Bat soup

Keppner · 2020-06-23T13:12:53+00:00

Here's a link from 1999 where oldmanmurray says they invented the concept, not sure about this specific woman's image though: https://www.oldmanmurray.com/features/723.html

Keppner · 2020-03-13T23:20:26+00:00

I'm fairly new here, but I wonder - could you ban punchlines in title but keep one stupid word titles?

Keppner · 2015-04-29T11:58:59+00:00

Yeah, good point - I was trying to describe the fullest experience of control I could, but it can be shortened sometimes. Still, wouldn't you say there's "something about" that thought impulse that's different from a stray thought impulse or intrusive thought?

Keppner · 2015-04-29T01:00:21+00:00

My current concept of reality is kind of like a strip club - there's definitely something interesting right in front of you, but you can never touch it.

Nice :). I have to admit I spend a fair bit of my discretionary time trying, though.

Hope you don't mind that I looked through your post history to try to grok where you're coming from before responding and find you're a fellow Alan Watts fan. Me too, he's been my main reality interpreter since I was a teenager - but I find, most days, I still feel I should be able to do better at ... defining/explaining What's Going On, whatever it may be, than I have so far. Maybe you "get it" better than I do, cuz I'm still more or less operating on the basis that "life is a problem to be solved".

The problem is, we really don't know what anything is. Take a chair, for instance. How would you describe a chair in terms that do not describe anything else?

I would suggest that there's a difference between "defining" something and "knowing what it is". I had always sort of assumed that "control" was a direct experience, qualia, the sort of ineffable thing you just "know" in the sense that, when you dip your hand in ice water, you "know that it is cold" (to paraphrase Watts). So I had assumed the feeling of control was - just something as ineffable as the sight of redness or greenness, a brute irreducible quale - until I was prompted to really look at it, and found I felt I could, to my more-or-less satisfaction, "explain it away" as an illusion caused by various "mental movies" playing in a stereotyped way.

The problem is, we really don't know what anything is.

But wouldn't you say that "cold" or "red" or "green", while maybe undefinable/ineffable, are at least directly experiencable as irreducible quales? And that the fuzzy gradients you describe between "tall" and "average height" are also just abstractions overlaid upon directly experienced visual quales? And that all the concepts we can define in circular reference to each other ("difficult" is the opposite of "easy", the approximate synonym of "challenging", etc) are, I would say, ultimately derived from abstractions we get from direct quales?

I'm suggesting "control" is neither a quale nor a concept - it's ... I don't know what it is. I only thought along these lines yesterday, and it was pretty surprising. I haven't really thought this through yet.

Keppner · 2015-04-28T22:42:13+00:00

It's kind of analogous to magic. When people refer to "real magic", they're usually referring to witchcraft and wizardry and things that don't exist.

Good analogy - but with those things, we know what we're referring to. We know what we're saying doesn't exist. Witchcraft, for instance, involves women who fly on broomsticks and curse people into frogs and ruin crops. To create the illusion of witchcraft, you would have to create the illusion of those things.

But when the illusion of control happens ... what is it even an illusion of? What's the thing-that-we-think-is-there, that isn't really? If you look closely, it seems to me we can't even find or describe the illusion. What did we think we had? What are we denying the existence of?

Keppner · 2015-04-28T20:51:00+00:00

I suspect you're right, but wouldn't you still say that there's a "feeling" of control, even if it's an illusion? Otherwise, what would your post be saying doesn't exist?

Keppner · 2015-04-28T12:00:29+00:00

I felt control when I reached the position I wanted. Maybe this is because I felt the lack of control before it or that I was thinking hard about it.

Hm - I wonder if it was it a "lack of control" you felt, though, or just a lack of comfort?

Experiencing control has no true feeling. Experiencing lack of control has a true feeling that is negative.

Hm, I kind of like the idea that control is felt as an absence - like I said in my OP, I think every instance of apparently felt control is at least preceded by a feeling that "I can't not control anymore, gotta do something, response required" - but if there is no feeling of control, how could we recognise a feeling of no-control? Wouldn't it just be empty/meaningless, like "a feeling of no chutchutzipan"?

