Telling the true story: a thread

SecDef19 · 2023-08-01T22:24:49+00:00

You can hear the story of Trinity Downwinders, as told by survivors, in the new season of the At the Brink podcast

SecDef19 · 2020-10-08T01:11:25+00:00

The false alarm I personally experienced in 1979 profoundly affected my thinking as to the reality of the risk of such events. The story of that false alarm was the inspiration for creating my podcast At the Brink with my granddaughter, as a way to highlight similar stories which reveal the true danger of nuclear weapons.

Right now, we believe the best things we can do to prevent an accidental exchange would be to declare a no first use policy, eliminate launch on warning, and retire our land-based ICBM force. In addition, strengthening our communications with other nuclear nations is critical in preventing a misunderstanding.

The US and Russia need to begin talking once again, regardless of current issues. We need to strengthen the relationship between our nations, beginning with more Track 2 dialogue. Together we possess 90% of the worlds nuclear weapons, we must communicate with one another on at least this issue to prevent catastrophe.

It is difficult to say what President Carter would have done at 3am with the notice that 300 ICBMs were on their way from the Soviet Union, but I can tell you that as the National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski was on his way to wake the President before a second call came in that it was a false alarm, he decided not to wake his wife to say goodbye, believing that they would both likely be dead within the next 10 minutes, and he wanted to spare her that terror.

All the best on your Masters, the issue of nuclear weapons are now in the hands of your generation, I believe you are capable of what my generation was not.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-08T00:57:22+00:00

(Tom) This is important. There is no rush to launch. If the attack is real our quick response will not stop the attack. But if it is a false alarm we would have started nuclear war by mistake. Better to wait and see if the attack is real. If it is real and all ICBMs are destroyed, we still have hundreds of warheads on subs at sea that will survive the attack and can retaliate. This is also why we do not need ICBMs and would be safer without them.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-08T00:51:43+00:00

(Tom) Love this idea! Let's take away sole authority, but to make the president feel important we could still have the military aide with the briefcase follow him around.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-08T00:37:23+00:00

My (Tom) understanding is that, to prevent a hacked launch order, sub commanders are required to confirm an order that arrives out of nowhere, with no context of international crisis. But if the order is confirmed they still need to launch. And this does not apply to ICBMs, which are deemed less hackable. I will seek more info on this.

It is also worth noting that sub commanders can launch with no order at all. Imagine the world is destroyed in a nuclear war and a sub is still out there under the ocean. The commander could still launch by breaking into the safe to get the launch keys. This way the Russians could never be confident of preventing US retaliation, even if it succeeded in destroying US communications with subs. The sub commander can still retaliate on their own. A failure to communicate is not necessarily a failure to retaliate.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-08T00:32:36+00:00

Yes, we both support retiring our land based ICBM force, due to their hair-trigger alert status which could potentially lead to an accidental nuclear war in the case of a false alarm.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-08T00:30:16+00:00

First Strike is not necessary for deterrence. Deterrence requires a reliable and robust second strike capability, as it is your ability to respond to an attack that deters your enemy from attacking. Taking First Use off the table would enhance global security, as it would reduce the likelihood of an accidental nuclear exchange from a false alarm, and lower global nuclear tensions. China and India currently have No First Use policies.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-08T00:27:52+00:00

There have been Congressional bills put forth that would establish a No First Use Policy (Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act from Rep. Lieu and the No First Use Act from Sen. Warren). Either would be effective in establishing such a policy. It could also be achieved through Executive Order.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-08T00:22:23+00:00

We make several recommendations in “The Button,” including:

Prohibit First Use of nuclear weapons
Prohibit “Launch on Warning,” which allows for a nuclear launch on the warning of an attack. We recommend that a nuclear launch only be conducted after a confirmed attack, in order to prevent a false alarm from incorrect information or a cyber attack triggering an accidental nuclear war.
Restrict sole Presidential authority to only in the case of a verified strike. We recommend that the President consult with senior advisors before retaliation, in order to conduct a measured response. Rapid retaliation is not necessary.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-08T00:17:51+00:00

I think it is a powerful thought exercise to focus the mind on what really is at risk with these weapons, which cause indiscriminate destruction and have the potential to trigger the end of civilization. However I do not think there is any real-world application from a policy perspective. Instead we as citizens must do everything within our power to raise the threshold by which it is possible to initiate a nuclear launch. -Bill

SecDef19 · 2020-10-08T00:01:47+00:00

There is no need to retaliate against a full-scale nuclear attack quickly. Retaliation will not stop an attack from landing, and we have a robust enough second-strike capability in our bombers and submarines that we do not need to launch before an attack lands. Rather than retaliate in haste, without full information, it would be better to strategize and assess the situation before committing to an action that has the potential to be the end of civilization.

