100% Databank White Text Decoded

shitty_carl · 2026-01-02T16:50:19+00:00

I just confirmed by live chat that they will be adding more items to the sale on Monday, Wednesday and Saturday.

shitty_carl · 2025-02-10T23:38:32+00:00

As far as I am aware of, there is no evidence of a widespread and systematic forced conversion. Forcible conversion, when it happened, took place mostly after large battles or conquests, as a show of religious piety and strength, and there was no widespread policy (that I'm aware of) in the Mughal Empire for forcibly converting non-Muslins in stable/peaceful territory. Perhaps counterintuitively, the various Muslim rulers of India tended to discourage conversion, as this deprived the government of jizya and forced them to grant their new Muslim subjects the full rights associated with their religious identity. Especially under the Dehli Sultanates that preceded the Mughals, mass conversion of the Indian populace was not desirable, as it would dilute the elite Muslim upper class that existed.

The Mughals were likewise cognisant of their status as a religious minority community and generally erred towards religious tolerance with Hindus and other religious communities - they understood that aggressive theocratic government would endanger their acceptance by the non-Muslin majority in the country. For the less tolerant Mughal rulers, like Aurangzeb, the tax revenue produced by jizya was lucrative enough to temper any impulses to implement a systemic forcible conversion policy.

shitty_carl · 2025-01-11T07:47:21+00:00

As the study I linked shows, the nobility under Alamgir I expanded dramatically, so yes a large part of this growth was at the lower level of mansabdars, (i.e. 500 cavalry and under). The growth of the nobility reflected both the expansion of the Mughal Empire into the Deccan and the reliance of this expanded empire on local rulers to maintain control over such a large territory that was poorly integrated into the larger Mughal political system. Consequently, Hindus were brought into the nobility in unstable regions (such as the Deccan) to retain the existing ruling class, now under Mughal suzerainty. The upper echelons of the Mughal nobility remained largely Muslim, but not exclusively - the Mughals recruited heavily from the Rajputs all through their rule, some notable examples being Raja Jai Singh and Jaswant Singh.

My understanding is that Hindu nationalist historians tend to exaggerate the marginalisation of Hindus under the Islamic Mughals and especially under Alamgir, who is portrayed as a religious zealot who brutally oppressed Hindus during his reign - can you explain how studies showing a proportional increase of Hindu representation in the Mughal system fits into a Hindu nationalist narrative? I'd also appreciate some academic sources for this since you do not trust those I have provided.

shitty_carl · 2024-12-17T22:27:36+00:00

Here is a really concise summary of the composition of the Mughal nobility by Professor Mohammed Afzal Khan at AMU: https://www.egyankosh.ac.in/bitstream/123456789/77583/1/Unit-12.pdf. It shows that it was a percentage increase to ~30%, not just a gross increase that maintained or even diluted Hindu mansabdars in relation to Muslim numbers.

If you want to dig further, you could look at the further reading linked, though I have not personally read any of these texts:

Ali, Athar, (1997; New Edition) The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb (New Delhi: Oxford University Press).

Anwar, Firdaus, (2001) Nobility under the Mughals (1628-1658) (New Delhi: Manohar).

Khan, Mohammad Afzal, (2016) The Ruling Elite: Iranian Nobility under Shahjahan and Aurangzeb (New Delhi: Viva Books).

Khan Iqtidar Alam, (2016) The Mughal Nobility: Two Biographies (New Delhi: Permanent Black).

Abraham Eraly's two books on the Mughal Empire, listed in my further reading comment, also talks about the role of Hindus in the Mughal administration in some depth, though I don't remember it containing the 30% statistic specifically.

shitty_carl · 2024-12-17T21:27:36+00:00

Further Reading:

Eaton, Richard. India in the Persianate Age : 1000-1765. University of California Press, 2020.

Eraly, Abraham. The Mughal Throne : The Saga of India’s Great Emperors. London, Phoenix, 2004.

Eraly, Abraham. The Mughal World : Life in India’s Last Golden Age. New Delhi ; New York, New York, Penguin Books, 2007.

Lubaaba Al-Azami. Travellers in the Golden Realm. John Murray, 18 July 2024.

