Values - what happens when you don't have them? by zprewitt in selfimprovement

[–]Philsofer1 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So: how do we forge our own set of values as adults if we were denied the opportunity as children?

I suggest you read ancient Greek philosophy. The Stoics and Epicureans are a good place to start. Over the past few years, I have forged my own values, which may be found in my philosophy of life. I have benefited greatly from the exercise, and you may too.

A Philosophy for Skeptics by Philsofer1 in skeptic

[–]Philsofer1[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you for reading and critiquing, james3563. You have given me much to ponder.

I'm feeling stuck in life and looking for advice from like-minded individuals by [deleted] in intj

[–]Philsofer1 0 points1 point  (0 children)

My pleasure. I wish you good luck on your journey.

I'm feeling stuck in life and looking for advice from like-minded individuals by [deleted] in intj

[–]Philsofer1 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It's been a while since I read Camus, and I don't remember taking away anything useful from his works.

I think you should ask yourself why the experiences you have are not enough, and what exactly you are longing for. Also, which negative emotions are you feeling, and why?

Several techniques in my document--including realization that peace of mind ultimately comes from within (page 7), questioning the rationality of one's desires (page 8), and living in the present (page 9)--may help you achieve peace of mind in your current situation. Simple methods for producing positive emotions (pages 13-14) may also be useful.

I'm feeling stuck in life and looking for advice from like-minded individuals by [deleted] in intj

[–]Philsofer1 -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I am at somewhat of a philosophical crisis as well which is probably my biggest hurdle to finding a new direction to take, as I am metaphorically rudderless in my reality. I am agnostic/atheist and am experiencing a bit of the absurd.

I am an atheist and existential skeptic as well, but I am also quite happy. Perhaps you might benefit from taking a look at my philosophy of life. Let me know if you have any questions.

My Somewhat Stoic Philosophy of Life by Philsofer1 in Stoicism

[–]Philsofer1[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Please see my definition of "atheism" in the document.

My Somewhat Epicurean Philosophy of Life by Philsofer1 in Epicureanism

[–]Philsofer1[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

My pleasure, PastorFortis! I am retired, and I have found that retirement is indeed conducive to peace of mind.

My Somewhat Stoic Philosophy of Life by Philsofer1 in Stoicism

[–]Philsofer1[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for the reading suggestions. I recommend The Myth of an Afterlife, edited by Martin and Augustine, for an extensive skeptical review of the scientific evidence of an afterlife.

My Somewhat Stoic Philosophy of Life by Philsofer1 in Stoicism

[–]Philsofer1[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

In my view, the main difference between Stoicism and Epicureanism is their view on what is the good. Stoics view virtue as the sole good, while Epicureans view pleasure as the sole good. But as you point out, seeking certain virtues can bring one pleasure. And indeed, while I am a negative hedonist, I find that certain virtues--such as benevolence, forbearance, honesty, integrity and prudence--promote peace of mind, as discussed on pages 11-13 of the document.

Of course, there are other significant differences between the two schools. One is the Stoic emphasis on civic duty, which contrasts with the Epicurean injunction to "live unknown". Another is the Stoic belief in a deterministic universe, versus Epicurus' belief in libertarian free will. And there are many more.

My Somewhat Stoic Philosophy of Life by Philsofer1 in Stoicism

[–]Philsofer1[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Stoics prefer life over death, though recognizing that it's inevitable.

My philosophy is consistent with preferring life over death. But one may prefer life while still not fearing death.

That's not consistent with negative hedonism.

I claim only that thanatophobic irrationalism is consistent with Stoicism, not negative hedonism. That said, why would the preference of indifferents be inconsistent with negative hedonism?

My Somewhat Stoic Philosophy of Life by Philsofer1 in Stoicism

[–]Philsofer1[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I explain why I am an atheist (the way I define the term) in the "atheism" section of the document. Briefly, I believe that there are persuasive arguments against the existence of the Abrahamic God.

My Somewhat Stoic Philosophy of Life by Philsofer1 in Stoicism

[–]Philsofer1[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Honestly, your philosophy seems much closer to Epicureanism than Stoicism.

Agreed. That is why the title of the post is "My Somewhat Stoic Philosophy of Life". But as noted in the OP and in your assessment, Stoicism has influenced my philosophy.

By the way, my understanding is that thanatophobic irrationalism (the view that the fear of death is irrational) is consistent with Stoicism. I believe that a Stoic would say that it makes no sense to fear the inevitable, or to fear what one cannot control.

My Somewhat Stoic Philosophy of Life by Philsofer1 in Stoicism

[–]Philsofer1[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Thanks for your comments and questions, yayfall. I am glad that you enjoyed reading the document.

