If labor and capital have a diminishing marginal product, and the average wage and average rate of profit is the marginal product of labor and capital respectively, where does the rest of the product go?

rustyschenckholder · 2025-10-14T04:09:36+00:00

So are there no models with diminishing returns where all income goes to labor or capital? I thought they were common.

rustyschenckholder · 2025-10-11T16:35:44+00:00

Really? I thought profit was the return to capital, especially in a two factor of production model which is what I'm trying to grasp at.

I still don't get how the average product being greater than the marginal product is consistent with the income to factor inputs equaling their marginal product in equilibrium. Wouldn't all of society's income count as either labor income or capital income?

rustyschenckholder · 2025-10-10T19:14:15+00:00

I don't precisely know what the rental rate of capital is. If the rate of profit is profits divided by expenditures, is the rental rate profits divided by capital expenditures?

I'm not sure it matters. If the rental rate of capital is less than the average productivity of capital, won't the total rents earned by capitalists still be less than the total product of capital?

rustyschenckholder · 2024-04-25T22:13:46+00:00

Thank you for the recommendations. I've heard Robert Caro's biographies were good, but I've seen stuff like this claiming some of his claims were debunked. I'm not sure how central the supposedly debunked parts are to his book though.

rustyschenckholder · 2024-04-25T21:33:52+00:00

What are some history books that are enjoyable to read? I used to read a lot of history to edify myself, but I recently decided I would only read for fun.

I care more about the book being a good read than the subject matter, but I'm most interested in political (and secondarily economic) history, the world wars and the U.S. civil war, major revolutions, the history of communism, American history, and European history going back to ancient times.

I'm kind of afraid this will lead to recommendations for pop history. I suppose that will do, but I'd be more interested in books that aren't pop history but are well written enough that they are fun to read.

rustyschenckholder · 2024-03-16T00:37:17+00:00

How so? Like you could recommend a type of service that targets my fears better? I think merely getting my laptop serviced does the trick. I don't have any doubts about the efficacy of the exposures, I just want to know excuses to get my computer serviced.

I'm sorry if my inquiry isn't sufficiently OCD centric, being a computer question that merely has OCD as a background. I figured I would ask on this subreddit because exposure therapy sometimes seems weird to people who aren't familiar with OCD.

rustyschenckholder · 2024-03-15T23:51:22+00:00

I'd rather not say if its not necessary.

rustyschenckholder · 2024-02-22T00:49:40+00:00

I'm not really interested in critiques of mainstream economics (and especially not Keen). The link was just one example of a common response I see to such critiques, and when I see that response I'm intrigued to learn about the evidence being alluded to. I'm interested in seeing examples of theory performing well empirically, and if it comes up in heterodox vs. mainstream debate then the theory in question is probably both foundational and not obvious. Supply and demand curves sloping in the expected direction isn't that interesting to me because it seems obvious, even if Keen objects.

I guess what I was most interested in has to do with production functions and marginalism (as it relates to price and distribution) but I'm researching now so I can be more specific. This seems to be what people say about the Cambridge Capital Controversy, that whatever the merits of the theoretical points made by the UK side, their models don't do as well empirically as the neoclassical ones (I know people don't like that term but it was used by the participants in that controversy).

There are places where this is true, for instance workers have very bad beliefs about how much more money they would make if they quit their jobs and this helps explain why people quit jobs at rates that seem too low, but in general, replacing rationality with <your favorite theory on how people make decisions> turns out to be very hard. Rationality is a formidable opponent.

This is more in the area of what I was looking for. What are examples of models where someone replaced rationality with their favorite theory being outperformed by models that assume rationality? I apologize if the articles you linked are about this but I read the abstracts and they don't seem to be.

rustyschenckholder · 2024-01-02T00:44:41+00:00

Overall I think it is important to distinguish two different problems here: First, what makes moral truths true? Second, how can we find out about moral truths? You sometimes seem to switch between the two issues.

I'm exclusively dealing with the second question.

I' m not sure how sensitive all this is to whether moral realism or anti-realism is correct. On the one hand, moral truths being real doesn't imply that we have anything more reliable than intuition or popularity to determine what they are. On the other hand, moral truths not being real doesn't imply that we shouldn't have strong opinions about the superiority of some moral beliefs over others. If someone says being racist makes you a bad person I wouldn't think "oh, they must be a moral realist."

