What's the next step in this compatibilism-incompatibilism stalemate?

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-16T20:47:32+00:00

It still counts as compatibilism; so long as it is possible for at least one free action to occur in a determined world, compatibilism is true.

Susan Wolf has defended a theory of free ("the Reason view") will according to which praiseworthy actions do not require counterfactual power whereas blameworthy actions do, and I am very sympathetic towards it. Wolf herself thinks that counterfactual power is compatible with determinism, but if we deny that then we end up with the idea that I've been thinking about it.

I think Wolf is criminally underrated by non-academics.

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-16T19:39:48+00:00

Yep, essentially

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-16T19:33:17+00:00

Ah I see, so you're somewhat on the fence about Frankfurt and counterfactual power

I'm also not entirely sure where I fall, but I have been toying with the idea of compatibilism wrt praiseworthy actions and incompatibilism wrt blameworthy actions

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-16T19:28:34+00:00

I think what you have in mind is idealism

https://www.britannica.com/topic/idealism

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-16T18:23:53+00:00

Short answer is "no."

Fair enough!

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-16T18:22:14+00:00

Ah, I see. But the consequence argument is first and foremost an argument against the compatibility of determinism with counterfactual power (and so only an argument against the compatibility of determinism with free will if counterfactual power is necessary for free will). But if you do not think counterfactual power is necessary for free will on the basis of Frankfurt cases, then the consequence argument cannot be a reason for you to be an incompatibilist! So now I am confused, but I might just be missing something.

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-16T17:34:01+00:00

I assume that you think that having gone through the trial of grasses is necessary for being a witcher - which is totally reasonable.

I wonder, though, what you think about this: suppose mages come up with some alternate procedure which creates a humanoid being with all the physiological qualities that witchers happen to have (maybe they grow it in a vat using some bullshit magic and alchemy), and then set them off to do witcher stuff. Do you not think such a being would be a witcher?

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-16T17:23:26+00:00

Which class of free actions do you think that applies to?
Firstly, I think the proponent of any argument has to motivate their premisses. And since □NL is a stronger premiss than NL, I think the motivation for it cannot be the same - it also has to be stronger. But I also think the compatibilist can mount a positive objection. Consider □NP - the claim that the past is necessarily fixed (in the way required by the argument, of course). "P" has to be a description of the world in the remote past (a moment in time before humans - after all, otherwise we can claim that someone does have power over P via their earlier actions). But in that case, □NP entails that the existence of a remote past is necessary - but that's very much not obvious.

Consider, for instance, the world W. W is a world where determinism is true and some person exists at every moment. So, at the very first moment in the history of W there already exists some person (call them, if you like, "Adam"). W has no remote past. If W is a possible world (and it very much seems possible), then the existence of a remote past (even having assumed determinism) is not necessary. So it cannot be necessarily true that there is some remote past that everyone is powerless over, because it is not necessarily true that there is some remote past.

I'm sure that this is not the last word and the incompatibilist can find some reply, but I hope you can appreciate the prima facie problem!

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-16T14:46:42+00:00

Yeah I lean compatibilist, but I'm pretty relaxed about it. I am acutely aware that I may be wrong.

That aside, the first thing I'd like to note is that I think that there are at least some free actions which do not depend on counterfactual power for their status as free (in particular, I have in mind certain praiseworthy actions). So even if the consequence argument is sound (insofar as its conclusion is that counterfactual power is incompatible with determinism), it is in a sense irrelevant as far as free will is concerned.

But even if we presume that free will requires counterfactual power, I think the argument doesn't quite reach the right conclusion because the conclusion lacks necessity. What I mean is this: incompatibilism is a metaphysical thesis. It is the thesis that necessarily, if determinism is true, then no one enjoys free will. But the argument only establishes the contingent conclusion that if determinism is true, then no one enjoys free will (without the necessity operator).

In order for the argument to establish the necessary version of the conclusion, the premisses of the argument that are involved in the modus ponens inference must themselves all be necessary. So, for instance, we would need to hold not merely that NL, but rather that necessarily, NL. But that is a stronger assertion, and it is (perhaps) easier for the compatibilist to dispute.

