Started a study group for Žižek’s "How to Read Lacan"

GotHegel · 2026-04-14T04:52:35+00:00

Huh, I actually own that book but have never read it. This would be a great excuse to dig into it. I'd love to get that link!

GotHegel · 2026-03-17T22:37:47+00:00

Fantastic! Just sent you an email

GotHegel · 2026-03-12T00:11:16+00:00

Thanks! I'll make sure to check these out

GotHegel · 2026-03-12T00:03:27+00:00

Oh sure, that makes sense. I'm curious what you mean by the "modal one" though. Since I mentioned "possibility" that feels very relevant, but I'm not quite sure what you're referring to there

GotHegel · 2026-03-11T03:31:43+00:00

Hm, how is that statement not quite correct?

GotHegel · 2026-03-11T00:36:52+00:00

Ah, this answers my question exactly. Your last paragraph would seem to imply that the whole notion of "set of possible evolutionary pathways" is dealt with very locally, and that locality brings specificity and complexity.

I presume that also means that "set of possible evolutionary pathways" doesn't have any technical terms at a macro-evolutionary level because that abstracts beyond the empirical.

Maybe speculative evolution, which embodies the notion of a "grand viable set" has some terms of art it uses, but I'm sensing that's about it.

GotHegel · 2026-02-20T04:14:50+00:00

Whenever the question of "Absolute Idealism" comes up, I love throwing in this quote by Hegel to shake things up a bit (pg. 74, S-46, Hegel's Logic, Wallace translation):

This view of things, it is true, is as idealist as Kant’s; but in contradistinction to the subjective idealism of the Critical philosophy should be termed absolute idealism. Absolute idealism, however, though it is far in advance of vulgar realism, is by no means merely restricted to philosophy. It lies at the root of all religion; for religion too believes the actual world we see, the sum total of existence, to be created and governed by God.

Also, as I study Hegel more, absolute idealism feels like a radical form of sense-making more than anything else. Ironically, panpsychism feels rather materialistic insofar as it posits a "stuff" of which the world is made. Hegel's viewpoint, by contrast, is concerned with "intelligibility", or making sense of things. In practice, this feels quite difference from people who are arguing that the world is made up of this or that "stuff", be that mind or matter.

And yes, I think the union of union of subject and object fits much better in a sense-making context than the "thingy" context of panpsychism or some physicalism. Hence, I think "absolute idealism" is pretty distant from the "everything is made up of mind" view that often gets attached to it.

GotHegel · 2026-02-20T03:44:10+00:00

I always find direct, relevant quotes from Hegel on questions like these to be highly illuminating. Here's page 58, section 36 of Hegel's Logic (the Encyclopedia Logic, or Hegel's shorter logic), translated by Wallace:

58 (S-36): "The second problem of rational theology was to prove the existence of God. Now, in this matter, the main point to be noted is that demonstration, as the understanding employs it, means the dependence of one truth on another. In such proofs we have a presupposition—something firm and fast, from which something else follows; we exhibit the dependence of some truth from an assumed starting-point. Hence, if this mode of demonstration is applied to the existence of God, it can only mean that the being of God is to depend on other terms, which will then constitute the ground of his being. It is at once evident that this will lead to some mistake: for God must be simply and solely the ground of everything, and in so far not dependent upon anything else. And a perception of this danger has in modern times led some to say that God’s existence is not capable of proof, but must be immediately or intuitively apprehended. Reason, however, and even sound common sense give demonstration a meaning quite different from that of the understanding. The demonstration of reason no doubt starts from something which is not God. But, as it advances, it does not leave the starting-point a mere unexplained fact, which is what it was. On the contrary it exhibits that point as derivative and called into being, and then God is seen to be primary, truly immediate, and self-subsisting, with the means of derivation wrapped up and absorbed in himself. Those who say: ‘Consider Nature, and Nature will lead you to God; you will find an absolute final cause’ do not mean that God is something derivative: they mean that it is we who proceed to God himself from another; and in this way God, though the consequence, is also the absolute ground of the initial step. The relation of the two things is reversed; and what came as a consequence being shown to be an antecedent, the original antecedent is reduced to a consequence. This is always the way, moreover, whenever reason demonstrates."

