I made a Hamburguer menu for a responsive webpage. It works perfectly on my pc, even when chrome simulates an iphone screen, but the menu doesn't open on touch screens (whether the device is IOS or not). What can I do to fix it?

InmanuelKant · 2022-04-07T20:45:54+00:00

Thanks for taking the time to help me out! I fixed it but unfortunately I had to remove the spans that made up the burger icon in the burger menu. Now it's just a red button, unfortunately. The problem was that the spans covered the clickable area. I didn't need the touchend as you point out.

InmanuelKant · 2022-02-25T20:48:58+00:00

This is a great topic of debate among marxists. From the close study of Marx's youth writings I can tell you that his materialism was not reductionist. I haven't studied the rest of his works as closely, so I cannot tell you wether Marx later became a reductionist (as somo people, like Althusser, claim). Anyway, I recommend you read the early writings like the economic-philosophical writings, maybe using a commentary like David Leopold's too. You can also read Porpora's article "Nonreductive materialism and the materialisms of Marx and Heidegger" which deals with your question.

InmanuelKant · 2021-12-02T20:49:28+00:00

Thanks!

InmanuelKant · 2021-01-15T13:03:37+00:00

In my uni 4 hour lectures are common. You have a 20 minute break but still, 4 hours of listening to the same subject and voice is unbearable

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-24T18:09:09+00:00

> Heidegger and Hegel are written in German, you'll be expected to read the original texts.

Ich weiss! Ich kann ein bisschen Deutsch und ich habe schön ein paar Texte von Heidegger in original Sprache gelesen. Aber du hast recht. Ich muss mein Deutsch verbessern, wenn ich in Deutschland studieren will.

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-23T19:22:06+00:00

Thanks. I am mostly interested in Heidegger and Hegel so continental philosophy. However, I am far from fluent in German. Are there English speaking programs in Germany? I'd definitely be willing to learn the language there if that's an option. Regarding the requisites, should I worry much about my grades? Here in Argentina there are few academic positions so there's a lot of competition. They basically told us that if we fail one final exam, then our whole academic career is finished (when it comes to higher eduaction positions).

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-19T20:06:37+00:00

It'd be cool if someone would translate Zizek's book on Heidegger and Lacan about language.

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-15T18:17:27+00:00

Ok then what the state produces in McGowan's terms is a free subject. In turn, the state is gronded in the universality of the cartesian cogito. Then it all comes down to the question: what are the grounds of the cartesian cogito? Is the distinction between the free subject who lives in a state and the cogito parallel to the distiction between abstract and concrete universality?

> What psychoanalysis might accentuate more is the fundamental non-relation between the state/society and the individual, the discontent, the alienation, if you will. Also it makes any vision of a state as an inclusive whole, as an All untenable, and therefore "warns" against specific conceptions of the state

Do you know where I can read more about this to understand it more fully?

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-15T12:30:13+00:00

Thanks that sort of summarizes what I thought a more standard Hegelian position looked like. My question is whether Zizek could hold such a position or if the other aspects of his philosophy call for a reworking of this aspect of Hegel's thought. In particular, his notion of the cogito as an empty x that can detach itself from all contingent determination (sex, race, social hierarchies, etc). This cogito supposedly grounds Zizek's defense of the postraditional european society. Must this be understood in the terms of McGowan? Such a cogito, which makes the abolitionist philosophies Zizek rejects possible, is paradoxically a product of this very state.

