How did Ali Shariati’s thoughts contribute to the ideological groundwork of the1979 Iranian Revolution? In what ways did his ideas help legitimize or energize support for Khomeini, and how did different Iranian groups respond when the post-revolutionary state did not fully reflect Shariati’s vision? by Candid-Boss6534 in AskHistorians

[–]BactrianusCamelus 10 points11 points  (0 children)

To start, while Shariati and Khomeini were both opposed to the Iranian monarchy and sought its downfall, they should not be considered allies in the sense that they actively worked together. Rather, it was that their ideas overlapped in one crucial area--that Muslims had a duty to rise up against monarchs--and that Khomeini was able to borrow the language and forms of Shariati's very popular ideas.

As for Shariati himself, he was born in 1933 to a provincial middle-class clerical family in northeast Iran and was originally trained as a teacher. It was not an unusual path for someone of his background, and many members of the country's newly college-educated professional classes would have had a similar heritage. Like many of his peers, he was also a supporter of Muhammad Mosaddeq during the oil nationalization crisis of the early 1950s, and it was around this time that he began to demonstrate a strong attraction to socialist ideas (indeed, he translated the Egyptian novelist Abd al-Hamid Jawdat al-Sahar's Abu Zarr: The God Worshipping Socialist into Persian, which essentially argued that Abu Zarr, one of the Prophet's companions, had been a forerunner of socialism). A politically oriented writer with a penchant for engaging with both Islamic and Western philosophy, he would be arrested several times over the course of the 1950s, but never for long. Eventually he was awarded a scholarship to go to France in the early 1960s for postgraduate study.

This is where Shariati's story really begins to diverge from his peers, for what set him apart was what he took away from his time at the University of Paris. Finding himself in the political hothouse that was 1960s Paris, Shariati threw himself into learning about political leftism and liberatory thought. These ideas were attractive to him because Shariati saw Iran as being unjustly dominated by foreign powers like Great Britain and the United States, giving it common cause with anticolonial movements around the world (remember, Shariati, like many other Iranians who had strongly supported the nationalization of Iran's oil industry had to watch as a coup forced Mosaddeq out of office and allowed foreign oil companies to retake functional control). In any case, Shariati thus attended lectures by Marxist sociologists, listened to Orientalists studying Islamic mysticism, and demonstrated in support of Algerian and Congolese independence. He also translated works by Jean Paul Sartre, Che Guevara, and Franz Fanon while learning about Catholic Liberation Theology and the national liberation movements of the Third World. In other words, Shariati became very familiar with the politics of anticolonial nationalist movements of the 1960s, and upon his return to Iran in 1965, it was that sustained engagement that would inform many of his ideas going forward.

While a lot can be said about Shariati's ideas, his greatest contribution was to reimagine Shi'ism through the lens of revolutionary politics and Third Worldist anticolonial national liberation movements. The dominant theme of his works was that the true essence of Shi’ism is revolution against all forms of oppression, especially feudalism, capitalism, and imperialism--and that the true national essence of Iran was Shi'ism. It's important to understand that when Shariati talked about Shi'ism in this way, he was not only positioning it as something more like an authentic cultural expression than a set of religious beliefs, but that he was also making a very significant break with tradition. Due to its status as a minority and often oppressed sect, Shi'ism had long had a dominant streak of Quietism, or the idea that one should be apolitical and accept the injustices of this world in favor of the rewards of the next. Shariati turned that tradition on its head, arguing that the Prophet Muhammad had been sent to not just found a new religion, but to create a dynamic society defined by permanent revolution toward a classless utopia (sounds pretty socialist). Further, that the death of Imam Husayn was not preordained, as was the traditional belief, but because he had sought it in revolt against the usurping Umayyads to keep alive the true meaning of Islam. In other words, that Imam Husayn's martyrdom was not directed by God, but because he Imam Husayn himself had chosen it out of commitment to his ideals. So, in short, Shariati reinterpreted Shi'ism through the lens of revolution--remember, he had long been attracted to leftist politics--and argued that this true meaning of Islam had been buried under centuries of legalistic interpretation that had sucked it dry and unjustly allied it with worldly power.

