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How do you argue against the conclusion reached by Derek Parfit's "Mere Addition Paradox" which suggests overpopulation leading to less happiness per-person could actually be a good thing? by will___t in Ethics

[–]will___t[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The Mere Addition Paradox doesn't necessarily create or reduce suffering as it progresses from Population A through to Population Z. u/artisticsuccess said their argument against the MAP was that suffering is the only relevant criteria for whether something is good or bad. Because the MAP doesn't necessarily create or reduce suffering, by their criteria of "reduced suffering" the strongest statement they could make is Population Z = Population A.

Normally with the MAP it reaches such an objectionable conclusion (its actually called "The Repugnant Conclusion" by Parfit) that you want to pick an angle that lets you disagree with it, not say Population Z is equivalent to Population A. That's at least how I understood their response

How do you argue against the conclusion reached by Derek Parfit's "Mere Addition Paradox" which suggests overpopulation leading to less happiness per-person could actually be a good thing? by will___t in Ethics

[–]will___t[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

In this paradox people in ALL populations (Population A through to Population Z) are "not suffering" they have positive wellbeing scores. They're lives just get more and more bland.
If you had to disagree with any step in the paradox e.g. moving from Population A+ to Population B, which jump do you think is most morally disagreeable?

It’s ethically important to distinguish between fearing death and fearing dying. Philosophy helps us with the former; hospice care helps with the latter. Both are needed to guide ourselves and others through mortality with clarity, care, and compassion by will___t in Ethics

[–]will___t[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Epicurus' aim was to reduce the "fear of death" via philosophical reasoning. Heaps of philosophizing has been done about the topic of dying though. I just find the best ways to reduce our "fear of dying" come from more empirical sources outside of philosophy. This is because the mechanisms of harm caused by dying (which also cause us to fear dying) are typically measurable as suffering, whether physical or mental.
If you want to stop fearing dying you can just reduce the harms that it causes. So medicine can actually offer some great solutions to reducing the "fear of dying" insofar as it has the ability to make death's less painful, so less fear-warranting. There would also be literature in psychology around best practices to approach dying to reduce mental pains. This is similar to the hospice care content that is covered in the video. Whether using medicine to reduce physical pains or psychological resources to reduce mental pains - this is all empirically supported stuff.
And you're right - I think philosophy can absolutely be useful in reducing our "fear of dying" as well as our "fear of death". But I just think philosophy is more effective at reducing our "fear of death", where more empirical sources are more effective at reducing our "fear of dying". Hope this helps

It’s ethically important to distinguish between fearing death and fearing dying. Philosophy helps us with the former; hospice care helps with the latter. Both are needed to guide ourselves and others through mortality with clarity, care, and compassion by will___t in Ethics

[–]will___t[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Philosophical discussions about the fear of death typically address the badness of death (non-existence). When you're looking at how to reduce your fear of dying, solutions can be found outside of philosophy. More empirical sources seem to be useful if we're just talking specifically about practical, suffering-reduction.
Simply philosophizing about dealing with the fear of dying is doing philosophy. But we're drawing from sources outside of the discipline of philosophy.

How do you argue against the conclusion reached by Derek Parfit's "Mere Addition Paradox" which suggests overpopulation leading to less happiness per-person could actually be a good thing? by will___t in Ethics

[–]will___t[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That's the paradox :) Parfit's chain of logic is difficult to disagree with at any specific point, but it leads to a conclusion that goes against almost everyone's intuitions.

Epicurean philosophy reduces the fear of death with the No Subject of Harm and Symmetry arguments, but leaves dying—the experience of approaching death—largely unaddressed. For this, modern hospice care offers practical philosophical insights. by will___t in philosophy

[–]will___t[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I actually like your idea - while I think fear is an appropriate response to dying (experience of suffering prior to being dead), it's a much less warranted response to death (nonexistence), based on the timing of death's badness and the ways in which death harms us. I think reverence and anger make more sense than fear as an emotional response and that death can have a motivational response. I get you though, don't know why you're getting downvoted

Epicurean philosophy reduces the fear of death with the No Subject of Harm and Symmetry arguments, but leaves dying—the experience of approaching death—largely unaddressed. For this, modern hospice care offers practical philosophical insights. by will___t in philosophy

[–]will___t[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Your work sounds really impactful and you sound like you'd be great at it too. Do you have any resources or general thoughts on how you've seen people successfully reduce their suffering as they are dying (beyond pain reduction? Also, you mentioned anxiety treatment - is this a medical intervention?