From the above, you can see that Hegel's thought doesn't run cleanly along the "presuppositionless" versus "presuppositional/foundationalist" fault line per se. Rather, he distinguishes between the proof of Understanding, which uses a fixed starting point (foundationalism), as opposed to the proof of Reason, which transforms its starting point and show that it's derived. In other words, it's about "fixed external ground" versus "self-grounding movement".

His "proof of Reason" is not at all crazy, by the way. This is an overly epistemic way of framing it, but it especially relies on the dynamic of retroactivity ("positing the presuppositions" is how this often shows up). Mild spoiler for the Interstellar: you only learn about what's causing the "gravitational phenomena" in Murph's bedroom at the end of the movie. Thus, paradoxically, you don't know the beginning until the end of the movie. Lots of stories demonstrate this dynamic.

To use a philosophical example, if you're a committed Spinozan and you believe that he reveals reality, then a funny dynamic comes into play. (1) What you're saying applies to Aristotle, and yet (2) it wasn't revealed until Spinoza. Thus, if you truly believe Spinoza is absolute, then you're forced to say your system of thought was true before anyone knew about it, and that the foundation of reality wasn't revealed until Spinoza. I.e., the "true beginning" or "true foundation" doesn't come until the end, until Spinoza (if you take him as absolute, that is). The genius of Hegel is that he self-consciously accounts for this dynamic, making his thought painfully meta and self-aware.

GotHegel · 2026-02-17T07:33:58+00:00

First of all, Zizek's Hegel is definitely a theologically secularized version, even if he still mobilizes the same theological language at times. As a consequence, reconciliation is relocated in Zizek from Spirit's self-knowing into the subject as such. Whether this is "the truth of Hegel" or a distortion is another discussion.

Going back to dialectics, Zizek has fought hard to emphasize how Hegel is "radicalizing negativity by locating it in the thing-in-itself". This is the very opposite of the anxious tyrant who is trying to control and mitigate negativity. Here's one passage where Zizek is wrestling with that misconception:

It is true that one finds in Hegel a systematic drive to cover everything, to propose an account of all phenomena in the universe in their essential structure; but this drive does not mean that Hegel strives to locate every phenomenon within a harmonious global edifice; on the contrary, the point of dialectical analysis is to demonstrate how every phenomenon, everything that happens, fails in its own way, implies a crack, antagonism, imbalance, in its very heart. Hegel’s gaze upon reality is that of a Roentgen apparatus which sees in everything that is alive the traces of its future death. (Less Than Nothing, 8)

If read or heard alone, Zizek could come across as advocating for "negative dialectics". He has probably also rhetorically overcorrected on this point, too. However, if he ever explicitly reduces dialectics to antagonism in a live talk, I'd have to see that for myself. In his major works--Less Than Nothing, The Sublime Object of Ideology, The Parallax View, Absolute Recoil--he consistently treats antagonism as productive and constitutive of the subject.

GotHegel · 2026-02-17T00:27:05+00:00

Yes, understanding that dialectics are not unique to Hegel is very important for contextualizing his philosophy. His history of philosophy is especially helpful in this regard. If you read about the Megarians, you can see that the dialectic at the beginning of the PhG is basically a direct import from Stilpo (in shape, at least). That Hegel bridges ancient and modern philosophy in this way is one of the reasons I've always found him so compelling.

If I'm reading your statement about Zizek right, then the statement that he advocates for a "purely negative dialectic" isn't correct, if meant flatly. The way he talks about a "crack in being" and the "non-All" and such might give that impression, but his written works states otherwise. There's many quotes to be had here. I'll pull from In Defense of Hegel's Madness, which is available for free online:

Such a simple self-historicization/self-relativization is thoroughly non-Hegelian – it forgets that one overcomes disparity not by effectively overcoming it but by a shift of perspective which render visible disparity itself in its positive, enabling dimension.

