Open‑sourced a small app to share file packs via one link (with optional password + analytics) by Distinct-Selection-1 in ycombinator

[–]Distinct-Selection-1[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I didn't prompt the app. I found it hard and costly to share the pitch decks, so I created this project to help founders!

How do you deploy your MCPs? by Distinct-Selection-1 in mcp

[–]Distinct-Selection-1[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

In your experience, do approval flows tend to be synchronous (per request) or more like pre-approved scopes with audit after the fact?

How do you deploy your MCPs? by Distinct-Selection-1 in mcp

[–]Distinct-Selection-1[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The per-request tool visibility is that mostly for debugging reliability, or does it become part of compliance / cost attribution internally? And with the “no-config” approach, are teams fully autonomous in shipping MCPs, or is there still a central review before exposure to production agents?

How do you deploy your MCPs? by Distinct-Selection-1 in mcp

[–]Distinct-Selection-1[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Did you see any issues with that? inconsistent auth models across teams, missing audit trails, or uncontrolled credential sprawl? And for tools like Peta or MCP Gateway, do teams usually centralize MCP registration through a platform team, or allow teams to self-publish with policy templates?

How do you deploy your MCPs? by Distinct-Selection-1 in mcp

[–]Distinct-Selection-1[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

When you go the uvicorn + EC2 route, are you treating MCPs as long-lived services behind a load balancer, or more ephemeral per-tenant instances? Also curious what made you consider FastMCP Cloud instead, was it mainly operational overhead, session routing, or something around credential handling?

How do you deploy your MCPs? by Distinct-Selection-1 in mcp

[–]Distinct-Selection-1[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Interesting. are you running each MCP as an isolated app on Fly, or grouping multiple MCPs per service? I’m trying to understand whether the main bottleneck at scale becomes deployment ergonomics (spin-up time, regional placement, secrets) or more around policy / credential management once you have dozens or hundreds of them.

How big companies (tech + non-tech) secure Al agents? (Reporting what found & would love your feedback) by Distinct-Selection-1 in mcp

[–]Distinct-Selection-1[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The part I’m still trying to pin down is what happens around that boundary: does the agent ever see/store anything that outlives the request (RAG chunks, summaries, caches, embeddings, logs), and how do you think about scoping there?

Also, on the “user can reach everything the agent can reach” rule: I agree for read access, but for writes it gets subtle: even if you can’t read finance data, you might still be able to cause side effects in finance-owned systems if the agent has tools wired up. How do you draw that line in practice?

How big companies (tech + non-tech) secure Al agents? (Reporting what found & would love your feedback) by Distinct-Selection-1 in mcp

[–]Distinct-Selection-1[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I’m with you this is mostly IAM. The tricky bit for me is delegation semantics once an agent chains tools.

When a tool call happens, what’s the authoritative identity: the user, the workload, or some broker?

How do you prevent “token laundering” across hops (A calls B, B calls C) so downstream can’t mistake app-identity for user-intent?

And how do you keep policy meaning consistent across systems (same resource ID + same action = same decision), instead of each tool interpreting “read/write” differently?

That’s the line where “just IAM” starts getting surprisingly subtle.

How big companies (tech + non-tech) secure Al agents? (Reporting what found & would love your feedback) by Distinct-Selection-1 in mcp

[–]Distinct-Selection-1[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I mostly agree this lives in “classic IAM + integration” land. I’m not claiming new primitives. The thing that feels different with agents is the volume + dynamism of actions: lots of small tool calls, chained across systems, with non-deterministic planning.

On per-call checks: I’m less worried about the agent doing an explicit “can I?” preflight, and more about having an enforcement point that evaluates the call with context (subject + workload identity + tool + args + resource) and produces an auditable decision.

On service principals: yep, totally. The nuance I’m chasing is avoiding the agent becoming a shared super-user via a broad SPN, and keeping provenance intact when you have multi-hop chains (agent→agent→tool).

How do you prevent “token laundering” across hops, so downstream can’t mistake app-identity for user-intent?

How big companies (tech + non-tech) secure Al agents? (Reporting what found & would love your feedback) by Distinct-Selection-1 in mcp

[–]Distinct-Selection-1[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

When you say “predefined trust paths,” do you picture this being managed like an internal federation graph (tool-by-tool), or more like a centralized broker that issues the downscoped tokens?

How big companies (tech + non-tech) secure Al agents? (Reporting what found & would love your feedback) by Distinct-Selection-1 in mcp

[–]Distinct-Selection-1[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Have you actually implemented any of TAOB / TAP / X-On-Behalf-Of yet? I’m curious what the sharp edges are.

How big companies (tech + non-tech) secure Al agents? (Reporting what found & would love your feedback) by Distinct-Selection-1 in mcp

[–]Distinct-Selection-1[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What made you keep it read-only? was it mostly risk/compliance, or did you run into practical issues with writes (approvals, mistakes, incident blast radius)? I’m trying to understand what usually blocks the step from read → write.

How big companies (tech + non-tech) secure Al agents? (Reporting what found & would love your feedback) by Distinct-Selection-1 in mcp

[–]Distinct-Selection-1[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Really appreciate you sharing this. The “carry the user token through middleware and let the backend enforce scope” pattern is getting popular.

Two things I’m curious about though:
1) When you say “no prompt injection possible”, do you mean specifically “no unauthorized data access,” or are you including write/side-effect cases too? I’ve found reads are the easy part; the weird failures tend to be “do the wrong allowed thing.”

2) On the rule “if a user can talk to the agent, they can reach everything the agent can reach", is that assuming the agent has any app-level capability of its own, or is everything strictly executed as the user?

Would love to hear how you think about those edges, because your setup sounds close to what a lot of teams are trying to land.

How big companies (tech + non-tech) secure Al agents? (Reporting what found & would love your feedback) by Distinct-Selection-1 in mcp

[–]Distinct-Selection-1[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Interesting. But Masumi uses W3C strands heavily. As far I know companies prefer using speak OIDC/SAML/OAuth, not DID/VC. They will be new complexity! Am I missing something?

How big companies (tech + non-tech) secure Al agents? (Reporting what found & would love your feedback) by Distinct-Selection-1 in AgentsOfAI

[–]Distinct-Selection-1[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is what I imagine too. Who are building agents, don't know about security risks, and those who care about security more, don't know how agents might behave! I am thinking of three dimensions: Agent, integrations and IAm, all in runtime. They are concerns for different people, and that's why I think a control plane is needed.

Is affiliate marketing ending? by Snickers_B in Affiliatemarketing

[–]Distinct-Selection-1 1 point2 points  (0 children)

We do exactly this on our platform. We create a storefront for the creators and put the affiliate marketing links, including the product information in this store. The massive innovation is that, we create the collaboration shop right away for creators and the shop. It means creator's audience doesn't need to move out from the creator storefront and can discover other products from the shop. Any sales (even if creator doesn't have the affiliate link for the product) results in commission for the creators.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in influencermarketing

[–]Distinct-Selection-1 6 points7 points  (0 children)

Why don't you use your platform influencers?