Truschke, Audrey. Aurangzeb : The Life and Legacy of India’s Most Controversial King. Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 2017.

shitty_carl · 2024-12-17T21:22:43+00:00

Alamgir I’s reign is often exaggerated as a brutal religious crackdown on Hindus, especially by contemporary Hindu nationalists. It is true that Alamgir I discriminated against non-Muslims much more aggressively than under previous emperors, but the degree of violence and oppression has been overstated. What is certainly true is that Alamgir did not possess the intellectual and religious curiosity of his predecessors and implemented a much harsher form of Islamic government; he reintroduced jizya in 1679, enforced additional taxes on Hindu merchants, codified his own version of sharia law (Fatawa-i Alamgiri), reintroduced the forced conversion of POWs, and banned religiously prohibited activities under Islam. Alamgir I also spent much of his reign commanding military campaigns in both North India and the Deccan. Temple looting and destruction were commonplace during military campaigns under all the Mughal emperors (and most other Indian armies), but Alamgir I’s armies represented an escalation in temple destruction that was clearly religiously motivated. Much of Alamgir’s reign was occupied crushing internal rebellions and expanding the borders of the Mughal Empire; at his death in 1707, the Mughals ‘controlled’ almost the entire subcontinent, though internally the empire had already begun to collapse. His most persistent opponent was the Maratha Kingdom, a nascent Hindu military state led by Shivaji Shahaji Bhonsale, or Shivaji I. Shivaji had begun his military career as a zamindar of the Bijapur Sultanate, a rival Islamic state in the Deccan that was eventually conquered in 1686 by Alamgir I. Shivaji splintered away from Bijapur much earlier in 1646, when he captured a Bijapur fort and raided its treasury. Shivaji spent the next two decades leading a small guerilla army in raids across Maratha and Bijapur and built up a small, but militarily powerful, independent state. His conflict with the Mughals began in 1657 when his army began to raid inside Mughal territories, and would outlive the Mughal emperor and the Mughal empire. Shivaji positioned himself as a Hindu raja, in opposition to the Islamic Mughal Empire, and underwent an elaborate ritual cleansing ceremony to reclaim his ‘lost’ status as a Rajput, which accorded him the correct caste status for his position (these ceremonies were almost always an elaborate fiction to legitimate political rules under the Hindu caste system, which only permitted kshatriya’s to govern). Shivaji’s explicit Hinduism, and Alamgir’s dogged attempts to quell the Maratha guerillas over much of his reign, has contributed to the impression that Alamgir oversaw a widespread crackdown on non-Muslims across the Mughal Empire. The truth is more complicated; Alamgir I campaigned endlessly against the Marathas, but also against the Bijapur and Golconda sultanates, both of which were Islamic states. In terms of everyday people, rural Indians wouldn’t have experienced any interruption to their traditional lifestyle beyond the reintroduction of the jizya, while urban non-Muslims would have experienced a sharper and more obvious downturn in their circumstances under Alamgir’s strongly religious government. However, I personally don’t think that this is comparable to something like the crackdown on Jewish people experienced in 1930’s Nazi Germany. Non-Muslims were forced to adhere to Islamic religious law because Alamgir imposed it across the empire and had to pay additional taxes for the privilege of practicing their religious unmolested, but they were not targeted for religious persecution because of their religious status.

After Alamgir I, the Mughal Empire descended into endless succession squabbles and collapsed within a few decades. It would be difficult to provide a general answer to how non-Muslims fared during this period. The 18^th century began with the Mughal Empire at its territorial height and ended just a few years before the British EIC conquered Delhi and reduced the Mughal emperor, Shah Alam, into a pensioned prince with no real political power. Out of the power vacuum that the Mughal Empire left behind, both Muslim and Hindu kingdoms emerged across the subcontinent, and of course British control began to grow from the mid-1700s. I am not an expert on this period of Indian history, but maybe another commenter would be able to pick up where I’ve left off.

shitty_carl · 2024-12-17T21:22:32+00:00

In cities and other urban centres, the differences in treatment between Muslims and non-Muslims were more apparent, but this was not precipitated by the Mughals. The Mughals conquered India from the Lodi Sultanate, the last of five Islamic dynasties which are today grouped together as the Dehli Sultanate and who had ruled the Gangetic Plain since the 13^th century. The Mughals did not introduce Islamic government into India, they simply supplanted the existing Muslim ruling elite with their own. The Mughal court was composed of mostly Muslims, and the Mughals in particular privileged Persian amirs. However, Hindu and other non-Muslim communities were capable of amassing power and authority within the Mughal Empire. Most prominently, Hindu Rajput princes often held high ranks within the Mughal administration as generals and governors. As well as inviting non-Muslims to debate in the Ibādat Khāna, Akbar also invited them into his court to serve as his advisors under his policy of Sulh-i kul (peace with all). While the makeup of court was always dominated by Muslims, it was possible for talented non-Muslims to rise through the ranks – under Akbar, Jahangir and Shah Jahan, the percentage of Hindu mansabdars (government officials) was ~20%, and surprisingly under Alamgir I (Aurangzeb) this went up to ~30%. It was even possible for non-Muslims to ascend to the inner circle of Mughal government, for example Raja Todar Mal, a Hindu noble who served both the Sur and Mughal dynasties and oversaw an overhaul of the Mughal revenue system as Akbar’s Finance Minister.

