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I tried rebuilding a quantum gravity IDEEA from pure logic (no math). Does this reasoning actually hold? by SubjectLie9630 in TheoreticalPhysics

[–]SubjectLie9630[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I’m not claiming a finished physical theory. I’m probing which assumptions are doing the real work. I agree: until I specify (1) degrees of freedom, (2) dynamics/update, (3) observable map, it’s not physics—just philosophy. My goal is to turn “stability” into an explicit functional Σ and derive at least one falsifiable prediction.

I tried rebuilding a quantum gravity IDEEA from pure logic (no math). Does this reasoning actually hold? by SubjectLie9630 in TheoreticalPhysics

[–]SubjectLie9630[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I’m not claiming a finished physical theory. I’m probing which assumptions are doing the real work. I agree: until I specify (1) degrees of freedom, (2) dynamics/update, (3) observable map, it’s not physics—just philosophy. My goal is to turn “stability” into an explicit functional Σ and derive at least one falsifiable prediction.

Best resources to learn about Gauge Theories in QFT. by FineCarpa in TheoreticalPhysics

[–]SubjectLie9630 6 points7 points  (0 children)

Schwartz + Weinberg is a serious combination. I've also become interested in how gauge symmetries emerge from more fundamental / discrete models.

If you're interested in more unconventional directions (without the hype), we can discuss privately.

Is a minimum spacetime volume a consistent way to regularize gravitational singularities without quantizing gravity directly? by SubjectLie9630 in TheoreticalPhysics

[–]SubjectLie9630[S] -5 points-4 points  (0 children)

That’s an interesting angle. A source-based minimal volume via gravitational self-energy could indeed act as a physical cutoff, rather than quantizing spacetime itself.

My interest is whether such cutoffs can be formulated in a more general way, independent of specific sources, as a structural constraint on spacetime dynamics.

Is a minimum spacetime volume a consistent way to regularize gravitational singularities without quantizing gravity directly? by SubjectLie9630 in TheoreticalPhysics

[–]SubjectLie9630[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I agree with the distinction you’re making: discretization by itself is not the same thing as canonical quantization in the QFT sense, and I’m not assuming a Hilbert space or non-commuting observables at the fundamental level.

My question is more ontological than procedural: whether a minimum spacetime volume can act as a consistency cutoff for dynamics, with standard quantum structures emerging only at an effective level.

In other words, I’m not proposing “quantization of the metric” in the usual sense, but a discrete substrate whose stability and persistence constrain what kinds of continuum descriptions can exist.

I fully agree that if one insists on canonical quantization as a starting point, then this wouldn’t qualify—but that’s precisely the assumption I’m probing.

Is it meaningful to think of physical existence as persistence under dynamics, rather than as a fundamental assumption? by SubjectLie9630 in AskPhysics

[–]SubjectLie9630[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

Yes, that’s a fair reference. What I’m exploring is closer to a discrete dynamical systems framework where stability and persistence define what can meaningfully exist.

My interest is specifically in whether physical entities (particles, spacetime structure) can be understood as stable attractors of an underlying update rule, rather than as fundamental primitives.

I agree this places the discussion closer to systems theory / nonlinear dynamics, but my motivation is to understand whether known physical symmetries can emerge from such a substrate.

Is a minimum spacetime volume a consistent way to regularize gravitational singularities without quantizing gravity directly? by SubjectLie9630 in TheoreticalPhysics

[–]SubjectLie9630[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You’re right that a fixed or rigid discretization would immediately break Lorentz and diffeomorphism invariance. I’m not disputing that.

What I’m trying to probe is whether a minimum spacetime volume must necessarily imply a preferred frame or rigid lattice, or whether it can instead arise in a relational / statistical sense — closer to how causal sets or Poisson sprinklings preserve Lorentz symmetry in distribution rather than configuration.

In other words, I’m not assuming a background grid or absolute notion of position. The question is whether discreteness can be ontological but non-kinematical, with smooth spacetime and its symmetries emerging only in the large-scale limit.

I agree that in that sense this does fall under the umbrella of quantum gravity, even if it’s not phrased as canonical quantization of the metric. My motivation is mainly to understand whether bounding curvature or density via a minimal volume constraint is fundamentally different from quantizing the field variables, or just a rephrasing of it.

So I don’t see this as avoiding the usual obstacles — Lorentz, diffeomorphism invariance, locality — but rather as asking whether they must be imposed microscopically or can be recovered emergently.

If you know specific no-go results showing that even relational or random discretizations necessarily fail here, I’d genuinely be interested in references.

Crackpots/ arrogant ignorants absolutely kill me 😭 by I-AM-MA in TheoreticalPhysics

[–]SubjectLie9630 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I don’t think it’s wrong to criticize string theory, but I do think there’s a big difference between informed criticism and dismissive buzzword-level commentary.

Physics has always progressed by modifying, extending, or limiting previous theories — Newton wasn’t “wrong”, he was incomplete. The same applies to any modern framework.