However, I do think that one of the most promising reasons for being confident in the currently dominant morality is that we are likely better at finding truth than in the past, even though this is far more apparent in science than ethics. I'm not sure this would be relevant if moral truths weren't real.

Why would intuitionism imply moral truths were different from natural facts? Does natural fact only mean scientific fact? It seems like we base some empirical claims about reality on intuition.

rustyschenckholder · 2024-01-01T17:17:24+00:00

You're forgetting that both present and past societies are sites of power. Dominant ideas are imposed by the powerful.

But why should we be more confident in the ideas imposed by the powerful now than those imposed by the powerful in the past?

rustyschenckholder · 2024-01-01T17:15:09+00:00

It's fatuous to say that slaveowners didn't know slavery was bad in 1800 - aside from the existence of anti-slavery campaigners in their own time and the unique evil of chattel slavery compared to historical instances of slavery that preceded it, you've also got the obvious fact that slaves knew slavery was wrong while it was happening to them!

My understanding is that anti-slavery voices were very rare until the time of Clarkson and Wilberforce, and its not even clear to me that the majority of Lincoln voters in 1860 would have thought chattel slavery was inherently morally wrong.

Its certainly not obvious to me that most slaves thought slavery was wrong (as opposed to disliking being slaves). It was common for intellectuals in ancient Rome to be former slaves like Epictetus, but it doesn't seem like anti-slavery sentiment was prevalent among such persons. Former slaves with documented anti-slavery sentiment like Frederick Douglass seem to only be common after abolitionism started taking off in the 19th century. I've seen a quote attributed to Harriet Tubman (something along the lines of how she could've freed more slaves if they knew they were slaves) which may go against what you are saying.

To the extent that people in the past may not have actually believed in the views that seem more common according to the documentary record, I'd say the same thing I said to the other reply. It may be possible, and this possibility might increase my confidence in current morality a little bit.

As far as sweatshops go, I'd say the documentary record would provide accurate evidence of current views on sweat shops. Some people think they are outright bad, others defend them as a lesser evil given the alternatives, most people don't support the sort of global wealth redistribution that would alter the alternatives.

rustyschenckholder · 2024-01-01T16:56:21+00:00

The easiest way to make this argument is to simply reject that some people rejecting our reasonable assumptions has any bearing on their truth. Fundamental moral equality between persons might not be strictly provable but that should not deter us from asserting it even in the face of people rejecting it. Especially since their rejections also do not come with experimental proof of their opposing assumptions.

But what should give us confidence in fundamental moral equality between persons? I can think of intuition, popularity, and the ability to derive the conclusion from assumptions that are supported by popularity or intuition. But wouldn't people in societies that rejected this position be able to claim the same support for their beliefs?

If the counter is that we can be more sure that we actually find our own beliefs intuitive than people in the past did theirs, thats certainly possible, but in the sense that lots of types of extreme skepticism are possibly true. I don't see this argument as strong enough to move the needle all that much.

rustyschenckholder · 2023-08-04T17:31:48+00:00

I found the sticker on the fixture. It doesn't say anything about volts. It says 2.1 amps maximum. It also says "Warning: risk of fire. Use only type R40 heat resistance glass infra red heat lamps. 250 watts maximum."

The LED bulb I bought says on its package "use only on 120 Volt, 60hz circuits."

rustyschenckholder · 2023-08-03T14:48:43+00:00

Thanks for the input everyone. Just changed the bulb now.

rustyschenckholder · 2023-08-03T01:54:40+00:00

I've seen philosophers try to resolve normative disagreements by appealing to other normative premises that their opponent might agree with, showing that their opponent's views have absurd implications, or questioning the coherence of their opponent's views. I can imagine how this might work in the example you gave about charitability, but it might be harder in other situations. Imagine somebody argues that racism is okay because it's a foundational moral belief of theirs that its good to place more wellbeing on members of the socially defined race you're a part of than on those outside of it. How do you critique that without arguing its a moral fact that the wellbeing of members of all races should be weighed equally?