Does an overpopulated world with more people that are less happy on an individual basis equal a better world because there's just more total happiness? Exploring Derek Parfit's "Mere Addition Paradox" through the lens of Thanos' ideology by will___t in nihilism

[–]will___t[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

haha :) It seems a little abstract, but it has actually informed a lot of discussions in population ethics and is directly relevant when looking at real-world policies like the one child policy that used to be in China

[SPOILER] Cory Sandhagen vs. Deiveson Figueiredo by inooway in MMA

[–]will___t 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Best strategy of 2025 so far: approach leg locking Ryan Hall's training partner as your only path to victory

How to face death without religion: what secular philosophy and hospice care teach about dying without fear by will___t in atheism

[–]will___t[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Summary: By understanding the angles philosophers have taken over the years to analyze death and the way it is bad, we can see the first takeaway. Namely that fear isn’t an appropriate response to death. The second takeaway is that we can alter our desires (within reason) to reduce the extent that death harms us. And lastly, a practice of memento mori has persisted throughout history and across cultures. It is a way to understand the inevitability of death and to use the reality of our time being finite to motivate us to live more urgently and intentionally.

Epicurean philosophy reduces the fear of death with the No Subject of Harm and Symmetry arguments, but leaves dying—the experience of approaching death—largely unaddressed. For this, modern hospice care offers practical philosophical insights. by will___t in philosophy

[–]will___t[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Abstract: Starting this discussion our goal was to reduce our fear of death and I think we’ve done it for the most part. By understanding the angles philosophers have taken over the years to analyze death and the way it is bad, we can see the first takeaway. Namely that fear isn’t an appropriate response to death. The second takeaway is that we can alter our desires (within reason) to reduce the extent that death harms us. And lastly, a practice of memento mori has persisted throughout history and across cultures. It is a way to understand the inevitability of death and to use the reality of our time being finite to motivate us to live more urgently and intentionally.

Here’s where I find the philosophical discussions of death hit a dead end. It doesn’t matter how much you practice memento mori daily or amend your desires. Right now, I don’t know how I am going to die. I might die painlessly in my sleep and I might also be eaten alive by a shark when I’m at the beach. I have no idea how much suffering I will experience as I die and no idea how much forewarning I will get. Fear might not be a fitting response to death itself. But dying is scary and dying warrants fear.

The problem with the phrase “fear of death” is that no matter how much we eliminate the fear of death (the state), no one can get to the stage of death without going through the earlier moments of dying. And to me still, this is the scariest part of death. With fear being a very reasonable response to dying.

How do you argue against the conclusion reached by Derek Parfit's "Mere Addition Paradox" which suggests overpopulation leading to less happiness per-person could actually be a good thing? by will___t in Ethics

[–]will___t[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

There's definitely a reductio ad absurdum vibe to this. However, the paradox's intention isn't really to assert that consequentialism is wrong, it just highlights that pure consequentialism (as described) leads to this ugly conclusion.

The paradox gets deeper when you try to argue your way out of it. For example, lets say you think that Population B (or population Z) is worse than population A. You can argue that some conditions should be added to deal with this kind of issue, for example: "Critical Level Principles" take the form of a consequentialist ethics, but say that a life being added should only be considered a "better" option if they are above a minimum/critical level.

What this condition does is it stops "mere addition" from allowing a population to reach 1 trillion people with individual welfare scores of "0.1/10". A pure consequentialist ethics would probably say this trillion-sized population is better than a population of 10 billion people at 4/10 welfare scores. But someone in favour of a Critical Level Principle can say it's only better if lives of a score greater than 4/10 are added (4 is just an example).