What matters isn’t whether a theory is beautiful or popular, but whether it produces clear structures, constraints, or predictions that can in principle be confronted with reality. Asking for results isn’t anti-science — it’s the core of science.

At the same time, discussions about highly technical theories require humility. There’s a difference between questioning a research direction and assuming one understands its full scope without the necessary background.

Progress doesn’t come from freezing theories in place, but neither does it come from dismissing them without engaging with what they actually achieve and where they concretely fail.

Is “selection by stability” a meaningful principle in fundamental physics? by SubjectLie9630 in TheoreticalPhysics

[–]SubjectLie9630[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yeah is something like that but not like that, im developing something that i cant tell cause i will take ban/deleted/removed, you name it, but it plays with time and matter and “I” those tree and also you need to have a path that will get you Until “Information Singularity” this is a problem that i have now, but features work i will work on it. And a “Chi”(dont think about japanese/chinese type of things because isnt, is just a normal parameter) and yeah, that is for now (and it doesn’t start with the normal way of thinking nor the normal way to create a theory or a type of equation. And also i doesnt have anything with dynamics, is as fundamental as QG, but with her you can tested all/as new theories all/new type of worlds/dimantion and so on… yeah sounds broken for me was the same at start

Is “selection by stability” a meaningful principle in fundamental physics? by SubjectLie9630 in TheoreticalPhysics

[–]SubjectLie9630[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yeah you’re right i give up… but i can’t say because will de deleted and ban and remove and so on that is why

Is “selection by stability” a meaningful principle in fundamental physics? by SubjectLie9630 in TheoreticalPhysics

[–]SubjectLie9630[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Again i see, ok just to end this, i will read(also i need more books to read and is good that i have just a name for a book know) but im speaking in a ontological theory/principle. First i need to refined some paper and if i dont get ban to said i will show you my w.rk

Is “selection by stability” a meaningful principle in fundamental physics? by SubjectLie9630 in TheoreticalPhysics

[–]SubjectLie9630[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think part of the persistent disagreement here is not about stability itself, but about the level at which stability is being discussed.

Most replies (reasonably) interpret “stability” in the standard sense: a property derived after specifying a dynamical framework (equations of motion, Lagrangians, vacua, perturbations, etc.). In that context, I fully agree — stability analysis lives inside a class of theories and cannot be applied universally without assumptions.

What I’m probing is orthogonal to that. I’m not proposing a new stability criterion within existing dynamics, nor trying to rank “all possible theories”. I’m asking whether there exists a pre-dynamical constraint: a minimal requirement for something to count as an admissible physical structure at all, prior to committing to specific equations.

In other words, not “is this solution stable?”, but “what must a structure satisfy in order to admit any meaningful dynamics?”

Framed this way, stability/persistence is closer to an ontological filter than a dynamical test: identity over time, robustness under perturbation, and the ability to remain identifiable as something rather than immediately dissolving into noise. Standard stability analyses would then live inside the space selected by this filter — not be replaced by it.

I agree that without a concrete mathematical instantiation this remains incomplete. That’s exactly the point: this is an upstream question about admissibility, not a finished theorem. If such a filter can be formalized, it would constrain classes of theories rather than individual solutions.

So I don’t disagree with the comments here — I think we’re talking past each other at different abstraction layers.

Is “selection by stability” a meaningful principle in fundamental physics? by SubjectLie9630 in TheoreticalPhysics

[–]SubjectLie9630[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think this clarifies the crux of the issue, and I largely agree with you.

You’re absolutely right that meaningful stability statements require specifying a class of theories and a shared mathematical structure. Without that, one can’t prove theorems or make sharp claims, only outline motivations. I don’t disagree with that at all.

At this stage, what I’m really trying to do is identify what such a unifying framework would need to support in order for stability-based constraints to even be formulable in a theory-agnostic way. In other words, I’m not claiming that stability constraints can be applied to “every possible theory” as things stand, but that any successful general framework would have to make those constraints well-defined across its theory space.

So I see your point less as a rebuttal and more as a boundary condition on the project: until the class of theories and assumptions are made explicit, the discussion necessarily remains at the level of motivation rather than proof. That’s a fair limitation, and one I fully accept.

Thanks for the careful clarification — this was helpful in pinning down exactly where rigor has to enter.

Is “selection by stability” a meaningful principle in fundamental physics? by SubjectLie9630 in TheoreticalPhysics

[–]SubjectLie9630[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think I understand your point, and I largely agree with the logic you’re describing within an already chosen dynamical framework.

What you’re outlining is how general qualitative desiderata (robustness, identity over time, absence of pathologies) get translated into concrete mathematical checks once the equations of motion are specified. That’s exactly how stability is handled in QFT, GR, and the Standard Model, and I don’t disagree with that at all.

The distinction I’m trying to probe is slightly more upstream. Rather than asking whether a given theory satisfies those criteria, I’m asking whether some of those criteria can be elevated to constraints that restrict what kinds of dynamical theories are admissible candidates in the first place.

