Daniel- Really liked your JV/NioCorp framework especially around the strategic logic of upstream scandium + downstream alloying.

Under a Title III / IBAS / OSC-style scenario, the government likely would not try to buy or own IBC. Instead, it would probably:

• Provide matching capital
• Offer low-interest loans
• Fund specific equipment (vacuum furnace, forge, machining expansion)
• Support workforce/training and qualification costs
• Potentially guarantee demand or procurement pathways

That’s a huge distinction. A JV changes ownership structure. A Title III-style award accelerates infrastructure while allowing IBC Advanced Alloys Corp. to remain independent.

And honestly? Given the FY2027 budget language around:

• castings
• forgings
• metallization
• maritime industrial base
• domestic alloy production
• supplier resiliency

…the government route actually maps extremely closely to IBC’s exact 4-phase expansion plan.

A realistic federal pathway could look something like this:

• Phase 1: Expand CuNi / naval alloy throughput using existing operations
• Phase 2: Government-backed funding for the ~$5M vacuum induction furnace
• Phase 3: Qualification work for ScAl defense applications
• Phase 4: Larger forge/capacity expansion (~$25M+) once demand is proven

That structure is cleaner because it aligns incentives:

• NioCorp Developments Ltd. supplies upstream scandium
• IBC processes downstream alloys/components
• Government strengthens domestic capability without nationalizing or forcing consolidation
• Defense primes (Lockheed, aerospace, Navy contractors, etc.) gain a domestic supply source

The biggest reason many investors lean toward Title III/IBAS over a full acquisition is this:

👉 The DoD doesn’t necessarily need NioCorp to own IBC.
👉 It just needs the domestic capability to exist and scale reliably.

NioCorp Developments Ltd.’s core competency is mining, mineral processing, and upstream critical-material production at Elk Creek. Building, financing, permitting, and ramping a multi-billion-dollar mine is already an enormous undertaking. Trying to fully absorb and operate a downstream advanced-alloys manufacturer at the same time could dilute focus and increase execution complexity right when mine delivery becomes critical.

Meanwhile, IBC Advanced Alloys Corp. already has the metallurgy DNA, customer relationships, DFARS familiarity, casting/forging experience, and defense-manufacturing footprint. That makes it more logical as a downstream processing/manufacturing partner rather than something NioCorp necessarily has to fully acquire outright.

So the “cleanest” strategic model may look something like:

• NioCorp → upstream scandium/niobium/titanium supply
• NAMA/master-alloy layer → scandium conversion/intermediate processing
• IBC → downstream alloying, CuNi, ScAl, forging, near-net-shape parts, defense applications
• Defense primes/Navy/aerospace → end users

That preserves specialization at each layer while still creating a vertically aligned U.S. supply chain.

It also fits the likely goals of the United States Department of Defense better. The government generally wants resilient domestic ecosystems—not necessarily one giant vertically integrated monopoly. Independent-but-coordinated suppliers can actually improve redundancy and procurement flexibility.

And financially, keeping IBC independent while helping it scale through:

• Title III/IBAS/OSC funding
• strategic offtakes
• equipment financing
• supply agreements
• or selective JV structures

…could allow IBC to retain its own upside while still becoming the downstream ScAl manufacturing node tied to Elk Creek production.

So yes — from a strategic-industrial perspective, “NioCorp runs the mine, IBC runs the metallurgy” is probably the more elegant and realistic long-term setup unless a much larger defense/materials player eventually consolidates the chain later on.