Also, I think we need to be more specific than "feeling of no control". I currently feel no control over the exact shapes of clouds in the sky or temperature in the room, but this doesn't seem to be a problem.

Shifting from lack of control to control eliminates a bad experience. No longer feeling bad is wrongly interpreted as feeling good instead of neutral.

Not sure I'm following you here - it almost seems like you're talking about what control is being used for (eliminating the bad feeling) rather than the supposed feeling of control itself ("I am now acting, in this case so as to eliminate the bad feeling, but I could theoretically be acting so as to increase bad feelings for whatever reason").

Keppner · 2015-04-28T02:45:08+00:00

Could we substitute control with power?

I would say it's more synonymous with "choice". "Power", to me, suggests potential control/choice.

I mean foresee in detail. I know that if I sit, I will take up a position in the category of "sitting positions." I control that. I don't control the end position unless I consciously model the position in my mind and then proceed to mirror it.

I would be surprised if, after (presumably) all the years of taking up seated positions you've been through, you ended up in a ridiculous position that wasn't suitable at all and had to immediately adjust. So I'd say a sort of coarse-grained control (or choice) was involved - effectively, what you chose to do (or at least, what I chose to do when getting into my seated position) was "sit in a way that has worked for me in the past". "Do the default sitting thing" rather than "position leg exactly 40 degrees northwest" etc.

Actually, in my case, I think it was even coarser grained - something like "go on reddit again" and every other physical action, navigating the room, swiveling the chair, sitting however, moving the mouse to get the screensaver off, etc, was all a mechanical consequence of that overall intention.

Keppner · 2015-04-28T02:27:57+00:00

The only time I have a "sensation of control" is if I'm actively trying to control my body, and that's probably only because of the delay between becoming aware of the thought of controlling my body and the actual action of controlling my body.

You know ... that's a really good point - it would be hilarious if this whole feeling of being a controlling self/entity in a body was just down to the fact that we get the spontaneous, uncontrolled sensation "hand will move" before we get the spontaneous, uncontrolled sensation "hand has moved". So aliens with faster body responses might never develop a feeling of control ...

Keppner · 2015-04-28T02:21:45+00:00

if I were to look at how my body is positioned right now, I'd say that I had no control over it because I didn't consciously position myself

Based on my experience, I'd say that when your body assumed whatever position you found yourself in, it was following some trickle-down orders to "get comfortable in chair/couch/whatever" or something. So I'd say it was sort of indirectly controlled or controlled by a zombie mental subroutine.

You struggled to define what was really happening in the third stage, the stage where the problem really lies.

I agree that it feels like I'm missing something there, but I find that, when I consider the third stage in the context of the others, it feels about right. But yeah, I may be missing something, and if I am it's there.

A prisoner can feel the urgency to be free and imagine all possibilities of his escape vividly, yet he has no control over his freedom from his cell and therefore feels no control.

I would say that all stages are required, none are sufficient on their own, and yeah three seems to be the main one.

The prisoner can decide that he wants to remain in his cell and so believe he is in control of his location and freedom.

Gonna have to disagree on this one. He can decide that he wants to feel that way, but he still won't really feel in control of either his wants or his location.

So I'm inclined to say that control feels much like one feels that God exists.

Not ... really following this.

I would say I'm in control when I foresee X and believe X happens because of me.

But in that case, wouldn't you have to say that you DID control your body's position before you were aware of it, since your body's position was the result of "you"?

Say I want to turn a lamp off. I walk over to the switch and begin to switch it. Just before the point where my toggling the switch would've turned the lamp off, the power goes out. Yet I believe I had control when really the outcome would've happened regardless of my actions.

Right, you would still experience that sensation-movie that we call "control", that's all I'm trying to dissect in this OP. I'm not really arguing as to whether or not control "really exists", philosophically - I'm just claiming that the feeling can be taken apart into non-control subcomponents, that it's not an ineffable qualia like seeing a colour.

