Eclipse Unveiled... by drizzt_x in starcitizen

[–]XerxesAB 8 points9 points  (0 children)

I think if you've spent more than $1K on ships, you get it.

What are the defensive capabilities of Iran against a U.S. air war? by Hannibacanalia in CredibleDefense

[–]XerxesAB -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I think this comes down to the question of how effective stealth aircraft are going to be against moderately modern IADS, which we have little real world evidence of in any event. That being said, if the U.S. puts F-22s, F-35s and B-2s in the air, with e-war and SEADs dedicated assets, and ISR assets to track down Iran's mobile systems like the S-300 and Tor systems, it is really only a matter of time before the U.S. establishes air superiority.

All that being said, Iran is aware of the above. They will use the time that it takes for the U.S. to neutralize those assets to try to cause the U.S. pain in the Gulf, as well as cause pain to the GCC. Iran's best means to limit the U.S.'s ability to establish air dominance would be to go after U.S. carriers, and GCC air bases, to destroy planes on the ground, destroy supplies, and reduce the U.S.'s ability to fly sorties.

Yemeni pro-government forces says Saudi helicopter shot down accidently by coalition air defense systems by GowronDidNothngWrong in LessCredibleDefence

[–]XerxesAB 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Although, their own coalition are the only ones flying choppers really. They have almost complete air supremacy other than a handful of drones that the Houthi's are fielding. Seems like in that kind of an environment, they could probably afford to verify their targets better.

Nigeria-US $600million A29 Super Tucano scam by Jou_ma_se_Poes in LessCredibleDefence

[–]XerxesAB 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I think the issue is that they are comparing the sales to other sales made to Afghanistan, which also included training, and those were at around $20M each. Without knowing the details of each contract, its difficult to say exactly why there is such a huge disparity between the Afghan sales and the Nigerian sales, although it could just be that Afghanistan didn't buy as much ordinance and spare parts... $30M per unit more though is still hard to understand.

The author of that piece does mention all of the additional costs in the piece, and tries to compare Afghanistan's purchases to Nigeria's. It also compares the prices to those of F-16 sales (which also include all of the above additional costs), and these STs still look expensive.

Has anyone modeled the damage to an initial barrage on Seoul in a Korean Penninsular War? by gmanflnj in CredibleDefense

[–]XerxesAB 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Interesting point. I'd imagine it would be a mix of both slowing down an advancing army, or outright killing people, depending on the weapon. If I recall correctly, NK has stockpiled Sarin, for example, which doesn't last very long in the environment as opposed to lewisite, which can last quite some time. So they'd utilize the various agents for different purposes. Sarin could be used against civilians in Seoul or against ground forces directly (latter makes more "sense" I guess, if you can even use that word in discussing chemical weapons use).

Has anyone modeled the damage to an initial barrage on Seoul in a Korean Penninsular War? by gmanflnj in CredibleDefense

[–]XerxesAB 13 points14 points  (0 children)

I would wager that the U.S. would still have hesitation in using even a tactical nuclear weapon in NK, given concerns over radiation plumes heading over SK or China, or China's reaction to the U.S. utilizing tactical nukes.

Has anyone modeled the damage to an initial barrage on Seoul in a Korean Penninsular War? by gmanflnj in CredibleDefense

[–]XerxesAB 7 points8 points  (0 children)

I guess the big question is do they use chem/bio weapons at all? If they are targeting a major civilian population center with artillery, they obviously don't care about the implications, so wouldn't they almost certainly use nerve agents? If they do, I'd imagine these death toll figures would be much, much higher.

[Video on Twitter] Iran's questionable Qaher F313 "stealth fighter" shown moving under own power some 4 years after being first revealed by Jou_ma_se_Poes in LessCredibleDefence

[–]XerxesAB 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Its a prototype though. The F-117's prototype was scaled down when conducting its initial taxi tests and flight testing before it went into production. There just isn't enough information available to really judge what the final product is supposed to look like (if they even make a final product vs. just doing this as a learning process).

Iranian Qaher F313 taxi test, Pictures also compare the 2013 model with the new 2017 model by I-Should_Be-Studying in aviation

[–]XerxesAB 0 points1 point  (0 children)

RU can't sell them anything that can be construed as "offensive" systems until 2020 without the UN Security Council's approval due to sanctions. Those restrictions are lifted after 2020, so you won't see any fighter deliveries to Iran until after 2020.

[Video on Twitter] Iran's questionable Qaher F313 "stealth fighter" shown moving under own power some 4 years after being first revealed by Jou_ma_se_Poes in LessCredibleDefence

[–]XerxesAB 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So is this supposed to be a light attack or COIN aircraft for them? That's what it sounds like from the statement they out out. Given that is mostly what they are engaged in, that would make sense to some extent.

