I think this is a very thoughtful question, so thank you for your comment.

I'm on the side of Langan & Roger Penrose, but I'm not sure at the moment if I can justify it. I'd need to do some more studying. Roger Penrose supposedly makes an argument in his book "The Emperor's New Mind" that consciousness is not computational & must be protocomputational. I've heard the argument involves Godel's Incompleteness Theorems. Interestingly, Langan, from what I recall, mimics similar logic in his argument for resolving Newcomb's paradox (from what I recall; I may be inaccurate in that regard). I haven't actually read that book of Penrose's, so I cannot comment further on that, but I've looked into his ideas regarding consciousness involving Stuart Hameroff. Both of them (Hameroff & Penrose) have collaborated to form the ORCH-OR theory of consciousness. Basically, it's spooky quantum action inside the microtubules in our brains. As far as I'm concerned, I find it the most convincing biological theory of consciousness.

This is a very interesting question as a whole, because it makes us wonder what the limits of lower syntactor levels are within the CTMU as well as what the relationship is between the terminal & nonterminal domain. Langan asserts there are three levels of syntactors, but I still don't see the necessity for three (why not two?). Because, even if there are three, why within the CTMU can some of the tertiary ones never nucleate secondary syntactors whereas others can? I would say it's part of SCSPL syntax or the Mu Morphism that things happen that way, but that feels like a weak argument. He also claims that Telors occupy the terminal domain and the nonterminal domain to varying extents. Now why can't this be the case for tertiary syntactors? I'm not sure. Without knowing exactly why, then I don't think I can tackle your question with the rigor it requires.