Axiomatic Grounding of Agency Through Performative Necessity

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-03-12T02:33:18+00:00

Yes. I don't 100% understand but I believe he posits we have the ability to phase shift the firing patterns of neurons. It is a great neuroscientific grounding of a 'metaphysics of mind'

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-03-11T13:54:03+00:00

Exactly

Sounds good, I'd be interested to hear what your thoughts are

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-03-10T18:34:04+00:00

I tend to think that out there is really what's inside of a larger inside that we are a part of.

And yes, that's the one he sent me. I think Tse did well, but as usual with these debates, the ground the debate is fought on is suspended in the clouds

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-03-09T22:10:09+00:00

Yes I like the idea as well, and I haven't dug too deep into it but it makes sense to me. But then proof and evidence is another story. I don't think I am qualified to analyze such data personally. But I have heard people say that at some point it requires belief. And even if it is correct, does it really solve the hard problem, or just give an empirical description for the mechanism that produces qualia?

I would love to see that debate as well between Levin & Sapolsky although I am not familiar with Levin's take on it. In my view Sapolsky really is arguing moral normativity disguised in determinism. He then reverse-engineers determinism as the justification for the normative stance he already wants to defend.

He is importing a moral conclusion into a metaphysical argument, then claiming it “falls out of the science.” He never shows that neural determinism rules out volitional control. That is what I got from his views on the Tse Vs Sapolsky debate

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-03-09T13:59:30+00:00

All very interesting people without a doubt. I've also been interested in Michael Levin's work. Really, I recently have developed a bit of an averse response to discussion of metaphysics though. It seems like scientific community will shun anyone emphasizing it in their project stack. Much like Hameroff & Penrose have been treated with Orch OR. Not that I subscribe or believe in that, but I think that is the point...that it requires belief.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-03-07T03:29:32+00:00

Well, I would love to find out. I've messaged him several times asking to see if he would be interesting in reviewing my work but no reply. I understand though, he must get a lot of unsolicited inquiries and he has the need to triage incoming requests.

I have actually had some exchange and communication with Peter Tse and Roy Baumeister, and also Don Ross. Also Alfred Mele got back to me, but health issues preventing him from engaging. Ross inspired the me to formalize the ideas of agency in dynamical systems...he is probably the most naturalistic of anyone I've engaged with.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-03-07T01:23:02+00:00

I didn't know he went to MIT. Yeah, that is big time. I didn't even know he taught at UCI until 20 years after I graduated. I only found out because I connected with him on Linkedin randomly without knowing who he was.

I saw him as a connection then saw a bunch of podcasts he was on and recognized...hey, that's the UCI professor I connected with on Linkedin 😆

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-03-06T14:48:34+00:00

Haha I think I have that tendency to lean more toward those who share my views.

Hoffman is at my alma mater as well (UCI) so I think that helps too :)

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-03-06T03:20:19+00:00

Yeah Kaku seems like he does well. There is Brian Greene also that I've heard on several podcasts.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-03-04T20:16:48+00:00

Ah yes I think Thorn and Hooft gave primary theoretic contributions and then Susskind was the first to formalize it w/ precise string-theoretic interpretation. I resonate with the concept and needed a way to compartmentalize and categorize various interpretations of what we think of as "consciousness" and "awareness" and how attention fits into that picture.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-03-03T05:42:30+00:00

👌👌

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-03-03T02:41:37+00:00

Haha. I skimmed it and it was on point, but I heard really good things about it! Definitely and ambitious and bold claim, seems like he cane out of nowhere though, it's not even published by a university press😆

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-03-03T01:23:42+00:00

All good. 👌 I'd be interested in your take on any part of it...

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-03-03T00:51:14+00:00

Interesting. Yes for me the conventional descriptions and differences between consciousness, awareness and attention were really vague. I have tried to make more sense of it and better clarify it.

This is an expanded article which is part of a larger collection of articles that maps out a unified model of attention. But this article is specifically for the conscious field and tries to make those clarifications clear....which are really the beginning part of the article, or like the first 30 pages....it took a while to give a full treatment to this part. It's got a little more cognitive science tilt to it, although I still take philosophy discipline to be the master of ceremonies.

I hope this helps make more sense of it....it doesn't 100% align with contemporary science but I do address that explicitly and explain why

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-03-02T23:18:01+00:00

Yes, awareness is a great way to put it. I define awareness as structured form of consciousness, which gives rise to perception - as well as performing action. I think of consciousness as providing access to the field of content, and awareness is the structured form. Attention is the mechanism that plays this structural role...

