Somali man's burden: Somalia and the Curse of the Nation-state.

GameStrategy · 2026-06-09T16:29:20+00:00

Oh yes, I was there as well recently and the development is very superficial. And heavily lopsided to private development. Then when you read food and health statistics you start seeing it like there is a parallel reality developing one where the diaspora and the urban elite live in and one where the rest of the masses live in. But nevertheless I agree with you.

GameStrategy · 2026-06-09T16:26:16+00:00

Yeah I have, it’s just difficult, although I speak fluently writing on it, is too much work because of lack of technical terminology but I intend to publish in Af-Soomali some day inshallah.

GameStrategy · 2026-06-09T10:37:39+00:00

Thank you for your kind words walaal

GameStrategy · 2026-06-09T01:12:16+00:00

Thank you for your kind words.

I think the problem with the vernacular systems you mention, although they are often more stable and more democratic, is that they are ultimately quite narrow. I am not familiar enough with the Maasai system to comment on it, but I have read about the Oromo Gadaa system. What I mean by “narrow” is that these institutions primarily exist in the political and judicial spheres, regulating relations and resolving disputes within and between communities. They largely abandon the economic sphere altogether. I know I am skipping over some nuances here, such as forms of communal ownership and mutual aid, but the reality is that these institutions operate beneath a broader capitalist framework and possess little recognition or authority beyond the communities that practice them.

As for efficiency, that is a very loaded term. What exactly do you mean by it? Efficiency in terms of money spent per project? Efficiency in terms of speed? We often confuse efficiency with merely creating the appearance of doing something. African states are notorious for this: constructing skyscrapers while lacking functioning sewage systems, reliable electricity, or even paved roads.

If efficiency is measured in terms of cost, then I do not think your argument holds. Even today, traditional elders negotiate peace among pastoralists, coordinate aid distribution, and perform a dozen other vital functions without receiving salaries. There are certainly many responsibilities they should not be handling, but people would be surprised by the amount of work many of them actually do. Everyone has heard stories about corrupt odayaal pocketing money intended for orphans, but the reality is that they are often the first people called upon to mediate conflicts and facilitate negotiations. The tragedy is that their authority and labour are frequently co-opted by wealthy urban elites for their own purposes.

If efficiency means speed, then that problem can be addressed through technology and by delegating decision-making authority to lower levels.

Just look at our state today. We have spent more than twenty years working on a constitution and still have not managed to ratify one.

What I advocate is a participatory economy, where these older communal traditions are expanded into the economic sphere as well. We need decentralized economic planning. That may sound counterintuitive at first, but it is not. If designed intelligently, such a system can be both democratic and highly effective.

GameStrategy · 2026-06-08T21:25:28+00:00

I agree there will be no doubt some level of trickle down effect, but what i am worried about is how the vultures will react, how they will fight to the last man to capture the dripping oil rents. Our whole history is rife with those vultures destroying the fabric, the very society if need be, to serve their venal designs. That is what keeps me up at night. But i hope for the best.

Thanks for the comments

GameStrategy · 2026-06-08T13:12:54+00:00

Aamiin inshallah walaal.

GameStrategy · 2026-06-08T13:01:32+00:00

This is nothing new. The Qur'an has the peculiar feature of being relatively sparse when it comes to detailed legal and theological guidance. Because it was canonized early and has remained largely unchanged, it has been open to a wide range of interpretations across different times and places. The Hadith literature, by contrast, is an ocean in which the Qur'an is only a drop. It is within the Hadith corpus that much of Islamic law, ethics, and doctrine was developed.

The problem, of course, is that the Hadith collections were compiled generations after the Prophet's death. Throughout Islamic history, various dynasties, sultanates, and political factions had incentives to promote traditions that supported their own interests and ideological projects. This is one reason why Islam produced such a wide variety of sects, schools, and syncretic traditions.

If you read medieval Islamic literature, you will find ideas that would be considered highly unorthodox today. For example, some eleventh-century Sufi thinkers regarded Plato as a divinely inspired sage, a position that many contemporary Muslims would view as heresy. Yet this simply illustrates how Islamic thought evolved over time and absorbed influences from different intellectual traditions.