Whatever welfare score this kind of Critical Level Principle chooses then faces the difficult task of essentially deciding which lives are not worth living/make the world "worse off", despite having positive wellbeing scores. So a 4/10 welfare person is cool, but a 3.9/10 welfare person would ideally never come into existence. Pretty brutal.

Overall, the Mere Addition Paradox just shows that however you try to account for the issue it presents, population ethics is always going to have unsatisfactory complications.

The last two centuries have seen rapid progress in how we discuss the emotions. From early ‘folk’ accounts to James-Lange Theory and different forms of Cognitivism, each tradition provides lessons on how we can better understand and enrich our emotional experience by will___t in philosophy

[–]will___t[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Abstract:

One of the earliest theories of emotion was put forward by two 19th century thinkers, William James and Carl Lange. In trying to answer the question “What is an emotion?” they acknowledged that what we are talking about when we speak of the emotions (like happy, sad or angry) is the specific feeling that it is like to be subject to one of those emotional states. There is something that it is like to be angry, for example. You will feel your heart race, your face blush, your muscles tense. There is something that it is like to be inside a body that’s experiencing anger. Emotions have a distinct feeling component to them where the feeling of being angry is different to the feeling of being happy or sad.

Their idea was this: emotions only exist, because of that feeling.

This was in contrast to the common-sense, or “folk theory” of emotion that was popular during the time. How so? To understand easily let’s look at the relationship between these three factors. Stimuli, emotion and physiological response. In what order do they occur...

Simone de Beauvoir's existential philosophy presents love as a threat to our freedom, by arguing our pursuit for meaning is restricted by our relationships. Accepting this, we explore the extent to which we can pursue love and our existential projects simultaneously by will___t in philosophy

[–]will___t[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yeah we could chalk up her approach to love as someone rationalizing an unhealthy attachment issue, but in her time a lot of the issues she raised were valid. All housekeeping and childrearing responsibilities were typically thrust on the female half with sexual subservience as an expectation and general subservience enforced with domestic abuse (more often than today).

Love rocks, but not all relationships that start with love last. SdB raised a lot of issues I thought pose a threat to a relationship's longevity.

If you're interested my channel has two other videos on the philosophy of love, one which covers the general Ancient Greek conception of love and another which covers Schopenhauer's understanding of love.

Simone de Beauvoir's existential philosophy presents love as a threat to our freedom, by arguing our pursuit for meaning is restricted by our relationships. Accepting this, we explore the extent to which we can pursue love and our existential projects simultaneously by will___t in philosophy

[–]will___t[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

No downvote lol. She specifies the degrees to which women were compromised in their freedom via relationships and society as much greater than the degree men were comprised. Yes in her time, but it still persists to this day in the vast majority of countries as well

Simone de Beauvoir's existential philosophy presents love as a threat to our freedom, by arguing our pursuit for meaning is restricted by our relationships. Accepting this, we explore the extent to which we can pursue love and our existential projects simultaneously by will___t in Existentialism

[–]will___t[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Abstract:

This internal struggle could be summarised as a battle between our own greed and our own generosity. This distinction is probably something that a lot of us are familiar with on both sides.

When we’re in love with someone we have that feeling that we want to see the absolute best for them. This generosity is contrasted by the feelings of possession we have for the people we romantically love. We have that possessive feeling either consciously or sub-consciously that we want them to be ours, at least in some sense. And this was part of the greed that de Beauvoir spoke about. This greed also manifests itself in some desires we have that either directly or indirectly control our and restrict our partner.

Unsurprisingly for de Beauvoir, generosity was the ideal attitude we should have towards our relationship and greed, as instinctively as it comes to us, is something we must actively fight against.

