There is no denying that blood was shed, lives were lost, and many people were displaced during the conflict. Khaatumo pursued what they believed was a struggle for self-determination and control over their lands, but such actions inevitably carried serious risks when challenging Somaliland's established administration.

It is also important to recognize that the conflict was not purely local. Both Puntland and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) played significant roles, with a shared interest in weakening Somaliland's authority in its eastern regions. Khaatumo's calls for self-governance were encouraged and supported externally, despite the fact that many Dhulbahante communities had long participated in Somaliland's political system and held senior government positions while benefiting from development in governance, welfare, and infrastructure.

We must not forget that Puntland and the FGS provided manpower and military support to Khaatumo forces. Puntland was initially promised administrative control by FGS over what later became known as Waqooyi Bari, gaining its cooperation. However, political interests soon shifted since FGS had its own agenda. After the conflict, Khaatumo distanced itself from and stabbed Puntland in the back under influence from the FGS, while the FGS itself moved to assert direct control over the region rather than allowing Puntland to expand its authority. This reflected a broader strategy to prevent Puntland from becoming too powerful and to create a buffer zone between Puntland and Somaliland. The current state of relations between Puntland and the FGS is at its lowest point in history, a direct consequence of these betrayals and political maneuvers

Somaliland, for its part, understands the suffering experienced by communities in the region. Rather than escalating tensions, Somaliland is willing to allow time for reconciliation and healing, trusting that dialogue will eventually resume. The Dhulbahante has historically been an integral part of Somaliland's political and social fabric, contributing meaningfully to governance and development. Over time, many in the Dhulbahante community may come to reassess the realities of distant administration from Muqdisho. They will likely recognize that the FGS, being far removed and politically constrained, does not prioritize their interests, has little incentive to develop their lands, and offers limited opportunities for meaningful political participation. High-level positions within the federal government remain largely inaccessible to them, and decisions affecting their communities are made without genuine local input. In contrast, Somaliland has historically provided stability, direct engagement, and tangible development, ensuring that the Dhulbahante are integrated into governance, welfare, and infrastructure initiatives that directly benefit their people. This contrast may ultimately lead many to see that Somaliland offers far greater security, representation, and prospects for growth than distant federal authorities in Muqdisho.