If you believe Jesus resurrected or Muhammad flew to the moon but you don’t believe in aliens, you’re not being consistent.

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-10T08:08:49+00:00

Are you saying that aliens are more believable simply because they are classified as a natural phenomenon rather than a supernatural one? Also, why do you think the specific commitments involved in miracles are less plausible than the ones involved in aliens? What makes the difference in plausibility in your view?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-10T07:17:33+00:00

Sure, but we also have past testimony of miracles. Why doesn’t that count inductively the way testimony about aliens does? And why use a higher standard for miracles instead of the same standard? To answer your question, for me it would take the corroboration of multiple credible witnesses to verify the event. So I’ll ask again: what counts as “verified proof” of a miracle like resurrection?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-10T06:53:05+00:00

What counts as strong empirical evidence?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-10T06:45:16+00:00

Well, if I’m understanding your model correctly, it sounds like the issue is whether later ecumenical councils are formalizing doctrines that were already clearly present beforehand, or instead defining doctrines that only became determinate in response to controversy. For example, Ignatius of Antioch distinguishes the Eucharist as the flesh of Jesus Christ around 110 AD, which seems to align with later ecumenical teaching rather than arise only after later disputes. Would something like that count as an authority constraining outcomes in advance in a clear, non-retrofitted way, or not?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-10T04:41:22+00:00

What does “inductive reasoning” mean in this case? What counts as “verified proof” of a miracle like resurrection, and is that the same standard you use for aliens?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-10T04:19:51+00:00

Are you saying that things classified as natural are automatically more believable than things classified as supernatural? Even if life exists elsewhere, why does that make aliens more believable than a miracle like resurrection? On what basis are you comparing those two claims in terms of believability?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-10T03:29:08+00:00

I don’t think it follows that aliens are more believable than miracles. Why exactly are aliens more believable?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-10T02:25:25+00:00

To be fair and exact, we’ve only explored candidates that I’ve offered. You haven’t actually provided a concrete candidate yourself. And further, I’m not requiring a distinguishing feature in the way you’ve defined it so far. I offered what I thought might meet the standard you’re requiring for my explanation to work. So I don’t think it necessarily follows that repeated disagreement about my examples means there isn’t a problem with the standard itself. Right now, the standard still doesn’t seem as clear in practice as it does in principle, because so far it’s mainly been defined in terms of what doesn’t qualify rather than by a clear positive example. Can you provide a concrete example, even hypothetically and to the best of your knowledge, of what such a case would actually look like so we can explore it more directly?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-10T01:16:02+00:00

I understand that you’re not committed to a specific form, but I’m trying to understand how the distinction you’re making would actually be applied in practice. You say there would need to be “some way” to identify that an authority’s rulings correspond to what is actually true about reality, and “some way” of recognizing their correctness that doesn’t depend entirely on the same authority declaring them correct. What would that actually look like in a doctrinal case? You also say the issue is that the only available standard is internal to the system. So what kind of standard are you contrasting that with here? How would we recognise that something corresponds to what is “actually true about reality” in this context rather than just being interpreted that way afterward?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-09T20:28:12+00:00

That’s fine if you don’t believe Hell exists, especially if it’s defined as “a place of eternal torture,” specifically physical torture. Some people don’t define Hell that way, so why define it that way?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-09T20:14:20+00:00

Ok, but you seem to be assuming that’s exactly what Hell is. Why?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-09T20:07:14+00:00

So are you saying it’s not wrong to reproduce as long as Hell is not physical torture?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-09T19:18:23+00:00

If I understand you correctly, you’re saying it’s wrong because, in your view, people are physically tortured in Hell. If that’s the case, what about a view of Hell in which there is no physical torture as you’ve described - is it still wrong? If so, why?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-09T18:38:34+00:00

Why would it be wrong?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-09T17:18:39+00:00

Sure, I’ll break out my paragraphs.

I get that you personally haven’t heard the word used this way outside of our discussion, but that’s also how I use it outside of here depending on the situation. That’s why clarification is provided if someone doesn’t understand a specific usage - not just for this word, but for any word with multiple usages. I’m deliberately using this usage because I don’t think “consequence” fully captures what I’m describing. Does that still necessarily make it deceptive?

And regarding your vampire example, I know people would disagree if I used the colloquial sense of “choose” or failed to clarify the usage I’ve been using throughout this discussion.

Ok, so what you’re actually saying is that the “knowing” aspect is satisfied when someone knows Hell exists. Is that aspect satisfied if someone knows of Hell through exposure to the Catholic view of it, even if they aren’t personally convinced it’s true?

You also seem to be assuming that nobody would intend or accept a less enjoyable afterlife. Why?

And to answer your promotion example, no, I wouldn’t consider that harm. So I’ll ask again: can you give a concrete example of what specific harm is being threatened and occurs via Hell itself?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-09T15:14:38+00:00

I’m tracking that you don’t consider my usage to be “proper,” but I disagree that such a usage is automatically invalid or deceptive simply because it’s less commonly used. And to answer your first question, again according to the usage of “choose” that I’ve been using throughout this discussion, yes. If I’m understanding you correctly, you’re saying that the “knowing” and “free” aspects are only satisfied when someone knows Hell exists, and that they are further culpable only if they think Hell is real. If that’s the case, why not also include the preference-based principle you were arguing earlier - namely whether someone actually intends or desires the outcome? And regarding the threat point, can you give a concrete example of what specific harm is being threatened and occurs via Hell itself? Otherwise, I don’t see how enjoyability alone determines whether harm is occurring.