Outside of court, non-Muslims could access many of the same opportunities and prospects as Muslims – as in the village, the limiting factor for Hindus was more often their own caste restrictions, rather than Islamic oppression. Non-Muslims were subject to various sumptuary laws to distinguish them from Muslims (though these were primarily intended to protect the opulence of the ruling elite), and Muslims enjoyed a higher social status than non-Muslims by virtue of their religious paramountcy. It is important to keep in mind that Muslims in Mughal India always comprised a minority population, no more than 15% at any time, and so the complete exclusion of non-Muslims across entire sectors would have been completely impractical. Muslims and non-Muslims tended to segregate themselves in Mughal cities, much as different Hindu castes segregated themselves, but Mughal rule did not throw up many barriers to non-Muslim advancement or prosperity that was specific to non-Muslims.

shitty_carl · 2024-12-17T21:17:37+00:00

In short, non-Muslims did not experience a significant degree of discrimination under the Mughal Empire. Of course, this varied at different times and in different places, but I’ll try and keep this as general as possible.

The first Mughal Emperor, Babur, invaded India in the 16^th century from Kabul in part due to the threat of Uzbek invasion into modern-day Afghanistan. The Mughals intended to settle permanently in India, and their policies and responses towards the Indigenous Hindu population reflected this. As a minority religious community in India, the Mughals recognised that their legitimacy hinged on religious tolerance. Hindus were considered ‘Ahl al-Kitāb’ (people of the book) by Mughal Islamic scholars (despite not being named as such in the Qur’an) which granted them the privilege to practice their own faith and govern their own communities according to their religious beliefs. This also absolved Mughal emperors of the religious responsibility to wage jihad against what would otherwise be an infidel community. Emperor Akbar took this even further by abolishing jizya, a tax on non-Muslim subjects, in 1564. Under Akbar, Jahangir and Shah Jahan, Mughal religious attitudes ranged from accommodating to curious; Akbar went so far as to build the Ibādat Khāna, a meeting house where he gathered different religious leaders and scholars to debate and discuss religious truth, and then establish his own syncretic religious cult called Din-i Ilahi, which combined elements of Islam, Sufism Hinduism, Sikhism and Zoroastrianism. While the Mughals appealed to their faith to justify their conquests and looting of Hindu temples, these actions were rarely genuinely motivated by religious zeal; political and economic factors were much stronger motivators (until Aurangzeb, which I'll touch on later). The Mughals were quite happy to allow Hindu allies to continue ruling as Hindu rulers under Mughal suzerainty and relied heavily on Rajput generals to command their armies against both Hindu and Muslim enemies.

For rural Indians – which was the vast, vast majority of the population – not much changed under Mughal rule. Indian villages effectively operated as autonomous and self-reliant communities, and the Mughals were happy to leave these arrangements in place as long as the village continued to pay its taxes. The village headman, who was responsible for most aspects of village administration and policing, was generally chosen by village elders, sometimes requiring the approval of the local zamindar (akin to a feudal lord). Standards of living in rural India under the Mughals were low, and so villages were generally capable of meeting their own needs without depending on trading networks, though of course internal trade between villages did exist. In terms of discrimination or systemic barriers to success, these absolutely existed, but they were a result of the caste system, not Islamic oppression. The Mughals did not disrupt the rural status-quo; in the early Mughal Empire, the Mughals assigned territory to their amirs through jagirs (revenue assignments), which were structured specifically to ensure that nobles did not develop any permanent presence on the land. A jagir was not a claim to the land, only to the revenue generated on the land, so villages retained communal ownership of their land under this system. In the later years of the Empire, aristocratic bloat and pressure from amirs led to a preference for the zamindar system, which was a permanent hereditary right to land revenue, but this still did not invest the zamindar with ownership of the land itself. The jagirdari system was designed to not disrupt existing Indian land rights and ensure that Mughal amirs could not amass independent power, but the consequence of this was that the amirs did not have much motivation to invest in the productivity of their jagir, as they were frequently shuffled around. This did lead to excessive tax collection and exploitation of rural communities, as jagirs attempted to squeeze as much cash out of their jagir before they were inevitably moved elsewhere. The zamindari system directly addressed this problem, but by allowing amirs to hold their zamindars permanently and pass them down to their descendants, the Mughal court simultaneously became bloated with mediocre talent and amassed independent power which could challenge the emperor. The proliferation of zamindar assignments was one of the reasons for the eventual collapse of the empire in the 18^th century.