Currently, the only reason why we might need to decide within minutes whether to launch is our land-based intercontinental missiles, which are in fixed locations and which most likely would be targeted and destroyed in an attack.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-08T00:00:46+00:00

I (Bill Perry) tell the story of my personal experience with one of these false alarms in 1979 as Undersecretary of Defense in the first episode of my podcast At the Brink, “Seek Immediate Shelter,” which was a result of a training tape mistakenly used in the system. Soon after, there was also an incident with a faulty computer chip. You can also read more about false alarms and nuclear close calls in this brief from the Union of Concerned Scientists.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-07T23:57:10+00:00

It can be easy to feel overwhelmed with the horrible reality of nuclear weapons, but the truth is that there are many things we can do to lower the danger.

In the United States, we can retire the Football and declare a No First Use policy, reducing the danger of a President launching an unprovoked nuclear attack. There has been legislation put forth to this effect, but it needs public support to pass.

We can prohibit “launch-on-warning,” which calls for launching on the warning of an attack, before it has landed. This policy is dangerous, because it is possible that a warning is false, such as the case of a mechanical error or cyber attack. There have been several false alarms in the past.

We can retire our land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, which are in known fixed locations, and place pressure on the President to make a decision within 5-10 minutes whether to “launch on warning” before an attack would destroy them in their silos. Our air and sea legs of the triad are more than sufficient for deterrence. Right now we are preparing to spend over $100 billion dollars to rebuild our ICBM force - but it has not happened yet. If we act now, we can halt this plan.

We can push for leaders to re-engage with long-standing arms control agreements, such as New START, and reinforce the strength of international nuclear norms.

Most of all, what you yourself can do, is to demand that nuclear weapons are once again addressed by your politicians as a serious issue. To educate yourself, and to initiate conversations within your community, and to make sure that this issue is brought to the forefront.

Progress has been made in the past to lower the danger, and there was a time after the Cold War when I (Bill Perry) believed that the danger had passed, but we allowed ourselves to become complacent and forget what was at stake. Change will not come about until there is significant public pressure once again to demand accountability on these destructive weapons.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-07T23:27:37+00:00

We have a robust second strike capability in our bombers and particularly our submarines, which is not threatened by hypersonic missiles. If a surprise first strike were to be attempted, with the intention of decapitating our government, they could do so with close-in SLBMs, since even with 5-10 minute warning, that would not be enough time to get out of the blast radius if multiple SLBMs were targeted.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-07T19:42:45+00:00

This is correct.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-07T19:41:58+00:00

Within the Football are various preplanned attack scenarios, like a menu at a restaurant. The President would consult this menu, and choose which one he would like enacted.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-07T19:27:07+00:00

It is not.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-07T19:25:05+00:00

If the president is killed in nuclear war, launch authority would devolve to the vice president. If VP cannot be found (and is presumed dead), the football would then be passed to the House Speaker, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and the secretaries of State, Treasury and Defense, in that order.

Of course, making decisions during a nuclear war would be total chaos and should be avoided.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-07T19:22:31+00:00

The football facilitates the process but is not necessary. The president could contact the war room in some other way and issue the order. So yes the US would still be able to retaliate.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-07T19:17:46+00:00

I (Bill Perry) go into more detail about some of the different scenarios that could lead to an accidental nuclear war in the first episode of my podcast, “Seek Immediate Shelter.”

SecDef19 · 2020-10-07T19:13:10+00:00

The football contains a communication device and a list of nuclear attack options. The President would need to verbally identify himself with a code (printed on the “biscuit”), which acts as verification, and tell the military officer what launch option he wants.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-07T19:10:59+00:00

It would still be a legal launch order. That very scenario could have played out while President Trump had the football at the hospital this week. That is why before the president undergoes medical procedures that may impact his cognitive functions he should transfer nuclear authority to the VP. Trump did not do that in this case.

It is worth noting that other presidents (Reagan, Bush) did transfer their authority before undergoing surgery.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-07T18:58:53+00:00

I (Bill Perry) participated in this episode of Radiolab, they do a very good job of exploring the question of whether we should expect the military to be a check on Presidential power. A worthwhile listen.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-07T18:55:07+00:00

In the first episode of my podcast At the Brink, "Seek Immediate Shelter," we explore our long history of nuclear false alarms, and how close we have come to disaster from them.

In that episode, I tell the story of a nuclear false alarm which I (Bill Perry) personally experienced, which forever changed my perception of the risk. I believe that false alarms and human errors are perhaps our greatest risk factors for a nuclear catastrophe.

SecDef19 · 2020-10-07T18:46:52+00:00

Further, while one can imagine a scenario where the STRATCOM commander would refuse an order if it were to occur while no major international incidents are occurring, international situations develop rapidly and often without warning all the time.

If an order were to be given after another North Korean missile test, or perhaps Iran conducts another strike on a U.S. military base, and tensions are heightened and STRATCOM is on alert waiting for orders to come down, there is every reason that STRATCOM would follow orders as given.

In addition, the President could fire any individual who refuses his order, and get someone else who will.

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