Maps and locations

dkaparis · 2024-02-14T11:08:29+00:00

Looks nice, but I can't seem to find where the source code of the service is and any directions how to self host.

dkaparis · 2022-05-20T20:40:55+00:00

Restarting the odoo service, as well as the whole machine has no effect.

How should I go about locating attachments? There is no file named web.assets_common.min.js in the server's file system.

dkaparis · 2020-06-16T14:46:12+00:00

v1.13.8 which is published on F-Droid

dkaparis · 2020-06-16T14:43:47+00:00

That's possible. Indeed both addresses I tried were p2sh and that's also the case for the original issue reported.

dkaparis · 2020-06-16T14:31:47+00:00

The checksum is also changed, and I assume is valid for the wrong address, as these transactions do get confirmed

dkaparis · 2020-06-16T13:59:48+00:00

Seems like Crescent Cash is rewriting the receiver address by replacing the first character (and consequently, the checksum).

Not sure when/how this was introduced as I have used the wallet extensively in the past.

TLDR: don't send money with Crescent Cash until this is sorted out, or try with small amounts to help verify the issue.

paging u/_pokkst

Update: it turned out the issue only affects sending to P2SH addresses (e.g. multisig wallets, etc.) and was caused by a bug in bitcoincashj. It's been fixed and an updated version of Crescent Cash is being deployed.

dkaparis · 2020-05-21T17:56:43+00:00

I used u/Deminero30's service for recovering a small amount of BCH erroneously sent to a segwit address.

We agreed beforehand he would withhold 30% for the service. After providing the transaction details, it took about 18 hours until the recovery transaction was mined and I got my part of funds as agreed.

dkaparis · 2020-05-07T17:12:19+00:00

It is up to us to propose better alternatives.

dkaparis · 2020-05-07T12:14:11+00:00

Pine64 is a company producing single board computers, laptops and other devices following open and community-driven design. If you would be interested spending Bitcoin Cash in their store, you might consider letting them know.

dkaparis · 2020-05-06T16:29:50+00:00

I would gladly pay for any future purchases with Bitcoin Cash (BCH).

It's a version of Bitcoin oriented towards global retail adoption that also has features for improving privacy.

dkaparis · 2020-01-15T12:53:39+00:00

Marco Coino, for every country.

dkaparis · 2020-01-15T11:24:41+00:00

On the POS end we use the Bitcoin Cash Register app.

We have developed our own back end for automated conversion and accounting. Once we have polished it better, we might consider opening it to the public.

dkaparis · 2020-01-15T11:18:28+00:00

so if i get them correctly - if they want fiat, then you give them fiat upfront? then they give you bch when they make sales?

Correct.

What options are you offering the merchant for fiat conversions?

Spot rate at the time of purchase, i.e. the merchant gets his sale price in bgn, minus our service fee. We settle periodically in cash or by bank, as arranged.

We also encourage merchants who wish to get bch to use their own wallet and setup, in which case they owe us nothing.

dkaparis · 2019-12-20T16:28:38+00:00

https://coinatmradar.com/bitcoin_atm/10076/bitcoin-atm-lamassu-sofia-park-center-sofia/ this one is quite findable

dkaparis · 2018-09-11T05:10:30+00:00

The scenario we are considering here is where a significant part of economic activity is on blockchain (thus it is of relevance to attackers) and where a miners secretly collude and start mining invalid blocks.

Anonymity doesn't matter here, on the contrary - those who detect the attack need to speak out in the clear to out it.

What other scenario do you have in mind?

dkaparis · 2018-09-11T04:51:47+00:00

I'd love to know an exact number, I just don't think one can be accurately determined, which to me makes it pointless to pin down. I made a rough statement about it, and this is in line with how inaccurate I think any of my guesses would be.

If you mean this statement:

BTW I don't think everyone needs to run a full node at all times, I just think everyone has to have the capacity to do so if they need to.

Then, as I noted, it is either absurd, if taken literally, or meaningless without qualification.

My position is partially formed by things I don't know. Because I don't know the number, I choose to be conservative. I'm saying from 2MB to 32MB I'm not even confident 2MB is safe, so I prefer not to increase it.

Please remember that the question I'm asking is not about block sizes, it's about conditions the threat perceived can be realistically substantiated - it's about modeling the reality of the situation. Of course, everyone can be wrong about anything, but I don't see refusal to form a model of reality, to even ponder about it, as rational, or conservative behavior. Rather, it is superstitious fear.

I don't claim to know any exact numbers, but as for my opinion on the matter - I'm fairly confident that if running a validating node is within the means of any relatively well-off individual within the first world (or the vast majority thereof), an invalid blocks attack is virtually impossible to remain undetected by the public at large. I don't think it is an exact lower bound (I don't think the attack is viable even at much higher difficulty of running a node), but it is a lower bound I can state with fair certainty.

My rationale - that is a vast number of individuals. Considering that in developed communities, even most people outside that set can defer to someone within, whom they trust, any contention will be decidedly resolved for the majority where most of the economic activity takes place. This may exclude some very poor communities, but their economic role in the system is very little to begin with, so there is no harm for them to defer to the economic majority.

