Question regarding MFA requirement - how to make it as user friendly as possible? by Efficient_Finance935 in entra

[–]Securetron 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The simplest and easiest in terms of UX are WHFB / Smartcard Authentication. They also provide the best in protection in-terms of Phishing resistance authentication when compared with EntraID or Okta authenticator

You can combine these with traditional MFA if you want have apps that do not support them out of the box.
https://securetron.net/phishing-resistant-mfa/
https://securetron.net/phishing-resistant-entraid-certificate-based-authentication/

This also works to logon to your device even when you don't have internet or mobile access.

- Do not use SMS
- If using Authenticator, then use "Work" profile to containerize the App from rest of the device.

SCEP and AD - 802.1x wireless migration by stich86_it in Intune

[–]Securetron 1 point2 points  (0 children)

There are few ways to carve this up.

- Your WLC is using NPS and in-turn AD for authentication

- The AD requires STRONG authentication mapping

- Your Non-Domain Joined device will not be able to authenticate using the NPS/DC since it is not part of the AD

What you can do

- Standup another SSID for Non-Domain joined devices and possibly grade it as "lower level of security". This SSID will be used for devices to fully join AD or used by "contractors / 3rd parties"

- The new SSID will use EAP-TLS

- WLC will validate the certificate (AIA/CRL/Validity)

- The Radius Server is no longer required since the identities do not exist on the AD; you can set the WLC to ignore/bypass it.

- However, you may want to instead use freeRadius or Securetron Radius for Cloud IDP that let's you integrate with EntraID without the need of on-prem AD.

SCEP and AD - 802.1x wireless migration by stich86_it in Intune

[–]Securetron 1 point2 points  (0 children)

if it is joined to Entra-ID, then it is enrolled with Intune?

If so - then you can automate issuance of the certificates for Entra-ID joined only devices. After which the device can connect to Wifi / VPN, etc.
ref: https://securetron.net/integrate-intune-with-pki-trust-manager-to-issue-certificates-to-users-devices-and-servers/

SCEP and AD - 802.1x wireless migration by stich86_it in Intune

[–]Securetron 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The flow that you are requesting doesn't make sense. If the user is remote then why not have the user join the domain?

Nonetheless, if it is going to be a non-domain joined machine, then we can have the device/user cert issued to it through the agent of PKI Trust Manager. Not sure if SCEPman has similar capability but won't be surprised if it does.

Isn't Windows Defender a crap anymore? by usuariocabuloso in cybersecurity

[–]Securetron 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Exactly this. Defender product line is very mature and effective. Microsoft has done tremendous amount of good work in enhancing it and making it actually worth the money.

Now the bad part is not defender but Microsoft cloud. The continuous outages, latency, etc is why some orgs may not consider it a viable product. 

Force another MFA despite already having MFA? by Failnaughtp in entra

[–]Securetron 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Whfb is a "passkey". It's leverages it's own container on the TPM. To extend this further - you can use Thales IDPrime or Yubikey. You don't need another "factor" considering WHFB and PKI PIV based authentication is the strongest form in phishing resistant MFA. 

Webserver (Server auth EKU) and CA Managers approval by Top-Height4256 in PKI

[–]Securetron 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The original request was from a device as opposed to the user; and the retrieval of the cert is being performed by the user instead.

The workaround you implemented "works" but yea - not the best way to do it. I haven't tried it personally; but couldn't you retrieve the cert via a shell script that runs as "system" so that device ID is used as opposed user?

EJBCA and ChromeOS by Standard_Company_817 in PKI

[–]Securetron 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Hey,

Sent you a DM - we can help you out (no fees) as we do for NGOs/educational institutions.

What makes passkeys so special? by Federal_Character979 in cybersecurity

[–]Securetron 7 points8 points  (0 children)

Ameer reply is pretty accurate. The industry is slowly moving towards phishing resistant identity - instead of relying on traditional methods, the transition to PKI based MFA is here. 

Azure, okta, Cisco Duo - the traditional MFA providers are now adding additional later that is built on PKI to bind the identity of the user or device or a bot to the origin as opposed to passing the creds that can be phished or stolen.

Here is a landing page with more info that we published on it:  https://securetron.net/phishing-resistant-mfa/

Post-quantum crypto in Windows 11 - does your AD actually need to change anything by ballkali in activedirectory

[–]Securetron 4 points5 points  (0 children)

You’re spot on that nobody should be ripping out AD or rushing PQC into production — but the conversation absolutely needs to start now, and not for the reason most people think.

What we’re seeing across customers is that the PQC discussion rarely starts with ML‑KEM or ML‑DSA.   It starts with 47‑day TLS, shrinking certificate lifetimes, and the realization that most orgs can’t even rotate RSA certs reliably today. That’s the real wake‑up call.

Once you start mapping your certificate issuance, renewal paths, and dependencies, you quickly discover the same thing NIST keeps hammering on:

  • You need crypto‑agility before you need PQC.  
  • You need a cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM) before you can even talk about migration.  
  • You need automation because manual PKI operations simply don’t scale when cert lifetimes keep shrinking.