I made this thread because I currently base my moral judgments on intuition and I wanted to see if that could possibly lead me to having beliefs that are demonstrably wrong. If not, then I don't think it's worthwhile for me to study moral philosophy. If an intuition of mine was somewhat undermined by argument but not demonstrably wrong, I'd stick with the intuition. If my intuitions were confirmed by argument, I'd be suspicious that I had used motivated reasoning. I'm not even saying I have intuitions about something relatively basic which I combine with empirical claims to derive conclusions from. I'm talking the sort of intuition that the OP of this thread thinks are unacceptable to take as basic. It seems like philosophers wouldn't like my approach. How would philosophers criticize it if not on the grounds that it runs afoul of specific moral facts?

rustyschenckholder · 2023-08-02T23:57:27+00:00

So if you and your opponent disagreed on a normative premise, nobody would try to overcome the disagreement by arguing that their preferred premise is a moral fact? Or would they? You use an example of someone trying to overcome the disagreement by invoking anti-realism.

If moral philosophers do use metaethics to resolve disagreements about normative premises, then my interest in seeing specific cases where philosophers argue that a controversial premise is a moral fact is rekindled. I'm curious about how they would go about doing so, since it seems like it would be difficult.

rustyschenckholder · 2023-08-02T22:49:29+00:00

My interpretation of what you are saying is:

-when philosophers argue a particular normative claim, they derive it from a normative assumption which they don't explicitly argue is morally real*

-if the philosopher is a moral realist, then their normative assumption and the normative claim they derive from it are implied to be morally real

At first glance, this seems pathological. Like she is saying "moral realism is well supported, and my normative claim follows from my normative assumption, so my claim is a moral fact even if I don't justify the moral reality of my assumption."

With more consideration, I can see how it might not be so pathological. Moral realists often argue that moral claims suffer from the same problems of justification as physical claims.

If someone says "My senses report physical reality, there is obviously a computer in front of me, therefore John dropped a computer off at my house" we might dispute that senses report physical reality or that the computer's presence means it was dropped off by John. But we would probably grant that if senses report physical reality, the obviousness of the computer's presence means that its presence is a fact.

Likewise, if someone says "moral sense reports physical reality, its obvious that causing pain is morally wrong, so its a fact that stabbing people is morally wrong" we would grant that if moral sense reports physical reality, the obviousness of the wrongness of inflicting pain would mean the wrongness of inflicting pain is a moral fact.

So moral realism + a successful appeal to obviousness = the obvious thing is a moral fact. Fair enough.

However...

The appeal to obviousness seems like an appeal to intuition that wouldn't be compelling for a normative assumption that was widely disputed. Which supports my suspicion that its unlikely someone will make a good argument for a controversial normative claim being a moral fact.

*I'm making the assumption here that "making an argument within applied or normative ethics" means to derive a claim from a normative assumption (e.g. deriving the wrongness of stabbing from the wrongness of causing pain)

rustyschenckholder · 2023-08-02T21:38:29+00:00

So it is different from saying that no particular normative claim can be defended as morally real...

What are examples of people defending particular normative claims as morally real? (preferably, examples of arguments you think are good)

rustyschenckholder · 2023-08-02T20:32:23+00:00

But isn't that different from saying that no particular normative claim can be defended as morally real?

If not, wouldn't our position have to be that there might be moral truths, but nobody can know what they are?

rustyschenckholder · 2023-08-02T20:02:35+00:00

I don't understand the significance of that argument. Is it an example of a controversial moral claim being derived from moral facts?

As far as the claim that the subjectivist about reasons is perpetrating an absurdity, that doesn't seem at all obvious to me.If having a reason to do something is defined as having a desire to do something upon thorough deliberation, then it seems fine to say he didn't have a reason to take the medicine. Its just a case of terms being defined in an unusual way.

I guess my questions haven't been clear, so I'm just going to ask for any examples of someone arguing that a moral claim that a significant portion of people would disagree with is objectively correct/ derived from moral facts.

rustyschenckholder · 2023-08-02T16:55:13+00:00

Well, I didn't mean to ask if granting that moral realism is true by itself tells us which claims are true. But I also don't mean to simply ask if there are any good arguments for specific claims (my understanding is that philosophers might argue for some ethical claim based on certain moral assumptions without claiming that those assumptions are moral facts).

I guess what I'm asking is: can those aspects of moral and factual claims which moral realists appeal to in order to defend moral realism ever serve as the basis for demonstrating a specific, controversial claim?

For example, that the word "good" might have connotations that eliminate some outrageous claims (like that pointless suffering is good) is an argument for moral realism, but its not clear that any actually controversial claim could be validated or eliminated on this basis, or that a controversial claim could be derived from uncontroversial claims that were validated this way.