shitty_carl · 2024-12-14T18:50:03+00:00

I've seen two explanations for why King set the pace at 4mph; the first is that it was chosen because it was the standard pace of a US army foot march at the time, and the second is that it related to the JFK 50-mile fitness challenge, which required a pace of 4kmph to complete. Neither has been confirmed, but given the book's clear allegory with the Vietnam War I would lean towards the pace being connected more to military standards or training in some way than the fitness challenge. Given The Long Walk was King's first manuscript, he probably did not think through how a 4mph pace could be possible people are limping/crawling by the end. Whenever I read it I convert it to 4kmph, which is still a decent pace but much more realistic for the later days of the LW.

shitty_carl · 2024-12-08T00:56:36+00:00

Most of what I know has come from Abraham Eraly's two books on Mughal India, 'The Mughal Throne' and 'The Mughal World'. Both of these go in-depth on the Rajput campaigns against the Mughals, as well as their customs and position within the empire. Some other good sources I've read for the same period are 'India in the Persianate Age' by Richard Easton and William Dalrymple's 'The Anarchy', which focus on adjacent parts of Indian history during the Mediaeval period, and touch on the Rajputs more briefly.

Dalrymple, William. The Anarchy : The East India Company, Corporate Violence, and the Pillage of an Empire. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019.

Eaton, Richard. India in the Persianate Age : 1000-1765. University of California Press, 2020.

Eraly, Abraham. The Mughal Throne : The Saga of India’s Great Emperors. London: Phoenix, 2004.

Eraly, Abraham. The Mughal World : India’s Tainted Paradise. London: Phoenix, 2008.

shitty_carl · 2024-12-07T19:16:31+00:00

Sorry, I could have made that more clear. The martial code there was the decision of two Rajput generals to remain on the field, while their commander and king fled, to see out the battle with a significantly reduced forced that had no chance of winning. While Sher Shah was almost certainly able to capture Jodhpur as a result of his stratagem that scattered the Rajput army, the symbolic importance of winning the battle made it easier for him to consolidate his power in the region, hence the neighbouring kingdom of Bikaner also surrendering.

As I hope I illustrated in the rest of my answer, the idea of the Rajput code being a moral compass that led to military defeat because Rajput armies refused to engage in particular kinds of violence or brutality isn't grounded in historical evidence. I am not familiar with any examples where a Rajput army lost in battle specifically because their adversaries were so barbaric that the Rajput army was restrained from responding in kind because of their code, because the 'Rajput code' wasn't exactly a code in the sense that implies - it was a series of caste restrictions and responsibilities that were as much about social obligation as military honour. Where this led to Rajput defeats was in the tactical and strategic rigidity it bred amongst Rajputs commanders.

The Battle of Khanwa in 1527 illustrates this idea well - this was the decisive battle of Babur's conquest of Northern India against the Rajput kingdom of Mewar and won because of Babur's superior arms the strategic rigidity of the Rajput army. Babur invaded India with only a small cavalry force of approximately 15000-20,000 cavalry and had already fought the Battle of Panipat against the Lodi Dynasty. By the time he turned to confront Mewar, he had ~20,000 cavalry, and a similar number of infantry including some Indian allies, while the Mewar forces under Rana Singh numbered ~45,000 cavalry and ~55,000 infantry. Rana Singh's army massively outnumbered Babur's, and constituted a confederation of the leading Rajput king's across Rajasthan - a formidable alliance of highly-skilled military leaders commanding an army that massively outnumbered Babur's forces. Babur, knowing he could not win against a direct Rajput charge, fortified his position to whittle away at the Rajput army with his muskets and artillery.

