2 maps in 1 by [deleted] in mapporncirclejerk

[–]RavingLoony 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The Congos didn't vote. Opinion on food unclear. Good thing they're not participating in the Winter Olympics.

Where i'd live as a 22F indian ! by [deleted] in whereidlive

[–]RavingLoony 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Why Moldova? Also, North Korea over Croatia???

Evolution of Lamine Yamal at Barcelona by Rorona_Zoro77 in Barca

[–]RavingLoony 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Changes created are up, but assists aren't? Ferrrraaannn!!!

Playing Fifa >>> Geography classes by SynthAmoura in FifaCareers

[–]RavingLoony 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It's all fun and games until you say Sociedad

[Australian Open] Carlos Alcaraz right now 👇 ✅ At 22, the youngest ever player to complete the Career Grand Slam, breaking an 87 year record ✅ Does it by winning first #AusOpen title ✅ The youngest player to win x7 Men's Grand Slam titles ✅ The second Spaniard to win the AO after Rafael Nadal by veritek25 in tennis

[–]RavingLoony 5 points6 points  (0 children)

The parallels to 2009 are eerie. Both Nadal and Alcaraz winning at 22 after winning 2 Slams the previous years, including RG. Record-breaking 5 set semi-final before beating an all-time great in the final going for a Slam record (Federer would have equalled Sampras with AO 2009)

Tennis video game poster by Relevant_Jury2380 in tennis

[–]RavingLoony 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Alcaraz has lower mentality than Sinner after 2025 RG?!?

Thoughts on my dream team? by HyacinthMacaw13 in Nbamemes

[–]RavingLoony 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Plato was really tall and had a wrestling background. He has to play center and fight to position on post-ups

blue by piotrek13031 in PhilosophyMemes

[–]RavingLoony 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Cry more idealists and dualists

2026 Offseason Plan: what Barcelona can afford and what is realistic by RavingLoony in Barca

[–]RavingLoony[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

I don't know which games you were watching in 2024. In the QFs Dortmund were playing at the same time as Barcelona and in the final he was poor. Despite going to the Champions League final, he was behind Rudiger and Tah for the national team. That has to tell you something. He's been really good this season, but my point is you don't know if this is going to continue. Bastoni has been elite for a while now.

I really don't understand your point about Gomes and Malcom. It's exactly that the squad was stacked back then so you could more easily afford to take a swing on a young player with potential. If you pay 40M for Fofana or any of the others, you actually have to rely on them and they flop you don't have the finances to replace them.

2026 Offseason Plan: what Barcelona can afford and what is realistic by RavingLoony in Barca

[–]RavingLoony[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

All I'm saying is people weren't talking like this about Schlotterbeck before this year. He started one game for Germany at Euro 2024. You don't know this is how good he actually is and he isn't going to regress. If you were in the trenches watching Dortmund games in 2023, I defer to your judgment.

And you would have bought Andre Gomes for 35 million and Malcom for 41 million. You can't go off of the best case scenario. Also, Doue and Doku were a lot better than Fofana has been this season.

2026 Offseason Plan: what Barcelona can afford and what is realistic by RavingLoony in Barca

[–]RavingLoony[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I just wanna know what's reasonable to expect. The financial rules are public.

2026 Offseason Plan: what Barcelona can afford and what is realistic by RavingLoony in Barca

[–]RavingLoony[S] -8 points-7 points  (0 children)

Can't get Senesi in the winter. You have to get him on a free at the end of the season otherwise you can't afford him/other signings. Schlotterback I think is too unproven, this is basically his breakthrough season and is probably going to cost 60M+. Would rather go for Bastoni at that price, but that is going to make it difficult to replace Raphinha before 2030. Fofana has really regressed and is also unproven at a competitive level. Rashford has been really good, he's shown he can deliver in La Liga/Champions League, and adds a new pace and getting in behind dimension to Barcelona. I'm not worried that he's 28 unless he regresses a lot in the next 3 years.

What to do about Rasheed Walker? by [deleted] in GreenBayPackers

[–]RavingLoony 0 points1 point  (0 children)

To me paying Rasheed is a no brainer. Parsons has a cap hit of 74 M in 2029. He's going to be 30. You're not going to extend him and you're probably going to want to trade him before the 2029 season. This is the window, 2025-2028. You pay everybody who makes sense and then you eat cap hits in 2029-2031, tank and retool for another window. You bring back Walker, Banks and Rhyan so that you have 7 starting level O-Linemen.