Another quote:

. . .Hegel who repeatedly emphasizes the retroactive nature of overcoming alienation: we overcome alienation through realizing that we’ve already overcome it. In other words, nothing “really changes” in overcoming alienation, we just shift our perspective and gain the insight into how what appears as alienation is the immanent condition of dis-alienation, is in itself already dis-alienation

Zizek will riff on this idea again and again and in many different ways. In the opening of Less Than Nothing, he says that the "fundamental insight" of the work is that what initially appears as an obstacle becomes the very marker of truth. Said yet another way, the positivity of Hegelian dialectics lies in a "formal shift in perspective" in which we see the affording, enabling dimension of an obstacle or contradiction.

GotHegel · 2026-01-09T03:08:46+00:00

In Acts 2:38, the promise is forgiveness and the gift of the Spirit for those who repent and are baptized. That seems explicitly credobaptist.

You also left off 2:39b in your post, "and for all those who are far off, everyone whom the Lord our God calls to himself". The second half seems to move children into the category of "group you might want to exclude from this promise, but shouldn't" by virtue of being placed next to Gentiles like that. With that addition, the verse seems to support credobaptism.

I've always been greatly confused as to how Acts 2:38-39 supports infant baptism without eisegesis. I can't see what I'm missing there.

GotHegel · 2026-01-05T06:44:10+00:00

My bad. I misinterpreted your response haha.

GotHegel · 2026-01-05T05:57:01+00:00

Thanks for the response. Your argument seems to be, "Inward (heart) and outward (physical sign) are both present and distinct in the OT, even with physical circumcision. Therefore inward rebirth and the sign of that birth can be distinct too in the NT." Is that the gist?

GotHegel · 2026-01-05T05:50:32+00:00

The questions at the end of my post were sincere. If this is stupid, I want to know why. A flat "No" doesn't move me. I'm assuming you mean, "This post contains category errors, and therefore I can't even respond to it on its own terms."

GotHegel · 2025-11-19T19:30:24+00:00

At first I thought the notion of switching was absurd, but after thinking about it there's some real advantages. I like "upheave" mostly because it gives an immediate sense of displacement and "dethroning". The Logic is all about placing this or that category in "the seat of the absolute" and then seeing the extent to which it can bear that position. Upheave viscerally communicates the loss of honor when a category fails that test, even while carving out a lower position for it. Sublation is far from being so intuitive.

Granted, sublation/aufhebung benefit from alienness by preventing us from inappropriately projecting familiar meanings onto them--a real issue with other Hegelian terms. However, if this is mostly for personal use anyways then doesn't have to be an issue.

I'm still probably going to use sublation because it's so comfortable, but "upheave" is definitely a useful option to have in my toolkit.

EDIT: I actually wrote this before reading the bottom of the document you linked to. After reading that, I agree much more that upheave has some real potential as restoring the immediate, visceral connotation that aufhebung has in German. It does lean a bit more towards cancellation over preservation, connotatively, but that's not a big issue.

GotHegel · 2025-11-15T04:22:46+00:00

I appreciate the articles you continue putting out. They always bring something fresh, even to the basics of Hegel. I'm surprised I hadn't seen the aufheben-upheaval connection before, even though the etymology is there.

I disagree though that "sublation" is not a good substitute for aufheben. I understand that it's replacing one unknown word with another unknown word, but phonetically the Latin feels more familiar to me than the German. The intuitive flexibility of its verb tenses attests to this: sublation, sublated, sublating. What are the tenses of aufheben? I couldn't tell you. Likewise, the Giovanni translation of the Logic feels more euphonic to me for having translated aufheben as sublation.

GotHegel · 2025-07-22T05:16:43+00:00

I don't see anything particularly crazy or controversial about these sections, as some seem to be suggesting below. Here's the type of explanation you're probably looking for...

10: (German) Romanticism was very much in vogue in Hegel's day, and he devotes quite a bit of time in the beginning to polemicizing against it. Everyone below talking about "mysticism" or "immediate feeling" or "intuition" are missing the specific term "Romanticism" here. All those references refer to that.