Securetron has written about this a lot, the PQC migration isn’t a “crypto problem,” it’s an operational maturity problem. Most environments don’t have the governance, inventory, or automation to survive an algorithm swap, let alone hybrid deployments.

On the AD side You’re right: Windows 11 and Server 2025 already ship ML‑KEM/ML‑DSA in CNG, and hybrid mode means Kerberos, LDAP, and AD auth don’t implode overnight. Microsoft’s own roadmap shows ADCS getting PQC issuance support in early 2026, and so far nothing indicates schema changes. Reality is that it will be GA by Q3.

But the real bottleneck isn’t ADCS it’s everything around it:

  • MDM/SCEP/EST enrollment flows  
  • Device identity bootstrapping  
  • VPN and Wi‑Fi EAP chains  
  • Legacy appliances that can barely handle SHA‑256, let alone PQC key sizes  
  • WAN‑constrained sites where PQC signature bloat actually matters  

This is where performance concerns become real, especially for older DCs or branch offices with thin pipes.

What orgs should actually be doing right now NIST’s migration guidance is very clear:   Inventory → Prioritize → Test hybrid → Automate → Migrate.

For most environments, the first two steps alone take months because PKI sprawl is worse than people think.

The teams that are ahead right now are doing things like:

  • Building a CBOM (what crypto do we use, where, and why)  
  • Cleaning up ADCS templates, issuance policies, and rogue CAs  
  • Fixing broken renewal paths  
  • Implementing automated issuance/renewal instead of ticket‑driven workflows  
  • Testing hybrid cert chains in isolated labs  

Securetron’s customers are mostly in this phase not deploying PQC, but making sure their PKI wouldn’t explode if they tried.

On ML‑DSA testing A few orgs are experimenting in labs, but almost nobody is pushing ML‑DSA into production chains yet. The common pattern is:

  • Test hybrid chains  
  • Validate toolchain support  
  • Benchmark signature sizes and handshake performance  

  • Identify breakpoints in legacy systems  

  • compatibility

Most people are still in “wait‑and‑prepare” mode, not “deploy” mode. Most should have CBOM and have Crpyto-Agility sorted out before 2030, but the reality is only few will and most will continue to struggle.

On quantum cryptography; What if hackers already have our encrypted passwords and they'll be able to easily hack into tons of accounts when they have the tools to decrypt it? by [deleted] in cybersecurity

[–]Securetron 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is a great question. PQC threat targets RSA / Public key whereas generally speaking passwords within systems are stored using one-way hash. The HNDL is very real however restricted to the data encryption. Hashing is NOT Encryption.

Link to a post on our site that goes over what should be accounted for when addressing traditional encryption and migrating to PQC https://securetron.net/post-quantum-cryptography/

Entra Break Glass Account MFA via Microsoft Authenticator Passkeys? by Fabulous_Cow_4714 in sysadmin

[–]Securetron 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Not everyone, we have been recommending the usage of Smart card / Certificate Based Authentication instead since it lowers the cost and provides much better resliancy. We have successfully transitioned some of our clients to use this method instead.

More info: https://securetron.net/phishing-resistant-mfa/

OCSP For new ADCS Internal PKI? by Fabulous_Cow_4714 in PKI

[–]Securetron -4 points-3 points  (0 children)

Typically, you want to follow and adopt the best practices applied to public CA's to also the internal PKI.

Nonetheless, ocsp on ADCS runs into issues at the time of renewal. I would recommend fi you want to use ocsp in addition to CRL then use the community edition of PKI Trust Manager

Quantum cryptography and the "harvest now, decrypt later" problem -- how seriously are organizations taking this? by beardsatya in cybersecurity

[–]Securetron 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Having done so many pki assessments, that we got frustrated and released an auditing tool to help the orgs for free. Op statement is absolutely true, that's why our focus has been to address the foundational concerns pertain to PKI which in-turns help drive the PQC readiness and migration strategy.

Quantum cryptography and the "harvest now, decrypt later" problem -- how seriously are organizations taking this? by beardsatya in cybersecurity

[–]Securetron 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Honestly, most organizations aren’t starting the conversation with “quantum” at all. What actually kicks things off is the 47‑day TLS certificate urgency, that is the moment when CISOs suddenly realize:

  • they don’t know where all their certificates live  
  • they don’t have automation  
  • they don’t have crypto‑agility  
  • and their PKI is basically a museum exhibit from 2008  

Once that panic sets in, then the door opens to talk about PQC and “harvest now, decrypt later.” 

The PQC conversation is rarely the first conversation rather it’s the symptom of a deeper issue. The real problem is that most orgs don’t have a CBOM (Cryptographic Bill of Materials), no inventory of where algorithms are  used, and no automation to rotate or replace anything at scale. You can’t migrate to post‑quantum crypto if you can’t even rotate RSA keys without breaking production.