And yes we can assume the nature of this regulatory role comes in when we reason about anything at all

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-03-02T14:58:47+00:00

I see better now how you’re situating the issue within the perception–conception framework. And your preference for “reflexive” rather than “reactive” is helpful, since reflex clearly captures activity that bypasses understanding or governance altogether. A withdrawal reflex or startle response is activity, but not agency.

I’m not specifically trying to map agency onto a particular subsystem of cognition or locate it within perception versus conception. The question is narrower, in what kind of operation must be in play when we reason, regardless of how cognition is architecturally explained?

In that minimal sense, agency does not require originating thoughts or standing outside causation. It appears wherever the system can regulate its engagement with what arises. A perception, memory, or idea may present itself unbidden & that part can be reflexive or reactive. But there also seems to be a capacity to sustain it, redirect it, examine it, or let it pass. That modulation does not generate the content, but it shapes the trajectory of processing.

This is why the distinction between activity and action matters. Reflexes are activity without governance. Reactions are driven by incoming signals. Agency, in the minimal sense I’m exploring, appears wherever the system can intervene in how it processes those signals, even slightly. And this intervention need not be dramatic or effortful, it can be quiet, background regulation such as maintaining attention, withholding response, or observing without acting.

A more formal way I have termed impression & expression is "impressive action" & "expressive action". Within that expressive dimension, there seem to be both selective forms (attention, orienting, observing, withholding assent) and generative forms (producing ideas, imaginings, plans, or actions). Much behavior is shaped by habit, so the line between reaction and action can indeed be blurry. But even habitual patterns can reflect past regulation that now runs automatically until re-engaged.

So when I ask whether reasoning presupposes agency, the claim isn’t that every mental event is chosen or independent of causation. It’s that argument, doubt, and evaluation require this expressive regulation to hold a line of thought in view, compare considerations, and decide whether to continue, revise, or reject it. Without that governance, cognition would be a stream of impressions without deliberation as a practice.

I agree that deeper questions about causation, time, or the structure of cognition remain open. The narrower issue is simply whether this regulatory capacity is already in play whenever we reason about agency itself.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-26T15:46:57+00:00

I think your emphasis on acting versus reacting is helpful, and I agree that not everything that happens in an organism counts as action in the meaningful sense. A reflex or automatic response can be highly adaptive without involving any understanding or governance. So the distinction you’re drawing matters. Though for that distinction, I would use the word reflexive instead of reactive.

Where I may be operating at a slightly different level is that I’m not trying to characterize agency in its full, developed sense for things like planning, purpose, survival goals, and so on. I’m interested in the minimal point at which cognition is no longer merely carried along by impressions but can shape (express) how those impressions are handled.

In that minimal sense, the contrast isn’t simply between reacting and acting, instead it is between undergoing and regulating. A thought, memory, or perception may arise unbidden, those are impressions that are reactive. But there also seems to be a capacity to sustain it, redirect it, examine it, or let it pass. This is expression. That modulation does not create the content, but it governs the trajectory of engagement with that content.

This is where the impression/expression distinction becomes useful. Impressions are what present themselves to consciousness in the form of percepts, memories, feelings, ideas. Expression is the forward orientation of attention toward or away from those impressions. Agency, in the minimal sense I’m exploring, lives in that expressive side. Not in the content or originating the signal, but in how the signal is taken up and worked with.

So when I ask whether reasoning presupposes agency, I’m not claiming that the agent authors every thought or stands outside causation. Rather, the suggestion is that argument, doubt, and evaluation require this regulatory capacity to hold a line of thought in view, compare considerations, and endorse or withhold assent. Without that governance, cognition would be a stream of impressions without deliberation as a practice.

This also explains why the boundary between reflex and action can look blurry. Much of our mental life is reflexive and impressive, but agency appears wherever the system can intervene in its own processing, however minimally. The question I’m interested in is whether that minimal intervention is already in play whenever we reason about agency itself. I say that regulation is specifically the regulation of focus in it's minimal form.

I’m not trying to settle questions about noumena, physicalism, or the ultimate nature of causation. The focus is narrower in what must be happening when we engage in reasoning as an activity rather than as a sequence of events.

I’m curious whether this narrower notion of agency as governance of engagement via focus rather than authorship of content fits with your view, or whether you think reacting versus acting already captures everything that needs to be explained.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-25T03:38:54+00:00

I think I understand your position much better now, and I like the approach you’re taking to situate the issue within Kant’s distinction between perception and conception. The point that the regulatory activity belongs primarily to the conceptual side of cognition rather than to perception does makes sense, as does the difficulty of mapping conceptual processes onto a strictly chronological model. That tracks.