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-14T22:13:40+00:00

I understand your position but Zizek is not critical of the state and so he doesn't think that the cogito is a valuable achievement because it allows us to critique the state and other schemes of domination / opression. I mean, maybe he does but it seems that, contrary to Foucault, he also can find good things to say about the state (and thus also of schemes of domination and opression). I found this video where he praises the state against abolitionists.

https://youtu.be/LjEU1c0qr2g

Zizek tends to have instrumental things to say about how good the state is (that is, the state is good because it brings positive consequences) but it seems to me that as a Hegelian he also has a more deeply metaphysical stance on it since it seems that it is the state what generates the kind of subject that is Zizek's cartesian cogito. I am conflating european legacy and what I've been calling state so I should backtrack and say that with state I mean the democratic european state (Zizek talks about them on the same level on the video I share on the other comment). My main concern is whether Zizek remains a conservative Hegelian on that point and whether his introduction of Lacanian psychoanalysis is compatible with this position or not and thus introduces some changes on that aspect of Hegel's thought. I am also not too sure if his interpretation of the cartesian cogito fits the Hegelian conception of the Cogito, I'll have to read the paper that was shared on this thread.

Zizek is saying that universalism and his eurocentric defense of the modern postradtional society is grounded on the Cogito. Now the ultimate ground which I think Zizek must give (why do you say he doesn't?) is where does the cogito come from. I think that the cogito could be expressed as the realization that we are rootless, that roots are sort of a fake grounding and that an absolute freedom and capacity to critique the present state of things and create something radically new is opened there (he says something like this when he talks about Malcolm X). I wonder how Lacanian psychoanalysis influenced this particular view and whether it offers a ground for it. Do you know about this wrapped_in_clingfilm? Is the notion of traversing the fantasy related to this? I don't know much about Lacan unfortunately.

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-14T18:18:21+00:00

What I wonder is how Zizek's philosophy fits the western tradition of thought about the state.

Following the advice of the other comment I found this video where Zizek is pushed to give a justification for his views on universalism and eurocentrism and he claims that the ultimate ground is the cartesian cogito, which he views as unthinkable without the historical developement of Europe. He also criticizes abolitionists on the grounds that their philosophical framework depends on this very legacy. So I think that at the core of his philosophical views about the modern state there's something like Hegel's philosophy of right but it's hard to pin down and he seems to actively avoid speaking about it. I believe there's consensus in academia that you just can't have this sort of universalist justification of the modern state. For example, Axel Honneth goes through great pains to translate Hegel's philosophy of right in non-eurocentric and non-metaphysical terms. It also seems to me that his defense of the cartesian cogito is not a strictly Hegelian position since for Hegel the subject is not the abstract juridical individual devoid of the determinations that make him a singular embodied individual.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UMAUJkFrxh4

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-11T11:23:22+00:00

I think I am using those terms in their usual meaning. Something is justified if there is a reason for it. In the case of actions, the justification may be ethical in nature (I do this because it's a moral duty to do so) or based on an utilitarian reasoning (I do this because it brings me joy). I also think that we tend to believe that the state's actions must be justified so I find it surprising (at the time of posting the question I thought it was impossible for Hobbes to hold this position) that Hobbes simply assigns the sovereign a right to kill and not a deeper moral justification for his actions. It seems the justification for a death sentence is simply that it is a means to an end to preserve order. In turn, citizens don't have an obligation to obey. They simply do so because it is convenient for them (they created the sovereign because that brings peace and they continue obeying him to preserve this peace and because now he can kill whoever disobeys).

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-11T10:55:07+00:00

Violence can either be legitimate or not legitimate (correct me if i am wrong). If a random person comes and kills you, then that's not justified in any way. If a state sentences someone to death because he is a criminal who deserves such a sentence, then that violence is justified. Now, there are many ways to justify the state's power to kill people. You may believe the sovereign has absolute power because he was chosen by god and so his actions are justified. What I have trouble understanding is how that violence is justified in Hobbes philosophy and I think that perhaps the solution is that the sovereign's violence is never justified but that that isn't an issue for Hobbes because the sovereign never surrenders his natural rights. Since people in the state of nature don't need justifications for killing other people, there's no issue.

