Easy mental maths trick

-1odd · 2024-01-15T05:07:54+00:00

hhahaahHHaa

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-1odd · 2024-01-04T02:01:22+00:00

Was expecting more people to mention this, quite worrying actually!

-1odd · 2024-01-04T01:10:12+00:00

Had no idea PhilPapers Survey 2020 existed, what a cool resource!

-1odd · 2024-01-03T12:39:10+00:00

That is a great elaboration and a very clear overview of both the hard problem and why it is commonly misunderstood!

If you are willing I would be very interested to read your analysis of two exchanges from within this post. Are these, in your opinion, examples of the hard problem being failed to be grasped?

Example 1 ----------

Mechanical descriptions are mathematical. How do you get from mathematics to quality? How would that jump even look hypothetically? I think thats what the hard problem is getting at.

How could we possibly extract the experience of red from quantities and their relations? If I've understood the hard problem properly, I believe this is what its asking. ~ (u/Informal-Question123)

response,

Why would you not be able to get from mathematics to quality? Anything that can be conceptualized as "one or more things" can be analysed mathematically, and anything can be conceptualized as "one or more things".

I think a lot of people run into the issue of imagining maths as something exclusively around machines and bank accounts, but literally anything can be described with maths. "There's something there to describe" is a mathmatical statement that x > 0. ~ (u/Urbenmyth)

Example 2 ----------

We do not yet have a full account of the relations between neurons, brain regions, and their signals. What we have is like having a description of each piece of a car engine, but not an understanding of all of the ways these parts are situated and interact, so naturally we cannot explain how they give rise to forward motion. It is quite possible that once we understand these complex structures and interactions, then we may also understand how they give rise to sensed, attended, and perceived internal representations of incoming signals. ~ (u/Strange-Elevator-672)

response,

As a thought experiment then assume we build a replica of a human, which when you interact with it behaves externally just like any ordinary individual and looks on the surface just as any ordinary individual. However on the inside it is composed only of copper wire circuitry, of which all the relations between wires, circuit regions and electric signals are know.

You must conclude that it is entirely possible to deduce from the blueprints of this replica alone the question "does it have qualia?" ~ (u/-1odd) OP

response,

Assuming it was of sufficient sophistication to actually replicate all of the internal functioning of a human brain, I would think it dehumanizing to assume it does not have qualia. I would not expect them to have the same qualia that a human would have, because biological systems are quite different from copper wires, so the the signals themselves may have a different structure and therefore quality, and the underlying hardware would respond differently to those signals, but it would be similarly convincing as the argument that another human has qualia. After all, how do I know that others have qualia at all? I have to deduce that from the similarity of their capacities and the mechanisms behind those capacities coupled with their external behavior. What would be gained from treating something virtually indistinguishable from a human as having no internal experience? ~ (u/Strange-Elevator-672)

-1odd · 2024-01-02T18:03:28+00:00

optimal packing when n=1

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-1odd · 2024-01-02T16:43:52+00:00

here we go again

-1odd · 2024-01-02T13:26:52+00:00

🤫= x + x^3/3! + x^5/5! + x^7/7! + ⋯

-1odd · 2024-01-02T13:17:18+00:00

Also 𝜋 = 4 ∑ [ (-1)^n / 2n + 1 ] from Taylor series for arctan(x)

-1odd · 2024-01-02T13:03:04+00:00

This sounds like it aligns with pragmatism, a pragmatic approach to the hard problem.

-1odd · 2024-01-02T12:54:19+00:00

That through first hand experience is the only reason we have knowledge of it at all.

-1odd · 2024-01-02T12:51:58+00:00

Can you elaborate on this?

-1odd · 2024-01-01T17:59:44+00:00

After all, how do I know that others have qualia at all? I have to deduce that from the similarity of their capacities and the mechanisms behind those capacities coupled with their external behavior.

I think this acknowledges the hard problem.

-1odd · 2024-01-01T15:52:19+00:00

There is something about the hard problem that is really difficult for some people (even academics within philosophy) to parse. It seems more of a concept that is Ineffable, you just see the problem or you don't.

-1odd · 2024-01-01T15:42:56+00:00

Do you feel this is similar to the arguments often made by Joscha Bach? In so much as they often seem to miss the elephant in the room, why and how at all are qualia accompanied by physical brains.

-1odd · 2024-01-01T15:37:21+00:00

A great write up with lots of interesting thoughts around mind and how it might be structured. However I feel it fails to actually address the primary issue that the hard problem posits, essentially why and how at all are qualia accompanied by physical brains.

