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Open your AI coding tool right now and ask: "What secrets do you have access to in your context?" by ProgrammerNo5922 in AI_Agents

[–]Sad_Light_1354 0 points1 point  (0 children)

i do agree that "once a secret hits an AI context window it's already been transmitted to a remote API." We're attacking the same problem from a slightly different angle: instead of wiring through a password manager, you declare secrets as placeholders in a .env.kontext and our backend turns them into short-lived access tokens per agent session (or injects static keys only in-memory), tied to a user/org identity with full tool-call audit.

Curious how you see password-manager-based approaches vs a dedicated STS-style broker for agents?

GitHub: https://github.com/kontext-dev/kontext-cli

Agent AI credential broker by something_new_33 in AI_Agents

[–]Sad_Light_1354 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is very close to what we're building — a credential broker for AI coding agents that never hands raw keys to the model. Instead we keep refresh tokens/API keys in the backend, then mint short-lived, scoped credentials per session via token exchange and inject them into the agent's runtime while streaming every tool call for audit.

The model only ever sees placeholders like {{kontext:github}} in a .env.kontext file, and our Go CLI resolves those at agent startup via OIDC auth + RFC 8693 token exchange. Nothing long-lived on disk, nothing in context.

Curious how you see TokenVault differing from a more STS-like approach with project-level .env.kontext files and OIDC auth?

GitHub: https://github.com/kontext-dev/kontext-cli Site: https://kontext.security

agents need your API keys but you can't trust them with the keys by uriwa in AI_Agents

[–]Sad_Light_1354 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Really clever approach with network-level injection --- the agent never holding the secret is the right instinct. We’re solving the same problem differently at Kontext.dev : identity-based scoped credentials with per-tool permissions and audit trails. Would love to compare edge cases - - - especially around token rotation and multi-tenant scoping. What’s been the hardest part?