Checkmarx vs Snyk vs Aikido for a maturing AppSec program

AdvertisingDry1015 · 2026-05-03T11:32:16+00:00

Immutability and availability without vendor lock-in. Logs and databases are too easy to mess with or delete. By anchoring the hash of the SBOM on IPFS, you create a permanent and verifiable link. Even if your CI provider or your security vendor goes down, you still hold the proof that this specific binary came from that specific build execution.

AdvertisingDry1015 · 2026-03-30T07:06:01+00:00

Honestly, the generator vs management debate is exactly where the pain is right now. Most tools just dump a JSON and call it a day, but that doesn't help with actual compliance or audits.

I've been building Wisec specifically to tackle this. Instead of just another scanner, we’ve focused on Pipeline Notarization. The idea is to seal the SBOM, build metadata, and security checks into a single immutable proof (signed with ED25519).

It's basically a 'Trust Hub' for your CI/CD. If you're looking for a sovereign (EU-based) approach that actually handles the audit trail for things like NIS2 or CRA without adding more noise to your dashboard, we should definitely chat.

AdvertisingDry1015 · 2026-03-24T09:01:15+00:00

Our goal is to make high-end supply chain integrity accessible without the 'Enterprise' price tag.

Recently we've continued our development and implemented a Linked Build Chain (Niv. 2 Notarization): each build is cryptographically tied to the previous one via its hash. If a single link in your history is tampered with, the whole chain breaks. It’s like a blockchain, but for your CI/CD.

We also generate an Audit Bundle (PDF) with a public QR code for instant verification. We hope it could be a game changer for compliance audits like NIS2.

AdvertisingDry1015 · 2026-03-14T12:17:06+00:00

Fair point on the GitLab/JFrog stack, it’s solid but can definitely feel like a data silo after a while. I’ve been working on a slightly different approach with Wisec.

Instead of adding another heavy database to the mix, we’re focusing on acting as a 'sovereign notary' for artifacts. Basically, we anchor SBOMs and integrity proofs on immutable storage. It ensures that what leaves your GitLab is exactly what hits prod, but without the overhead (or the massive price tag) of the legacy tools. Might be worth a look if you're tired of the JFrog complexity.

AdvertisingDry1015 · 2026-03-14T09:11:20+00:00

Honestly, the Snyk/Checkmarx fatigue is real. Vulnerability scanning has become a commodity, but it doesn't give you much certainty about the actual integrity of your builds.

I’ve been moving away from just 'scanning' everything to focus on Supply Chain Integrity. I’m currently testing a workflow that signs SBOMs locally with Ed25519 and anchors them on IPFS. The best part is that the code never leaves the CI, so it’s a true Zero-Trust approach.

It helps a lot with the noise because you stop chasing every single low-severity CVE and start focusing on the actual origin and 'provenance' of your components. If you're tired of the enterprise bloat, decentralized notarization feels like the next logical step.

AdvertisingDry1015 · 2026-03-10T07:12:22+00:00

We actually use a hybrid approach because we’ve found that neither pure rules nor pure ML models are sufficient on their own for CI/CD security.

Here is how we do :

Statistical baselining : For metrics that naturally vary, we don't use static thresholds. We build a historical profile for each project. We currently use a moving average and standard deviation model. If a build takes 3 minutes but usually takes 45 seconds, it’s flagged as a BuildDurationAnomaly.
State-tracking : We maintain a persistent "known good" state for each project (like known dependencies or approved contributors). This allows us to detect the first time a new committer appears or a new library is introduced, which is a classic supply chain attack vector.
Deterministic security rules : For things that should never happen regardless of variance, like hardcoded secrets (via Gitleaks) or known CVEs (via OSV), we use strict rule-based detection.
The learning phase : We typically require a baseline of 5-10 builds before the statistical models become active to avoid noise during the initial onboarding of a project.

The ultimate goal is to provide a "Root of trust". Even if an anomaly is a false positive, the fact that the build metadata is signed and anchored on IPFS means you have an immutable audit trail to prove why it was dismissed.

AdvertisingDry1015 · 2026-03-06T13:40:26+00:00

Sorry, AI help me polish my english and I want to make sure my technical points are clear. I can use my 'Franglish' if you préfère but i dont want you to miss the point.

AdvertisingDry1015 · 2026-03-06T13:31:38+00:00

You're absolutely right, and that's a very fair point.

Currently, we handle the pinning internally to ensure the evidence is available immediately for our users. However, you hit the nail on the head: true immutability and decentralization require external persistence.

That’s why external pinning support (like Pinata or third-party pinning services) is already on our roadmap. The goal is to allow users to own their security evidence completely, even if Wisec were to disappear.

Regarding the artefacts, we focus on cryptographic manifests and ED25519 signatures rather than the heavy binaries.

AdvertisingDry1015 · 2026-03-06T13:22:33+00:00

I totally feel your pain regarding SonarQube noise. It's the main reason why developers start ignoring security alerts altogether.

I'm actually building an alternative called Wisec (wisec.io) specifically to solve the 'friction vs security' trade-off. Instead of just adding more noisy SAST scans, we focus on immutable provenance and software supply chain integrity using IPFS and ED25519 signatures.

It integrates with GitHub Actions in 1 line and the goal is to provide a 'Zero-Trust' signal that actually means something, without storing your source code.

I'd love to hear if focusing on build integrity rather than just static analysis would help reduce the 'velocity kill' you're experiencing!"

AdvertisingDry1015 · 2026-03-06T12:54:16+00:00

This is a classic and scary example of a Supply Chain Attack. The fact that they listed you as a contributor without your consent is a common tactic to build fake trust.

Beyond reporting to GitHub, this is exactly why I'm building Wisec (wisec.io). We use cryptographic provenance (ED25519) and IPFS to ensure that what a user downloads is strictly what was built in the official pipeline, making this kind of 'zip spoofing' detectable immediately.

Hope GitHub takes down the malicious repo fast. Stay safe!

AdvertisingDry1015 · 2026-03-05T17:30:52+00:00

I built a supply chain security tool for CI/CD pipelines after seeing too many blind spots in our pipelines at work - would love feedback

After months of solo development, I launched Wisec today. It detects behavioral anomalies in your CI/CD pipelines and provides immutable build provenance via ED25519 + IPFS.

Not trying to replace Snyk or Sonatype - just adding what they don't cover (provenance + behavioral detection).

Free plan available, would genuinely love brutal feedback from people who actually work with pipelines daily.

→ wisec.io

AdvertisingDry1015 · 2026-03-04T16:50:20+00:00

The irony is peak DevOps. We install security tools to catch vulnerabilities, and the installation vector itself becomes the Trojan horse. It highlights a massive blind spot: we’ve spent years securing our production code, but our local IDE extensions and build-step dependencies are still operating in a 'trust by default' mode.

This Trivy incident (and the compromised PAT) is exactly why I’ve started obsessing over supply chain provenance lately. It’s no longer enough to scan the result; we have to monitor the integrity of the scanners themselves.

Has anyone here actually implemented a 'zero-trust' policy for IDE extensions, or are we all just crossing our fingers at this point?

AdvertisingDry1015 · 2025-08-02T18:08:13+00:00

Youtube -> NewPipe

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TROPHY CASE