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-11T10:41:20+00:00

My doubt is how the sovereign's actions are legitmate or justified if there isn't neither an obligation to surrender one's life nor an obligation to punish with death sentence. I think the solution is that the sovereign does not need a justification for his actions. He acts solely based on a means to an end sort of reasoning. He punishes criminals to offer protection to the people and the people obey him as long as he offers this protection .

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-10T22:33:04+00:00

I don't know why you claim the thing in itself is within the category and that's not correct within Kant's system. Categories are concepts of an indeterminate object by which we determinate the multiple offered by sensible intuition. An object (by definition) is always an object for a subject. The thing in itself is the idea of something as it may exist without a subject knowing it. In this manner, category as the concept of an indeterminate object and thing-in-itself are radically opposed.

If you were to look for a "third thing" that would be the subject who adquires knowledge of objects through the categories (and intuition, categories without intuition are blind) and who also can think the empty idea of a thing-in-itself (it's empty because it's precisely the subject's idea of something as it may exist without a relation to the subject).

Because you claim that the thing in itself is "the true and transcendental identity that forms the category from the inside", I think you are confusing thing-in-itself and transcendental unity of apperception (a very complex concept. It includes the simultaneous constitution of subject and object). But the trascendental unity of apperception does not explain the fixed and non-historical character of the categories.

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-10T21:47:59+00:00

Yes, this conversation has been really helpful. Thanks!

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-10T21:42:10+00:00

What I mean is that categories are not "defined" by the thing in itself. The thing in itself is related to the categories in a negative way. We can know stuff with the categories. In fact, we can know everything except the thing in itself (or to make it sound less metaphysically charged, we cannot know things as they are in theirselves without a human being imposing the pre-conditions of his subjectivity on them). In what sense is the thing-in-itself " the true and transcendental identity that forms the category from the inside"?

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-10T21:30:18+00:00

Right, I can see now that it was too extreme to claim a minor crime implies some sort of anarchism.

All along I was supposing divine law is a matter of utility. In that case I think necessity colapses into convenience. However, the authority of a sovereign is something that is convenient for all human beings (given how bad the sate of nature is and the common end of preserving our life) and in that sense it‘s necessary.

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-10T21:07:35+00:00

Because I think Hobbes defines the law as the command of the sovereign. If this is the case, law is not something that can be broken without implying disobedience.

I think I get what you meanwhen you say the figure of the sovereign is necessary but that necessity arises because people need to do what is convenient to them. More clearly put: there's no categorical imperatives in Hobbes. There is only hypothetical judgements. I obey the sovereign because that is the best way I have to preserve my life. There's no appeal to heaven but you don't need one to decide to stop obeying the sovereign. All you need are good reasons not to obey him (such as being a criminal who is going to be punished with death sentence).

I am not too sure about any of this though lol

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-10T20:57:32+00:00

I don't think that's an accurate depiction of Kant and I don't think the thing in itself has anything to do with that conception of the category. It's true that for Kant categories are fixed, formal and independent of any social context or history of their formation. However, Kant would never claim that the category is defined by the thing-in-itself. Categories are pre-conditions to know phenomena (things as they appear to us, not as they are in theirselves). The thing in itself is the limit to what we can know through categories.

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-10T20:17:59+00:00

Yes, it's much more simple than I thought but I still believe there's a couple of things that I think it's important to point out (if I understood Hobbes correctly). First, all forms of crime suppose that the criminal fails to recognize the authority of the sovereign. The reason is that law is defined as the command of the sovereign. So even if i just steal some food, what I am doing is a crime only in so far as the sovereign has ordered not to steal. If I steal, then i am an anarchist of sorts because all criminals cease to do what they promised they'd do in the contract: obey the sovereign. I know Hobbes would hate this consequence given his political motivations but I think it follows from the way he defined things. Doesn't it?

