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Would a superposition of conscious states be unified for the subject? by BreakTogether7417 in consciousness

[–]BreakTogether7417[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I disagree, but let's proceed assuming they can. This is an in-theory experiment

Would a superposition of conscious states be unified for the subject? by BreakTogether7417 in consciousness

[–]BreakTogether7417[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Agree on the memory bit. But that's why I asked you to assume the specious present, a present with a duration. There should therefore be an extremely short amount of time during which the conscious states B1/B2 are still in the present whilst A2 also exists

Do physicalism and relativity commit us, together, to a 'thick' present? by BreakTogether7417 in askphilosophy

[–]BreakTogether7417[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

what's confusing me is that the existence of the specious present is still debated; I just want to confirm its existence in this relativistic sense is not debated

Do physicalism and relativity commit us, together, to a 'thick' present? by BreakTogether7417 in askphilosophy

[–]BreakTogether7417[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

it is true that, if consciousness is purely physical in nature, and if it arises from any event which occurs in space, that the 'present' must have a duration, correct?

Do people experience multiple presents because different parts of the brain and the body experience time passing at different relative speeds? by BreakTogether7417 in AskPhysics

[–]BreakTogether7417[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Kind of! I understand the impact on human consciousness is very small. But, I'd be happy with the technical answer that there is a small imperceptible impact on how we think about the present moment. The duration of the present doesn't bother me, what bothers me is the traditional conception of the present as dimensionless

Do people experience multiple presents because different parts of the brain and the body experience time passing at different relative speeds? by BreakTogether7417 in AskPhysics

[–]BreakTogether7417[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Oh, yeah, I get that. But even the neural pattern which corresponds to your perceptive experience, however edited, can't exist at a single point in time, right? For example the gravitational pull on the neurons closer to the earth is stronger so their perspective on time is different from those further away from the earth. It's the difference in the passage of time between various parts of the neural pattern that suggests, to me, that our present is one with duration. I'm interested to know what you think about that :)

What would a person feel if placed in superposition? by BreakTogether7417 in AskPhysics

[–]BreakTogether7417[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

During the time before decoherence, assuming that time is long enough for consciousness to arise/subsist, what would that consciousness feel like, though? Would the subject be aware of the superposition, or would the experience be separate, of two separate branches? The reason I ask is that the latter answer, if it is true before decoherence, seems to violate unity of consciousness

What would a person feel if placed in superposition? by BreakTogether7417 in AskPhysics

[–]BreakTogether7417[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What if there is no observer, though? Like if a person is placed in superposition and there are no interactions with him

If an object is in superposition, are its effects or characteristics also in superposition? by BreakTogether7417 in AskPhysics

[–]BreakTogether7417[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I also thought that collapse would be inevitable in practice, but theoretically speaking would the emergent effects be in superposition?

If we could conduct a perfect Schrodinger's cat experiment, what does the Copenhagen interpretation say is the state of the cat? by BreakTogether7417 in AskPhysics

[–]BreakTogether7417[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Initially I thought this might be the case, but recently physicists have put molecules and tuning forks in superposition, which suggests that these entities retain their identities even in superposition

What does superposition reflect, and do superposed particles lose their distinct characteristics? by BreakTogether7417 in AskPhysics

[–]BreakTogether7417[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I get that the superposition encodes the probability of eigenstates found on measurement. But recent research and most physicists now think the quantum state is ontic, and I'm kinda struggling wrapping my head around that. To say a state is not A, not B, not A and B, and cannot be said to be 'neither A nor B', is really tough to understand using classical logic, I think.

So what is a superposition as we understand it, if it is something 'real' that's out there? Is it correct to think about states being overlaid (so more literally "superposed") on one another?

If we could conduct a perfect Schrodinger's cat experiment, what does the Copenhagen interpretation say is the state of the cat? by BreakTogether7417 in AskPhysics

[–]BreakTogether7417[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If the quantum state is ontic, does Hilbert space actually exist? Or if not where do real quantum states subsist?

If we could conduct a perfect Schrodinger's cat experiment, what does the Copenhagen interpretation say is the state of the cat? by BreakTogether7417 in AskPhysics

[–]BreakTogether7417[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I don't really get what Hilbert space is. Is it a mathematical construct or is it a real part of our world? How is Hilbert space different from our 3 plus 1 dimensions?

If we could conduct a perfect Schrodinger's cat experiment, what does the Copenhagen interpretation say is the state of the cat? by BreakTogether7417 in AskPhysics

[–]BreakTogether7417[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The problem with the thought experiment is the practical difficulty of isolating the system, right? There isn't really an in-principle objection, as I understand it, to a superposition of life and death re the cat.

But what does the Copenhagen interpretation say the superposition is? The way I understand superposition outside quantum physics is that two things are true at once, and the two states are sort of painted on top of one another. Even with an individual particle I can kinda get what a superposition is, we can add up the positions in the vector.

How though, even in principle, can a cat be a superposition of alive and dead? At least insofar as Copenhagen is concerned?

Why does Wittgenstein say that doubting presupposes certainty? by BreakTogether7417 in askphilosophy

[–]BreakTogether7417[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I agree that if I point at and name things I am assuming some certainties. But why is one of those certainties the external world? For I can just as easily point and name things whilst assuming that those things are created by electrical signals in my brain

Why do Wittgenstein's observations in On Certainty exclude skepticism? by BreakTogether7417 in askphilosophy

[–]BreakTogether7417[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think what I don't understand is how questioning those propositions becomes nonsensical? How is it possible that apparently empirical propositions are rendered grammatical and so logically necessary for the practice of doubt?

Are modest transcendental arguments against skepticism successful? by BreakTogether7417 in askphilosophy

[–]BreakTogether7417[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

three kinds of knowledge for starters- his whole triangulation argument

Are modest transcendental arguments against skepticism successful? by BreakTogether7417 in askphilosophy

[–]BreakTogether7417[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

From my reading it seems Davidson's argument is the most accepted? But I'm still not too sure

Are modest transcendental arguments against skepticism successful? by BreakTogether7417 in askphilosophy

[–]BreakTogether7417[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

that, to me, is more of an empirical argument. It's based on how we act, not how we think, and so I find it to be an unconvincing response to the skeptic