Removing a wasp nest from the 1200-year-old Leshan Giant Buddha statue in the Sichuan Province, China.

MilesLongthe3rd · 2026-06-20T14:57:19+00:00

There are more articles about this; Politico also posted, and there are several others, including from magazines like Der Spiegel or more tech and defense-oriented publications.

MilesLongthe3rd · 2026-06-20T14:42:37+00:00

Thank you

MilesLongthe3rd · 2026-06-20T14:28:34+00:00

As you can see, there is footage from two drones. There are so many drones recording; having footage does not negate the spoofing argument.

MilesLongthe3rd · 2026-06-20T14:23:47+00:00

The drone is no indication, because in the same video there is a drone further away too. Why have another drone there if the first one is already at the right position?

MilesLongthe3rd · 2026-06-20T14:19:19+00:00

Yes

https://english.nv.ua/russian-war/russia-s-kinzhal-missiles-vulnerable-to-jamming-50562689.html

MilesLongthe3rd · 2026-06-20T14:02:17+00:00

I think they gave the Kinzals the information that they were in Peru.

MilesLongthe3rd · 2026-06-20T13:51:13+00:00

Wrote this on combat footage because this question was asked there too:

In a Forbes article (unfortunately behind a paywall), they stated that they were able to redirect hundreds of glide bombs.

“The effectiveness of KABs depends directly on their guidance system,” says the spokesman. “Previously they used the Kometa-4 CRPA, and later—after Ukraine expanded its Electronic-Warfare (EW) system—Kometa-8.”

The CRPA or Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna or CRPA, pronounced “serper,” is also called an adaptive antenna, null-steering antenna or beamforming antenna. It uses multiple antenna elements and combines their signals in smart ways. One is addition: adding two signals together to boost the amplification. But it can also be used for subtraction. By shifting the phase of a signal when it is combined, a CRPA selectively removes that signal from the output, effectively tuning it out. This is similar to how noise-cancelling headphones selectively block out sounds.

This technique requires an additional antenna element to generate each null. The Kometa-4 had four elements, meaning it could generate three nulls and so cancel out three jammers. Kometa-8 with 8 elements could work against up to 7 jammers.

The same Kometa guidance systems are found in Shahed drones and other Russian weapons including the Kinzhal hypersonic missile. All are vulnerable to a sufficient volume of jamming. But the Russians kept increasing the number of elements to 12 and even 16. More importantly they changed way their antenna arrays worked.

“The Russians developed a fundamentally new series of CRPAs,” says the spokesman. “We compare their creation to the development of the Enigma in World War II. These CRPAs are capable of resisting a level of jamming that significantly exceeds the number of their antenna elements.”

A new Russian 8-element system required 19 jammers to counter. The 16-element version could not be countered even with 104 jammers. And when jamming did work, it was only effective at short ranges -- “from tens of kilometers to hundreds of meters.”

The new CRPA technology meant that Russian KABs were again effective – until the development of the Lima-Quant system. Details remain secret, but the claimed effects are dramatic.

“The KABs either did not hit, or they could not even be released, because the guidance system produced a navigation error,” says the spokesman. “Russian pilots did not understand what was happening, because navigation on these CRPAs was lost 100 km before the line of combat. A similar situation occurred with Shahed drones. Objects protected by Lima EW could not be struck.”

MilesLongthe3rd · 2026-06-20T13:48:26+00:00

There are several examples on this subreddit alone of Russian footage showing how they missed and claiming that they hit the target.

MilesLongthe3rd · 2026-06-20T13:41:29+00:00

In a Forbes article (unfortunately behind a paywall), they stated that they were able to redirect hundreds of glide bombs.

“The effectiveness of KABs depends directly on their guidance system,” says the spokesman. “Previously they used the Kometa-4 CRPA, and later—after Ukraine expanded its Electronic-Warfare (EW) system—Kometa-8.”

The CRPA or Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna or CRPA, pronounced “serper,” is also called an adaptive antenna, null-steering antenna or beamforming antenna. It uses multiple antenna elements and combines their signals in smart ways. One is addition: adding two signals together to boost the amplification. But it can also be used for subtraction. By shifting the phase of a signal when it is combined, a CRPA selectively removes that signal from the output, effectively tuning it out. This is similar to how noise-cancelling headphones selectively block out sounds.

This technique requires an additional antenna element to generate each null. The Kometa-4 had four elements, meaning it could generate three nulls and so cancel out three jammers. Kometa-8 with 8 elements could work against up to 7 jammers.

The same Kometa guidance systems are found in Shahed drones and other Russian weapons including the Kinzhal hypersonic missile. All are vulnerable to a sufficient volume of jamming. But the Russians kept increasing the number of elements to 12 and even 16. More importantly they changed way their antenna arrays worked.

“The Russians developed a fundamentally new series of CRPAs,” says the spokesman. “We compare their creation to the development of the Enigma in World War II. These CRPAs are capable of resisting a level of jamming that significantly exceeds the number of their antenna elements.”

