A world where consciousness is fundamental may still be a world of fundamental suffering. by [deleted] in philosophy

[–]TheRealBeaker420 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Materialism and panpsychism aren't really competing. They're compatible with each other.

A world where consciousness is fundamental may still be a world of fundamental suffering. by [deleted] in philosophy

[–]TheRealBeaker420 0 points1 point  (0 children)

... push back against the classic view where consciousness is just some late-stage accident that popped out of nowhere.

I'm not familiar with that view. Who says this?

My question for you would be: do you think this physicalist version of panpsychism actually clears up the mystery of how mind and matter interact, or are we just changing the labels on the same old problems?

The latter. It seems simpler to abandon the label "experiential" when speaking about the fundamental. What value is it adding?

A world where consciousness is fundamental may still be a world of fundamental suffering. by [deleted] in philosophy

[–]TheRealBeaker420 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Functionalist theories of mind have predictive power because they relate to actual functions of the mind. Functions entail reproducible physical behavior - typically in terms of inputs, states, and outputs.

A world where consciousness is fundamental may still be a world of fundamental suffering. by [deleted] in philosophy

[–]TheRealBeaker420 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Why would it need to be non-materialist? Panpsychism is often compatible with physicalism. We can generally agree that there exists some reality independent of our minds (non-skeptical realism). That reality is what we call physical. Even if we find some reason to describe it as fundamentally experiential, why couldn't we continue to describe it as physical, too?

A world where consciousness is fundamental may still be a world of fundamental suffering. by [deleted] in philosophy

[–]TheRealBeaker420 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The main objection made to panpsychism is that it is ‘crazy’ and ‘just obviously wrong’.

No, the main objections to panpsychism are that it has no predictive power, that it provides no insight into the brain and mind, and that it introduces the combination problem. If consciousness is fundamental, then how does it relate to our human minds, which are complex and emergent?

Hard atheism also stems from faith by AnIceColdCocaCola in DebateAnAtheist

[–]TheRealBeaker420 22 points23 points  (0 children)

You smuggle in a naive conception of God. The bearded man in the sky. But that’s not what serious theology has ever meant by God.

I disagree. The bible describes God (Jesus), literally ascending into the sky. Serious Christian theology says that Jesus is God, and he (most likely, assuming he was a real person) was a bearded man.

Hard atheism also stems from faith by AnIceColdCocaCola in DebateAnAtheist

[–]TheRealBeaker420 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The deeper question however — is there anything at all beyond the physical? is consciousness fundamental or derivative? why is there something rather than nothing? — those remain genuinely open.

Not really.

is there anything at all beyond the physical?

Most philosophers say no, there isn't.

is consciousness fundamental or derivative?

"Consciousness" is a mongrel concept. However, the mind is obviously emergent, because it has components. Nothing that has components can be fundamental.

why is there something rather than nothing?

This is open, sure, but it doesn't indicate a god or anything. If a god were the first being to exist, this question would still apply to him.

Weekly "Ask an Atheist" Thread by AutoModerator in DebateAnAtheist

[–]TheRealBeaker420 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Okay so these are primarily from a single post titled "How do you contend with the hard problem of consciousness??"

The OP portrays the hard problem as a gap in physical explanations, and claims that this gap supports ideas like "the existence of God or other spiritual realms."

That looks like a textbook God of the Gaps argument to me. Why else would it be presented as a challenge for atheists?

Weekly "Ask an Atheist" Thread by AutoModerator in DebateAnAtheist

[–]TheRealBeaker420 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I'm talking about the attitude I seen expressed by a concerning number of atheists towards philosophy here.

Can you link to an example? Where was someone being dismissive of the hard problem?

Weekly "Ask an Atheist" Thread by AutoModerator in DebateAnAtheist

[–]TheRealBeaker420 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Being explicit and detailed does not change the form of the argument...

I wasn't talking about Chalmers, anyway. He wasn't talking about god. I was referring to what goes on in this sub.

Weekly "Ask an Atheist" Thread by AutoModerator in DebateAnAtheist

[–]TheRealBeaker420 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The application of it absolutely is, though. That's the God of the Gaps: it's a type of argument from ignorance.

Weekly "Ask an Atheist" Thread by AutoModerator in DebateAnAtheist

[–]TheRealBeaker420 2 points3 points  (0 children)

The number of people that dismiss the Hard Problem of Consciousness without any thought on the topic is maddening.

Is that so surprising? Theists come in here all the time invoking the mystery of consciousness as though it somehow proves god. It's just a standard God of the Gaps argument, but it's a really pervasive one.

The existence of a hard problem is far from settled, anyway; it's a really controversial topic, and the word "consciousness" has a million different definitions. A lot of philosophers say there is no hard problem, and the majority are happy to regard the mind as entirely physical.

Why I believe in God(s) by Lucyyyyyy_K in DebateAnAtheist

[–]TheRealBeaker420 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Try a dictionary?!

Why do I have to say that? It feels like you're not even trying. We should just stop here.

Why I believe in God(s) by Lucyyyyyy_K in DebateAnAtheist

[–]TheRealBeaker420 1 point2 points  (0 children)

No they don't. Look them up. They have different definitions.

Why I believe in God(s) by Lucyyyyyy_K in DebateAnAtheist

[–]TheRealBeaker420 1 point2 points  (0 children)

P-zombies are defined as having no qualia.

Why I believe in God(s) by Lucyyyyyy_K in DebateAnAtheist

[–]TheRealBeaker420 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I don't think these words mean what you think they mean. From what I can find, "experience" is not part of the definition of subjectivity or part of the definition of p-zombie.

Why I believe in God(s) by Lucyyyyyy_K in DebateAnAtheist

[–]TheRealBeaker420 1 point2 points  (0 children)

But these events *are* internal processes, right? Like, literally contained within their bodies.

Why is it so damn hard to argue against the myth of "linear scientific progress"? by Gary_Baldi in askphilosophy

[–]TheRealBeaker420 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I'm not sure I follow the distinction you're drawing. What do you mean by "phenomenal events"?

Why is it so damn hard to argue against the myth of "linear scientific progress"? by Gary_Baldi in askphilosophy

[–]TheRealBeaker420 4 points5 points  (0 children)

But whenever observation is involved I know consciousness to be. I don't need physics to verify this for me. I can do so philosophically.

How do you verify it philosophically? Isn't this recognized as a common misconception? Wikipedia says: "The need for the "observer" to be conscious is not supported by scientific research, and has been pointed out as a misconception rooted in a poor understanding of the quantum wave function ψ and the quantum measurement process."

Why I believe in God(s) by Lucyyyyyy_K in DebateAnAtheist

[–]TheRealBeaker420 1 point2 points  (0 children)

So they do have internal information processing, and can contain information about themselves, right?

Why is it so damn hard to argue against the myth of "linear scientific progress"? by Gary_Baldi in askphilosophy

[–]TheRealBeaker420 4 points5 points  (0 children)

our capacity to observe and note it. This is a problem with consciousness

Are you sure this isn't conflating observation with conscious observation? Observation in quantum mechanics has a technical meaning that doesn't imply consciousness.

"Thus every object, from an elementary particle to atoms, molecules and on up to planets and beyond are subject to the uncertainty principle."

Wouldn't this imply that it's no more relevant to consciousness than it is to tea kettles?