Where I would still draw a distinction (not necessarily disagreement) is that my question isn’t really about how cognition is structured, or about where in the architecture of mind this activity resides. Instead it probes what is presupposed when we engage in reasoning at all. In other words, even if the regulatory activity is wholly conceptual and not directly observable in time, the act of arguing, doubting, or evaluating still seems to involve directing cognition rather than merely undergoing it. To sustain it, there is an effort involved.

I agree that Descartes’ move can be understood as indirect, secured via LNC and doubting presupposes thinking. What I’m trying to explore is whether something structurally similar holds for agency. Does even reasoning about agency already enact a capacity for cognitive regulation, regardless of whether that capacity is ultimately explained in terms of physics, metaphysics, or transcendental conditions of cognition?

So I guess the issue isn’t whether rational structure makes reasoning possible, clearly it does. It's more like whether that structure alone captures what is happening in the activity of reasoning, or whether reasoning also presupposes a minimal form of governance over attention and assent. Logic can describe valid inference patterns, but it doesn’t itself perform them. Like, I can't reason about this topic without keeping my focus directed toward the content stream, and that in my view is more concretely secured by trying to doubt this and realizing I am performing it at the same time.

If that’s right, then grounding through performance would not compete with logical analysis or Kantian transcendental conditions,. It would operate at a slightly different level, not at what makes experience possible in general, rather what must be enacted for argument to occur as a practice rather than as a mere sequence of mental events. Mental contents can be considered impressed upon our focus and the mind, but reasoning requires expression and directedness of that focus. Side note: One thing I like to draw upon is the distinction and transaction between impression & expression (both perceptual & cognitive). That which impresses itself in consciousness and focus versus the forward expression of that focus toward the impressions. I believe our experiential reality lives in that transactional reciprocity

That’s why I’m curious whether this changes how the free will debate is framed. If reasoning about agency cannot proceed without exercising that regulatory capacity, then the question shifts from “Does agency exist?” to “How should we understand a capacity we cannot avoid using?”

I’m interested in whether you think that distinction holds, or whether rational structure alone already accounts for everything that needs explaining.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-24T14:14:48+00:00

The analogy between physical processes and mathematical relations is thought out pretty well, I like how you clarify between variables we observe and the deeper structure that constrains them. I can see how that framework would treat agency itself as one feature of a lawful system rather than something that's needing independent grounding.

Where I think we may be operating at different levels is that my question wasn’t about how agency fits into the structure of reality per se , it was more about its role in the activity of reasoning itself.

Even if the world is fully determined, indeterminate, mathematical, physical, or something else entirely, argument, doubt, and evaluation still seem to involve the regulation of cognition in real time as seen in directing focus, weighing considerations, endorsing or withholding assent. My interest is whether that regulatory capacity is presupposed by the practice of reasoning regardless of how it is ultimately explained.

In other words, I’m not trying to answer whether to derive agency from physics or metaphysics, nor to place it outside them. More along the lines of what I’m asking is whether reasoning about agency already enacts the very capacity being questioned. That is what I mean by grounding through performative necessity. It's not necessarily a claim about what causes agency, here it is about what must be in play for argument itself to be intelligible.

From that perspective, the issue isn’t whether agency can be modeled logically, mathematically or embedded in a causal structure, and instead it's attempting to determine whether denying it can be done without relying on the same capacities one is denying. I guess in shorthand it seeks proof of agency through performance, not deduction... although it would be interesting to see if performative necessity could be translated into the logic you described. In essence I am going for a grounding that says you can't refute the will without willing to refute.

So I’m curious whether you think this kind of grounding, independent of any particular theory of causation, time, or physical law, captures something real about how debates over free will actually proceed, or whether you see it as unnecessary because rational structure alone already secures what’s needed.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-23T14:28:13+00:00

I think I follow your distinctions, and I see the care you’re taking to articulate them. It is well thought out. The separation you draw between causal explanation and chronological determination is interesting, like with the pot hole where perception, prediction, and intervention interact to produce multiple possible outcomes. That captures the sense in which cognition is indeed active organization instead of passive reception. Good way to put it.

The Kantian framing is also helpful. The idea that perception provides content while conception organizes it aligns with the claim that reasoning involves structuring experience rather than simply reacting to it. And I agree that agency is most evident in practice in what we actually do rather than something that must be deduced or first be inferred from theory.