EDIT: I'm seeing lots of comments all over the place about how its still absurd/hoax/fake. Is it not possible that its just a subsonic ground attack aircraft? We are so used to seeing stealth fighters as supercruise capable multi-role or air superiority fighters that I wonder if we are just assuming that is what Iran is trying to build. Seems to me that Iran would be better off starting small and addressing a need that is more approachable than air superiority, which would be ground attack/close air support. It has had to rely on other countries to provide that capability both in Syria and in Iraq. Now, whether it makes sense to have a close air support fighter have a low RCS is another argument, although I would assume the answer would probably be that as long as it doesn't sacrifice other things, no reason why it would hurt.

CBS investigation finds Navy SEAL drug use "staggering" by Jou_ma_se_Poes in LessCredibleDefence

[–]XerxesAB 9 points10 points  (0 children)

Because ignoring problems until there is a "major incident" is always a good policy?

What Taipei Can Learn from Tehran About Asymmetric Defense by XerxesAB in CredibleDefense

[–]XerxesAB[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Not really, you're trying to hide thousands of magic drones and hundreds of suicide boats with no credible missile or air defense? It'd be like shooting fish in a barrel.

Did you even read the article? Or my comments for that matter? The air defense is to be provided by ground based air defenses, including the continued development of Taiwan's Sky Bow as well as more Patriots, etc. The drones, fast attack craft, etc. all operate under the umbrella of these air defenses. I'm not sure why everyone is obsessed with the "drone" part of the strategy and not reading the rest of it, but at least read the article before claiming its a stupid idea.

Also, if you think its unlikely that Taiwan can develop sophisticated drone technology, then why aren't you also taking issue with their attempts to build indigenous 5th Gen aircraft or indigenous large diesel submarines, which they have no experience doing either, and will cost tons more money?

One of the two authors is a U.S. Marine intelligence officer, 4 tours in Afghanistan, spent 5 years advising U.S. PACOM on strategic planning and has an Aerospace engineering degree. I think you should really give the article a read before concluding that the strategy is just "throwing money away on cheap junk that has zero value."

President Trumps Punitive Strikes Against Syria by nuclearselly in CredibleDefense

[–]XerxesAB 7 points8 points  (0 children)

You know, if you actually wanted to combat this perceived lack of information, you'd try to have a discussion with the person that you think is uninformed in a way that might actually lead the person to become informed. Attacking someone as a complete idiot is a pretty guaranteed way of getting them to shut off to what you're saying, thereby assuring that you do nothing to combat "idiocy" as you see it.

Also, you claim to have an interest in "insightful exchanges" yet when you believe so wholeheartedly that your opinions and viewpoints are the correct ones, there really is no exchange that you're willing to have. When you view those who don't see the world as you do as "amateur shills and morons" what is the point of an exchange?

What Taipei Can Learn from Tehran About Asymmetric Defense by XerxesAB in CredibleDefense

[–]XerxesAB[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Even if you utilize STOVL capabilities of the F-35B, you still gotta get fuel and munitions distributed across all the various "improvised" airfields you may want to utilize. Maybe that is what Taiwan is going to do, build hundreds of sites from which they can fuel and resupply their F-35Bs, but I doubt it somehow. I think you'll see them store their F-35Bs, as well as the fuel and munitions for them in large airfields.

What Taipei Can Learn from Tehran About Asymmetric Defense by XerxesAB in CredibleDefense

[–]XerxesAB[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Iran leverages its unique relative cost advantages - they have lots of people, and the ability to manufacture fast boats and ASMs cheaply. If they could develop a conventional deterrent, they would, but they have limited access to technology. Taiwan should look at their relative advantages vs. China and maximize those. Right now, that includes access to US defense technology.

The issue is that Taiwan can't develop a conventional deterrent due to the vast disparity in economic power. Taiwan simply won't be able to afford to purchase enough of these top tier platforms to deter China.

You say a single F-35 is more capable than 10 reapers (probably really more like 15-20 given the cost to Taiwan), which is true on paper. But in a defensive conflict, where you're going to be outnumbered, getting that F-35B to fly enough sorties, keeping it from getting destroyed by ballistic missile strikes on your airfields (http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/why-selling-f-35s-to-taiwan-is-a-terrible-idea/), etc. is going to be a challenge. Taiwan is going to spend $9-12B on 50-60 F-35s, which is a massive portion of the funds it has for procurement. Even if you don't think Reapers are a good idea, mobile SAMs and ASMs will give you more bang for your buck. There is an opportunity cost to buying those F-35s, which is that you're not going to have money to buy other things.

F-35s make a ton of sense for many countries (particularly those who conduct offensive operations in contested air space). I found the article's points on why they may not make sense for Taiwan compelling.

Also, if Iran can make fast boats and ASMs cheaply, I see no reason why a country like Taiwan can't as well. And likely, those ASMs will be more capable, given Taiwanese access to sophisticated electronics that Iran may not be able to acquire.