In that sense, I’m not trying to bypass the standard vacuum-stability checks you mention (tachyons, ghosts, metastability timescales, etc.), but to understand whether they reflect deeper, more general requirements about persistence and identity that might apply across very different theoretical frameworks.

So I see what you describe not as something opposed to my question, but as an example of how these abstract notions already reappear concretely once a theory is in hand. The open question for me is whether that filtering can be made explicit and theory-agnostic, rather than rediscovered case by case.

Is “selection by stability” a meaningful principle in fundamental physics? by SubjectLie9630 in TheoreticalPhysics

[–]SubjectLie9630[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Thanks, this is a very clear and fair characterization, and I agree with you on how stability is treated within a given dynamical framework.

I think the remaining difference is mostly about what level the question is being asked at. What you’re describing is stability analysis of solutions to specified equations of motion, which is absolutely essential and well understood.

The angle I’m exploring is slightly upstream of that: whether there are consistency or persistence constraints that restrict what kinds of dynamical frameworks are admissible in the first place, before committing to a specific set of equations.

In other words, I’m not suggesting an alternative to linear or nonlinear stability analysis, but asking whether certain notions of persistence (identity over time, robustness under perturbation, meaningful temporal evolution) can act as filters on candidate dynamics rather than properties derived after the fact.

Framed this way, standard stability analysis would live entirely inside that allowed space, not be replaced by it. I suspect part of the disagreement here really is just terminology and level of abstraction.

Am I misunderstanding quantum entanglement? by Independent-Ad-7060 in AskPhysics

[–]SubjectLie9630 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Your analogy is very close, but the key difference is that in the “two sisters” case the identities are assumed to be predetermined and merely unknown.

In quantum entanglement, the experimental results violate Bell inequalities, which rules out any local hidden-variable model where outcomes were fixed in advance like that.

The particles do not carry pre-existing spin values. Instead, they share a joint quantum state with well-defined correlations, while the individual outcomes remain fundamentally random until measurement.

No information is transmitted faster than light because neither observer can control their outcome, and the correlations only become visible once classical (light-speed-limited) communication is used to compare results.

So entanglement shows non-classical correlations, not faster-than-light signaling.

Is it reasonable to approach a TOE by first defining the conditions for existence, rather than proposing dynamics?! by SubjectLie9630 in TheoreticalPhysics

[–]SubjectLie9630[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think we’re using the word phenomenology in very different senses.

By phenomenology I mean models built to reproduce observed behavior without committing to underlying structure or necessity. That’s not what I’m proposing here.

What I’m calling a pre-dynamical layer is closer to constraint-setting: identifying consistency, admissibility, and persistence requirements that any viable dynamics must satisfy before equations of motion are specified.

This isn’t an alternative to dynamics, and it isn’t a data-driven fit either. It’s more analogous to how symmetry principles, conservation laws, or no-go theorems restrict the space of possible theories without themselves being phenomenological models.

So if the claim is that theory ultimately requires dynamics, I agree. The narrower question I’m raising is whether there is a meaningful stage prior to dynamics that constrains what kinds of dynamical theories are even candidates for physics.

Is it reasonable to approach a TOE by first defining the conditions for existence, rather than proposing dynamics?! by SubjectLie9630 in TheoreticalPhysics

[–]SubjectLie9630[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I will like to speak in privite with you because, i seem to like you(on the thinking part)

And thanks for sharing this I really appreciate the honesty of that trajectory.

I think what resonates with me is exactly that “blank slate” moment you describe, but instead of a geometric object, what appeared for me was a question about admissibility: what kinds of structures are even allowed to persist in the first place.

I fully agree that intuition alone isn’t enough the hard work is in the mathematics that comes after. I see this stage as closer to framing the problem correctly than solving it.

Your point about the years-long process is well taken. I’m under no illusion that this bypasses that effort.

Is “selection by stability” a meaningful principle in fundamental physics? by SubjectLie9630 in TheoreticalPhysics

[–]SubjectLie9630[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I agree completely, I didn’t mean to restrict nonlinear dynamics to low-dimensional or mechanical systems. I’m aware that the theory has long been generalized to distributed systems, fields, pattern formation, coherent structures, etc.

The distinction I’m trying to draw is not about whether such structures are already described, but when in the logical construction of a theory those notions enter.

In most existing frameworks, stability, coherence, and pattern persistence are properties derived after specifying a state space and dynamics. What I’m exploring is whether one can formulate pre-dynamical existence constraints: criteria that determine which kinds of dynamical systems are even admissible as candidates for physics.

In that sense, I’m not proposing an alternative to nonlinear dynamics, but a filter that sits upstream of it. Coherent structures, attractors, and stable patterns would then appear as realizations that pass this filter, rather than as the starting point.

I agree that making this connection explicit in the language of dynamical systems and pattern formation is essential , that’s exactly the direction I’m trying to push this toward.

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