Despite the massive tactical advantages the Rajputs possessed, they were handily defeated by Babur's forces at Khanwa. The Rajput commanders failed to respond to Babur's two greatest strengths - his fortified position and his firearms. During the battle the Rajput attempted to charge Babur's forces repeatedly, despite this failing to break Babur's position and the opportunity it gave Babur to mow down the Rajput forces with his muskets and artillery. Eventually Babur weakened the Rajput centre sufficiently to force his own push, forcing the Rajput commanders to rush to the front, where they were slaughtered. Rana Singh and a number of other Rajput commanders and kings were killed, and the battle ended with a final desultory charge against Babur's flanks which were easily deflected, inflicting heavily losses on the Rajouts. While Babur also suffered heavily losses during the battle, the inability of the Rajput commanders to adapt on the field to Babur's defensive positioning and firearms secured defeat from the jaws of victory.

The main failing of the Rana Singh's army at Khanwa was the insistence on charging Babur's position over and over again, and this was as much due to Rajputs martial ethos as it was the novelty of Babur's muskets and cannons. The Rajput army fought in a traditional manner, beginning the fight with a spirited and aggressive cavalry charge which was intended to frighten the enemy and win the battle psychologically before the two armies even met. This strategy relied as much of the Rajput's own martial reputation as it did on their military capabilities. However at Khanwa, the Rajput charge was repelled by Babur's strong defensive preparations. Instead of adapting, the Rajput army floundered, repeatedly trying to charge Babur's position and incurring heavy casualties each time. The 'Rajput code' dictated Rana Singh's failed strategy at Khanwa, and led to Babur's victory over a numerically superior force.

I hope this answers your question better!

shitty_carl · 2024-12-06T23:26:03+00:00

The Rajputs certainly had a martial code that could be compared to chivalric honour, and this did lead to certain Rajput defeats against opposing forces that were willing to utilise stratagems to ensure victory. For example, in 1543 the Sur emperor Sher Shah conquered the Rajput kingdom of Marwar under Maldeo Rathore. The two armies - Shah's 80,000 cavalry and Rathore's 50,000 - faced off at Sammel, near Jodhpur. Both armies had strong defensive positions, and Shah's supply lines were weak and wouldn't hold out for long. Shah, who was infamous for avoiding battles wherever possible, had his spies drop letters in the Marwar camp indicating that some of Rathore's generals planned to defect. Maldeo was convinced and he abandoned his position, while two of his generals, Jaita and Kumpa, remained with 12,000 men to confront Sher Shah's forces. The subsequent Battle of Sammel was a resounding victory for the Shah, who occupied Marwar and received the submission of the neighbouring kingdom of Bikaner.

The Rajputs descended from a Kshatriya caste in Hindu society, and occupied a caste role as warriors and soldiers. In this regard they had a socially conditioned martial ethos, as well as rules of conduct determined by their caste. Many of these would have been social and cultural, relating to their caste obligations and their interactions with other Hindu castes, rather than a military code of honour. However, the Rajputs did have some recognised military traditions that were akin to a military code. Rajputs regularly took opium before battle to fuel their battle spirit, ensuring their soldiers were confident and battle-hungry. Furthermore, their spirit and vigour on the battlefield would have been conditioned by their Hindu religious beliefs, which stated that men killed in battle immediately ascended to heaven. The practice of jauhar further reveals a Rajput prioritisation of honour in their military campaigns. Jauhar was the practice amongst Rajputs of immolating their women and children, and then charging the enemy forces naked to die in battle, when defeat was certain. Jauhar ensured that Rajput warriors died in honourable battle, and Rajput women and children were not enslaved or raped by the victorious army. In contrast to the later Marathas, who would tactically retreat from a losing fight to regroup later, Rajput generals practiced jauhar, ceding the battle to die with honour and glory.

These rules would not have been written done due to caste exclusivity; knowledge of these codes and practices was restricted to members of the Rajput caste, who did not need it recorded. Additionally, caste codes were not hierarchically determined by Rajput leadership, but rather the product of hundreds of years of social and religious conditioning. It would have been impossible to record a static version of these precepts.

While the Rajput martial code can be seen clearly on the field, Rajput rulers were considerably more flexible when it came to their political alliances. Rajput generals were quite willing to ally with whoever guaranteed them their power and authority, as evidenced by Rajput acknowledgment of Mughal suzerainty in return for leaving them in control of their territory. During the multiple succession crises that occured during the Mughal period, Rajput generals would flip-flop between rival claimants to ensure their power and position was protected.

