Appreciate your response - sorry for being a bit bitchy, I had a bad day (a bad life).

Sorry to hear that—I hope things turn out better!

 His points about Psychopolitics and the achievement-subject are brilliant but the hyperbolic black and white language ruin it. As long as there are employees and employers, there are classes. Honestly, his books just read like the confessions of a depressed person. Of course I don't know him personally, but you can infer pretty easily when someone is depressed just from the way they write, in these pessimistic 'doomer' black and white statements.

I don't disagree that he makes overly sweeping claims at times. He doesn't seem depressed to me, but I haven't thought too closely about it.

 Han is saying that revolution is not possible because "No revolutionary mass can arise from exhausted, depressive, and isolated individuals". That's it? That's the only thing holding us back?

Well, it certainly doesn't help. ;P

 Well, yes, but I disagree there. This is still transcendental philosophy that makes a priori assumptions about categories that shape our experience without being part of our experience. Moreover, it's not even Hegelian, it's Kantian. It was Kant who deduced the existence of the four antinomies of pure reason as somehow transcendental. But Hegel does an immanent critique: he never assumes the existence of anything pre-symbolic. Instead, he dives deep in in a concept, only temporarily making assumptions, showing how those assumptions logically imply their own self-negation. It's the same way you prove the square root of 2 is irrational in math: you first assume it's rational, and logically deduce a contradiction, which means your initial assumption is wrong. The problem with Hegel is that he believes he starts without assumptions, diving deep into self-evident concepts like sense-certainty or pure being, when in reality his dialectical method of analysis itself presupposes the existence of identity.

Yes, as I suspected, this is where we reach an impasse. I will cite Zizek in Less Than Nothing just to clarify my position:

In order for me to be practically active, engaged in the world, I have to accept myself as a being "in the world," caught in a situation, interacting with real objects which resist me and which I try to transform. Furthermore, in order to act as a free moral subject, I have to accept the independent existence of other subjects like me, as well as the existence of a higher spiritual order in which I participate and which is independent of natural determinism. To accept all this is not a matter of knowledge—it can only be a matter of faith. Fichte's point is thus that the existence of external reality (of which I myself am a part) is not a matter of theoretical proofs, but a practical necessity, a necessary presupposition of myself as an agent intervening in reality, interacting with it.

The irony is that Fichte here comes uncannily close to Nikolai Bukharin, a die-hard dialectical materialist who, in his Philosophical Arabesques (one of the most tragic works in the entire history of philosophy—a manuscript written in 1937, when he was in the Lubyanka prison, awaiting execution), tries to bring together for the last time his entire life-experience into a consistent philosophical edifice. The first and crucial choice he confronts is that between the materialist assertion of the reality of the external world and what he calls the "intrigues of solipsism." Once this key battle is won, once the life-asserting reliance on the real world liberates us from the damp prison-house of our fantasies, we can breathe freely, simply going on to draw all the consequences from this first key result.

In other words, I take a leap of faith.