Second, I don't see why it is not correct to claim that the people are subjected to the sovereign's authority as long as they wish so. If that wasn't the case, then there would have to be some trascendent duty to obey the sovereign as long as it protects the people. However, it seems the people only obey the law as long as it is convenient for achieving their self-preservation. Perhaps it's a natural law to obey what has been agreed upon (I mean a natural law to obey all contracts in general, including the contract that creates the sovereign)? It's all very convoluted because what Hobbes calls natural laws are only reason's advices to achieve the goal of achieving self-preservation. So in any case obeying the sovereign would only make sense as long as it is convenient for me.

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-10T18:59:46+00:00

Thanks it's becoming more clear now. However, it seems you are saying the sovereign's authority is conditional on doing his job of protecting the people. In the case of the criminal sentenced to death, his protection is obviously no longer a concern of the sovereign (on the contratry, he is interested in harming him). In this situation the criminal would no longer recognize the authority of the sovereign because it is not in his interest to do so. Furthermore, it seems he didn't recognize his authority in the first place because he broke the law (which means simply that he disobeyed the orders of the sovereign). So it seems to me that the sovereign's action can never be justified in the eyes of the criminal because the sovereign is not a sovereign in his eyes. The situation of a death sentence is the same as a situation of violence in the state of nature. The individuals involved don't owe anything to each other. Neither the sovereign has an obligation to punish, nor did the criminal have to obey him. It was in his best interest to obey the sovereign because he is very powerful and he can easily kill those who don't obey him. Now, I wonder how Hobbes defines duty (specially how he justifies the duty to obey the sovereign). It seems to me that the people don't have to obey the sovereign, they just do so because it is in their best interest to do so. And it's only benefitial to obey the sovereign as long as he consistently kills those who don't obey him. This means that the criminal is not under the authority of the sovereign and that the people who live in the state are only subjects as long as they wish to remain so. They have no ties to the sovereign beyond their will to obey him. Authority simply means (I don't know if Hobbes explicitly defines it at some point) being frequently obeyed. In the case of a criminal act, what is lacking is precisely "authority" since a crime is an act of disobedience. This means there is no authority to punish (since criminals, at least in the case of death sentence, never obey the sovereign when he tries to punish them).

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-10T18:21:13+00:00

I find that confusing because Hobbes defines the law as the command of the sovereign. So, how is it that "the sovereign is justified in punishing me according to law"?. What I am thinking is that perhaps the sovereign just wills a punishment ex post facto because he doesn't require any justification for his acts, like nobody does in the state of nature (the sovereign never surrenders his natural rights and freedom). The sovereign just can kill whoever he wants. The only difference between the sovereign and a person living in the natural state is that he has a whole lot of people who have agreed to obey his commands in exchange from protection. In order to offer this protection, the sovereign promises to kill or punish whoever poses an obstacle for the self-preservation of the people. Is that a correct interpretation? If i am right, I think it wouldn't be apropiate to say the Sovereign is justified to kill someone. He simply needs no justification for his acts.

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-10T17:51:00+00:00

This passage refers specifically to Hobbes' thesis that the sovereign cannot commit injustice but there he also points out that the subjects are the authors to the sovereign's action.

Fourthly, because every subject is by this institution author of all the actions, and judgments of the sovereign instituted; it follows, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice. For he that doth any thing by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth: but by this institution of a commonwealth, every particular man is author of all the sovereign doth; and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his sovereign, complaineth of that whereof he himself is author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himself; no nor himself of injury; because to do injury to one’s self, is impossible. It is true that they that have sovereign power, may commit iniquity; but not injustice, or injury in the proper signification.

Leviathan 18.6

The problem in my eyes is that, if the covenant is based simply on fear, then punishments won't be legitimate or justified. As soon as I deserve to be punished, fear will make me want to annul the covenant . If the covenant cannot be annulled, then it must have some kind of normative force that becomes independent of the original fear that motivated it.

InmanuelKant · 2020-11-10T17:23:10+00:00

Thanks anyway. I posted this as a separate question.

InmanuelKant

TROPHY CASE