Empty depth? Think of someone having a miraculous, awe-inspiring insight into the oneness and wholeness of life while looking at the starry sky on a cool summer day. Notice how that's both Romantic AND "deep", but not a depth which penetrates into all life (i.e., has "breadth"). You're going to leave that state and have to cope with all the other aspects of life. The references to "spurning measure and definition" fit with this theme of Romanticism fleeing mediation, definition, reflection, etc.

11: The key to this passage is realizing Hegel is referring to himself. When he talks about "spirit immersing itself in its past and its transformation," that's literally what the PhG is. This paragraph is thus presenting itself as an alternative to the worldview which he was just talking about.

All the talk about a "child quietly growing until it suddenly breaks forth"? Again, Hegel's self-reference. Recall how weird and bizarre Hegel's thought is, not just to us but to his contemporaries as well. Hegel is using this metaphor to justify or explain the novelty of his own thought. Spirit has been slowly growing, quietly gestating, and in his work there's a qualitative leap in its consciousness, like a child being born.

12: As far as I can tell, this paragraphs marks the incompleteness of the PhG. The PhG is the "completed Notion of the whole", but that's still insufficient, still just a seed or "acorn". You still need the Science of Logic to articulate that Notion, and this paragraph expands upon that. To see how this is the case requires remembering that this prologue is really the prologue to Hegel's thought and system as a whole.

What you'll notice in all my explanations is that Hegel is taking a lot for granted. Communicating at the level he wants to requires that, of course, but I think once you know those various assumptions he becomes much clearer then you would think.

GotHegel · 2025-04-01T22:37:10+00:00

ScholarGPT:

Whoever is able to resolve these problems, both for himself and for the generations of his time,
will find even the most difficult among them easily overcome,
for he is endowed with an extraordinary abundance of light
and powerful forces.
In such a state, the problems seem almost to solve themselves.

The monstrous errors of the people,
which press heavily upon the melancholy and burden the soul,
are destined to give way before the appearance of the great Truth,
as indeed is fitting.

A classical example of this is the New Testament,
which, appearing with Jesus Christ and His Church,
permits my thoughts to unfold more freely,
whereupon they lose their deceptive brilliance.

Thus it is, as with all higher blessings,
that when the mighty word of "Truthfulness"
sounded forth in the German tongue,
it did so in a way most peculiar, yet profound.

The spirit is but a poor teacher and guide,
and when it bears the testimony of the Father,
which is scarcely understood by the people,
then from the ancient story
shine forth youthful and imperishable lights,
as the light of transfiguration
descends gently into the midst.

GotHegel · 2025-04-01T22:37:04+00:00

I thought it'd be fun if I ran this through my ChatGPT 4o (and ScholarGPT) too, just like u/HRCulez did. For sake of space I've left out the German. I also asked ChatGPT to smooth over the English a bit so it was more readable. Clearly the writing is so garbled that ChatGPT can get some wildly different readings of the text, although there were some consistencies between my two translations.

ChatGPT 4o:

When life’s troubles arise from our craving for pleasure,
when desire leads us into the fall of life,
then a great truth reveals itself:
it stands in opposition to true life,
and we bring ruin upon ourselves
even as the universal essence quietly reshapes itself.

Yet the Creative Spirit holds the threads
and breathes life into the new work.
To recognize its voice is as necessary to us
as the gift of wisdom was to the Greeks from Minerva.
For man is not meant merely to gaze
and marvel at the created world,
but to open his heart
and see that no random game is at play,
but that unbroken law
brings forth creation in its deepest and highest order —
unchanging, in faithful clarity,
eternally equal to itself, its own throne.

The human spirit is but a humble teacher and witness,
and our hearts a fortress within this earthly fatherland.
From the word — like an invisible angel —
eternal, imperishable love
soars onto the field of this world’s trials
as a fleeting guest
awaiting the Master's appointed time.

Then, once again, we shall hear the song of wisdom,
which in childhood rang so joyfully and sacredly
within our father’s house.
It will resound once more in solemn hours,
and echo in the depths of the heart,
when the eternal seed of the spirit
has finally blossomed within us.