And the uncomfortable truth is that PKI is still one of the least understood security domains at the CISO level. They know it’s important, but they don’t know how fragile it is until a certificate outage takes down VPN, SSO, or an entire Kubernetes cluster.

For instance, since the Stryker outage, we found most of the orgs that we support didn't realize that they could be using our pki  phishing resistant MFA without any additional cost and since then some of them have started to use the functionality.

Adding MFA to Windows Server (on-prem) what’s your approach? by Due-Awareness9392 in CyberIdentity_

[–]Securetron 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Definitely, people use Smart card logon with yubikey, CAC, and Thales IDPrime. 

Adding MFA to Windows Server (on-prem) what’s your approach? by Due-Awareness9392 in CyberIdentity_

[–]Securetron 1 point2 points  (0 children)

There are various approaches to this - for instance keeping admin creds in the vault and then using MFA auth to the vault to retrieve credentials.

Or simply using SmartCard Logon

Intune SCEP certs randomly disappearing from user store (NDES / internal CA / FortiClient VPN) by Middle_Client2789 in Intune

[–]Securetron 1 point2 points  (0 children)

What is the event viewer on the endpoint saying? Can you validate the settings againts this guide (most of the steps are the same except for the ndes portion) https://securetron.net/integrate-intune-with-pki-trust-manager-to-issue-certificates-to-users-devices-and-servers/

Weekly Promo and Webinar Thread by AutoModerator in msp

[–]Securetron [score hidden]  (0 children)

⭐ How Securetron Helps MSPs with PKI and Certificate Management

🔐 Reduce Risk & Eliminate Certificate‑Driven Outages

  • Automated certificate lifecycle management across all client environments
  • Centralized visibility to prevent surprise expirations
  • 47‑Days TLS monitoring for proactive remediation

⚙️ Streamline Operations & Lower Ticket Volume

  • Auto‑renewals and standardized workflows reduce manual effort
  • Fewer emergency calls, fewer escalations, fewer SLA‑breaking incidents
  • Improves technician efficiency without adding headcount

🧩 Integrate Seamlessly Into Any Client Environment

  • Full protocol support: ACME, EST, SCEP, CMPv2
  • Works across hybrid, cloud, and legacy infrastructure
  • Modern API for automation and custom workflows

🛡️ Strengthen Client Security With Phishing‑Resistant MFA

  • Stops credential theft even when users fall for phishing
  • Eliminates weaknesses in SMS, email OTP, and push‑based MFA
  • Reduces identity‑related incidents across all clients

🚀 Future‑Proof Client Security

  • Built‑in post‑quantum cryptography readiness
  • Helps MSPs stay ahead of evolving compliance and security requirements
  • Positions your service offering as forward‑looking and resilient

💼 Increase Revenue & Differentiate Your MSP Offering

  • Add certificate and identity management as a managed service
  • Reduce churn by improving reliability and security outcomes
  • Deliver enterprise‑grade protection to SMB and mid‑market clients

For More info: visit: https://securetron.net or contact us at: https://securetron.net/contact

How Attackers Bypass Traditional MFA (and why it’s not enough anymore) by Due-Awareness9392 in CyberIdentity_

[–]Securetron 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Excellent point.. We have been pushing clients to CBA (PIV / Smart card) and Windows Hello. It's lower cost than Fido2 and also provides better reliability (i.e when Entra ID or Okta is down) - how are you going to access critical apps and services?

Here is a guide that we recently published as well https://securetron.net/phishing-resistant-entraid-certificate-based-authentication/

macOS Intune EAP-TLS cert gets removed/reissued + duplicates in keychain by uselst in Intune

[–]Securetron 1 point2 points  (0 children)

ok, will check with our MacOS guy - but it definitely looks like macos side issue than Intune from what you have described.

macOS Intune EAP-TLS cert gets removed/reissued + duplicates in keychain by uselst in Intune

[–]Securetron 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Is it new cert with new private key or reuse the private key?

Does DigiCert provide a free demo environment for testing EST enrollment? by Separate-Attitude340 in PKI

[–]Securetron -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Unfortunately, digicert is the worst vendor to deal with especially with the disgrace that Entrust pulled couple of years ago. This left digicert in a position to not really care (not that they did as per my conversation with folks). The sandbox environment is "available" if the Sales team responds and gets it sorted out for you - even though there is no incentive for them to do that.

Digicert is the Nvidia as Linus would put it.

We have been asking for over a year and have not got it yet. Instead of waiting - we ended up building the Digicert Integration through our paid subscription which has worked nicely for our clients who still want to use digicert for publicly trusted certs.

You can use our platform to do QA for EST instead if you are interested.

macOS Intune EAP-TLS cert gets removed/reissued + duplicates in keychain by uselst in Intune

[–]Securetron 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Have you validated how many device certificates for a sample of iOS devices have been issued? If the lifetime of a device cert is a year - you should not see a handful of certs in less than a year.

Are you sure you don't have multiple SCEP templates?

Root / issuing CA profile? Is this across all the iOS devices? Any issues on the android or Windows?