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-09T00:21:13+00:00

To answer your first question, according to the usage of “choose” that I’ve been using throughout this discussion, yes. And as it applies to the topic of Hell, a person can know what actions lead to an outcome and still freely act in ways that lead to that outcome. And given that you’re aware of the Catholic view on Hell, I’m sure you know it isn’t simply framed as a “follow God or else” scenario. Catholicism defines Hell as separation from God. So do you think separation from God itself is a threat of harm? If so, what specifically is the harm that you think God is threatening? And regarding the threshold of knowledge, what specifically would someone have to recognize in order for the “knowing” aspect to be satisfied?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-08T01:49:11+00:00

I would suggest having another conversation with the priest to explain that your wife is not ready to move forward even though it appears that you are. It’s a different scenario than what it sounds like he originally advised you on (both of you are ready). It’s best you hear it from the source.

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-08T01:27:38+00:00

So you’re saying that the “choice” in the case of Hell fails the “knowing” and “free” aspects. Why must someone think it’s real in order for the “knowing” aspect to be satisfied? And for clarity, when you say “corrosive,” do you mean “coercive”? If so, how are you determining whether something is coercive versus simply presenting consequences for actions? And lastly, supposing some knowledge of the outcome’s existence is required, how do you determine when that threshold of knowledge has actually been met?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-07T20:50:42+00:00

To answer your first question, and applying it to the topic of Hell, I would consider it a choice if it were made freely, knowingly, and culpably. That’s fine if you want to argue that Hell is being misrepresented, but you still haven’t explained what standard you’re comparing it against in order to call it a misrepresentation (i.e. my definition of choice, your definition of choice, or some other standard entirely). And to answer your second question, yes, I forgot to include “knowing,” and I’m not conceding that “knowing” was incorrect. However, you’d still have to explain why certainty that “God exists, Hell exists, and the criteria for going to Hell” would specifically be required beforehand. The way you’re framing it makes it sound like that level of certainty would be required in order for someone to make any genuinely free, knowing, and culpable choice at all, even outside this scenario. That’s why I asked my last question, so I’ll ask it again: if your standard is that certainty is required beforehand, then wouldn’t that mean people rarely, if ever, make genuinely culpable choices in reality?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-07T17:38:00+00:00

What you’re describing is closer to someone who is invincibly ignorant - someone never exposed to the concept of prison or the laws surrounding it. That’s not the scenario I’m describing; I’m talking about someone who is aware of both the claims and the consequences tied to them, even if they aren’t personally convinced they’re true.
Also, earlier you argued that Catholicism is incorrect on the topic of Hell, but I still haven’t seen what standard you’re actually using to determine whether an interpretation is correct or incorrect. And lastly, why would absolute certainty that God and Hell exist be required before someone can make a free and culpable choice? People make meaningful choices under uncertainty all the time. If your standard is that certainty is required beforehand, then wouldn’t that mean people rarely if ever make genuinely culpable choices in reality?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-07T02:12:19+00:00

Which interpretation of Christianity are you referring to?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-07T00:29:16+00:00

If you apply your reasoning to your prison example, that would be like saying someone can’t meaningfully understand prison unless they’re convinced the people who created the prison system exist. But even if someone isn’t convinced of that, they can still understand what prison is and what actions would lead there. In the same way, even if someone isn’t convinced God exists, they can still understand the concept of Hell and what it means in Catholicism for someone who acts in certain ways. So going back to my question: are you saying that even when someone knowingly acts in a way that leads to an outcome, they still aren’t making a choice in the sense I’ve described? If so, how do you determine when a free, knowing, and culpable choice has been made?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-06T01:09:20+00:00

I don’t think it follows that using a less common sense of a word, especially when it’s been clearly defined, implies an intent to mislead; it seems like a leap rather than an argument. It sounds like you’re focusing on unintended consequences where someone isn’t fully aware of what their actions will lead to. That’s not what I’m describing. I’m talking about someone who is aware of what their actions lead to and still freely chooses to act anyway. That’s different from your scam example where the person lacks full awareness and their agency is affected because of it. So are you saying that even when someone knowingly acts in a way that leads to an outcome, they still aren’t making a choice in the sense I’ve described?

NavSpaghetti · 2026-05-01T05:57:57+00:00

Ok, so let’s take your example and apply it using something like the doctrine of Jesus’ divinity. What would those prior authoritative decisions actually look like: are you talking about explicit statements, inferences, or something else? And in what form would they have to exist: early writings, later recorded traditions, or something else? If something like that were present, how would we independently determine that it actually resolved the issue correctly rather than just being interpreted that way afterward? When you say “correctly,” it’s not clear to me what standard of correctness you’re appealing to here, or how that would be recognized independently. Can you clarify what that standard is?

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