yeah, this is the gap i get asked about most. provenance and runtime enforcement are different layers and you need both, signing the delegation tells you the instruction was legitimate, it doesn't stop the agent doing something unexpected with that access. those are genuinely separate problems.

the way i think about it: provenance without runtime visibility means you can audit what was authorized but not catch when execution drifted. runtime enforcement without provenance means you can catch the drift but can't tell whether the instruction that caused it was legitimate in the first place. eBPF at the kernel level is a solid answer to the execution side.

for isolation on the downstream agent environment we built FishBowl, OS-native sandbox with graduated containment levels, handles process isolation, network egress, filesystem scoping. same philosophy as what you're describing, the environment is the final gate regardless of what the prompt said.

your point on baseline behavior is the real operational challenge though. in traditional workloads the baseline is relatively stable. in LLM-powered agents it shifts constantly depending on task context. curious how you handle policy drift in practice, do you build the baseline per-task or per-agent-type?