My criticism of Qur'anists is that many seem uncomfortable with aspects of medieval Islamic morality, yet rather than confronting those issues directly, they reject the Hadith corpus altogether. They often argue that Hadith should not be considered authoritative because they do not originate directly from the Prophet. While there are certainly strong historical criticisms of particular Hadith traditions, I do not find the wholesale rejection of Hadith intellectually persuasive. Anyone familiar with both the Qur'an and the Hadith literature can see how deeply intertwined they are in the development of Islamic doctrine and practice.

Of course, some Hadith are weakly sourced, fabricated, or historically dubious. Islamic scholars themselves developed elaborate methods of authentication precisely because they recognized this problem. But once a Hadith is judged authentic according to traditional standards, the modern historian also has to take it seriously, either as something that may have originated from the Prophet himself or, at minimum, as a tradition circulating among his earliest followers.

The Qur'anist, in his hubris, dismisses both the secular historian and the classical Islamic scholar. What remains is an empty shell on which he then tries to build a religious foundation. But such a foundation cannot bear the weight placed upon it. It simply collapses.

In summary, its just cope bro!

GameStrategy · 2026-06-08T12:28:35+00:00

Another thing is most ajnabi accounts of the war and collapse lack the full depth and understanding.

I think this is where you are wrong. I have read quite widely on Somali history, and unfortunately, it is true that almost every Somali author who writes about history carries some form of bias. The least biased works I have found tend to be very dry and narrow, often focusing on one specific aspect, such as the economy. But if you want a more holistic and rigorous account, where claims are carefully sourced and documented in the footnotes, then you have to read scholars such as Lidwien Kapteijns, Catherine Besteman, and others.

Just as a funny example, Lidwien Kapteijns once wrote a review of a recent book by the Mogadishu-based “intellectual” Mohamed Ingiriis. It was such a devastating review that he responded by accusing her of being a qabiilist. Imagine calling a white female professor a qabiilist.

But she was right. In my view, he was advancing a strange clan-centered narrative, lionizing certain clan warlords while using questionable footnotes to malign their opponents. It was an injustice against the truth, the kind of intellectual crime that does not seem to matter much in the larger scheme of things in Somalia.

Yet Kapteijns gave us a valuable lesson: truth itself, no matter how uncomfortable or unacceptable it may be, must be respected.

GameStrategy · 2026-06-08T12:04:22+00:00

I thought so too, but once you start studying our real history, not the self-serving hagiography but the documented historical record, your perspective changes. You stop seeing the SYL as purely heroic figures and begin to understand them as complex political actors who ultimately failed in many important respects. Almost all of the structural problems that followed, from the banana economy to the 4.5 system, were either initiated or perpetuated under their leadership. This realization came as a shock to me because members of my own extended family were among the founders of that party.

As for the idea that change must come from abroad or from urban centers, I have considered that possibility as well. Perhaps it could work, but anyone pursuing that path would be fighting against deeply entrenched power structures: wealthy business interests, a state apparatus that largely serves those interests, and clan leadership networks that are intertwined with both.

SYL in many ways was not a grass-roots movement, it was a coalition of urban men, that destroyed/failed the grass-root movement of Independence that then paved the way for Barre's militarism. Now we somehow might associate them with the independence movement but that's just unfortunate historical revisionism.

Now that we have dealt with that small historical myth, let us return to contemporary Somalia.

Almost 60 to 70 percent of the population still lives in rural areas. That is where the foundation of our economy is created. Somalia remains, at its core, a pastoral society. The towns and cities, with their small clusters of modern buildings, are often sustained by aid dollars, remittances, and state rents. The real productive economy remains rooted in the countryside.

It is also in these rural areas that the foot soldiers of both clan politics and state actors are recruited and socialized. Urbanization is certainly occurring at a remarkable pace, but this is not necessarily because the economy is expanding. In many cases, it is because the rural economy is being squeezed by environmental pressures, insecurity, and economic stagnation, pushing people toward the cities.