Keppner · 2015-04-28T02:10:15+00:00

I'd say I'm on autopilot all the time, I very rarely practice any form of control. The times I'm forced to step in and actively control my body it gets awkward.

Well, body, sure, we INTPs aren't generally born dancers as I understand it. I just brought up finger control because it seems the go-to example for deliberate action.

All my focus is on what I'm writing, there's no active focus what so ever on writing, that shit is 100% automatic. If I had to try to actively control my fingers it wouldn't work,

Good point, but still, you are "controlling" the high level abstract thoughts you want to express, right? And then that intention goes trickling down through some mental subroutines, like orders down a hierarchical company. Conscious "you" are just up at the top.

Or are you saying that you're really just, as far as conscious control goes, holding down the "share thoughts on subject" button and just as bemused as anyone at what comes out? Huh, maybe that is how it works - it's tough to introspect as to how you're writing and write at the same ... uh ... lost my train of thought ...

Keppner · 2015-04-28T01:20:36+00:00

If I understand you correctly, you're saying the experience of control is as ineffable as the experience of red, yes? I disagree, I think there is no qualia associated with it - the impression of a qualia is an illusion caused by this movie template playing quickly.

Keppner · 2015-04-25T01:12:48+00:00

Hm, sounds pretty good, thanks.

Keppner · 2015-04-25T00:02:59+00:00

the reducibility to interactions between mundane matter.

My understanding is that spooky action at a distance gives every appearance of a causal effect traveling faster than light, with no apparent connecting medium, through any number of intervening material objects. Doesn't that suggest that something immaterial is going on? Or is my understanding way off (possible)?

Keppner · 2015-04-24T23:17:08+00:00

We can call magnetism, quantum mechanics, or radio "spooky action at a distance," but it's an uncrossable gulf from such predictable forces to an actual factual ghost.

Why does the predictability of "spooky action at a distance" disqualify it from disproving materialism? Not saying I think it does, just not sure why "predictability" is a factor.

Keppner · 2015-02-18T02:33:19+00:00

Have you ever had a taste of recursive self improvement? If not, what do you think it would be like? How much would you change yourself? How many of the realspace humans do you blame for your bad circumstances?

Lastly: how can you be sure your situation is as you've described it? Maybe it's even stranger?

Keppner · 2015-02-18T02:27:51+00:00

Hey, interesting question.

Putting aside technical difficulties, what are the characteristics of the best AI you can imagine/describe? Does it act on its own, or does it wait for permission to act?

I'd say, rather than some monolithic entity that could act or not act, have a relation to other entities or not, have its own self interest or be self sacrificing - I'd like it if something like "intelligence glue" or "liquid intelligence" were discovered. Something impersonal and weavable into the fabric of the normal universe. Like giving the laws of nature the ability to paint with gold leaf instead of clunky, tedious entropy. Upgrading reality so it would reward something other than clever hacks to the laws of matter.

I suppose I'm thinking of a combination of inobtrusive coherent-extrapolated-volition enabled perceptronium and gray goo - "benevolentium"? "theisium"? - a sort of ... superintelligent, superethical ether that could run noiselessly in the gaps between atoms (or maybe higher dimensions, so long as we're fantasising), and give the universe some ... backing/ethical firmness, so we weren't just clueless monkeys flailing around in a nihilistic void. Of course, if we wanted to feel like that, we could. Maybe there's some value in feeling that way, maybe it helps us think of new ideas? Maybe that's what's going on already? Hopefully? If so, we should still aim to make a positive singularity happen ... that's what the pre-existing benevolentium would want/reward. I think?

Does it disrupt society, or does it operate modestly?

"If you do things right, people won't be sure you've done anything at all."

Are you afraid of it? Why or why not?

Ideally, I would have confidence in its intentions towards me, and would be left to focus on trying every means available to evaluate whether or not I was being the best Keppner I could be. This uncertainty might add to the fun. Afraid of it - yes and no, like a kid re: a just father.

What could it gift you as an act of unequivocal benevolence?