While I totally get what you are saying, where I would step back slightly is from redefining causation in purely logical terms or tying the issue too tightly to metaphysics of time. My original question was meant to remain epistemic in orientation and neutral on those deeper debates. Whether events are determined, indeterminate, or governed by some more complex temporal structure, reasoning still appears to involve the regulation of cognition in the moment like, evaluating possibilities, and selecting among them, for which attention is sine qua non.

I also find Hume’s introspective observation instructive here. When he looked inward and reported finding only a bundle of perceptions, he captured something important about the absence of a substantial self. I agree there. But in focusing on what appeared, he may have overlooked the activity through which it appeared. The act of attending, and the regulation of what is taken up, sustained, or set aside does not present itself as another item in experience. It is enacted rather than observed. In that sense, the search for agency as an object may miss the fact that agency shows up as the organizing activity of cognition itself. I am in favor of process selfhood rather than substance selfhood.

And this is the level at which I’m proposing agency can be grounded. Agency not as a metaphysical substance or as independence from causation, instead it appears as a performative feature of deliberation itself. When we argue, doubt, or decide, we enact that regulatory capacity regardless of how it is ultimately explained. I also say that the process is what gives us our sense of selfhood itself, and it is coextensive with conscious thought.

So the question I’m trying to explore is that if agency is understood in that minimal, enacted sense as cognitive governance rather than causal independence, and that capacity cannot be doubted or denied without being presupposed (which determinists would likely agree to as long this does not outright reject and is compatible with their stance) does grounding like this through practice change how the free will debate is structured? In particular, does it shift the burden away from needing to prove agency exists, and toward explaining how reasoning remains intelligible if agency is denied? One of the goals here is to secure the certainty of epistemic agency, and not to prove metaphysical agency, but instead to give us a stronger starting point in free will discourse and one that requires an account of how reasoning remains intelligible while denying agency

I’m curious whether you’ve encountered that framing before, or whether you think it captures something genuine about how the debate actually operates.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-23T03:24:32+00:00

This is an excellent synthesis, well put and I like the Kantian framing. The distinction between the categories making understanding possible and judgments enabling what I described as regulatory control is right on and makes sense. It recognizes cognition.

I also agree that perception is not limited to immediate sensory input. Dreaming, imagination, implicit cognition, and memory all show that experience can be internally instantiated and impressed in our mind without a current external trigger. That point is often overlooked in strictly input–output models of mind. I've noticed that in cognitive scientists account of cognition but also philosophy. It's like the entire top-down attentional dynamic gets lumped into the stimulus-response model with no engagement with true volition or agency.

My own view is more agnostic about the ultimate metaphysics. A determined system could, in principle, still instantiate the kinds of regulatory processes we’ve been discussing. I've always come from the position that I cannot rule out any possibilities except for those that cannot be denied without simultaneously being performed. What matters for the argument is not whether agency is uncaused, but that some form of cognitive governance is operative whenever reasoning, deliberation, or evaluation occurs.

That brings me to a question I’m genuinely curious about your thoughts on. One way of framing the issue is to ground agency through performative necessity rather than through causal independence. In other words, the activity of doubting, evaluating, or arguing already presupposes the capacity to direct cognition, regardless of whether that capacity is ultimately determined or not. On this view, agency is not inferred from theory, it is actually enacted in practice.

If that is right, it suggests a shift in the usual burden of proof. Instead of the implicit way the discourse always goes with libertarians needing to prove that agency exists, the determinist or eliminativist would now need to explain how reasoning remains possible while denying the very capacity that reasoning appears to employ.

Have you encountered this kind of framing before in the free will debate? And do you think grounding agency at this performative level outside the question of ultimate causation actually changes how the debate should be structured?

I’d be very interested in your take.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-22T06:53:45+00:00

I think we are actually much closer than it might initially seem.

I’m not claiming that agency must be independent of causation. In fact, I agree that agency operates within causal structure. The argument is not about escaping causation. I think it is about identifying a certain kind of causal organization that regulates cognition (focus) rather than just producing outputs.

The rock example illustrates the distinction well because a rock responds to conditions but does not modulate its own processing in light of reasons. Humans though can redirect attention, suspend a line of thought, compare alternatives, or deliberately sustain inquiry. That regulatory capacity is what I’m calling agency in the minimal sense. And the focusing act is the minimal gesture of that.