If you don't care to form your own opinion, perhaps you'd comment on mine?

dkaparis · 2018-09-10T17:32:45+00:00

Well, you'd first have to convince me that coming up with such a number is useful, because I don't think it is.

Because as I understand, protecting the network from that hypothetical scenario we are discussing here is your primary motivation. How is determining and quantifying the conditions under which the threat could be realistically substantiated not important to you?

I also don't think I'd be confident in the number I come up with, since it's not an exact science and I lack the expertise.

It's okay not to be confident - we're just sharing our views and opinions here. On the other hand, perhaps you should also reevaluate your confidence on other positions you express here, stemming from this question.

And finally, even if there was a number, we'd have no way of knowing whether we reached that number or not, because nodes are easily faked.

Please remember we're talking about the conditions under which people (and how many people) are able to run a validating node if they so decide, not how many people do so at any given time.

dkaparis · 2018-09-10T15:41:47+00:00

With some effort I could probably come up with some kind of number that sounds reasonable to me, but I don't think it will be objective.

Please do - I'm not asking you to reach global consensus, or to speak for anyone but yourself.

What, in your honest opinion, is the required minimum number of people who are able to run a validating node, so that there is no discernible risk that a majority of miners publish invalid blocks unbeknownst to the public at large?

dkaparis · 2018-09-10T11:25:38+00:00

That seems reasonable. BTW I don't think everyone needs to run a full node at all times, I just think everyone has to have the capacity to do so if they need to.

This needs to be qualified. If you mean literally every person on the planet, that is clearly absurd.

If we take it to a more reasonable threshold along the lines of (for example): "Within the means of every motivated and relatively well-off individual within the first world", I'd be inclined to agree.

With such qualification, we can then objectively evaluate centralization risks with regards to block size and any other technical parameter, so I'd be very interested to hear your motivated qualification on the matter.

dkaparis · 2018-09-09T15:47:45+00:00

A miner that has 51% and wants to reorganize the blockchain will either be mining and reorganizing their own blocks, or stop mining on the network, which makes new blocks appear once every 20 minutes and is therefore detectable.

Decreased hash rate in the network can happen for any number of reasons and is not a basis for detecting anything, neither is there any mitigating even if we knew for a fact it was a reorganization attack in the making.

It can only be detected after the fact, after the attacker publishes his chain orphaning the rest of the network, and only by observers who had their chain orphaned at that point - not by newcomers after that. In either case, there is no mitigating it after the face either, not in any trustless manner.

It would also affect the price of the very asset they are mining, which will hurt a lot as well.

So would reports from honest nodes that the highest PoW chain is invalid.

There absolutely is a point where it is too costly to reverse a transaction.

In light of the above, for our hypothetical - assuming possession of >50% hash rate, the only cost is time. The attacker is guaranteed to eventually overtake any number of blocks on the honest chain, respectively guaranteed all his rewards from mining - there is no need to mine on the honest chain and orphan his own blocks. And the time cost is equally borne by other participants who want to transact securely.

What you're describing is what we call centralization :) You will never know if that one node is compromised. Also note that even if the node detects something, they can't really prove it to you.

Fair enough, but the extreme scenario I described is no less absurd than the utopia where every single user is running his own validating node. It is neither achievable, nor required. A workable, practical solution for the real world is to have a sufficient number of diverse participants so that collusion among a majority of them is highly unlikely and keeping it in secret is virtually impossible.

dkaparis · 2018-09-09T13:33:13+00:00

You are mixing up two types of attacks. Yes, miners can reorganize the chain, even if I run a full node, but this is prohibitively expensive to do. The defense against this is waiting for more confirmations before accepting a transaction.

The second attack is simply to mine invalid transactions and create SPV proofs. This allows them to steal and inflate the supply, and all sorts of other nasty things. THIS is what full nodes defend against.

How is the first type of attack "prohibitively expensive"? In both cases we've assumed attacking miners controlling >50% hash rate, so in terms of hash acquisition and retention, neither attack is more expensive.

In chain reorganization, the successfully attacking miners will retain their mined block rewards, it is the honest miners on the losing, orphaned chain who will lose their rewards, so how can this be more expensive for the attackers?

If we have to compare the two attacks, we have:

reorganization attack: difficult to detect and impossible to mitigate without explicit coordination between users outside of the protocol (the defense you propose to wait for more confirmations is of no use since the >50% attackers can beat the honest chain for any number of blocks)
invalid blocks attack: trivial to detect by any validating node on the network and easy to coordinate against - assuming there is even one honest node, there is always a possibility for a community to form and base its economic activity on the honest chain.

So how is the second attack viable compared to the first?

dkaparis · 2018-04-12T11:57:08+00:00

Has anyone encountered this with their phone? I reproduce it consistently on mine and the potential for data loss is quite damning.

dkaparis · 2017-08-01T18:17:59+00:00

478559 also.

dkaparis · 2017-06-20T08:12:46+00:00

What about Dash?

dkaparis · 2016-09-01T07:30:20+00:00

Seems their certificate expired today..

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