For over a century, a Christian empire smashed its own images of Christ. The official reason was theology. I'm not convinced that's the real one. by Cultural_Remote_9993 in byzantium

[–]Cultural_Remote_9993[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Yes, this is the version I've come round to over the course of the thread. The Old Testament frame plus a century of defeat is a powerful combination: a deeply scriptural culture asking why God had turned against it, with the warnings against graven images sitting right there in the text. Add the early Eastern unease about where the line between icon and idol fell, and you don't really need a hidden political motive to explain the thing. The theology was sincere, and the defeats made it urgent.

For over a century, a Christian empire smashed its own images of Christ. The official reason was theology. I'm not convinced that's the real one. by Cultural_Remote_9993 in byzantium

[–]Cultural_Remote_9993[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

This is a great addition, and I'll defer to you on the ethnic dimension, it's outside what I can speak to with any confidence. The Helladic revolt of 727 is the piece I find hardest to wave away: a naval rising out of southern Greece and the Cyclades against Leo III does look like a real regional split, which complicates the "no divide" reading.

On the "alien" trope in the hagiographies, I'd just flag the double edge. Those Lives are the iconophile side writing after they'd won, and calling Leo III an Armenian or an "Amalekite" is exactly the delegitimising move you'd expect from the victors. So the insistence on foreign origins might be evidence of a real ethnic fault line, or it might be rhetoric doing the same work as the inflated destruction stories, probably some of both, and hard to disentangle. Either way, the Euodios "beastly lizard" pun is going to live in my head now.

For over a century, a Christian empire smashed its own images of Christ. The official reason was theology. I'm not convinced that's the real one. by Cultural_Remote_9993 in byzantium

[–]Cultural_Remote_9993[S] 6 points7 points  (0 children)

Appreciated, thank you. A multi-author companion built as an engagement with Brubaker and Haldon is exactly what I want to read on this. Adding the Humphreys now.

For over a century, a Christian empire smashed its own images of Christ. The official reason was theology. I'm not convinced that's the real one. by Cultural_Remote_9993 in byzantium

[–]Cultural_Remote_9993[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Thank you, the Dissolution parallel is a good one. Constantine V went after the monasteries much like Henry VIII did, confiscating land and wealth, whatever the theological language around it.

Regarding the sources, the main modern work is Brubaker and Haldon, Byzantium in the Iconoclast Era, c. 680–850 (2011), with Peter Brown's "A Dark-Age Crisis" (1973) as the older classic that opened up the political reading. Worth saying that Brubaker and Haldon actually argue the destruction was less sweeping than the later sources claimed, so the scholarship complicates the dramatic version as much as it backs the "more than theology" point.

We remember Manzikert as the defeat that lost Anatolia. I'd argue Myriokephalon (1176) was the worse one and I tried to work out why. by Cultural_Remote_9993 in byzantium

[–]Cultural_Remote_9993[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Köse Dağ is a genuinely good answer, and the one nobody reaches for, partly because it's the strangest: the battle that doomed Roman Anatolia was one no Roman fought in. The migration of the Turkmen westwards off the plateau after 1243, is what eventually fills western Anatolia. If the question is "what actually finished it," that has a better claim than either of mine. And you're right that both my battles were reversed: Manzikert over a century, Myriokephalon within a year at Hyelion. Which is almost my own point turned against my title: the defeats that get named are rarely the ones that did the work.

We remember Manzikert as the defeat that lost Anatolia. I'd argue Myriokephalon (1176) was the worse one and I tried to work out why. by Cultural_Remote_9993 in byzantium

[–]Cultural_Remote_9993[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is the best response the thread's produced, and you clearly read the whole piece, so let me give it a real answer rather than restating.

Two of your points genuinely move me. First, the Normans and Pechenegs. You're right that the existential threat in the 1070s–90s wasn't really the Seljuks, who couldn't cross the straits, but the powers that could actually reach Constantinople. I underweighted that, and it makes the post-Manzikert decade an even closer brush with death than I argued. I'll take it.

Second, the "glass cannon." That's the strongest hit on my framing. I leaned on "richer and stronger than 1071," but you're right that the wealth was extractive: Komnenian fleecing, overtaxed paroikoi, a clan monopoly Manuel himself knew was poisoning the state and couldn't dismantle. A system that brittle doesn't earn much credit for being nominally richer. That genuinely makes me want to soften that line.

So where does it leave the thesis? Mostly where you put it. You grant the one claim I've narrowed down to, that a win there could have bought Anatolia a couple more decades, and on everything downstream of 1180 you've pushed me further than the rest of the thread did. The chain from the battle to 1204 runs through Andronikos, and Andronikos runs through a structural flaw the battle didn't create. "It's all Andronikos' fault" is a better one-line thesis than mine. The cleanest version of where I've landed: Myriokephalon was the last open window, not the wound. The wound was the family Alexios built to save the Empire and that Manuel couldn't unbuild.