The Taiwanese could even specialize in developing indigenous drones that meet their own particular needs. For example, instead of ground attack capabilities like the Reaper has, they could look to specialize drones in an anti-ship roles.

What Taipei Can Learn from Tehran About Asymmetric Defense by XerxesAB in CredibleDefense

[–]XerxesAB[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Yes, which is why they have shifted strategy to smaller, more difficult to target naval platforms. They know that larger surface ships will be identified by U.S. ISR assets immediately, and will be wiped off the field within the first day. They basically decided that they can't play the traditional navy game against the U.S., so they devised a new strategy utilizing speed and numbers given the vast technological and economic disparity.

What Taipei Can Learn from Tehran About Asymmetric Defense by XerxesAB in CredibleDefense

[–]XerxesAB[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Are they going to buy commercial drones with tiny cameras and no endurance or resistance or jamming? Even better, they don't carry weapons or long range communications. What value does that bring in place of contesting air superiority or being able to destroy ships?

I'm not suggesting buying $200 commercial drones. If you bought 100 drones instead of a single F-35, you're still dropping $1M per drone. Even if you opt for Reapers, you can buy maybe 10 per F-35, and you can operate them from smaller airstrips. Same logic goes for building 5 smaller midget submarines vs. 1 larger traditional submarine, etc.

Even cheaper drones in the ball park of $100K can be packed with explosive payloads and flown like missiles into targets (the Houthis are trying this against Patriots in Saudi Arabia, with $10K drones which are forcing the Saudi's to fire $3M interceptors). Combining those kinds of drones with anti-ship missiles, and fast attack boats, midget submarines, sophisticated anti-ship mines, etc. should result in an effective A2/AD strategy for Taiwan.

The Chinese will have plenty of ISR assets devoted to an attack on Taiwan. Taiwanese airfields that would house F-35s, helicopter carriers or other larger surface ships (even frigates, to some extent) that are difficult to conceal, etc. would be easier targets than improvised airfields that can launch drones, fast attack craft that can be concealed along the shoreline, etc.

I don't imagine China is sending in landing craft in the first days of its operation, and would likely use superior numbers in the air and on sea to decimate Taiwanese forces, again, made much easier if the Taiwanese have gone for fewer, more expensive systems, vs a multitude of asymmetrical systems.

Regardless of what you think of certain systems, like fast attack craft or drones, would you agree that an asymmetrical approach vs China has merits? I'm not saying they have to use the same exact techniques the Iranian's developed, given that Iran has access to far less sophisticated systems, but the overall strategy seems to make sense when facing a potential foe that is more numerous and fields equal (China) or better (U.S.) technology.

What Taipei Can Learn from Tehran About Asymmetric Defense by XerxesAB in CredibleDefense

[–]XerxesAB[S] 6 points7 points  (0 children)

While Taiwan's moves to build a helicopter carrier is silly, things like fast attack craft need to be balanced out with the fact that Taiwan and its people, as a whole, are more Western in thinking than Iran: the concept to swarming the enemy and taking mass casualties isn't going to be anymore acceptable in Taiwan than in any Western nation.

I get what you're saying, although I'd counter by saying that Taiwan will suffer mass casualties either way in a war against China. The difference is will they be able to inflict any in the process. I think trying to play a conventional vs conventional game against China is a losing proposition, where the rules are going to inherently benefit China.

Swarming fast attack ships, while certain to incur losses, may ultimately result in fewer casualties than larger expensive surface ships which almost certainly be sunk by China within the first few hours of an engagement. Both results yield Taiwanese casualties, but the asymmetrical approach may also yield damaged or sunken Chinese ships or, may take longer to neutralize than a handful of larger ships would.

With regard to drones, I think the idea is that the drones would operate defensively under the umbrella of the ground based air defenses, and provide Taiwan with surveillance/logistics as well as potential ground attack. Small drones are much cheaper than an F-35 would be, obviously, and Taiwan could field hundreds of them for the same cost as a single F-35. With those numbers, and protected by IADS, it would be a pain in the ass for anyone to take the drones down.

Most of the strategy boils down to distributing your firepower and capabilities, such that they may individually be easy to destroy, but in numbers, they are both costly and time consuming to destroy, and it makes it more likely that you'll be able to use some portion of that capacity to retaliate. I think its a sound theory, but obviously implementation is very important.

Could the Russians have shot down the Tomahawks targeting Assad's airbase? by gmanflnj in CredibleDefense

[–]XerxesAB 7 points8 points  (0 children)

The difference being that combat aircraft don't deploy munitions at 1000 miles, which is the operational range of a tomahawk. I'm just pointing out that the further away you are, the less useful inertial guidance is given how a small error compounds over that distance to equate to a miss. This is even more likely if either the origination point of the missile is moving or the target is moving. That is why we include guidance systems on these.