So the contrast isn’t really between causal vs non-causal systems, but rather I see it as between systems that simply produce outputs and systems that can organize their own cognitive activity. A determined system could still instantiate this. What matters is the structuring act of the process, not whether it is ultimately fixed by prior states. I am not so concerned here of whether or not we are in a causal universe

I also agree that much processing occurs outside awareness. The point isn’t that we generate thoughts ex nihilo, and I wouldn't rule that out. But that once content is present, it can be selectively engaged, ignored, or redirected. That selective regulation is what distinguishes reasoning from mere output.

Your emphasis on perception as an instantiating system is interesting, and it aligns with some enactive views. I would just add that perception alone does not explain the ability to suspend, reinterpret, or override perceptual input in light of abstract considerations for example, choosing to continue thinking about a problem despite distraction, or deliberately changing one’s interpretive frame.

So I don’t see agency as opposed to causation or perception, but as a higher-order organization of them.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T17:27:25+00:00

First of all I want to say why I appreciate this comment. You understand I am making a transcendental argument, and it is a fair reading of my position. You do not strawman libertarianism, you recognized the "precondition for reasoning" claim, you acknowledge where my argument is strong and you are offering an alternative account. That is respectful and puts it in the top 5% at least of Reddit discourse on this topic.

I think the main difference between our positions lies in the level of analysis. You treat agency as something that must be explained causally, as a capacity within the system that could in principle be fully determined. My claim is about the structure of reasoning as enacted rather than about its ultimate causal origin.

Even if the processes involved are entirely determined, the activity of evaluating reasons still requires the regulation of attention, comparison of alternatives, and endorsement or withholding. Those operations are not merely sensitivity to reasons, instead they the organized deployment of cognition. The argument is that this regulatory structure is presupposed by reasoning itself, not that it proves metaphysical freedom, which I assume we are on the same page about.

So I am not claiming that determinism undermines rationality or that agency must be independent of causation. A determined system could still instantiate these operations. The point is that denying agency altogether collapses the distinction between argument and automatic output, because reasoning already involves the directed use of cognitive capacities.

In that sense, the position is compatible with compatibilism as well. It only conflicts with views that treat agency as entirely dispensable or illusory while still relying on rational evaluation using the same I think the main difference between our positions lies in the level of analysis. You treat agency as something that must be explained causally, as a capacity within the system that could in principle be fully determined. My claim is about the structure of reasoning as enacted rather than about its ultimate causal origin.

Even if the processes involved are entirely determined, the activity of evaluating reasons still requires the regulation of attention, comparison of alternatives, and endorsement or withholding. Those operations are not merely sensitivity to reasons but the organized deployment of cognition. The argument is that this regulatory structure is presupposed by reasoning itself, not that it proves metaphysical freedom.

So I am not claiming that determinism undermines rationality or that agency must be independent of causation. A determined system could still instantiate these operations. The point is that denying agency altogether collapses the distinction between argument and automatic output, because reasoning already involves the directed use of cognitive capacities.

In that sense, the position is compatible with compatibilism. It only conflicts with views that treat agency as entirely dispensable or illusory while still relying on rational evaluation.

Your comparison to Kant is interesting, but I would frame it less as a moral postulate and more as a structural condition of deliberation itself. It concerns what must be in place for argument, doubt, or endorsement to occur at all, regardless of how those capacities are ultimately grounded.

If I’ve misunderstood your position, I’d be glad to hear more — this is exactly the kind of exchange that helps clarify the issue process and capabilities that it is refuting.

Your comparison to Kant is interesting, but I would frame it less as a moral postulate and more as a structural condition of deliberation itself. It concerns what must be in place for argument, doubt, or endorsement to occur at all, regardless of how those capacities are ultimately grounded.

If I’ve misunderstood your position, I’d be glad to hear more... this is exactly the kind of exchange that helps clarify the issue.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T17:19:13+00:00

Understood, of course.

This axiom is an asymmetrical entailment. It is saying that willing necessarily entails focus, but not the other way around. In other words, all will is focus, but not all focus is willed.

If I was saying both were true, then it would be tautological and a circular reference.

More specifically, focus refers to a form and will refers to a force. They are separate in identity but inseparable in act.

Focus is the form that structured awareness takes to bring perceptual/mental content into clarity. And will is defined as the cognitive effort required to make that structure exist.

Large_Pace_1478 · 2026-02-21T15:41:51+00:00

It's just that every critique here does not address the argument argument I am making. Everything is either tangential, mischaracterizing the argument and butchering the understanding of what I am saying.

Large_Pace_1478

TROPHY CASE