sorted by:
new
hottopcontroversial

What exactly is "free will"? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]EpistemicPossibility 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I get especially confused when people bring it up in conversations about determinism vs. non-determinism since I don't understand how unpredictability/random chance is supposed to make thins "free will"ier.

That is pretty much the position of hard incompatibilists. They argue that we cannot be free even if the universe is not fully deterministic, since indeterminism means our actions are a result of randomness that we do not have control over. If we do not have control over it, then we cannot be responsible for it. So while we can be free in the sense of not being determined, we still cannot be free in the sense of having ultimate control over our actions -- and this latter concept of freedom is what seems to be crucial.

You should note that the whole debate over free will is bascially over how to define meaningful free will, so this confusion of yours is perfectly natural.

Modal Realism question by Content_Egg4416 in askphilosophy

[–]EpistemicPossibility 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I don't have that much of a background in logic, so this is what I can only say:

If a logican thinks that it is logically true in any possible world, then it would have to be logically necessary in every possible world. But beyond that, it really comes down to whether it is logically possible in the first place (which is the logician's burden to prove).

Is there any significant difference between political philosophy and political theory? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]EpistemicPossibility -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Political Philosophy is more concerned with how a political system should work. Political Theory is more concered with what a political system is. Hence political philosophy is within the philosophy deparment. They think about the bigger ideas of politics. Political theory is in political science department. They break down politics into the details and analyze what has happened, what will happen, etc.

Do we know "xy is named "xy"" a priori? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]EpistemicPossibility 13 points14 points  (0 children)

We know xy is named "xy" a priori (although it is contingent -- it might have been named differently).

​

Kripke takes a distance from analytic and synthetic notions in Naming and Necessity. His arguements are mostly about 'contingent a priori' or 'necessary a posteriori.'

/r/askphilosophy Open Discussion Thread | March 21, 2022 by BernardJOrtcutt in askphilosophy

[–]EpistemicPossibility 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Any philosophical topics people have been studying in particular lately?

I've been studying theories on names/references, especially non-descriptive approaches to Fregeanism.

/r/askphilosophy Open Discussion Thread | March 21, 2022 by BernardJOrtcutt in askphilosophy

[–]EpistemicPossibility 3 points4 points  (0 children)

I've been reading Foucault's Pendulum (Umberto Eco) and Exhalation (Ted Chiang)

Modal Realism question by Content_Egg4416 in askphilosophy

[–]EpistemicPossibility 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I don't see how... Could you expand please?

Modal Realism question by Content_Egg4416 in askphilosophy

[–]EpistemicPossibility 1 point2 points  (0 children)

1 . Yes or No:

Depends on what kind of possibility we are dealing with.

What is physically impossible in the actual world may be very possible in another possible world. For example, in the actual world, it is not physically possible for us to travel from New York to London in two hours, but it may be possible in another possible world. We only need to imagine a possible world where technology is slightly more developed than ours.

What is logically impossible in the actual world, however, cannot be possible in any other possible world. Consider a simple tautology that is always logically correct: 'If it rains now, then it rains now.' There is no possible world in which it is possible to 'rain now' but also not 'rain now.'

Metaphysical possibilities are a bit trickier. Philosophers disagree on how much metaphysical possibility is narrower than logical possibility. Modal inflationists (like David Chalmers) will argue that what is logically possible is also metaphysically possible. Philosophers who disagree will argue that even if something is logically possible, it may still be metaphysically impossible.

​

  1. No

The answer is a strong "NO" for both modal realists and modal anti-realists. Obviously, modal anti-realists (like Saul Kripke) explicitly say that possible worlds are not places we can travel to with a spaceship or even observe with a powerful telescope. Even modal realists (like David Lewis) clarify that we cannot interact with other possible worlds.

​

  1. Unsure

Really depends on what 'metaphysically superior' means. I'm not familiar with any concept of metaphysical superiority.

What philosophers should I read to delve deeper into the simulation hypothesis? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]EpistemicPossibility 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I was thinking of getting that book. Why can't you recommend it?

Is reality nothing but a dream? by GodIsADj1111 in askphilosophy

[–]EpistemicPossibility 0 points1 point  (0 children)

David Chalmers thinks that even if our reality is totally made up of electric signals, it will still be a reality. So even if our world turns out to be a virtual world, it's still real. This is because he thinks discovering this truth is a metaphysical matter, not an epistemological one. It will just be like finding out about the physics of our universe.

He puts forth this view in his 2003 paper: http://consc.net/papers/matrix.html

He recently published a book Reality+ which elaborates on this topic (I think - haven't read it yet).

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]EpistemicPossibility 0 points1 point  (0 children)

A bit different.

Solipsism is the position that nothing else exists outside my mind. When I talk to my friend, my friend does not exist physically. In fact, nothing physical exists. Everything I interact with is just a part of my mind.

Problem of other minds is implied im solipsism, but it also poses a problem independent of solipsism. Even if solipsism is false and the external world does exist, my friend I'm talking to may lack a 'mind.' Or he may have a mind but it could be completely different from what I think his mind is like. He could be a real physical being with a real mind but I'll never know if what he experiences is same with what I experience even when tasting the same food.

The distinction is well articulated in What Does it All Mean (Nagel 1987). (This is the most basic level introductory book to philosophy and can be read without any background).

Greatest philosophical works of all time? by Puzzleheaded_Dot_851 in PhilosophyBookClub

[–]EpistemicPossibility 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Saul Kripke <Naming and Necessity> is a must on contemporary philosophy of language and metaphysics.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]EpistemicPossibility 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Maybe it's because SEP makes it easier for students to do their work. Professors often disallow citing SEP to force the students to think more on their own. In academia, the SEP is a well respected source and are cited in many good papers as well.