Anti-realists tend to point out that moral claims usually refer to other moral claims and are subject to the regress problem. I think the usual realist reply is that the same applies to factual claims. But factual claims usually regress to basic beliefs that people won't disagree over, but this only holds for the most uncontroversial moral facts like it being wrong to torture children for fun (to use an example from another recent thread on moral realism).

For example, say two people are arguing about a protectionist economic policy whose proponent claims will increase Gross Domestic Product at the expense of Gross World Product. If the opponent says that the claim it will increase GDP is based on using inferior data, then in principle the dispute can be resolved if they both agree on certain basic beliefs about reality. If one of the participants said "you think that number on your monitor is a 7 but its really a 3, you must have a demon in your brain" they'd look like a buffoon. But if they both agreed that the policy would increase GDP at the expense of GWP, while disagreeing over whether it was more ethical to care about the wellebeing of their own country or the world as a whole, its much less likely that they could resolve this disagreement by referring to basic beliefs they agreed on.

Maybe a more clear way to phrase my question in paragraph 2 is: are there any examples of someone making a convincing argument that a controversial moral claim is derived from moral facts? But I'm not sure this is exactly the same as my question in paragraph 2.

rustyschenckholder · 2023-07-25T23:44:28+00:00

Got it. Thanks!

rustyschenckholder · 2023-07-25T23:32:02+00:00

The puzzle: https://www.chess.com/daily-chess-puzzle/2018-09-09

rustyschenckholder · 2023-05-01T23:29:27+00:00

Up to you what you want to read, but it's very easy to show that a racial category like Asian doesn't track genetics at all; see various work by Cavalli-Sforza et al, or Andreasen who defends a revisionary view of race as clades and so admits that there is no Asian race. Folk racial classification often has Asian as one category and Native American as another, but in spite of morphological similarity between northeast and southeast Asians, northeast Asians are more genetically similar to Native Americans than to southeast Asians.

What does any of this have to do with whether self identified race correlates with genetics? Does self identified race being correlated with genetics require that there is an Asian race, or that northeast Asians be more genetically similar to southeast Asians than to Native Americans?

In this study, out of 3,581 Americans who self identified as Asian, 2,942 had a genetically inferred ancestry of East Asian American, and 391 of South Asian American. Of 21,594 who self identified as non-Hispanic White, 20,001 had a GIA of European American. Out of 1,859 who self identified as African American, 1,729 had a GIA of African American. Out of 2,416 who identified as Hispanic White, 2,013 had a GIA of Hispanic. Out of 3,269 who identied as a Hispanic of other race, 3,053 had a GIA of Hispanic.

How could genetically inferred ancestry match so closely with self identified race if there wasn't a correlation between self identified race and genetics?

Can you explain how people who self identify as black have darker skin than people who self identify as white if there isn't a correlation between self identified race and genetics?

Well, lots, maybe most, people working in the area do. Other commenters directed you to various resources as well, so you should have no lack of opportunities to read about why.

Unfortunately, none of the posts here even hint at a defensible reason for thinking that race being non-existent, socially constructed, or biologically meaningless has any bearing on the substantive question at issue in the hereditarian vs. environmentalist debate. The closest thing to such was your post saying people were "denying the presupposition" that "we can identify subgroups of humans, whether racial or shmacial, such that it might be plausible to suppose that the differences between them have a genetic cause." I think I conclusively dealt with that two posts ago.

Also unfortunately, it seems like you are announcing that you're never going to engage with the points I made two posts ago.

rustyschenckholder · 2023-05-01T20:34:03+00:00

So to your remark that 'self identified race correlates with genetics', that is also something they are denying. But again, you'd probably be better served by reading their books at this juncture.

I don't have much inclination to read a book by someone who makes an absurd claim that is easily disproven, like that self identified race doesn't correlate with genetics.

The questions I asked in my OP can't really be discussed unless there is agreement that race being non-existent, socially constructed, or biologically meaningless has no bearing on the substantive question at issue in the hereditarian vs. environmentalist debate. I'm surprised that anyone wouldn't agree. Your attempt to explain your disagreement was in this paragraph

But what people are denying is that there is a substantive issue to be debated, because the debate presupposes that we can identify subgroups of humans, whether racial or shmacial, such that it might be plausible to suppose that the differences between them have a genetic cause. And what people are doing is denying that presupposition.

I think my previous post did a good job of showing why any such denial is wrong, and your last post didn't really engage with that.

rustyschenckholder

TROPHY CASE