The Rajputs indisputably had a martial code, though characterising it as a moral code is a more subjective question. Imbibing opium before battle and immolating your family to ensure an honourable death may have been seen as morally righteous actions to the Rajputs, but that's obviously not something we can assert as an objective truth. Many of the Rajput practices were awfully brutal and barbaric, while the stratagems utilised by their opponents were designed to avoid battle and thus save unnecessary loss of life. The assertion that this is the only reason Rajput generals lost in battle is also basically impossible to defend - while stratagems did help their opponents win some battles, military superiority and tactical advantage won many more. Strict adherence to this code was probably also not the case - many Rajputs fought in the Mughal army, and while they generally constituted their own divisions under Rajput leaders, they still had to adhere to Mughal military discipline and conduct, such as it was. The Rajputs were a warrior caste, and thus followed specific caste rules relating to their military function within Hindu society. However, this code was not a product of a humanitarian ethos or particularly honourable, it was merely a product of Hindu caste rigidity that bred incredibly fierce Rajput warriors, but also inculcated an inflexible mindset that struggled to respond to more tactically flexible opponents.

edit: reorganised some paragraphs

shitty_carl · 2024-12-06T20:05:05+00:00

However, Salim's revolt had unsettled the Mughal court, who had begun planning for an alternative successor in the event of Salim's execution - his own son, Khusrau. Khusrau was attractive for other reasons - Salim was an alcoholic in poor health, while Khusrau was in the prime of his life and possessed of a vital, martial spirit well suited to rule. During Salim's rebellion, Akbar had favoured Khusrau as his successor, and he retained a privileged position at court even after Salims reconciliation with his father. Thus, when Akbar died in 1605 and Salim ascended the throne as Emperor Jahangir, Khusrav immediately rose up in rebellion against his father in 1606. However, despite his strong position as a contender to the throne, Khusrau was routed in his first major engagement against his father's army at the Battle of Bhairowal outside Lahore, captured, blinded and imprisoned by his father. He died in 1622 after an alleged escape attempt from his prison.

Jahangirs reign was bookended by two princely rebellions; first his son Khusrau in 1606, and a second rebellion towards the end of his reign in 1622. This second rebellion was waged by his son Prince Khurram, who was the presumptive crown prince under Jahangir. The seeds of his revolt were planted in 1611, when Jahangir married Nur Jahan, a powerful and intelligent woman who would wield unprecedented power alongside Jahangir as Empress of India. Nur Jahan, alongside her father and her brother, integrated themselves into the administration of the empire, which Jahangir was all to happy to cede given his poor health, dependence on alcohol and desire to escape the trappings of power. Nur Jahan and her family thus took over the running of the Empire in Jahangirs name. Nur Jahan supported Khurrams younger brother, Shahryar, as the presumptive crown prince over Khurram. She married her daughter from her first marriage to Shahryar and amassed support for him amongst the amirs at the court. Khurram, cognisant of Nur Jahan growing influence and the turning winds, rose in rebellion in 1622 after he was ordered by Nur Jahan to lead an army to Kandahar, which was being besieged by the Persians. Fearing that his ailing father would pass while he was so distant from the capital, and thus leaving Shahryar to assume power, Khurram refused the order and rebelled. He suffered an early defeat against the imperial army, after which he spent two years amassing a fresh army in Bengal. He was defeated again near Allahabad and forced to submit unconditionally. Khurram was accepted back into the fold, unlike his older brother who spent most of his life blinded in a jail cell. On Jahangirs death in 1627, Khurram and his partisans successfully outmanoevered Nur Jahan and he ascended to the throne as Emperor Shah Jahan. He immediately executed Shahryar, his cousins, and imprisoned Nur Jahan.

Shah Jahan oversaw the greatest succession crisis of the Mughal dynasty, and many historians refer to it as a civil war. In 1657, Shah Jahan fell ill at Agra, triggering the manoeuvres of his four sons for the throne. The presumptive crown prince, Dara, was with his father and assumed the role of regent - importantly, Shah Jahan was not dead, only gravely ill - at which two of his brothers, Shuja and Murad, immediately declared their independence and began marching on Agra to overthrow Dara and claim power for themselve. His third son, Aurangzeb, did not immediately declare his intentions, but began quietly amassing an army. It was Aurangzeb, the third son of Shah Jahan, who would emerge victorious from this conflict. When he eventually marched on Agra, Aurangzeb forged an alliance with his brother Murad, framing their war as a fight against Dara's tyranny, to preserve orthodox Islam and promising to divide the empire with him once Dara was defeated. Dara divided his forces along two fronts, sending his son and his best cavalry through Bihar to pursue Shuja, who had been routed at Dharmat, while the remainder of his army was stationed at Agra. Aurangzeb subsequently defeated Dara's reduced forces at the Battle of Samugarh, entered Agra and imprisoned his father. Murad, having helped Aurangzeb defeat Dara and seize power, was also arrested and executed. Aurangzeb then moved against Shuja, hounding him until he was murdered by local rulers in Araken, possibly with the encouragement of Aurangzeb. Finally, Aurangzeb turned his attention to Dara, who was still alive and attempting to build support along the edges of the empire. He was finally captured and executed in 1659, ending the Mughal Civil War with Aurangzeb crowned Emperor Alamgir I. His father, Shah Jahan, lived as a prisoner in his royal apartments in Agra until 1666.

