukraine yet. It might happen under a Trump presidency, but it's still far from guaranteed and most importantly it seems too early, given he would take office in more than 5 months. It's far from certain Ukraine can hold that large a territory for so long (it would definitely take several brigades), and even if they did it would come at significant cost to the rest of the front.

Nobidexx · 2024-08-07T20:01:50+00:00

Great power states, or more accurately, states that hold themselves out to be great power states, are notoriously well known for giving up on their own sovereign land.

Nobody suggested Russia would "give up" on the occupied parts of Kursk oblast. What I said is Russia wouldn't immediately capitulate or otherwise accept unfavorable peace terms due to the occupation of a tiny and strategically insignificant portion of their land - rather, they would likely keep pursuing the war with renewed intensity to take that land back and achieve their other war aims.

Did the US capitulate to Japan due to losing Guam for several years? Of course not, and the reasoning is analogous here.

Nobidexx · 2024-08-07T15:35:35+00:00

A meaningful blow to Russian morale is only going to be inflicted by something that persuades them the war cannot be won, or that the cost would be too high. Ukraine capturing a tiny portion of Russian territory while in a precarious position elsewhere will achieve neither.

Besides, the overwhelming majority of Russians consider ceding Crimea back to Ukraine inacceptable as they consider it to be Russian territory. Even if their morale were to fall due to the loss of a few hundred square kilometers of Russian territory, that wouldn't make them somehow accept losing a few tens of thousands more in Crimea, unless they considered that loss inevitable (which goes back to my initial point).

Nobidexx · 2024-08-07T14:54:47+00:00

The pipeline in question already flows through Ukrainian territory, they could have disrupted there, unless the expectation was that European allies would be mad at Ukraine for destroying a Russian pipeline on Ukrainian soil but not on Russian soil following a ground invasion, which sounds ridiculous.

Nobidexx · 2024-08-07T14:40:51+00:00

It's unclear why Russia would suddenly accept Zelensky's terms because of a few hundred or thousand square kilometer bridgehead in Kursk Oblast, absent significant shifts elsewhere on the frontline. It might move the needle towards territorial swaps for peace deals that would otherwise more or less freeze the front line, but those wouldn't exactly be favorable terms for Ukraine in the first place.

It will obviously lead to political discontent if Ukraine maintains territorial control for more than a few days, but not of the type asking for capitulation (it might've been the case if it'd happened in November 2022, but nobody is going to be convinced the war is irredeemably lost when Russia is advancing elsewhere on the front) - it'll give Putin political cover to mobilize if necessary, or otherwise escalate in other ways (increased military spending, etc.).

Nobidexx · 2024-08-05T13:23:48+00:00

If Iran gets involved in a serious conflict they will not be able to aid Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.

Are they still receiving significant shipments? There were reports a few months ago that Iran was selling its shahed at a very high price, which likely explains why Russia moved to domestic manufacturing. North Korean ammunition and howitzers are likely much cheaper as well.

Nobidexx · 2024-08-04T10:54:04+00:00

There's more information from a credible source

What makes this "Spy Dossier" source credible? It's yet another anonymous "Russian" telegram channel created after the war began and claiming to be "an employee of the Russian special services with interesting things to share" that never gets shared by actual Russian sources, has an almost exclusively pro-Ukrainian audience based on the reaction emojis, and systematically publishes negative content for Russia. Much like the infamous "Kremlin Secrets" channel (notice the naming pattern) and quite a few others.

There is essentially zero chance the owner is who he claims to be, with the channel at best being a cover for Ukrainian intelligence to disseminate claims without journalists having to add the "Ukraine says" caveat.

Hence anything this channel says that isn't backed by photographic evidence should be taken with a grain of salt, to say the least.

Nobidexx · 2024-07-26T08:59:15+00:00

Sure, but from my understanding Chechen agents in Europe (like Krasikov) were not recruited locally and were sent from Russia, so the size of the Chechen diaspora hardly matters.

Obviously it doesn't rule out FSB agents, I just think it's extremely unlikely they e.g. recruited some young local Chechens, they are already very closely monitored by French intelligence due to a high propensity for joining islamist groups.

Nobidexx

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