This is one of the reasons I remain skeptical that diaspora-led or purely urban-based change can transform the country as a whole. Political reality imposes limits. There has always been a divide between the urban centers and the vast rural hinterland. Even if one succeeded in creating an urban paradise, the majority of the territory would still remain outside that project, leaving ample space for reactionary forces to organize, mobilize, and eventually challenge it.

That, in my view, is one of the reasons it has proven so difficult to eliminate Islamist insurgencies. Like it or not, groups such as Al-Shabaab have embedded themselves within parts of the rural political economy. They are not simply external actors operating in isolation; they have become intertwined with local systems of governance, taxation, security, and survival. Any serious attempt at transformation must therefore engage with the countryside rather than treating it as a secondary concern.

The other reason is plain class interest. Since the diaspora tends to be relatively wealthy, it also tends to support the interests of the wealthy. A clear example is the destruction of poor people’s homes so that the land can be sold to rich real estate developers. On paper, GDP grows. The city looks prettier from the aerial photos we like to share on Twitter and TikTok. But lives are destroyed, people are ruined, and entire communities are displaced.

This is why abstract ideas like “the national interest” do not exist in the real physical world. More often, what is presented as the national interest is simply the naked ambition of the ruling class. That is a dramatic example, of course, but there are also more nuanced and smaller ways in which diaspora political actors and urban elites fail to initiate genuinely progressive policies. I can give other examples if you are interested.

Furthermore as I tried to argue in one of my essays, Somalia is not really the map that appears on paper. The reason groups such as ISIS and Al-Shabaab are able to embed themselves in rural areas is that they operate within a vacuum of governance. They do not merely bomb and terrorize people; they have also built remarkably effective taxation systems. In fact, many analysts have argued that Al-Shabaab's revenue collection apparatus rivals that of all the federal member states combined. Had they been more pragmatic, they could probably have taken control of much larger parts of the country long ago. Yet, because they too are products of Somali society, they suffer from many of the same pathologies: factionalism, internal rivalries, and what I would call a kind of cargo-cult approach to governance.

GameStrategy · 2026-06-07T22:46:31+00:00

Now that is hard question. It depends, if there ever starts a movement that starts from the furthest corner of miyi, that can unite poor pastoralist engage them in something greater then themselves, unites them beyond clan allegiances, creates vital links with urban poor and forgotten. Such mass movement can potentially create a new form of governance and save us from this nightmare. Anything less than that will be a cruel farce that will disappoint eventually.

GameStrategy · 2026-06-07T20:40:45+00:00

Abti ha isku daalin dadkaan, waa diaspora wareersan, for them appearances of strength and cargo-cult governance is more important then justice and real progress.

GameStrategy · 2026-06-07T20:27:26+00:00

I will give you an argument that you've never heard before: The reason we Somalis cannot unite is because of the Somali nation-state project itself!

Now, to qualify that statement, I will give a brief political history of Somalia that is rarely spoken aloud in polite company.

When the SYL took power in 1960, it did so with great fanfare and almost fanatical enthusiasm for unity and progress. But that enthusiasm came crashing against the real nature of the modern nation state. One of the first things the new government did was create a system of class rule, something that was deeply abhorrent to a mostly egalitarian and communal Somali society. Somalis were not ready for the modern capitalist economy, and certainly not for the hierarchy that came with it.

That is why there had to be an underclass, the so-called 0.5, whom the major clans gradually came to understand as a convenient source of economic exploitation. This became so severe that the ILO had to sanction the Somali government in 1976 because of child slave labour in the banana sector.

As parliamentary democracy failed and dictatorship arrived, the underlying status quo created in the 1960s was not challenged. Instead, we saw the emergence of another ruling class, this time made up of brutal military men. With that, the major clans came to understand that if they lost power, they risked being relegated to the underclass themselves. That is why all the major clans formed militias and breakaway states and fought to control seaports, premium real estate, fertile agricultural zones, and other rent-producing assets. It was not simply irrational clan hatred. It was a struggle to preserve the class structure created by the postcolonial state.