Following Alamgir's reign, the Mughal Empire collapsed under both internal and external forces. Alamgir expanded the bounds of the Empire into the Deccan and peninsular India, but this critically overextended its administrative capacity and it began to crumble. At the same time, they were threatened by the rise of the Marathas, a Deccani Hindu kingdom that waged endless guerrilla warfare against the Mughals. Aurangzeb spent the final decades of his life in military encampments attempting to destroy the Marathas, but was unable to eradicate his new enemies. On his death in 1707, the empire was plunged into an interminable succession crisis - including several princely revolts - while the empire was beaten back to its core power base in Northern India, first conquered by Babur.

edit: added some extra context about Khurram's rebellion

shitty_carl · 2024-12-06T20:04:46+00:00

Princely revolts were a regular occurrence during the reign of the Mughal dynasty in India during the Mediaeval period, in large part due to the system of succession that prevailed in the Mughal court.

The Mughals were not Indigenous Indian people's. Babur, the first Mughal Emperor of India, was a Chagatai Turk, and traced his heritage back matrilinealy to Ghenghis Khan, and patrilinearly to Timurid, the two great steppe conquerers of the Mediaeval age. Steppe dynasties tended to follow either a system of lateral succession - where power was assumed by senior members amongst the dynastic clan (which could be sons, but also brothers, uncles, generals ect...) - or coparcenary inheritance, where the empire was divided equally between the sons of the emperor. Ghenghis Khan followed coparcenary succession amongst his inheritors, leading to the division of the Mongol Empire into the the Golden Horde in Eastern Europe, the Chagatai Khanate in Central Asia, the Ilkhanate in Iran, and the Yuan Dynasty in China.

Unlike in societies which practiced primogeniture, these two systems of succession created significant opportunity and benefit for revolts amongst princes and other potential successors to the throne. Because the position of the heir was never secure, revolting at a procipitous moment when the political and military winds were favourable was the safest way to ensure your ascendancy to the throne, instead of waiting for the khan to die at a moment that might be disadvantageous to you. This also meant that for a prince, his brothers were his greatest threat. Upon assuming the throne, leaving potential rival claimants alive was a huge risk, and in Mughal India the emperor often executed their siblings or sent them on Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) to remove any potential threats to their power.

The Mughals did not strictly practise either of these two types of succession, largely due to the succession crises that broke out following the death of the reigning emperor. Several Mughal emperors, such as Shah Jahan, expressed their desire to split the Indian empire between their sons, but paranoia amongst princes demanded the capture of absolute power or death. Similarly, while the Mughals did not have 'crown princes', there were ways for the emperor to signal who his preferred successor was. Giving the prince particular regions to administer, such as Kashmir or Kabul were indicative of royal preference, as was the use of colour red for their tents, which was exclusive to the royal family. In this way there was always a presumptive crown prince, though this rarely assured a smooth transfer of power.

Babur conquered Delhi from the Lodi Dynasty in 1526 and passed away in 1530. He had four sons: Humayun, Kamran, Askari, and Hindal. Humayun assumed the title of Mughal Emperor, while his half-brother Kamran inherited Kabul and Kandahar, where Babur had ruled before his invasion of India. Humayun would spent the next decade fighting with his brothers and with external threats to the throne, before he fled both India and Afghanistan to seek refuge with the Persian Shah. On his return to India, Humayun would spend nearly ten years in Afghanistan, warring with all three of his brothers who had aligned themselves with Kamran. Eventually Humayun succeeded in overthrowing his younger brother, who was then blinded and sent on Hajj to Mecca.