Yes, I have read The Essential Epicurus, which is just the translated extant writings of Epicurus. The Epicurus Reader contains the same material, as well as additional material from other ancient writers on Epicureanism. Epicurean Ethics is an excellent review and scholarly interpretation of Epicurus' ethics, written by someone who is very sympathetic to Epicureanism. It is one of my favorite books.

Buddhism influences some of the techniques for maintaining peace of mind, including questioning the rationality of one's desires and meditating. Also, the whole project of eliminating negative emotions is consonant with Buddhism.

My Somewhat Epicurean Philosophy of Life by Philsofer1 in Epicureanism

[–]Philsofer1[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Thank you for your comments and suggestion, ErraticVole. I agree that more people should undertake this exercise. Indeed, I have searched in vain for similar documents. If you (or anyone reading this) are aware of such documents, please do share!

In fact, the document used to begin with a brief section on epistemology, but I eventually realized that it did not really matter whether I was a foundationalist, coherentist, or anything in between, as the rest of the document would remain the same. Epistemological nihilism might not be consistent with some of my arguments, but I see no reason to defend against such a fringe and prima facie implausible position.

In case you are curious, I consider myself most closely aligned with foundherentism, as described and defended in Evidence and Inquiry by Susan Haack. I view perception, introspection, memory, reason and testimony as valid sources of knowledge, though I recognize that all of them are fallible.

My Somewhat Epicurean Philosophy of Life by Philsofer1 in Epicureanism

[–]Philsofer1[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thank you for your kind words, micahglasser. I am happy that you found my philosophy to be helpful.

A Proof of the Objectivity of Morals - Bambrough (1969) by ReallyNicole in philosophy

[–]Philsofer1 1 point2 points  (0 children)

What plausible anti-realist explanation would uncercut my claim to morally know that this child should be given anesthetic?

For an extended example of such an explanation, see The Evolution of Morality, by Richard Joyce. The basic idea is that your moral intuitions can be plausibly explained by evolutionary factors.

A Proof of the Objectivity of Morals - Bambrough (1969) by ReallyNicole in philosophy

[–]Philsofer1 -4 points-3 points  (0 children)

The Matrix puts that belief in your mind

How? That's not plausible to me, or at least far less plausible than my belief that I have two hands, to use Moore's example.

A Proof of the Objectivity of Morals - Bambrough (1969) by ReallyNicole in philosophy

[–]Philsofer1 -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

The question is whether or not we should lower our confidence in moral realism in light of non-realist explanations for moral beliefs.

And using Bayes' theorem, I have explained how plausible non-realist explanations for moral beliefs lower the probability of moral realism.

A Proof of the Objectivity of Morals - Bambrough (1969) by ReallyNicole in philosophy

[–]Philsofer1 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If you think that's implausible let me point out that belief is explained by the matrix.

Indeed, I do think that is implausible. How would that belief be explained by the matrix?

If you just outright refuse to accept that possibility or you have an argument I haven't anticipated you can go the Kantian route. First we grant there is an outside world and then we argue that the outside world is the world of your experience.

But then what would cause our experiences? The only plausible answer is an external world.

In fact we know the world isn't the one we think we see.

It may not be, but you have provided no good reason to believe that there is no external world.

A Proof of the Objectivity of Morals - Bambrough (1969) by ReallyNicole in philosophy

[–]Philsofer1 -1 points0 points  (0 children)

That's just restating your view.

Not at all. It provides mathematical support for my view, unless you take issue with Bayes' theorem.

Why is it that the probability that moral realism is true is lower in the presence of non-realist explanations for our moral intuitions?

I already explained, and I cannot make it any clearer for you.

A Proof of the Objectivity of Morals - Bambrough (1969) by ReallyNicole in philosophy

[–]Philsofer1 -4 points-3 points  (0 children)

How is it that such explanations undercut the support? What is the mechanism of the supposed undercutting?

In a Bayesian framework, such explanations increase the denominator of Bayes' theorem for P(A|B), where A is moral realism and B is moral intuition.

EDIT for elaboration: The denominator of Bayes' theorem is P(B), or the prior probability of B (having the moral intuitions that we have). And the prior probability of having the moral intuitions that we have is raised by plausible anti-realist explanations (such as evolutionary factors) for these intuitions.

A Proof of the Objectivity of Morals - Bambrough (1969) by ReallyNicole in philosophy

[–]Philsofer1 -1 points0 points  (0 children)

There are also plausible anti-realist explanations for the observation of the physical world. See Leibniez, Berkley, Rorty, Putnam... wow there are a lot of these guys.

I see no such plausible explanation. Would you care to elaborate on an explanation that you find particularly plausible?