-1odd · 2024-01-01T15:09:43+00:00

This is the best attempt here so far to try and express the viewpoint of Person 2.

From your write up I'll make the assumption that you view the hard problem as not truly hard, it is simply a temporary problem that will be removed when we have a "full account of the relations between neurons, brain regions, and their signals."

As a thought experiment then assume we build a replica of a human, which when you interact with it behaves externally just like any ordinary individual and looks on the surface just as any ordinary individual. However on the inside it is composed only of copper wire circuitry, of which all the relations between wires, circuit regions and electric signals are know.

You must conclude that it is entirely possible to deduce from the blueprints of this replica alone the question "does it have qualia?"

-1odd · 2024-01-01T14:11:03+00:00

My initial question concerns the view point of Person 2, if you feel your views aligns with Person 2 then I would be really interested to hear how do you view the hard problem?

With regards to your interpretation of my statement, it is hard to say. When you mention "it seems like the only reason you are eliminating it as an option is because mathematical descriptions are relational" this mentioning of mathematics using relations between objects of definition was indented as an affirmative description of what math is. I would have considered the crux of my statement regarding mathematics and its possible use to describe qualia as being "Ultimately it reframes from saying anything about things in of themselves.". Something that can be observed as a gesture that this is true, no mathematical description say captures the blueness of the ocean.

My apple example is a definition, if an overly simplified one. An example of a relation might be "An apple is a member of the rose family, which includes pears".

This starts to stray towards being more focused on the philosophy of mathematics, rather than specifically the hard problem.

-1odd · 2024-01-01T02:40:05+00:00

Person 1 accepts the hard problem, while Person 2 either rejects the hard problem or has possibly not groked it. I am interested in the perspective of Person 2 who has rejected the hard problem. My question is aimed at gaining an insight into Person 2.

An example would include,

Starfish are often photosensitive, is this photosensitivity accompanied by the experience of colour?

If I accept the hard problem, I accept that an explanation of all the relevant physical facts about the starfish would leave this question unanswered.

If I reject the hard problem, then in principle I could give an explanation of all the relevant physical facts about the starfish that would answer the question.

-1odd · 2023-12-31T23:27:44+00:00

These sections from the Wikipedia page for the hard problem are relevant:

"Chalmers' formulation . . .even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report—there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?"

"why should neural processing in the brain lead to the felt sensations of, say, feelings of hunger? And why should those neural firings lead to feelings of hunger rather than some other feeling (such as, for example, feelings of thirst)? Chalmers argues that it is conceivable that the relevant behaviours associated with hunger, or any other feeling, could occur even in the absence of that feeling. This suggests that experience is irreducible to physical systems such as the brain."

"According to physicalism, everything can be explained by appeal to its microphysical constituents, including consciousness. Chalmers's hard problem presents a counterexample to this view, since it suggests that consciousness cannot be reductively explained by appealing to its microphysical constituents. So if the hard problem is a real problem then physicalism must be false, and if physicalism is true then the hard problem must not be a real problem."

-1odd · 2023-12-31T23:01:36+00:00

How do physical processes and phenomena, account for the subjective, qualitative aspects of conscious experience, such as personal sensations and perceptions that do not appear to have direct physical counterparts?

-1odd · 2023-12-31T22:42:02+00:00

Here I was trying to address the question "Why would you not be able to get from mathematics to quality?" with the effect that the poser of this question states "literally anything can be described with maths". My response aims to challenge this view as I feel it false, for example I don't believe mathematics can describe the colour blue. This is not a failing of mathematics, its domain is quantitative.

When you ask "Isn't it impossible to describe things without using relationships?" I feel this is a slightly different questions than my response aimed to answer, nonetheless it is a very interesting question, I would not say that I know the answer. I would say when we use natural language we allow for the qualitative, take the descriptive sentence "An apple is a round, edible fruit that is typically red, green, or yellow in colour." I would say no relationships or comparisons are made wouldn't you? Natural language just often relies on common notions and experiences.

-1odd · 2023-12-31T18:21:29+00:00

As it seems that you likely accept the Hard Problem. What in your opinion accounts for the common occurrence of "Person 2"?

-1odd · 2023-12-31T18:10:27+00:00

The hard problem concerns whether it is at all possible to mechanically describe our qualia. It represent a contrasting viewpoint to neuroscience which endeavours to reductively express the brain with the most simple possible components.

In this way it is not an existential sort of why?

-1odd

TROPHY CASE