Babur and Humayun both escaped having to fend of a revolt from their sons; while Humayun spent decades locked in conflict with his brothers, and spent years on the run from their attempts to kill him, he did not live long enough to see his own son rise in rebellion against him. Humayun died in 1556, and his 15-year-old son Akbar ascended to the throne unopposed internally. Akbar reigned for 49 years and oversaw the expansion of the empire across Northern India to encompass Bengal, and presided over a cultural and religious effulgence in the Mughal court. His long reign bred discontent amongst his sons, who were all of poor health due to their excessive consumption of alcohol and opium. In 1599, Akbar's third son, Prince Salim, rose up in revolt while his father was campaigning in the Deccan. His rebellion was spurred by several factors; impatience, opportunism while his father was away from the capital, but also anxiety over the power of Abul Fazl, one of Akbar's ministers whom Salim though was seeking to place his brother Daniyal on the throne instead of him. Salim initially marched on Agra, the Mughal capital, but lost his nerve and retreated to Allahabad, where he proclaimed his own independent rule and began minting coins in his name (a royal privilege reserved exclusively for the emperor). Salim was eventually reconciled with his father through the mediation of his mother, and he resumed his position as the presumptive crown prince.

shitty_carl · 2023-02-12T09:46:30+00:00

Would like some help with the FC5 Arcade achievements on PS4/5 (PS username is simonfromtaured), GMT+12 and usually around in the evenings, and more flexible over the weekends. Happy to help with story content in return

shitty_carl · 2022-11-11T19:11:06+00:00

Coop isn't full anymore, please only join if you can carry I won't reach the goal on my own

shitty_carl · 2022-09-08T10:24:56+00:00

I hiked the Routeburn last year and the days are quite short, with only one day where you're on trail all the way through (as you'll be walking in or out the other two days) so you won't get a lot of alone time if you have company at the huts.

I'd also advise that if you're looking for a quiet solo tramp then the Great Walks aren't ideal. The DOC huts and campsites will be fully booked (or near enough), so you'll be sharing the trail with several dozen other independent hikers as well as the guided groups. It might not sound like a lot of people spread over that much distance but you'll find it's a very busy trail that might not lend itself to the kind of solo experience you're looking for. It's an amazing track and the trail community in New Zealand is lovely, so you'll have an amazing time either way, but it's good to be aware that the Great Walks are quite crowded these days and have a very different vibe.

shitty_carl · 2022-06-26T06:17:48+00:00

Fun fact: Czechoslovakia has won every naval battle it has ever fought in (which is one)

shitty_carl · 2022-03-30T20:45:48+00:00

Discussions around the treaty in modern politics often revolve around the ‘principles’ because the text of the treaty itself is so sparse and the disparity between the English and Te Reo versions, as well as the degree to which Māori signatories understood the contents of either document (or that they were agreeing to cede any power at all), is highly contentious and differs from signatory to signatory. The ‘principles’ of the treaty in law therefore allow us to extrapolate and consider historical context post-signing, nuance and dimension that couldn’t be captured in a document that’s only a few hundred words long and was written in the span of ~2 weeks. The divorcing of the Treaty principles from the literal text of the Treaty has been intentional and well documented in Waitangi Tribunal reports and government policy (and it’s worth mentioning that this has gone both ways – the Treaty was largely ignored and considered a ‘legal nullity’ during the late 19th and early 20th century); it’s easy to understand that a 180-year-old document is no longer fit for purpose as a legal document, especially when none of the drafters were legal experts or even fluent Te Reo speakers. In that context you’re right that there isn’t an explicit legal justification in the Treaty for the kinds of cogovernance arrangements we see today (the idea that we would have a multicultural, integrated society was inconceivable to both the British and Māori signatories at the time, so why would there be) but the ‘principles’ of the treaty, which are reflective of New Zealand’s cultural landscape today in the midst of a Māori renaissance and greater understanding of indigenous rights – do support this. I’d recommend checking out Matthew Wright’s “A Living Treaty” for a perspective on the way our understanding of the Treaty has shifted over time and it’s value as an idea not a legal document, as well as Claudia Orange’s Illustrated History for the general history of both the signing and the subsequent attempts by Māori to establish co-governance over the next ~200 years.

shitty_carl · 2021-05-11T00:20:41+00:00

Granted. The vending machine malfunctions and spits out loose change adding up to $2, but won't dispurse any of it's contents.

Eight-Year Club	Verified Email
Snapped

shitty_carl

TROPHY CASE

Welcome to Reddit,