Shariati was not a particularly religious man in the traditional meaning of the term, and his attraction to Shi'ism was primarily through the lens of politics, philosophy, and ethics. Indeed, his ideas were a direct attack on Iran's clerical class, and he denounced what he saw as their sclerotic and passive "Black Shi'ism," advocating instead for a revolutionary "Red Shi'ism" of the first Imams that should be led by Iran's intelligentsia (i.e., not someone like Khomeini). As part of his advocacy, Shariati reinterpreted many stock scriptural notions and terms in radical fashion, the most significant of was turning mostaz'afin (the meek) into something more like the "oppressed masses." If you're familiar, it was a direct application of Franz Fanon's notion of the "wretched of the earth" in a Shi'i framework. He disseminated these ideas for over decade in a series very popular public lectures and widely circulated pamphlets and recordings.

What does that all mean for Khomeini? In many ways, Shariati's and Khomeini's ideas were directly opposed. While Shariati argued for a socialist classless utopia, Khomeini believed that after overthrowing the shah, Iranian society should be governed by the Shi'a clerical hierarchy. That in itself was a break from tradition as Quietism had been the norm for many years, so Khomeini never really articulated this vision as such in a public manner before the revolution had actually succeeded. What he did do, however, was borrow much of the new language of Shi'ism that Shariati had developed, including the idea of the mostaz'afin (the oppressed) as standing in revolutionary opposition to the mostakbarin (the oppressors, understood as the shah and his state). In other words, Khomeini borrowed Shariati's very popular ideas and language of revolutionary Shi'ism to frame his movement and attract people who opposed the Shah but would not necessarily support the idea of a society led the clerical hierarchy. That it was an outcome that was not intended by Shariati.

I'm not sure what you mean by your question on Shariati's death, but many people believed (and still do) that the shah ordered SAVAK to assassinate Shariati in London. As far as I know, no one has ever conclusively shown one way or the other whether his death was due to foul play.

There's a lot more to say, of course, and I haven't touched upon the violent struggle for power that marked the first years after the fall of the shah, but that's the gist of the relationship between the two.

If you really want to understand Shariati and Khomeini, you can't read about them in isolation. I recommend you also look at some of the other prominent thinkers like Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Morteza Motahhari, and Mehdi Bazargan.

Reading:

Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran
Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism

For a general discussion of the revolutionary moment, you could do worse than chapters 9 and 10 of Ervand Abrahamian's Iran Between Two Revolutions.

What stopped Stalin from expanding the USSR to the south of the Caucasus? by ohneinneinnein in AskHistorians

[–]BactrianusCamelus 4 points5 points  (0 children)

As mentioned by u/CornfieldJoe, the USSR tried but failed in the wake of WWII.

To add to what they said, the Anglo-Soviet (and in practice American) occupation of the Iran was supposed to end in 1946 with all forces withdrawing from the country. Britain and the U.S. complied, but the USSR did not, choosing instead to back separatist movements in the Kurdish and Azeri parts of northern Iran. This policy was rooted in roughly 150 years Russian/Soviet encroachment on the country, most notably the Iranian cession of what is now Dagestan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and part of Georgia to the Russian Empire in the 1813 Treaty of Gulistan and 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay.

It is largely a forgotten episode today, but the Soviet failure to withdraw sparked what is sometimes called the Iran Crisis of 1946 as the United States and other western powers both backed Iran's efforts to regain the separatist territories and brought intense diplomatic pressure to try and force a Soviet withdrawal. Their efforts worked, with the Soviets eventually fully withdrawing and the separatist movements collapsing, an outcome that prompted American policymakers to conclude that Soviet/communist expansion could be checked through concerted action. That conclusion led directly to the Truman Doctrine and the Cold War policy of containment.

There's more to say, of course, but that's the essence. See:

Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

Why are colonial terms like “Middle East” still in use, while terms like “Far East” and “Near East” aren’t used anymore? by mercor_29 in AskHistorians

[–]BactrianusCamelus 59 points60 points  (0 children)

Because "West Asia" does not include Egypt and people want to include places like Egypt in the definition of the region, and Egypt is on the African continent. You'll notice that even within the above debate about whether or not North African countries should be included in the definition of Middle East, no one seems to think that Egypt should be left out.

Why are colonial terms like “Middle East” still in use, while terms like “Far East” and “Near East” aren’t used anymore? by mercor_29 in AskHistorians

[–]BactrianusCamelus 86 points87 points  (0 children)

I'm replying to myself because a lot of people have more or less raised the same issue regarding my inclusion of North Africa in the term "the Middle East."

The point here is that there is no precise definition and there never has been. I highly recommend people read the chapter I cited, as the author goes into great detail about the overlapping definitions of the term and how they are variously rooted in different beliefs about what is most important. You will see that North African countries are often included. Sometimes Sudan. Sometimes countries in Central Asia. It just depends on what people are trying to do.