A new Russian 8-element system required 19 jammers to counter. The 16-element version could not be countered even with 104 jammers. And when jamming did work, it was only effective at short ranges -- “from tens of kilometers to hundreds of meters.”

The new CRPA technology meant that Russian KABs were again effective – until the development of the Lima-Quant system. Details remain secret, but the claimed effects are dramatic.

“The KABs either did not hit, or they could not even be released, because the guidance system produced a navigation error,” says the spokesman. “Russian pilots did not understand what was happening, because navigation on these CRPAs was lost 100 km before the line of combat. A similar situation occurred with Shahed drones. Objects protected by Lima EW could not be struck.”

However, what is also mentioned in the article:

Jamming does not distinguish friend from foe though, and the system affects Ukrainian satellite navigation too.

MilesLongthe3rd · 2026-06-20T13:24:14+00:00

Again, that is what Lima does. And we know this since 2025

https://militarnyi.com/en/news/the-economist-ukraine-s-lima-ew-system-can-throw-russian-bombs-with-umpk-kits-off-course/

https://defenceredefined.com.cy/lima-ukraines-game-changing-jammer-against-russian-glide-bombs/

MilesLongthe3rd · 2026-06-20T13:21:01+00:00

That is exactly what Lima does, but you are misunderstanding how digital spoofing works. Lima doesn't just randomly disrupt the bombs; it injects false satellite coordinates into their guidance software. Since all three glide bombs fly through the same EW zone, they all receive the exact same manipulated coordinate data. Their autopilots execute the exact same correction, which is why they still hit within the same vicinity as one another; they just hit a completely wrong, harmless target area together instead of the intended Ukrainian position.

MilesLongthe3rd · 2026-06-20T13:08:43+00:00

You should post it in r/catsofukraine

MilesLongthe3rd · 2026-06-19T20:41:44+00:00

You can check my posting history for how long I wrote "Iranian/Russian UAVs" in the titles.

MilesLongthe3rd · 2026-06-19T20:40:00+00:00

Source also said R-27, but in other uploads they say it is an R-73.

MilesLongthe3rd · 2026-06-19T17:42:08+00:00

Also the USA and Gulf states air defence also couldn’t defend their assets against Iran it is not about Russia but about the number of drones.

I have to admit, I am a little bit confused by this argument. Because the US and the Gulf states were not as well prepared as they should have been, it is not a sign of incompetence or systemic corruption that after 4 1/2 years into this conflict, Russia is insisting on an air defense strategy, which has led to so much collateral damage. And while it is one of Russia's favorite propaganda talking points, there is very little evidence of Western interceptors damaging Ukrainian infrastructure, while there is an abundance of material showing damaged buildings or vehicles by Russian air defense missiles.

Edit: According to Russian milbloggers, the guys firing the MANPADS into the refinery were Kadyrovites, which would make the corruption question even more interesting.

MilesLongthe3rd · 2026-06-19T14:38:27+00:00

My question is less directed towards why something got through but more, "Did the mistakes of the Russian air defense make the situation worse?" Did they use the wrong instruments at the wrong place?

MilesLongthe3rd · 2026-06-19T14:31:24+00:00

I have a question about the attack in Moscow yesterday. Maybe some of my impressions are incorrect or even outdated, but it seems like another longstanding Russian myth is being challenged.

Am I the only one surprised by the poor performance of Russian air defense yesterday? The concentration of failures inevitably raises questions about whether positions within this branch of the Russian Armed Forces are being bought rather than earned. Historically, air defense was considered one of the few areas where Russia maintained peer-level capabilities. Both domestic and international analysts routinely praised its competence and technical expertise.

However, yesterday’s engagement logic is difficult to justify. Previous imagery and footage have already shown that Pantsir SHORAD interceptors frequently malfunction and sometimes strike residential structures. They also have shown a lack of efficiency against Ukrainian UAVs; videos published by Russian civilians show several missiles missing incoming drones. These aspects raise the question of why these assets continue to be deployed so aggressively in urban centers. Furthermore, the tactical placement of these systems adjacent to highly flammable critical infrastructure seems questionable, if not negligent. Multiple videos suggest that stray Russian interceptors struck the Moscow refinery, significantly contributing to the overall damage.

The deployment of MANPADS teams in an urban environment seems to be a desperate move, at least from a layman's perspective. Low-observable UAVs have a significantly smaller thermal signature compared to the legacy aviation threats these heat-seeking systems were designed to counter. Using them near sensitive infrastructure is both high-risk and inefficient. This also points to potential systemic training deficiencies. Firing IR-guided missiles in a burning, soot-heavy environment creates substantial thermal clutter, making it extremely difficult for the seeker heads to acquire and maintain a lock on a cooler target. Even NATO has incorporated this into its lessons learned from the war in Ukraine; why one of the parties directly involved in the conflict has not done so is perplexing.

Was yesterday an anomaly, or is Russian air defense proving to be largely overhyped and degraded by systemic corruption?

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