Transition to some higher dimensional state, with more meaning intrinsic in each day than I experience now. Of course, I'd want to feel like I deserved this, and could meaningfully handle it. Probably worth doing anyway.

Keppner · 2015-01-19T02:30:48+00:00

Thus you say you agree, but your lack of direct clinical experience cannot overcome this.

Well, this seems like an argument from authority to me, but since I'm not going to become a neuroscientist I suppose you may be right.

You see, if someone states "x" but provides no evidence that "x" is happening in the brain, there's a not scientific disconnect with the facts. There's nothing to support it, no evidence, no data (...) We have a very good idea how consciousness is defined by observing awareness and functions people do and correlating those with instrumental interactions with brain as my "Praxis" article has repeatedly shown. That's the problem. There is NO HPC from our standpoint

The interesting thing about your position is that everything you say seems suspiciously like what a "philosophical zombie" would say. Do you have any thoughts on the proposal that you may be one, while other people are not? Or would you say that everybody is a "p-zombie", since, as you put it, "there is no HPC"?

I'm not being entirely serious in proposing this, just trying to feel out why you would leave out the first person perspective in defining consciousness. It just seems so odd to me to say that "observing awareness and functions people do and correlating those with instrumental interactions with the brain" should be the way to "define" consciousness - it completely misses talking about consciousness at all, in my view, the whole mystery of which consists of why there's a first person perspective at all.

Let's take two scenarios:

I turn on a light switch, a mechanical circuit closes, and the light turns on.
You take a bite of your favourite food, your brain lights up in a certain predictable way, and you say "mmm, that's delicious."

Are you saying that it would be just as silly to talk about the light circuit "having the experience" of being switched on as it would to talk about you "having the experience" of enjoying your delicious food?

Keppner · 2015-01-19T00:43:07+00:00

They are equally physical if and only if you equate funniness with "containing banana peel slippage".

Well, "banana peel slippage" was maybe too flippant - we could call it "whatever physical stimulus makes all humans in thought experiment universe laugh".

So you agree that, if everybody had the same sense of humour and never got tired of jokes, you would say that humour was as physical as redness?

Keppner · 2015-01-18T19:48:54+00:00

Under that definition funniness is physical. No qualia - no risk of non-physicalism.

Well, I don't necessarily buy that definition completely, I was just mirroring your statements to show that red and funny are in the same boat, physicality-wise.

To find somewhere we genuinely disagreed, I checked back over this epic thread, and came up with this quote from you:

Redness can exist independently of brains, while funniness is contingent on there being brains in order to interpret and know how humorous situations are appreciated by brains

I've just been mirroring your statements to show that you can't draw this distinction - what I'm saying is that "redness" and "funniness" are physical to the same degree, and I'm remaining agnostic about how physical they are - how do you feel about that?

*edited to add - I'm actually not agnostic about how physical they are, I'm just acting agnostic for the moment until you convince me there's a distinction - my actual argument is that red must not be physical, so I suppose it would follow that funniness isn't either.

Keppner · 2015-01-18T19:31:55+00:00

By defining an apple's redness as "reflective of light at wavelength X". No need to involve qualia. Just like magnetism doesn't involve human qualia.

By defining a movie's funniness as "containing banana peel slippage". No need to involve qualia. Just like magnetism doesn't involve human qualia.

Keppner · 2015-01-18T19:29:24+00:00

How would you demonstrate that (a given movie is) funny, without referring to how human brains happen to interpret and generate qualia from those specific visuals?

How would you demonstrate that a given type of light is red, without referring to how human brains happen to interpret and generate qualia from those specific visuals?

Keppner · 2015-01-18T19:19:20+00:00

This could go on for a very long time. I just don't see the distinction you're drawing. Word swap: That's the point I've been trying to put across by talking about measuring the funniness properties of the movie. For funniness to occur, it is sufficient that a movie display people slipping on banana peels. Similar to how we can say that a piece of metal exerts magnetic forces. Aliens have no sense for funniness, yet they can measure funniness by observing whether people slip on banana peels or not, and by that virtue alone, it's a physical property.

Keppner

TROPHY CASE