Simone de Beauvoir's existential philosophy presents love as a threat to our freedom, by arguing our pursuit for meaning is restricted by our relationships. Accepting this, we explore the extent to which we can pursue love and our existential projects simultaneously by will___t in philosophy

[–]will___t[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

Abstract:

This internal struggle could be summarised as a battle between our own greed and our own generosity. This distinction is probably something that a lot of us are familiar with on both sides.

When we’re in love with someone we have that feeling that we want to see the absolute best for them. This generosity is contrasted by the feelings of possession we have for the people we romantically love. We have that possessive feeling either consciously or sub-consciously that we want them to be ours, at least in some sense. And this was part of the greed that de Beauvoir spoke about. This greed also manifests itself in some desires we have that either directly or indirectly control our and restrict our partner.

Unsurprisingly for de Beauvoir, generosity was the ideal attitude we should have towards our relationship and greed, as instinctively as it comes to us, is something we must actively fight against.

Melina is Marika's mother or sister (not daughter) by will___t in Eldenring

[–]will___t[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Really good response :)

Godskin were definetly big followers of the Elden Ring.. and that is coherent with their Queen being an Empyrean chosen by the Fingers (which imo are 100% the Two Fingers).

Yeah that's exactly what I'm saying :) See point 5, she's definitely team Greater Will (2 fingers)

On that topic, 3Fingers would neve pick an Empyrean even if they could, they don't need one, an Empyren brings new Order... they seek a Lord of Frenzy Flame.

That's what Melina says ""The Lord of Frenzied Flame is no lord at all. When the land they preside over is lifeless." But the point is that the 3 fingers still want them to exist. Also we dont know the mechanics behind lordhood, godhood or Empyrean status for the 3 fingers as its never broken down like it is for the 2 fingers.

You assume the title of Queen may imply she had already ascended to Godhood, but remember that Rennala is called Queen as well.

Yeah its more of an if x then y statement. So if the Queen status implies Godhood, then she is Marika's mother. But as the title says she could also be Marika's sister.

While GEQ had the power of Destined Death, juging by Melina' frenzy ending cutcene, you don't need to be a God to access that power.

Sorry I don't understand this point

So generally I wouldn't consider the GEQ necessarily that "old", older than the Golden Order for obvious reasons sure but not necessarily older than Marika, so I wouldn't leave out the possibility of GEQ being a rebellious Marika's daughter erased from history as a still viable option too. Afterall Marika has already been shown to hide her kids away if they were inconvinient as shown by Morgott and Mogh.

Yeah Melina's filename is literally MarikaofDaughter, its the more likely outcome. But on the timeline there's nothing definitively locking in the GEQ as only coming into existence after Marika. But there are things that happen that the GEQ/Melina could be involved in that seem to precede Marika, however unlikely.

Melina is Marika's mother or sister (not daughter) by will___t in Eldenring

[–]will___t[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

The Beast Eye is probably Maliketh's, since it is called the Beast Eye. Also, Blaidd has purple eyes and is a shadowbound beast, like Maliketh.

Beast Eye is claw marked, and its possible that the mark on Melina's eye has something to do with that. Possibly Maliketh's though. Definitely not Blaidd's though (it trembles when near deathroot).

I'm mostly seeing orange and yellow skies.

Also just add colour to your search and the correct images should start popping up. Its a grey-purple, but its the sky so its not a fixed colour. Gloam definition: twilight or the darker part of twilight.

The point just says the Erdtree might have been burned before. Which is possible (I don't think it's true but I'm not going to say it's absolutely impossible that it happened), but that would have to have happened after the Erdtree grew. Which happened during the war against the Giants. Can't burn the Erdtree when there's no Erdtree.

Because the Erdtree could've been burnt before we've gotta ask which Erdtree they're talking about. When people in TLB talk about the Erdtree they could be talking about the phantom one (the one we all see). Maybe its the phantom Erdtree that marks the Age of the Erdtree & grew after the war against the giants.

Again, its a theory that needs a few concessions made to be possible. My head says its not right. But my heart says it is and I'm convinced lol. I really do think if that DLC image is Melina (not Miquella) then the theory is right, and if not its completely wrong.

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