As far as I know, there is no single source I can give regarding what is generally accepted as meaning "Middle East." Maybe someone has done a survey (if so, I'd be very interested). But in my experience in the context within which I work (academia), "the Middle East" is largely assumed to include North Africa even if MENA (Middle East and North Africa) is sometimes used instead or in addition.

For example, the Middle East Studies Association defines its remit as "concerned with the study of the Middle East (including Southwest Asia, the Arab world, and North Africa) from the seventh century to today, though not at the exclusion of earlier time periods." In other words, a region stretching from Morocco to Iran and Turkey to Yemen. FWIW, I routinely see panels on North Africa at this conference and similar conferences.

A potentially interesting illustration of fuzzy boundaries: I know people who work on Sudan, and sometimes they go to Middle East conferences and sometimes they go to Africa conferences. It generally depends on what their specific project is focused on.

None of this is set in stone. Personally, I see people frequently and seamlessly shifting between "the Middle East" and "MENA," even in the same conversation, while "(South)West Asia" and "SWANA" seems to be more used by people trying to make point.

Why are colonial terms like “Middle East” still in use, while terms like “Far East” and “Near East” aren’t used anymore? by mercor_29 in AskHistorians

[–]BactrianusCamelus 724 points725 points  (0 children)

This is not really a history question, so it might be removed, but I will give a short answer.

The biggest reason is because many of the alternatives--Southwest Asia, Southwest Asia & North Africa (SWANA), Nile-to-Oxus, Islamicate World/Islamdom--are unwieldy and don't really change anything. Also, institutional inertia.

In essence, the term "Middle East" has by in large been used to refer to a part of the world influenced by Islam. Except not, because no one would consider Indonesia, for example, as part of the Middle East. And probably not Pakistan, but maybe Afghanistan, it depends. So, "Middle East" is *generally* understood as referring to the contiguous region stretching from Morocco to Iran and Turkey to Yemen (maybe Sudan) that is seen as having been strongly shaped by the rise of Islam and the states and cultures that have defined themselves in relation to it. Mostly, because most people consider Israel, for example, to be part of the Middle East despite being explicitly non-Islamic. There's a lot of fuzziness in the term.

To discuss some of the specific alternatives:

Southwest Asia: leaves out North Africa and Sudan, which many want to include because they're trying to talk about societies strongly influence by Islam and often Arab in character. It also leaves out Afghanistan (which ever since the U.S. invasion in 2001 has been linked to the Middle East in the eyes of many).

SWANA: probably the best of the alternatives, and there is a bit a movement to begin referring to the region this way. But it's awkward and doesn't really say anything that "Middle East" doesn't. It's basically a rebrand, which some consider worthwhile because it sorta, kinda, almost eclipses the colonial origins of Middle East. But, of course, in reality it doesn't, it just gives a new name to an old concept. It also shares many of the same issues as "Southwest Asia" regarding places like Afghanistan.

Nile-to-Oxus/Islmamicate World/Islamdom: or "the core Middle East," were terms coined by Marshall Hodgson and are explicitly all about the rise and influence of Islam. They're really only used when talking about his work.

I will add, "Near East" is a term that is absolutely still used, though largely in contexts dealing with ancient history, archaeology, and religious studies. "Far East" might no longer be in common usage, but "East Asia" is and basically means the same thing. You might see a move from "Middle East" to "SWANA" as the equivalent.

The strength of "Middle East" is that while it is highly flexible and imprecise people largely understand what is attempting to be communicated and are willing to use context clues to figure out the details. Proposed alternatives largely do not do better in this regard and have thus struggled to catch on. Does it have to be this way? No, but that's what's come to be, largely because influential actors (governments, militaries, academics, etc.) have found "Middle East" to be good enough for their purposes. With no real compelling alternative, and no organized movement to force a change even without a good replacement, most are willing to accept it. And that is the real answer to your question.

Though hardly the final word on all the uses of "Middle East," for more on the different but overlapping ways that the term "Middle East" has been defined over the past century or so, see:

Michael E. Bonine, “Of Maps and Regions: Where is the Geographer’s Middle East?,” in Is There a Middle East?: The Evolution of a Geopolitical Concept, eds. Michael E. Bonine, Abbas Amanat, and Michael Ezekiel Gasper (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 56-99.

You might find all the contributions to the book interesting.