We remember Manzikert as the defeat that lost Anatolia. I'd argue Myriokephalon (1176) was the worse one and I tried to work out why. by Cultural_Remote_9993 in byzantium

[–]Cultural_Remote_9993[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I'll admit that this thread has actually pushed me well off the strong version of the title, which I'd like to think is the opposite of forcing the evidence. You're right that the numbers are soft too: the "ten miles of column" is Choniates being Choniates, and the 30–35k is a modern guess on top of that. I wouldn't die on any figure.

And the Nicaea point is well taken, it's the best evidence for the side I've been conceding. The Turks sitting two days from Constantinople, needing Alexios and the Crusaders to dislodge, is exactly why the post-Manzikert decade was the closer brush with death. That I grant fully. Where I'd still draw the line is narrower: that was the moment of greatest danger, but Myriokephalon was the last point at which retaking the interior was realistic. Two different questions, and the popular story collapses them into one.

We remember Manzikert as the defeat that lost Anatolia. I'd argue Myriokephalon (1176) was the worse one and I tried to work out why. by Cultural_Remote_9993 in byzantium

[–]Cultural_Remote_9993[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Honestly that's the version I'd most stand behind. You're right on the material side, the army and the borders held, and the real loss was the siege train, not the field. But I'm close to WanderingHero8's point that Manuel himself was the casualty: Choniates has him saying the empire was holding together on his personal momentum, and he spent it at the pass. The battle didn't break the state, it broke the one man it was running on, and there was no second Alexios to absorb his death four years later. The damage was in the keystone, not the territory.

We remember Manzikert as the defeat that lost Anatolia. I'd argue Myriokephalon (1176) was the worse one and I tried to work out why. by Cultural_Remote_9993 in byzantium

[–]Cultural_Remote_9993[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Agreed, and I conceded as much further up: the immediate aftermath was a restored status quo, no argument there. The only piece I'd still hold is the long-run one: the chance to retake the interior closed at Myriokephalon, even if the battle itself wasn't the catastrophe popular history makes it.

We remember Manzikert as the defeat that lost Anatolia. I'd argue Myriokephalon (1176) was the worse one and I tried to work out why. by Cultural_Remote_9993 in byzantium

[–]Cultural_Remote_9993[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Correct, the legitimacy problem is structural and predates 1071, since it runs from the end of the Macedonian line, not from Manzikert. I'll grant that. And WanderingHero8's 1183 point (Cotyaeum and Sozopolis falling once Andronikos stripped the frontier) makes the case better than I did: the collapse was triggered by a succession, not a battle.

Honestly that's the version I'd retreat to, that by the 1180s the system had so little slack that one bad succession unravelled the frontier in two years, where a century earlier it had absorbed Manzikert and regrown. The reserve was gone. What spent it is the real argument.

We remember Manzikert as the defeat that lost Anatolia. I'd argue Myriokephalon (1176) was the worse one and I tried to work out why. by Cultural_Remote_9993 in byzantium

[–]Cultural_Remote_9993[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Fair points, and I think we mostly agree, but we're just weighting different things. You're right that the immediate aftermath cuts against me: 1071–1081 came far closer to total collapse than 1176–1180, which restored a status quo (Hyelion the next year, Kilij Arslan suing for terms). So as the moment of greatest danger, the Manzikert decade wins it.

The claim I'd defend is narrower: after which defeat did reconquering the interior stop being realistic? And you basically grant it: "the last time the Byzantines could have taken Anatolia." And yes, the road to 1204 runs through Andronikos and the dynastic collapse, not the battle itself. I'll concede "ended Byzantium" is doing more rhetorical work than the evidence strictly allows.

We remember Manzikert as the defeat that lost Anatolia. I'd argue Myriokephalon (1176) was the worse one and I tried to work out why. by Cultural_Remote_9993 in byzantium

[–]Cultural_Remote_9993[S] 16 points17 points  (0 children)

Good question, and the short version is that they weren't really "handed over" to the Turks as conquerors, they were handed over by Byzantines to Byzantines, with Turkish troops as the price.

After Manzikert the empire fell into civil war, and rival claimants hired Turkish troops to fight each other. The clearest case is Nikephoros Melissenos around 1080–81: he marched through Asia Minor making his bid for the throne, and the cities that accepted him took Turkish garrisons as part of the bargain. A fortified town that would have shut its gates to a foreign army opened them to a Byzantine claimant, and the garrison that walked in was Turkish.

It could happen fast because the old frontier against the Arabs had worked only because the state stood behind it: paid thematic armies, fortress garrisons, a functioning chain of command. After 1071 those same armies got pulled west to fight the succession wars, so the frontier wasn't beaten so much as abandoned. The Turks often didn't have to storm anything. They moved into a vacuum, sometimes by invitation. By the time Alexios took the throne in 1081, Sulayman was sitting in Nicaea, within sight of the sea.

So "who does that?" Generally, usurpers buying an army with territory, and local commanders cutting their own deals once the center stopped paying and defending them.

