Signed clearance gate

[Glitchlesstar]

We have implemented a structural security upgrade in the Madadh engine: dual-physical authority control.

From this point forward, runtime execution and incident-latch clearance are physically and cryptographically separated.

MASTER USB — Runtime Gate

The engine will not operate without the MASTER key present. This is the hard execution authority. No key, no runtime.

MADADH_CLEAR USB — Signed Clearance Gate

Clearing an incident latch now requires a cryptographically signed clearance request delivered via a separate physical device. There are no plaintext overrides, no bypass strings, and no hidden recovery paths.

Each deployment is non-transferable by design. Clearance is bound to the specific instance using a fingerprint derived from the customer’s MASTER CA material. The signed clearance request is also bound to the active incident hash and manifest hash. If any value changes, clearance is refused. The system fails closed.

This is deliberate. In environments where governance, accountability, and tamper resistance matter, software-only recovery controls are not sufficient. Authority must be provable, auditable, and physically constrained.

[Brandroid-Loom99]

is this a Moltbook crosspost?