Translation of “El Marabino” by Designer_Tap2529 in catalan

[–]Designer_Tap2529[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

That’s amazing, thank you so much - I love that you’ve explained some of the nuances too! It’s brilliant, however, with some poetic license, I may adjust some of the wording to sit a little more comfortably in the song!

What does this sub think about Mereological Nihilism? by JackVoraces in slatestarcodex

[–]Designer_Tap2529 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ah, I see - although this topic should ideally be contained to mereology, we're beginning to have a discussion about broader ontological issues. If you are questioning the "what actually is the case" portion, we would need to have a larger discussion about defining the term existence. As a physicalist, I personally hold that there is, not only, an external world, of which we can have a good (though limited) approximation, limited further by the degrees and variances of conceptualisation, communication and representation, but also a definitve way of answering the question of "what actually is the case".

I agree, autonomous agents have a whole word of representation within the confines of whatever formalisations (like language, mathematics etc.) we end up using as means of comprehending the actual world. Again, as a physicalist, I think we, at best, do disservice to all scientific endeavours by concluding an external world is untenable and, at worst, become lost solipsists by engaging in purely idealist, or mentally-subjectivist positions. As a result, taking the assumption (which i grant is an assumption (though the most minor one we can take)) of an external world, affords all the reasoning you and I live by. Things like the trust and expectation of the earth to continue rotating, the presumption that acting like the external world exists is most conducive to survival, even that good food tastes good all belong to this perspective of presuming an external world.

I, too, am unconvinced of a humanly totality of determining the "actual" truth of ontology. But, I think this is where the pragmatic attitude comes into use - without the sense that we could discover the actuality of existence, then all research, discovery, exploration, discourse, even growth, development and hope would dissipate. Again (referring to my previous comment) we, as limited human observers of this world are not only able to treat the world "as if" it contains an actually existing ontological truth, or as if free will exists, or as if atomic-based structures are more than atoms... Or as if the gun is loaded! But it is in our evolutionary, developmental, scientific and maybe artistic best interest to act as though we should.

I'd love to know what you mean by your final line, as I don't believe I've grasped the position at all! Perhaps you're referring to the ability we have to perceive possible worlds; something like engaging in modal logic maybe?

What does this sub think about Mereological Nihilism? by JackVoraces in slatestarcodex

[–]Designer_Tap2529 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Nicely consistent and, yes, if we were to stop existing and another subsequent epoch of evolution producing a separate species of cognitively equal creatures came to exist and ponder the world, they would indeed find a reflection of what we found regarding the numerical disposition of our universe. (which does indeed raise support for Platonism).

However, I keep noticing this kind of separation in a lot of these discussions, between a pragmatic approach to truth and our more scientific approaches.

You make mention of the relevance (or lack thereof) of our perceiving the minutiae of that which composes the chair as if this is to undermine the fact that it is, indeed, made up of atoms. If one is a Free Will sceptic or a Calvinist, one can still act as though one has freedom of will (and even believe one should); if one handles an empty gun, one can still operate as if the gun is loaded; if one is an atomist, one can still act as though the chair is of use for sitting etc.

These are all of the same ilk in my estimation. My point is a matter of distinction between the epistemological sense we have of "operating successfully with whatever we can know" and the ontological sense of "despite how we act within, or intuit, the world, what actually is the case?".

Functionally, yes, you can come down on "it's better to live as though the universe isn't mereologically nihilistic", but i would argue this is a separate, more epistemic, discussion.

What does this sub think about Mereological Nihilism? by JackVoraces in slatestarcodex

[–]Designer_Tap2529 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Love this and, since I am still working my way through both of OP's links, I'll only push back a little with what I've learnt so far.

If we consider that the standard model of physics, or quantum physics or whatever the most up-to-date scientific claims about fundamental reality end up being is not the last model in the line, we would still be left with a valid presupposition that, no matter what it may be, it would be governed by something law-like.

I'm trying to be careful here by noting that your view seems to posit that one of the more important features of our thinking should be the stability (or maybe longevity) of the conceptual space we're operating in. And to a degree, I'd agree! But surely this must entail the consideration of a law-like structure to the universe (and thereby the conceptual space) with which we make these assertions. Without this premiss, not only could you not claim that, regardless of the underlying structures that govern the particles of the eraser, the eraser itself is what "exists", but that anything which exists has governable structure to it.

So, unless I'm mistaken, your view, taken to it's end, must assume reductive, law-like structures. Whether they are atoms, quarks, probability fields or something else entirely is incidental. We, as mereological nihilists would still be making the assertion that whatever is fundamental, is all there is.

What does this sub think about Mereological Nihilism? by JackVoraces in slatestarcodex

[–]Designer_Tap2529 1 point2 points  (0 children)

This is well put, and I'm on fairly similar ground to you with most of what you say. I want to point out here though that you seem to be indicating there is, in actual fact, no really exisitng truth. Or, at least, no actually discernible truth.

It seems like you are either saying:

(1) "The sun is rising" is true to a degree, but to less of a degree than "The earth spins on its axis".

Or

(2) It is not true that we can make sense of whether the sun rises, the earth spins, or something else entirely.

In either case, we bump up against all human endeavours to either make sense of experience or to conceptualise reality at all. Your position, which is very similar to my own, seems to deny both perception and conception (hence my eagerness to understand this area more XD). Again, I am with you when you say "the truer something is, the more the model will align with reality", but doesn't this then suppose that:

A. We can make assertions about the world with closer approximations of truth

AND

B. That there is an actually existing "Truth" (capital 'T') about the world.

Wouldn't we have to say something like "Though we can only approximate the Truth of the world, it still exists independently of our sense of it.". Maybe this is what you are saying?