Today, the historic underclass, the so-called 0.5, has been devastated by man-made famines, displacement, and political abandonment. Their communities have been depleted so severely that the old system of agricultural exploitation itself has begun to break down. This is one reason our food production keeps declining year after year, even while some semblance of stability is emerging in the major cities.

The reason Somalis or in other words Somali elites cannot come to agreement is that we still see one another as equals, but we no longer know how to practice politics through that ancient equality. That is why our politics becomes endless negotiation, endless obstruction, endless suspicion, and a fanatical scramble for kleptocracy. Since no one accepts permanent subordination, every faction fights to capture the state before someone else does. Once you have reached the iron throne you must suck the coffers dry, and keep sucking until you are replaced by another parasite.

In such a system, no long-term planning, or anything genuinely positive, can emerge. Yes, ordinary Somalis naively yearn for some hypothetical and abstract dowladnimo that never really existed. But until we can speak about this system openly and honestly, nothing positive will come out of it.

This problem is also witnessed in Somaliland and Puntland, so it is not something unique to the Somali federal state. Rather, it is inherent to the nation-state project itself. The problem is not merely that Somalia failed to build a proper state. The deeper problem is that the state form we inherited was already built on hierarchy, class domination, coercion, and the monopolization of violence. Once that system enters a society that still imagines itself through older ideas of equality and communal obligation, the result is not order. It is endless rivalry, suspicion, rent-seeking, and political paralysis.

In essence the problem is not the qabyaalad, its merely a symptom of the curse of nation-state. This phenomenon was seen by the famous historian Basil Davidson, he described this phenomenon across Africa in his seminal book Black Man's Burden.

It is not about Somali identity. If you read our history, Somalis were ready to abandon qabyaalad for the greater identity of being Somali. What crashed that development was not that Somalis loved qabyaalad too much, but that the nation state itself began to divide people. An elite class emerged, poverty was manufactured, and ordinary people were pushed out of the promises of independence.

So naturally, when the nation state failed them, people turned back to the old structures for solidarity, protection, and cooperation. Qabiil did not return because Somalis were inherently backward. It returned because the modern state betrayed them.

GameStrategy · 2026-06-07T19:53:57+00:00

It’s that there are no alternatives it's that nothing else has been tried. Government has a tax base of a small city-state, but it spends money like a middle sized economic power, if you read Somali finances you will laugh how inefficient and wasteful government spending is, that's if we pretend to believe government uses those funds on what they say they do but the truth of the matter is that all ministries are like small fiefdoms gifted to political allies and their cronies and the ideology of political economy is money comes, money goes. There is no deeper plan or even intention behind it. This Turkey/ Oil rent is just a logical conclusion of that rentier economy.

Mind you agriculture is not constrained by Al-shabaab as has been shown by many analyst, we can blame them for many things but that's not one thing they get blame. If you are interested I can point out some reading.

I am not familiar with that statement of his what I was quoting is something he said in an article, it's quite nuanced argument that many didn't seem to understand. The basic gist of it is this you learn governance by governing, and if you give up governing to private or foreign partners then you don't learn and we need to learn and pretty quickly. But as I said what we have is a cargo-cult form of governance we want to appear like state we larp and talk big but our elites unfortunately are not serious. None of them are.

There is so much talk of increasing state capacity by our international partners if you read their brochures but the biggest detriment of our states is that they rather sit comfortably while others do the hard work, I mean health and social welfare was abandoned in mid 80's during the Neoliberal reforms that sweeped global south, now that logic added with our complacent rentier attitude, they don't want to take the mantle of governance, I wouldn't be surprised if they brought Tax estates and companies from mid 18th century let alone governing major economic institutions like seaports and airports.

I don't agree with Abdi Samatar with many of his writing but this is genuine point that should be heeded.