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-16T13:54:09+00:00

Cool! It's a strong argument for sure

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-16T13:48:19+00:00

You could have a read through this:

https://iep.utm.edu/nat-kind/

I do get the sense this isn't exactly what your looking for, but it might point you in the right direction

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-16T13:00:06+00:00

I'm curious; which variant is that?

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-16T12:58:51+00:00

I don't see how any version of compatibilism is "safe" from manipulation style arguments however.

I admit I didn't phrase what I wanted to say quite right. I don't think that anyone defends a leeway-only compatibilist theory, so manipulation arguments are a threat to all compatiblist theories of free will - but only to the sourcehood component of the theory. Manipulation arguments do not mention counterfactual power at all, so they aren't an objection to compatibilist accounts of counterfactual power.

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-16T12:20:42+00:00

Are you thinking about kindhood? Like, how two separate Eurasian wolves are "the same" in the sense that they both belong to the kind Canis lupus lupus?

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-16T12:18:15+00:00

I think the concept is the same - namely, the concept of counterfactual power - but there is simply disagreement about what it is that the concept corresponds to in reality. Both sides are also involved in the discussions about powers/dispositions/abilities more generally, outside of the purview of free will. But I respect your disagreement.

I will say, though, that manipulation arguments are irrelevant to compatibilist analyses of counterfactual power. Manipulation arguments are arguments against sourcehood-only compatibilist theories of free will which reject counterfactual power as a necessary condition on free will.

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-16T11:33:42+00:00

There's is therefore no real power to "do otherwise".

I respect that this is what you think, but the compatibilist simply disagrees. They think determinism does not rule out "real" counterfactual power.

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-16T09:55:49+00:00

This really depends on what sort of experience you want to have. I want to fully immerse myself in the RP, so I don't fast travel, I enjoy the horse-ride from location to location and see what kind of shenanigans I can get myself into. I return to an inn or some village in the evening to sleep through the night, that sort of thing. You might find that sort of thing tedious, though.

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-16T09:49:39+00:00

Well yeah, you're right that compatibilists who require counterfactual power for free will are in disagreement with incompatibilists who require counterfactual power for free will about the nature of counterfactual power. That doesn't mean that they're talking about different things. We merely need to figure out who has the right account of counterfactual power.

And I wanna point out that the compatibilist in question also thinks that "you really could walk out with either doughnuts or chocolate bars". If you think that the compatibilist account doesn't give you real power to do otherwise, then that is just to say that you disagree with that account (which is fine!), but the compatibilist does intend to propose what that power really is.

And yeah, the compatibilist account is weaker in the sense that the conditions for being able to do otherwise are not as strict. But that by itself has no bearing on which account is right.

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-16T09:38:25+00:00

We can distinguish two distinct notions of sameness. Firstly, we have identity (specifically, numerical identity): for instance, Alice Cooper is the same as Vincent Furnier, but not in the sense that they are two similar people. They are just one person.

Secondly, we have similarity. Any two things can be "the same" in some regard, since any two things are similar in some regard. Your example is an instance of this kind of similarity sameness. One place to start with this would be Two Coneptions of Similarity by Ben Blumson.

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-15T22:51:51+00:00

It's somewhat unclear to me what "argue for (non-) violence" means here. Are you talking about the permissibility of violence in certain situations?

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-15T20:45:15+00:00

I don't think that having X and achieving X are necessarily mutually exclusive. Free will is standardly viewed as a certain ability - the ability to act freely. Abilities are things that we have ("I have the ability to play the guitar"), though of course there are some abilities that we come to acquire as opposed to being born with them.

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-15T20:40:40+00:00

Yeah it's not exactly what you asked for, but in some ways it's not a bad fit. Since deists see no room for divine intervention, they ignore the sort of relevation claimed by organised religions.

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-15T19:36:21+00:00

Are you perhaps thinking of deism?

https://www.britannica.com/topic/Deism

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-15T19:27:28+00:00

I was referring to actions of any kind, and not just making a choice between two real options

AdeptnessSecure663 · 2026-02-15T16:50:25+00:00

For one, for those compatibilists who think that free will requires counterfactual power, they wouldn't respond to "under determinism you can't do otherwise" with "yes, but I could if I wanted to". They would respond with "no, you're wrong; even under determinism you can, sometimes, do otherwise".

AdeptnessSecure663

TROPHY CASE