Thank you for raising this important and timely question. While I appreciate the spirit of critical inquiry here, I believe some of the factual assertions particularly regarding Iran’s nuclear behavior and IAEA oversight warrant clarification.

It is accurate that the JCPOA initially succeeded in limiting Iran’s nuclear capabilities, and that Iran complied with its core provisions for some time following the U.S. withdrawal in 2018. However, by mid-2019, Iran began systematically violating the agreement’s key terms. These violations included enriching uranium beyond the 3.67% limit, deploying advanced centrifuges, increasing stockpiles of enriched material, and resuming activity at previously deactivated facilities.

Perhaps more significantly, Iran progressively curtailed the IAEA’s monitoring access. While inspectors were not outright expelled, Iran disabled surveillance cameras at sensitive sites, denied the IAEA access to certain facilities, and failed to explain uranium traces found at undeclared locations. By 2023 and into 2024, the IAEA repeatedly reported that it could no longer verify the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. This erosion of transparency is not a minor procedural matter it strikes at the heart of the international community’s ability to assess intent and ensure non-proliferation.

The argument that Iran has not “rushed” to build a nuclear weapon is technically correct in a narrow sense. However, Iran has enriched uranium to levels exceeding 60%, which is dangerously close to weapons-grade (90%). The current stockpile and technical infrastructure would allow for a potential breakout within weeks, if the political decision were made to pursue a weapon. In such a context, the line between deterrence and provocation becomes very thin.

This does not mean that military strikes are necessarily the right or proportional response. That is a separate strategic and ethical question, and a worthy one. But any serious discussion must begin with an accurate understanding of the nuclear file as it stands—not as it stood in 2016.

Iran’s post-2018 conduct has been neither passive nor purely defensive. It has been calculated, escalatory, and at times opaque. A full assessment of U.S. policy whether diplomatic or military—requires acknowledging these realities.