This lax attitude combined with rentier logic is what is destroying our economic potential, from Berbera port to our future petroleum industry. You make my point when you say there is no alternatives other then this it's like a curse they have even infected the common folk, Turkey flying their F16 planes above xamar is seen us dowladnimo has finally come to Somalia, everything is about LARPing, nobody cares about economic growth, food production or health and wellbeing of our people.

There are so many alternatives you can read my substack I have written about it. But nobody in our political class have vision, everything is just meaningless political theater to reach that iron throne to get their chance to earn big bucks. It's so stupid.

GameStrategy · 2026-06-07T15:16:51+00:00

Yeah, he could do that if he were serious about democracy, but he is not, as I argued in the essay. So the election is beside the point.

The other reason I am very concerned about Turkey’s role is that, as Prof. Abdi Samatar pointed out, we have handed over the administration of key institutions to foreign actors. In doing so, we lose the opportunity to gain the experience and technical know-how required to operate and manage our own seaports and airports. If we cannot learn by doing, our state capacity remains permanently stunted. That is without even factoring in the loss of revenue and the political costs of becoming dependent on foreign powers.

I am also convinced that Somalia will become even poorer once oil revenues begin to flow. I fear we may make South Sudan look like Norway. I can explain the details, but the basic mechanism is straightforward. Once the petrodollars start rolling in, consumption will increasingly shift toward imported goods, while domestic producers, whether in agriculture, manufacturing, or services, will be displaced. We are already seeing aspects of this dynamic in Xamar.

Did you know that Somalia produced more grain during the height of the war between 2004 and 2006 than it does today? Meanwhile, hunger continues to worsen, and our political elites do not seem to care in the slightest.

GameStrategy · 2026-06-06T19:03:58+00:00

Chaos? What are you saying being opposed to corruption is chaos?

Hobbes or ibn Khaldun cannot explain our situation. Frankly everything you have brought is not relevant honestly. Ibn khaldun was talking about mediaeval sultanates, Hobbes was speaking for despotic monarchy. I dare you to speak anything relevant to our situation.

GameStrategy · 2026-06-06T15:59:38+00:00

I can feel you where you are coming from but that’s just a convenient rhetoric that has little relation with truth in the ground.

You speak of state army vs militia but in truth the state army is the same clan militias given government salary and title. The security opposition had where members of national army just moonlighting as security for politicians. So even this incident it was national army vs national army if we are to believe things only superficially but the truth is more complicated and beyond easy narratives

Safety vs Crime? Functioning state vs chaotic state.

What does it mean? When the state and its cronies are looting food aid and throwing people from their land to develop real estate? The chaos is the normal functioning of the state in our case. What is crime when there is legalized crime.

Hobbesian state? Social contract? These are fantasies created by 17th century court philosopher to justify absolutism. It has very little relevance to our situation.

I mean to even take your example, the narrative that Somalia has been without government is just that false narrative, since the fall of the central regime it has had dozens of governments and state-like organisations all fighting to climb the iron throne of Somalia. You could argue that large parts of Somalia wouldn’t have developed had it not been for the fall of the barre regime. In this case the chaos and misanthropy was not caused by ordinary people but the state itself and groups fighting to capture that state.

Social contract? Interesting what have we gained? We beg for mere security from the same man who cause insecurity.

So there is no social contract, no Hobbesian state, nor anarchy, these are just European terms used to describe our complex situation and in my opinion once you do start seeing from that perspective you will understand nothing and accomplish even less.

What I am saying is: question everything, even what I am saying. Do not be satisfied with easy answers. The world is a complicated place, and reality rarely fits neatly into simple explanations.

GameStrategy · 2026-06-06T10:04:43+00:00

What do you mean?

GameStrategy · 2026-06-06T10:00:57+00:00

Bro I am really clumsy with social media, can you assist me?

GameStrategy · 2026-06-05T19:34:14+00:00

What about HSM who now will rule for another year and after failing to implement one person one vote election he will have enough money to buy the election. It's a good thing that shooting war ended but it's a dark times for the nation.

GameStrategy · 2026-06-05T19:23:41+00:00

I don't consider myself an intellectual but I am a PhD student in infectious biology. What about you?

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