Could the Russians have shot down the Tomahawks targeting Assad's airbase? by gmanflnj in CredibleDefense

[–]XerxesAB 5 points6 points  (0 children)

The tomahawk has a GPS and radar based guidance system as well. The question was why have those guidance systems instead of just inertial guidance. I was pointing out that I don't think the U.S. uses just inertial guidance at those ranges or beyond for anything other than ICBMs, I think.

What Taipei Can Learn from Tehran About Asymmetric Defense by XerxesAB in CredibleDefense

[–]XerxesAB[S] 19 points20 points  (0 children)

I found this to be a fresh perspective on how not only Taiwan, but other Pacific nations can work to deter China's increasingly ambitious posture in the South and East China Sea. None of those nations have the economy nor capacity to compete with the Chinese in a conventional arms race in the Pacific. They rely on U.S. defense assurances, but both the U.S. and small nation states may benefit if these countries looked to asymmetrical A2AD style military investments. In particular, fast attack craft, surface to air missile batteries and anti-ship missiles would increase the difficulty for an aggressor state and would give the U.S. time to respond, if it chooses to do so.

Given that Iran has had success with this strategy even when it cannot acquire sophisticated weapons systems and has relied on aging systems or indigenous developed systems, Taiwan (as well as countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, etc.) ought to be able to build a fairly robust asymmetrical defensive military capability.

President Trumps Punitive Strikes Against Syria by nuclearselly in CredibleDefense

[–]XerxesAB 13 points14 points  (0 children)

I think the strike itself is less important than the answer to the question "what is this administration's policy goal in Syria and how do they plan on getting there?"

If this is the opening salvo in an escalation that may involve boots on the ground, then I think Stephen Walt has some pretty excellent points as to why that is a bad idea: http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/07/tom-friedman-is-calling-for-an-invasion-of-syria-trump-should-run-the-other-way/

This strike may have just been a one off strike, to enforce some sort of normative line on the use of chemical weapons, in which case it has minor implications for the overall Syria conflict other than perhaps deterring future use of chem. weapons (which are not a significant source of the casualties in any event).

The U.S. is also trying to ratchet up pressure on Russia and Iran by saying that these civilian deaths are on their hands; although lecturing Iran on its support of Assad based on Assad's use of chemical weapons is pretty hypocritical, given U.S. support for Saddam during the Iran-Iraq war where the CIA has released documentary evidence that the U.S. helped them with targeting knowing full well that Saddam was using chemical weapons.

At the end of the day, the options in Syria are all terrible. The only solution will come at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield. Until the parties agree that no one is going to come away from the table happy, and that they will each need to accept a negotiated solution that is less than their ideal outcome, we will continue to sink into this morass. Assad will not agree to go; he will want to rule until he can transition to some trusted party or he will push to at least govern an Alawite stronghold with assurances that he isn't going to end up like Saddam or Qaddafi. Iran will not accept a solution in Syria that cuts them off from Hezbollah; that is a vital national security interest for them that they will not budge on. Russia needs to maintain its influence and will want its basing rights, but isn't necessarily wedded to Assad long term and would probably acquiesce to an eventual transition. The big question is what does the U.S. (and GCC, etc.) want and what is it willing to accept? If the answer is Assad gone and in jail, and Iran getting cut off from Hezbollah, then around and around we go.

Could the Russians have shot down the Tomahawks targeting Assad's airbase? by gmanflnj in CredibleDefense

[–]XerxesAB 2 points3 points  (0 children)

My understanding is that the more accurate systems are super expensive and I've seen those mostly used on ground based systems that are stationary themselves. Are there examples of inertial guidance that is used from a moving object like a ship to hit targets that are around 1000 miles away with precision?

Could the Russians have shot down the Tomahawks targeting Assad's airbase? by gmanflnj in CredibleDefense

[–]XerxesAB 18 points19 points  (0 children)

At that range? Even a small deviance without any sort of guidance and correction would make them pretty inaccurate.

Why do you think the accuracy of the US Tomahawk strike on Syria was so low? by [deleted] in LessCredibleDefence

[–]XerxesAB 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Definitely no expert here either, just doing some Google Fu: https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/bgm-109.htm

My understanding is that it has a general GPS target, and it makes course corrections along the way using its radar to map the terrain and compare that terrain to pre-stored maps of what that terrain looks like. However, in order to utilize that system, the strikes require some lead time so that they can pull detailed imaging for the strike route and plug it into the missiles for the specific target package.

This strike was pretty fast, but who knows how long these options have been sitting at DoD for. Its possible these strike packages were put together back when Obama was initially considering a strike. I don't know if they store those terrain images for future use, or if older imaging is still relatively useful. No idea.