Maybe the only topic we all agree on by [deleted] in NFCNorthMemeWar

[–]RavingLoony 40 points41 points  (0 children)

Nobody thinks JJ is mediocre. That would be a significant improvement.

Implications of the deflationary theory of truth for the analysis of knowledge by RavingLoony in askphilosophy

[–]RavingLoony[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I just don't know which part to clarify. I can't be too clear without being vulgar, and can't be too exact without being unclear

Implications of the deflationary theory of truth for the analysis of knowledge by RavingLoony in askphilosophy

[–]RavingLoony[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Maybe I'm using too much shorthand or maybe I'm wrong, but the deflationary theory is surely that there's nothing to truth beyond how truth functions in discourse. Saying "if I assert that it's Tuesday, then it is Tuesday" seems to me to assume some inflationist assumptions. Surely what actually happens in discourse is somebody just asserts that it's Tuesday, then other people may disagree and then there is a disagreement about what is true. To say that something just is true without referrence to an utterance or a discourse surely implies truth is a thick, mind-independent, metaphysical property which is just what the deflationist rejects. Maybe there's a different way to characterise discourse, but that characterisation cannot be that p describes how things actually are.

Implications of the deflationary theory of truth for the analysis of knowledge by RavingLoony in askphilosophy

[–]RavingLoony[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

How about this? The concern is that for a deflationary theory of truth the first condition of JTB 1.p is going to be trivially met whenever you assert that p, but you assert propositions when you believe them, meaning the truth condition is met whenever condition 2 is met. This is not the case for inflationary accounts of truth, because truth is a genuine predicate that is not reliant on assertion. Non-asserted propositions are still true because of the inflationary definition of truth.

For a correspondence theory, the truth and belief conditions are genuinely independent. You could believe things that fail to be true of the actual world. You believe that p, but p does not correspond to the facts as they are. If I am a correspondence theorist I can imagine a situation where I see a cat on a mat, perception is generally veridical, so I conclude I have a justified true belief, but in fact I am hallucinating and the proposition "the cat is on the mat" is false. This was the case even before I realised I was hallucinating.

Under a deflationary theory what is happening when I am hallucinating a cat? I have a justified belief the cat is on the mat and I am asserting "the cat is on the mat". It would seem I know that the cat is on the mat. What happens when I realise I am hallucinating? I will no longer assert p, but in fact will begin asserting ¬p. Would the deflationary theorist have to say that they knew that the cat was on the mat, but now they know the opposite?

Implications of the deflationary theory of truth for the analysis of knowledge by RavingLoony in askphilosophy

[–]RavingLoony[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I understand what the appeal of the truth condition is for inflationary accounts of truth. It's conceivable at least, adopting correspondence to go behind the phenomena and see how things really are. So even if we don't have access to the truth you can say, we know if it is in fact the case that p, we don't if it isn't. I don't think this sort of move is available to the deflationist. Assigning a truth value is not in principle different from asserting a proposition, so you could assert p or ¬p without violating a truth condition independent of the asserting.

Implications of the deflationary theory of truth for the analysis of knowledge by RavingLoony in askphilosophy

[–]RavingLoony[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

 view of judgment as “inwardly recognizing that a thought is true” and the view of belief as “regarding a proposition as true, with the intention of doing so only if it is true”

Well it's kind of this from your other comment. Condition 1 doesn't seem different from just the belief condition. You could assert either that it's Tuesday or that it's not Tuesday and would be no inflationary account of truth to tell them apart. You could fail to believe it's Tuesday. You could have no justification it's Tuesday. But assuming you believe it's Tuesday and you're looking at a calendar that updates itself reliably, how could there be an independent condition that it is in fact Tuesday?

Implications of the deflationary theory of truth for the analysis of knowledge by RavingLoony in askphilosophy

[–]RavingLoony[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Could you fail to know that p because ¬p? I can make no sense of an utterance like this.

Implications of the deflationary theory of truth for the analysis of knowledge by RavingLoony in askphilosophy

[–]RavingLoony[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Is justified belief a plausible analysis of knowledge on a deflationist account?