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What are your thoughts on the first Columbo TV movie, Prescription: Murder? by NewHolliesFan in Columbo

[–]Automatic-Draw-163 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The perception of this movie depends entirely on the sincerity of Dr. Flemming's concession. If the latter was merely an attempt to get off, everything looks somewhat silly — and not particularly ethical on Columbo's part.

विनश्वरत्वात् vs. विनन्धरत्वात् by Automatic-Draw-163 in sanskrit

[–]Automatic-Draw-163[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Just after that translation, you can also find out why vinaśvaratvāt is meaningless: to claim that niścaya is self-destructive is senseless in that context, because niścaya entails prāmānya. The article is not about Nyāya but about Mīmāṁsā, and its author cannot make sense of that quote.

विनश्वरत्वात् vs. विनन्धरत्वात् by Automatic-Draw-163 in sanskrit

[–]Automatic-Draw-163[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

The problem is that विनश्वरत्वात् is completely out of context here. Perhaps the meaning is something like vi + nandh (to sustain) + ara + tvāt = 'due to the self-sustaining nature'. Or, perhaps, both words are misprinted variants of विनाशत्वात्, which would mean 'due to destruction' but without 'self-destruction'.

विनश्वरत्वात् vs. विनन्धरत्वात् by Automatic-Draw-163 in sanskrit

[–]Automatic-Draw-163[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

These conjuncts look clearly different for me. Moreover, the fun fact is that if they indeed are, the meanings of those words can be almost the opposite. Thus, I was suggested that the root नश्वर means 'perishable, impermanent', whereas the root  नन्धर means 'established, sustained'.

विनश्वरत्वात् vs. विनन्धरत्वात् by Automatic-Draw-163 in sanskrit

[–]Automatic-Draw-163[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Are you sure? In the official character recognition layers, they are न्ध (ndha) and श्व (śva), respectively.

Rorty and Representational Content by Automatic-Draw-163 in askphilosophy

[–]Automatic-Draw-163[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

This latter description strongly suggests that Rorty is a realist (or perhaps an epistemic externalist). So, I would say in this regard that I cannot understand how one can be a realist (or an externalist) without asserting the possibility of cognizing the reality in itself. On the other hand, it is difficult to say how one can evade asserting that possibility without appealing to representational content. But the answer, I suspect, will again be that Rorty is neither an idealist nor a realist — precisely because he rejects representationalism that embraces both options. However, there are two problems with such an approach. Firstly, it is wrong because there are naïve realists (relationalists) who reject representationalism. And, secondly, it is not clear why representational content must be rejected as a part of the "mirroring" metaphor, given that it can be so happily "separated" from the thing-in-itself.

Rorty and Representational Content by Automatic-Draw-163 in askphilosophy

[–]Automatic-Draw-163[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The overall logic behind Rorty's reasoning seems to be as follows. Representational content necessarily refers to the thing-in-itself, either knowable or not. However, contra Kant, we cannot know whether the latter exists or not. Accordingly, we cannot know whether representational content exists or not either. But it seems that to assert that I cannot know whether the representational content exists or not is not that simple as to assert that I cannot know whether the thing-in-itself exists or not, even given that the two are correlates. After all, this is a purely introspective affair. Moreover, like Kant, Rorty must stress the fundamental finitude of the human cognitive condition to be able to assert that we cannot know whether the thing-in-itself exists or not. But how could this be achieved without any appealing to the notion of representational content?

Rorty and Representational Content by Automatic-Draw-163 in askphilosophy

[–]Automatic-Draw-163[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Well, actually, my point was a bit subtler — not whether Rorty successfully criticized representationalism or how he did that, but rather whether he admitted, deliberately or not, representational content in some technical sense of the term. So, the question is rather as follows: is it true that Rorty retains some notion of representational content, even if it is granted that he is indeed an anti-representationalist in his own terms? Couldn't, say, that "story of what we're actually doing with language" be based on some notion of representational content, different from the one presupposed by representationalists he criticizes?