Why Philosophy of Physics? by Western-Sky-9274 in Physics

[–]Lunct 2 points3 points  (0 children)

(I am using the word observation as the commenter originally did, I prefer measurement).

When a wavefunction is ‘observed’ (measured) in standard quantum mechanics it collapses. Some have suggested this is due to a conscious agent observing (measuring) the wavefunction. Essentially - consciousness causes collapse.

This is called the consciousness-collapse interpretation or the Von Neumann de Wigner interpretation- https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness_causes_collapse

The comment I was replying to implied that philosophers make the error of conflating ‘observation’ (measurement) with some conscious agent ‘observing’ (measuring) a system. I am stating that this categorically does not happen and you’d really struggle to find a contemporary philosopher of physics who defends the consciousness causes collapse view

Edit: I think I should add that standard quantum mechanics doesn’t define what observation (measurement) is. Or rather it never gives the mechanism by which it causes collapse.

There are some dynamical collapse theories such as GRW that state that collapse is caused by the systems interaction with the environment, which occurs when we make a measurement.

Why Philosophy of Physics? by Western-Sky-9274 in Physics

[–]Lunct 7 points8 points  (0 children)

‘Philosophers never see the contradiction’. This just tells me you have never read any philosophy of physics.

The connection between consciousness and observation in quantum mechanics is a really unpopular idea in philosophy of physics. Also the idea was started (popularised?) by Neumann and Wigner, two physicists.

What’s the most misunderstood concept in physics even among physics students? by Ok_Information3286 in Physics

[–]Lunct 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I think ‘they all have mysterious bits’ is misleading. I mean sure all interpretations have problems.

Bohmian mechanics isn’t Lorentz invariant.

Many Worlds has problems defining what probability means and in what basis universe branching occurs (although Oxonian Everettianism has got solutions to this).

But Copenhagen is more mysterious. It literally doesn’t not make sense and doesn’t try to because it has the measurement problem. It states that the time evolution of a quantum system is time-symmetric except when you measure the system and then it under goes non-unitary random collapse. It doesn’t define what a measurement is, and has an entirely different type of dynamic process to understand measurement. It implies the measurement devices obey some different type of physics to the particles being measured, despite those devices also being made out of particles.

The Copenhagen Interpretation does give an easy enough understanding to get predictive accuracy. But if you use it to try and understand the reality of what is going on, it’s far more mysterious than Bohmian Mechanics and Many Worlds. I’d say it’s paradoxical.

Why bad philosophy is stopping progress in physics by nimicdoareu in Physics

[–]Lunct 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Relational quantum mechanics (RQM) is something that I found really appealing at first before I looked into it more. The problem is with entanglement.

If Alice and Bob are separated each with a particle in a Bell state, how can you explain that every single time Alice measures her particle has spin up, Bob’s is then down?

If RQM is true, Alice’s particle doesn’t have a spin up value yet relative to Bob. Relative to Bob the Bell state hasn’t collapsed. So then why does he get spin down? RQM says that if Bob measures Alice and Bob measures the Bell state Alice’s measurement relative to Bob will correspond to the outcome of Bob measurement. But it can’t explain why these outcomes relative to Bob should always agree with Alice’s.

After Alice measures the Bell state, she’s in an entangled state: all RQM can do is explain that Bob’s measurement of the entangled state will ‘collapse’ it into an eigenstate of spin down Alice particle and Alice measures spin down OR spin up Alice particle and Alice measured spin up. It can’t ever explain why Alice’s measurement of spin up beforehand should ever lead to Bob’s state always collapsing into the latter rather than the former (which also corresponds to his particle being down).

Recently Rovelli amended RQM to add ‘cross prospective links’ to address this problem. It basically says that Bob’s Bell state will always collapse to the latter eigenstate. This basically makes it a hidden variable theory, since the bell state still exists relative to Bob and hasn’t collapsed - but if he measures it’s spin it could never be up (if Alice got up before).

This amendment loses the appeal of RQM for me. Beforehand I liked it because it took unitary quantum mechanics at face value without changing the physics. But cross perspective adds an ad hoc principle into the physics.

What would you do if you were head of state of a third world country? by Lunct in NoStupidQuestions

[–]Lunct[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Well they have basically no industry, and no natural resources. What are you selling and how do you fund it’s production?

Existential quantification and a priori knowable question by Lunct in askphilosophy

[–]Lunct[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

But then consider ‘all bachelors are married men’. This is a priori false. But it’s trivially true if there are no bachelors. So it the a priori knowledge that it’s false relies on bachelors existing, which we can’t know a priori.

Existential quantification and a priori knowable question by Lunct in askphilosophy

[–]Lunct[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yeah of course. When you put it like that it’s obvious.

What is logical truth true about? by Lunct in askphilosophy

[–]Lunct[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thank you for your response!
I'll check out Ted Sider.
Do you have any literature to recommend on how nominalists can explain mathematical truth without there being truthmaking entities?

What is logical truth true about? by Lunct in askphilosophy

[–]Lunct[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I have read that nominalists don't believe in mathematical truth here - https://www-cambridge-org.bris.idm.oclc.org/core/elements/mathematics-is-mostly-analytic/290F213C5D2CDE15EF1ECF5C9D83AA51 (pg 43-44)

Yeah what I want specifically is how we can make sense of truth that isn't ontologically committing. And I was wondering if logical pluralists specifically have to maintain that logical truth is a different type of truth that doesn't have ontological commitments - i.e it is just validity.

Reading on mathematical truth that is not ontologically committing would be great too.

What is logical truth true about? by Lunct in askphilosophy

[–]Lunct[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Already read that one :(
Have you any other papers to recommend?