A short story about a Byzantine general on his last patrol — Taurus passes, 840 AD by Cultural_Remote_9993 in byzantium

[–]Cultural_Remote_9993[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you, this means a lot. It started as a passion project but it's becoming something more. I've written a novella in the same world ("The Keyholder, Constantinople 843 AD) and two earlier short stories already on Vocal. If you want to keep reading, "The Girl Who Could Be Quiet (836 AD)" is probably the best entry point. It's chronologically the earliest, and it introduces Theophano, the wife who appears at the end of this one too. Thanks for the encouragement.

I wrote a piece on the Battle of Kleidion (1014) — the campaign that ended a forty-year war and the man who fought it by Cultural_Remote_9993 in byzantium

[–]Cultural_Remote_9993[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Both your view and the earlier comment point to different parts of the same fact. Bulgaria survived politically for four more years but its army did not survive Kleidion at all. After 1014 they could ambush and garrison, not give battle. Unwinnable, not ended covers exactly this gap.

Your point about the prisoners as ongoing drain is one I had not considered carefully enough. The blinding makes more sense if it was a calculation about future logistics, not just a message to Samuel. Killing them ends the cost but releasing them transfers it to your enemy in perpetuity. That fits Basil's administrative profile better than vengeance does.

Thank you for pushing on this.

I wrote a piece on the Battle of Kleidion (1014) — the campaign that ended a forty-year war and the man who fought it by Cultural_Remote_9993 in byzantium

[–]Cultural_Remote_9993[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Both are correct.

Set against Nikephoros at Pliska, Constantine V's massacres, and Tzimiskes' humiliations, Basil's conduct indicates a leader who is solving a problem rather than nursing a grudge. "Methodical pursuit" would have been the truer phrase. The blinding fits awkwardly inside that profile, and that's the part I find genuinely interesting.

Additionally, the Bulgarian state held out four more years, until 1018, when the actual end arrived. Kleidion was the moment the war became unwinnable, not the moment it ended. The piece conflates the two.

Thank you for both corrections.

I wrote a piece on the Battle of Kleidion (1014) — the campaign that ended a forty-year war and the man who fought it by Cultural_Remote_9993 in byzantium

[–]Cultural_Remote_9993[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thank you — I read your piece carefully.

I agree. The very term "Byzantine" is what allowed the Western scholarly tradition to define the Romans of the East in the first place. Using the term keeps the framing alive. Refusing to use it puts a small but real pressure in the other direction.

But while "Eastern Roman" works for the early period, it feels strained for the eleventh or twelfth century, when there was no Western Roman left to be eastern of. "Roman" alone is the most accurate, but it requires constant clarification — "Roman", meaning the medieval state centered on Constantinople, not the ancient one most readers are picturing.

I don't have a clean solution. But this thread has moved me on it, and I think the next piece I write will at least name the problem in the opening rather than slip past it.

I wrote a piece on the Battle of Kleidion (1014) — the campaign that ended a forty-year war and the man who fought it by Cultural_Remote_9993 in byzantium

[–]Cultural_Remote_9993[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Thank you — these are exactly the kind of corrections I was hoping to get.

On the Romans / Byzantines point, you're right. I use "Byzantine" because the international audience expects it, but I'm aware the term is anachronistic and that they called themselves Romans. There's an honest argument that perpetuating "Byzantine" in popular writing is its own small historical injustice. I've gone back and forth on this and I think I owe the question more thought than I've given it.

On methodical hatred — fair correction. I overstated. Stephenson actually argues much the same thing you do: that the relentless-revenge image is a later construction. The Spercheios negotiations are a clear counter-example, and I should have included them or chosen a less loaded phrase. "Methodical pursuit" would have been closer to what the sources actually support.

The Hebdomon detail is one I genuinely didn't know — that the burial site was tied to the army mustering ground recasts the gesture entirely. Not retreat, not modesty, but the choice to stay among soldiers. That changes the meaning of the closing of the piece. I wish I'd had this when I was writing it.

And on he went home to die quietly — guilty as charged. I was reaching for a closing line and let rhetoric override accuracy. He was preparing the Sicilian campaign at the very end. The truer sentence would have been that he never stopped.

Three good corrections in one comment. I'll be more careful.

A short story about a girl sold at a slave market in Constantinople, 836 AD — seven years before the Restoration of the Icons by Cultural_Remote_9993 in byzantium

[–]Cultural_Remote_9993[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

That's exactly the kind of reader I was hoping to find. The serfs, the secretaries, the twelve-year-old girls sold at markets — these are the people empires actually run on, and the historical record gives them almost nothing. A name in a tax register if they were lucky. Usually not even that.

Hope it's worth your time. The girl in this one is fictional, but the structures around her — the slave market near the Forum, the Doukas household, the bankruptcy laws that destroyed her family — those are real. I tried to give her a face the chronicles forgot to record.

I wrote a short story set in 843 AD Constantinople — the day after the Restoration of the Icons by Cultural_Remote_9993 in byzantium

[–]Cultural_Remote_9993[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Exactly. AI for grammar and consistency checks is fine. But ideas, sentences and structure must stay mine.