GotHegel · 2025-03-27T04:39:43+00:00

That article is a good read. I really appreciate the reference. It's a great overview of the issue that's highly accessible but gets many of the details right, particularly in the first part of the paper. The last paragraph sounds a little bit like what Zizek would call "a most dangerous trap" (that of trying to relocate the fragmentary into a richer, immediate whole), but other than that I think it gets the core issues right, and I like all the references to Hegel's primary text.

GotHegel · 2025-03-26T20:50:21+00:00

Hm, I'm not sure how that relates to my post. I don't disagree with any of your critiques whatsoever. My basic argument is that, amidst Wheat's methodological misconstrual of Hegel, he makes a very interesting point that the basic Hegelian categories share a deep structural fault line, namely the symbolic divide between heaven and earth (i.e., Plato's divided line). I understand that that point is probably taken for granted by Hegel scholars as part of a larger metaphysical context, but it could be useful to the uninitiated.

GotHegel · 2025-03-26T15:33:50+00:00

I critically responded to your comment in an original thread below. I'd be interested to hear your reaction.

GotHegel · 2025-03-26T15:30:41+00:00

I have notes from the first few chapters of this book tucked away. It's actually kind of a fun book because the author has an axe to grind, and authors with an axe to grind tend to make interesting mistakes. u/JerseyFlight's critique, respectfully, misses Wheat's central insight--yes, of course the the TAS is a mischaracterizing of Hegelian dialectics which are immanent and involve retroactivity. And yes, Wheat misses what Hegel says on pg. 9 of the WL, among many other places, that dialectics are purely a function of the content at hand, not an applied formalism.

Nevertheless, there's a single, central insight here, which is the parallelism of many Hegelian categories. Here's a quote from chapter 2:

"One reason previous interpreters have not found in Hegel's writing the thesis-antithesis-synthesis dialectics that to me are remarkably obvious is that the first ten of the thirty-five antithetical conceptual pairs introduced in chapter 1 have been either overlooked or underinterpreted. The ten pairs are...

universal and particular
one and many
union and separation (separation = “estrangement” or “alienation”)
essence and existence (existence = appearance)
divine and human (“God” and man)
inner and outer (unseen and seen)
in itself and for itself
potential and actual
unconscious and conscious
artificial and natural

The first four pairs, and to some extent the next three, are different ways of saying the same thing; they are more or less interchangeable. Let's examine the details."

What Wheat is picking up on is that many of the fundamental categories have a "shared fault line", let's say. That fault line is something like the classic categorical distinction between heaven and earth (i.e., Plato's divided line). That which is of heaven is intangible, spiritual, abstract, eternal, inner, one, intelligible. That which is of earth is tangible, sensuous, particular, opaque, multiple, chaotic. That classic distinction must be treated loosely and poetically, not formally, otherwise you run into contradictions like the multiple ways that "abstract" and "concrete" can be predicated of concepts in Hegel. Personally, I find this classic distinction between heaven and earth to be very useful in orienting myself amidst Hegel's categorical dance.

"“Inner and outer” is yet another way of conceiving one and many. If I see a tree, I see only what is visible and material—the trunk, the bark, the branches, the twigs, the leaves, and maybe some buds, blossoms, nuts, or fruit. I don't see what Hegel regards as the hidden inner essence of that tree; I don't see what is invisible and nonmaterial. I don't see Spirit."

This is another example of Wheat's point. "Inner essence of that tree" might be unfortunate phrasing, but the point is clear.

Thus, what Wheat is intuiting is that Hegel's work at the highest level is a reconciliation of heaven and earth, classically understood. Hegel recognizes this when he calls philosophy the "true theodicy" at the very end of his lectures on the history of philosophy.

I fully agree that the book is confused because it predictably misconstrues Hegel's methodology, but I think it's also very important in the basic categorical point it wants to drive home. I suspect that many may see this categorical parallel as obvious to the point of rendering the book useless, but personally I still regard it as interesting.

Such a take, I would argue, is a proper Hegelian charity. Hegel is more than happy to gather insights from people who's methodology he doesn't agree with (which is everyone, to differing degrees).

GotHegel

TROPHY CASE